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Abstract 
Abuses of power within certain religious communities have become a matter of 
public concern in recent decades. Less well known are the stories of people within 
local Christian communities who experience practices of religious authority which 
do not make headlines, but which nonetheless diminish the possibilities of their 
lives. Feminist analyses have highlighted the historical, cultural, and theological 
roots of the oppression of women in Christian communities, but work remains to 
be done on understanding how other subjugating practices, which oppress women 
and men, and resistance to such practices, are produced in religious contexts. 
This study asks (1) how it is that regimes of power and knowledge can subvert the 
call to freedom and justice which is pervasive in longstanding streams of Christian 
tradition, and (2) what has enabled some people to resist the practices of religious 
authority constructed by such regimes. In responding to these questions this thesis 
adopts a poststructuralist conceptual framework, drawing particularly on 
Foucault’s theorisation of knowledge, power, and subjectivity. In addition to 
Foucauldian ideas, poststructuralist feminist discussions of human agency, and 
Sampson’s (1993) notion of monologic and dialogic power relations, strongly 
influence the theoretical and ethical stance of this study. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with nine people, from a variety of 
Christian communities within New Zealand, who at some time had found it 
necessary to resist everyday practices of religious authority within their contexts. 
The interviews focused on their accounts of the subjugating practices they had 
encountered, the effects of those practices on their lives, and their acts of 
resistance. 
A discursive approach to narrative analysis was developed and applied to 
transcriptions of these interviews. This analysis identified a range of discursive 
technologies which had contributed to the subjugation of the participants and 
protected the hegemony of discourses which supported subjugating practices. 
This study concludes that (1) monologic power relations within religious 
communities are a primary indicator of problematic discourses and practices of 
authority; (2) the “Man of God” discourse and its variants inevitably subvert 
freedom and justice; (3) sexual abuse by religious leaders belongs to a spectrum 
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of discursively produced entitlement practices; (4) the embodied effects of 
subjugation bear witness to ethical hopes and intentions, and are instrumental in 
producing resistance; and (5) repeated exposure to a range of religious texts and 
rituals both supports and subverts people’s subjectification within the dominant 
discourses of a religious community. 
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1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In the Bible, prophets and teachers repeatedly contend with their religion’s failures 
and false claims. . . . Jesus challenged the Temple authorities who oppressed his 
people: “You have made my father’s house a den of thieves!” Judaism and 
Christianity claim that life is good and that there is an author of life who wants our 
freedom and joy. Our religious heritage gives us the imperative to confront it when 
it fails to foster life or advocate for justice. (Brock & Parker, 2001, p. 9) 
 
This thesis is born of a concern I have held for some years about practices of 
authority within some Christian communities, namely practices which “fail to 
foster life” and which subvert, rather than advocate for, justice. It engages with 
narratives produced through interviews with nine people, each of whom had a 
story to tell of their resistance to such practices within their own religious 
communities.  
  
1.1 Beginnings 
Within the complex and contradictory history of Christianity, some voices have 
called for a denial of this life in favour of the next, while others, echoed above, 
have affirmed the goodness of life in this world and the importance of pursuing 
freedom and justice in the here and now. Almost exactly fifty years ago, at the 
time of writing, Martin Luther King Junior added his voice to the latter group in 
his famous address at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. There King 
drew on biblical imagery, together with the espoused founding principles of his 
nation, to outline his dream and support his call for freedom, justice and a place 
“at the table” for his people and for “all of God’s children” (Collins & Young, 
1999, pp. 402-403). 
The problem addressed in this thesis is by no means on a par with the 
political struggle epitomised by King’s life and death. But my rationale for 
engaging in this study does share common ground with his speech, including its 
call for freedom and justice,1 and its biblical allusions. Like Brock and Parker, the 
feminist theologians cited above, I undertake this project with the conviction that 
                                                 
1
 What I mean by the terms “freedom” and “justice” is clarified briefly in section 1.3 below, and is 
outlined in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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embedded within my religious heritage, which I own as Christian, is a call to take 
action when it, or any other rationality, is used to support oppression, injustice, or 
exclusion. 
In my present work as a lecturer in spirituality in an inter-denominational 
theological college, and as a spiritual director (operating in a private capacity), I 
experience disappointment and anger when I hear people describe how the 
accomplishment of their lives has been constrained or disrupted by practices of 
religious authority in the very communities where they had hoped to find 
acceptance, respect and support. I use the term “authority” broadly in Weber’s 
sense, as referring to the kind of power which is exercised by one person or group 
over another, and is legitimised by a principle held to be binding on those over 
whom power is exercised (Kronman, 1983). Rather than focusing on particular 
classifications or structural features of authority, however, my interest is in the 
way authority itself is produced within religious settings by particular ideas or 
beliefs. In particular, the stories I have heard in the course of my work have raised 
questions for me as to how it is that authority comes to be constructed and 
exercised in ways that result in the subversion of freedom and justice, when 
ethical imperatives to uphold freedom and justice pervade Jewish and Christian 
traditions. I name this question, not as someone outside of the religious systems in 
which people encounter these difficulties, but as a privileged insider whose own 
assumptions and practices with regard to authority need to be interrogated.  
As much as I am concerned to pursue the question of what it is that 
produces oppressive practices of religious authority, I am equally intrigued by the 
presence of hope and defiance in the stories I have heard. Martin Luther King 
Junior spoke of a kind of hope and faith that supports people “to work together, to 
pray together, to struggle together, to go to jail together, to stand up for freedom 
together” (Collins et al., 1999, p. 403). In undertaking my research, therefore, I 
sought out people who had stories to tell of their own resistance to oppressive 
forms of religious authority. This thesis presents my engagement with the stories 
of nine such people who, in different ways, all found themselves needing to 
trouble what was being taken for granted in their communities in relation to 
religious authority. As I interviewed them, each person generously offered an 
account of their ethical hopes and intentions for their life in community, their 
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experiences of subjugating practices of authority, and their resistance to these 
practices. 
 
1.2 The research questions 
Motivated by the concerns outlined above, and influenced by theoretical ideas 
discussed in the next section, I approach this study with two main research 
questions in view: 
i Within Christian communities, how is it that some regimes of power and 
knowledge can subvert the call to freedom and justice which is pervasive in 
longstanding streams of Christian tradition? 
ii What has enabled some people to resist the practices of religious authority 
constructed by such regimes?  
These questions could be addressed in a variety of ways, and I briefly outline my 
own approach in the next three sections. In section 1.3, I introduce some of the 
theoretical ideas that form the conceptual framework for the project. In section 
1.4, I describe the methodology which underpins my work with the participants’ 
stories, namely discursive narrative analysis. In section 1.5, I provide an overview 
of the structure of this thesis document.  
 
1.3 Theoretical framework 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed elaboration of the theoretical and ethical 
frameworks within which I have pursued my research, but a sketch of key ideas is 
provided here. Chapter 2 reviews other approaches which have been taken to the 
issue of problematic expressions of religious authority, and offers a rationale for 
adopting the ideas introduced here. 
 
Power, knowledge and Foucault 
In 2001, I enrolled in a postgraduate diploma in narrative therapy (Monk, 
Winslade, Crocket, & Epston, 1997) at the University of Waikato, New Zealand.  
This marked my first serious encounter with poststructuralist ideas, including 
Foucault’s (1965, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1977a, 1978, 1982; Foucault & Gordon, 
1980; Foucault & Martin, 1988) compelling account of the ways in which power 
operates within social systems. As I wrestled with Foucault’s ideas, I was struck 
by their potential usefulness for addressing my perplexity concerning the practice 
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of governmentality within some Christian communities (Dean, 1999; Hodgson, 
2009). I was also intrigued by the way he used features of the pastoral relationship 
to illustrate the production of self-government (Foucault, 1982; Hook, 2003).  
Foucault’s analytics of power suggested a way to transcend pathologising 
discussions of the misuse of religious authority, in which people are analysed in 
terms of personal deficits, or categorised in the language of “perpetrator” and 
“victim.” In Chapter 2, I offer a brief discursive history of approaches to the 
problem of oppressive practices of religious authority, including those that take a 
pathologising approach. Rather than locating the abuse of power within 
individuals, in psychological or spiritual terms, Foucault’s power-knowledge 
theorisation invited consideration of the ways in which the operations of power 
and authority in religious communities are constructed at the level of language 
and dominant discourses. 
Given its use in the previous sentence, I need briefly to define what is meant 
by the term “discourse,” pending a more detailed discussion in Chapter 3 (section 
3.1). Burr (2003) offers an accessible description of discourse which will suffice 
in the meantime: 
A discourse refers to a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, 
statements and so on that in some way together produce a particular version of 
events. It refers to a particular picture that is painted of an event, person or class of 
persons, a particular way of representing it in a certain light. If we accept the view  
. . . that a multitude of alternative versions of events are potentially available 
through language, this means that, surrounding any one object, event, person etc. 
there may be a variety of different discourses, each with a different story to tell 
about the object in question, a different way of representing it to the world. (p. 64) 
So, for example, I refer above to a variety of ways in which people might make 
meaning of a Christian leader’s abuse of power and position. As each person or 
group gives their “particular version of events,” different discourses are 
dominating the process of making meaning—psychological theories, theological 
beliefs, philosophical ideas, and so on. Hence I refer to the “discursive history of 
approaches” which I intend to present in the next chapter of this study. 
 
The problem of agency 
Alongside the promise of new insights, my encounters with Foucault left me with 
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a question as to where human agency—the notion of a choosing human subject—
fitted, if at all, in poststructuralist accounts of personhood. In listening to people 
describe their encounters with oppressive practices of religious authority, I had 
been struck by the agentic ways they had eventually managed to challenge, 
question or leave these situations. Reflecting on how to account for these 
examples of agency and resistance, given Foucault’s power/knowledge analysis, 
eventually gave rise to my second research question.  
In grappling with the social dimensions of power and this question of 
agency, I have found the work of several feminist poststructuralists (Burman, 
1996; Butler, 1992, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2004; Butler & Scott, 1992a, 1992b; 
Davies, 1991, 1994, 2004; Davies, Browne, Gannon, Honan, Laws et al., 2004; 
Davies, Browne, Gannon, Hopkins, McCann et al., 2006; Davies & Davies, 2007; 
Davies, Dormer, Gannon, Laws, Rocco et al., 2001; Davies, Flemmen, Gannon, 
Laws, & Watson, 2002; Davies & Harré, 1990, 1999; Drewery, 2005; Drewery & 
McKenzie, 1999; Drewery & Monk, 1994; Drewery & Winslade, 1997; Hollway, 
1989, 2006; Weedon, 1997) to be especially useful. When I first considered how 
to approach this project, I was aware that many people in the Western social 
context might answer my question about the possibility of resistance in terms of a 
humanist understanding of personhood and agency. The heroic struggle to 
discover and assert one’s “true self” is a taken-for-granted narrative, woven firmly 
into our social fabric. As Davies (1991) has argued, however, such an account 
fails to reckon on the inherently social nature of persons “as beings discursively 
produced by their times,” even in their attempts to be “authentic” individuals (p. 
42). On the other hand, while strongly rejecting the humanist paradigm, Davies 
resists the hopelessness that accompanies purely deterministic accounts of 
personhood, in which agency is an illusion and resistance is merely an effect of 
power. Agency, she suggests, is derived not from “the essence of the person in 
question but from the positions available to them within the discourses through 
which they take up their being” (p. 52). 
I explore these and other ideas about agency, and its relationship to 
resistance, in Chapter 3 (section 3.3). The theorisations reviewed there inform my 
analysis of the interview narratives, and are drawn on again in the main discussion 
chapter (section 8.3). 
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Poststructuralism and Christian faith 
Before concluding this brief introduction to the poststructuralist ideas taken up in 
this project, I want to acknowledge the challenge they pose for Christians—like 
myself—who have experienced lifelong immersion in environments where 
notions of absolute truth and a true self are taken for granted. I was brought up in 
a Presbyterian family, and in young adulthood attended a variety of theologically 
conservative churches. (Presently I am a non-ordained member of an Anglican 
church.) My own approaches to truth and epistemology were certainly tested and 
reshaped by my engagement with the social constructionist epistemology which 
underpins narrative therapy. The critical stance adopted by poststructuralists 
toward all taken-for-granted knowledge, and their rejection of notions of 
knowable objective realities, directly challenge religious beliefs according to 
which a divine being has revealed truths which are absolute, that is, true 
independently of their historical and cultural production. Equally problematic for 
some Christians’ notion of truth is the poststructuralist assertion that the very 
language in which such truths are expressed does not describe pre-existing 
objective realities, but is a form of social interaction which constructs our 
knowledge of the world and ourselves. Some Christians also hold essentialist 
notions of personhood, according to which each individual has a unique God-
given identity and purpose. Such ideas are congruent with (and, I suspect, 
influenced by) the humanist paradigm, but at odds with poststructuralist accounts 
of identity as fluid, contradictory and socially constructed. 
This is not the place for a comprehensive discussion of the relationship 
between poststructuralist and religious viewpoints, and such viewpoints are in 
themselves complex and varied. Briefly, however, I want to indicate how I 
position myself epistemologically and ethically, as a Christian who appreciates 
the critical power of poststructuralist ideas. I see this as important not simply on 
behalf of transparently declaring my positioning as a researcher, but because both 
epistemology and ethics emerge as key issues of concern in my analysis of the 
participants’ narratives. 
In a discussion of discourse and realism, Parker (1992, pp. 28-34) suggests 
that things may be thought of from the point of view of three possible object 
statuses: ontological, epistemological, and moral or political. Things in the 
ontological realm—bodily aspects which form the material basis for thought, as 
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well as the physical and social environments that structure our lives—are taken to 
exist independently of human thought processes and language. However, no direct 
knowledge of, or talk about, such things outside of discourse is possible, because 
all thought involves a constructive process. This is what Parker means by the 
epistemological status of things. Some things may further be attributed a moral or 
political object status. This granting of moral or political status is constructed by 
discourse, but through language it may be afforded a reality which can affect the 
lives of people (attributions of various categories of mental illness, or 
intelligence, or employability, for example). When such discursively constructed 
moral or political categories are treated as if they have ontological status, the 
effects for those to whom such categories are attributed can be oppressive. 
In taking up this perspective, Parker (1992) aligns himself with “critical 
realism,” as opposed to what he describes as “the most rabid anti-realist” forms of 
poststructuralism (pp. 36, 41). He argues that a thorough-going anti-realist stance 
undermines the possibilities of engaging in historical analysis of the development 
of discourses, and of confronting and transforming social structures. On the other 
hand, for Parker, taking account of the existence of social structures “outside 
sense” supports these possibilities. 
This model of social structure, then, is one in which people are unaware much of 
the time of the conditions in which they act. However, the realist view does not 
explain away the activities of individuals as active agents, dissolving them into sets 
of biologically based or conditioned behaviours or as subject positions in discourse. 
. . . Because of the existence of society as something that stands always already 
there in relation to persons, it is not possible to say that we create society, rather we 
must either reproduce or transform it. (p. 37; emphasis in the original) 
I find Parker’s ontological, epistemological, and moral/political distinctions 
helpful in articulating my own positioning. I stand with a religious tradition which 
ascribes ontological status to a divine reality, or divine relationality, usually 
referred to as “God.”2 This, in the language of my tradition, is a stance of faith. 
Epistemologically, however, I join with longstanding Christian traditions which 
accept that no direct knowledge of the mystery called God is possible. Stockton 
(1992), writing as a poststructuralist feminist with a Master of Divinity degree, 
                                                 
2
 For the sake of simplicity, I mostly use the term “God” whenever reference to deity is being 
made in this thesis, rather than “my god,” “her god,” “their god,” etc. No hegemonic definition or 
universally agreed meaning is implied. 
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acknowledges that it may seem strange to many that “Judeo-Christian people of 
the Book can be linked to the failure of human meaning and to discourse on what 
exceeds human sign systems” (p. 118). In addressing this apparent contradiction, 
she points to the opacity of some of the biblical texts which speak of God or 
Jesus, suggesting that “these revelations purposefully and divinely cause human 
meanings to fail their familiar transparencies in order to open up some meaning 
that can only appear as discourse in excess of established discourse” (p. 118). 
Poststructuralist ideas, together with theological traditions of “unknowing,” 
invite me toward epistemological humility. I take up this stance for three reasons. 
Philosophically, I find social constructionist theorisations of language and 
meaning-making compelling. Ethically, the theological heritage with which I 
identify privileges the call to compassion and justice above the claim to 
knowledge and certainty. Experientially, I have witnessed the damaging effects 
of epistemologies of absolute certainty when they have supported practices of 
entitlement and control, sometimes in the name of God, and left hegemonic 
structures and strategies unchallenged. This last point is at the heart of the 
findings of this thesis, and illustrates Parker’s argument regarding the oppressive 
effects which may be produced when certain moral or political (or theological) 
attributions are regarded as beyond question. 
Questions are sometimes also raised as to the possibility of taking up an 
ethical position within a poststructuralist philosophical framework. Some ethicists 
maintain that poststructuralism is logically incompatible with a foundationalist 
basis for universal ethical norms (Popke, 2003). Others nonetheless undertake 
their work with commitment to an ethical position, such as justice (Derrida & 
Caputo, 1997), or responsibility to the other (Levinas, 1999), which is taken as a 
given. I observe that the critical power of poststructuralist theorisation is 
frequently exercised on behalf of a clear ethical intention, whether in relation to 
feminism, psychology, counselling, education, health care, criminology, the 
workplace, or other domains. For those who pursue such projects, Parker’s 
emphasis on the material effects of oppressive social structures which require 
critique and transformation appears tacitly to be assumed. In my case, to regard 
the stories I have heard about the oppressive effects of certain practices of 
religious authority as socially constructed narratives does not alter my conviction 
that there churches where such events occur and diminish people’s lives. Nor does 
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it undermine my ethical commitment to work for change in such situations, on 
behalf of freedom and justice. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I outline in more detail the ways in which I see my 
ethical stance in this project as joining not only with religious imperatives to 
pursue freedom and justice, such as those that guided Martin Luther King Junior, 
but also with ethical intentions reflected in the deconstructive work of 
poststructuralists such as Foucault (1988) and Derrida (1997). In those chapters I 
also acknowledge the influence of Sampson’s (1993, 1998, 2003) work on 
monologic and dialogic power relations, and of Levinas’ (1999) ethic of 
unconditional responsibility to the other, on the development and articulation of 
my theoretical and ethical stance in this study. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
The participants in this study were selected from people who responded to an 
information sheet (Appendix 1) which I had distributed to counsellors and 
spiritual directors. The main criteria for selection were that they should have a 
story of their own resistance to religious authority to tell, and that the events 
which they would describe should have occurred at least twelve months 
previously (to lessen the risk of re-traumatisation). What follows is a brief outline 
of the main concepts which underpin my approach to analysis. The methodology I 
adopt in my engagement with the nine stories of the participants in this project is 
outlined in detail in Chapter 4, and described only briefly here. 
I refer to this methodology as discursive narrative analysis. By narrative, I 
mean talk (whether spoken or written) which has the intention of telling about life 
and events. In particular, I view narrative as a means by which people give 
structure and meaning to their lives and identities (Riessman, 1993; Sparkes, 
2005). My interviews with the participants were intended to provide an 
opportunity for them to engage in this process of structuring and meaning-making 
in relation to their experiences of resistance to religious authority. The interviews 
were recorded and then represented in the form of typed transcripts, and this 
constitutes the data for my analysis. 
I offer the results of this analysis in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, where I re-present 
sections of the participants’ stories and engage in discourse analysis with my two 
research questions in mind (hence the term discursive narrative analysis). This is 
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not a socio-linguistic/conversational form of discourse analysis (Georgakopoulou, 
2007; Moissinac, 2007; Polanyi, 1985), but a study of the participants’ narratives 
as effects of particular discursive contexts (including but not limited to the 
religious communities they describe). At the same time, in re-presenting those 
aspects of the interview narratives in which discursive influences are especially 
apparent, I attempt to bring forward the narrators’ own voices and to preserve a 
sense of how they have imparted order and meaning to their stories. I regard this 
as a strategy for contributing to processes of change within Christian 
communities. While realising that any ethical aspirations pursued in a doctoral 
project need to be modest, and secondary to its contribution to academic 
knowledge, I stand with Lincoln (2005) in her call for research in the social 
sciences to show commitment to “social purpose and social justice” (p. 26). 
Bringing narrative analysis and discourse analysis together in this way is not 
a common approach in qualitative research, although it is certainly not unknown 
(Chase, 2003; Peterson & Langellier, 2006; Riessman, 2002, 2003; Smith & 
Sparkes, 2008; Sparkes & Smith, 2007; Taylor, 2005, 2007). In Chapter 4, I 
provide an extended discussion of the strengths and potential pitfalls of this 
approach, acknowledging the concerns of some poststructuralist writers that a 
focus on personal stories may overwhelm the social and political scope of 
discourse analysis and default to humanistic paradigms of subjectivity (Fish, 
1993; Hook, 2001, 2005). Mindful of these concerns, I turn to discourse analysis 
in the hope of shining a light on the ways in which powerful ideas about religious 
authority may circulate and position people within Christian communities, and of 
opening space for people in those communities to reconsider and resist such ideas. 
The research design by which I implement this methodology is also 
explained in detail in Chapter 4. There I identify particular areas of my chosen 
approach which required reflexive checking throughout the research process. I 
also name other areas for reflexive awareness, such as my own positioning in 
relation to the participants as a Pākēha heterosexual male who holds a privileged 
position of responsibility in a Christian ministry training context. 
 
1.5 Overview of thesis structure 
Chapter 2 offers a brief discursive review of various ways in which people have 
tried to understand and address situations in which religious authority is used with 
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harmful effects. I draw on feminist perspectives which highlight some of the 
shortcomings of the other approaches surveyed, and argue the benefits of applying 
a poststructuralist analysis to local stories of resistance to religious authority. 
Chapter 3 sets out the theoretical and ethical orientation of this project, 
elaborating on ideas which are introduced in the first two chapters. These ideas 
include poststructuralist notions of discourse, power and subjectivity, the 
discursive production of subjectivity, the possibility of human agency, and the 
relationship of agency to resistance. The final section of the chapter proposes that 
freedom and justice, as they relate to the issues addressed in this project, may best 
be thought of in terms of a dialogic ethic for relationship. 
Chapter 4 presents the methodology—discursive narrative analysis—and the 
research design adopted in this project. The challenges of combining narrative and 
discursive approaches to analysis are acknowledged and addressed. The 
participants are introduced, details of the research method are described, and 
strategies for attending to issues of reflexivity and validity in the research are 
outlined. 
In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, the results of applying discursive narrative analysis 
to transcripts of interviews with the participants are presented. Sections of each 
participant’s story are re-presented, together with tentative analyses of the 
discursive construction of the practices of authority and acts of resistance 
described in those sections. Each of these chapters concludes by summarising 
points of interest to be taken up in the detailed theoretical discussion undertaken 
in Chapter 8. 
In Chapter 8, the analyses of Chapters 5, 6 and 7, and the theory of Chapter 
3, are drawn together in a discussion of what this project has shown in relation to 
the two research questions with which I began. I begin with a reflexive review of 
certain assumptions which, my analysis revealed, I had brought to this project. I 
then outline and theorise several discursive technologies of subjugation and 
hegemony which became evident through my analysis. The third main section 
offers theoretical reflections on the production of resistance as described by the 
participants, drawing both on Foucauldian understandings of the micro-politics of 
power and more the expansive notions of the “body without organs” and “lines of 
flight” in the work of Deleuze (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Deleuze & Parnet, 
1987).  
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The thesis concludes in Chapter 9 with brief reflections on the strengths and 
limitations of my research design, and a summary of the main contributions of this 
study.
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Chapter 2: 
Problematic practices of religious authority:  
pre-modern, modernist, and feminist perspectives 
 
In the previous chapter, I introduced this project with reference to my own story 
and the stories I have heard people tell about the effects on them of certain ideas 
and practices of religious authority. This gave rise to my first research question: 
“Within Christian communities, how is it that some regimes of power and 
knowledge can subvert the call to freedom and justice which is pervasive in 
longstanding streams of Christian tradition?” This question is only one expression 
of a concern that many people have felt, throughout the history of religion, in 
relation to the abuse of power and position. Some 2,600 years ago a Hebrew 
prophet lamented the way in which “the shepherds of Israel” were abusing the 
privileges of leadership: 
You eat the fat, you clothe yourselves with the wool, you slaughter the fatlings; but 
you do not feed the sheep. You have not strengthened the weak, you have not 
healed the sick, you have not bound up the injured, you have not brought back the 
strayed, you have not sought the lost, but with force and harshness you have ruled 
them. (Ezekiel 34:3–4, New Revised Standard Version) 
Similar accusations continue to be levelled at some religious leaders in the 21st 
century. The media in the New Zealand context are quick to highlight situations in 
which Christian leaders appear to be enjoying excessively wealthy lifestyles at the 
expense of their less wealthy church members. Sexual abuse of children and other 
vulnerable people in the care of Christian clergy and caregivers has emerged as 
another area of public concern over the last three decades. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive survey of 
the many and varied ways in which religious authority has functioned within a 
multitude of church structures over two millennia of Christian history. My 
intention is rather to sketch a discursive history of ways in which people have 
tried to understand and address situations in which religious authority has been 
used with harmful effects. Focusing most closely on the last 100 years, this review 
is broadly historical, although the approaches surveyed are not always historically 
discrete. In the latter part of the chapter, I draw on a range of feminist perspectives 
14 
which highlight the shortcomings of the approaches surveyed. In light of these 
critiques, I then argue for the distinctive contribution of the approach taken in this 
project of drawing on poststructuralist ideas in analysing stories of resistance to 
religious authority.  
The literature reviewed in this chapter deals primarily with issues raised by 
my first research question (section 1.2). I engage with literature relevant to the 
second research question—concerning the possibility of resistance from a 
poststructuralist perspective—in the course of the theoretical discussion in the 
next chapter (section 3.3). 
 
2.1 Pre-modern perspectives: behind closed doors 
Prior to the first so-called Christian Emperor, Constantine the Great (c. 272–337 
AD), Christian communities were often marginalised and sometimes persecuted 
within the Roman Empire. While they were not yet politically powerful, these 
communities, like most human organisations, wrestled internally with the issue of 
authority and how it should function. The significance of the issue is suggested by 
the attention given to it within early Christian documents. The New Testament, 
for example, contains a significant body of teaching—ascribed to Jesus himself—
regarding the humble attitude required of followers of Jesus. As he washed his 
disciples’ feet, so they were to serve one another in humility. With an intertextual 
nod to the prophet referred to earlier, a first-century letter to church leaders 
exhorts them to “tend the flock of God” and not to seek “sordid gain” or “lord it 
over” those in their charge (1 Peter 5:2–5). The author emphasises that the model 
to imitate was to be found in the stories of their humble founder, their “chief 
shepherd,” Jesus Christ. In the same passage, younger people are urged to “accept 
the authority of the elders,” and all are told: “clothe yourselves with humility in 
your dealings with one another.” They are reminded that, “God opposes the 
proud, but gives grace to the humble.” Such encouragements and warnings 
suggest that the appropriate use of religious authority was regarded as a spiritual 
matter, and that problematic situations were the result of pride or greed in the 
leader. The issues were to be dealt with within the community, with accountability 
and sanctions entrusted to God.  
When Christianity became the official religion of the Empire under 
Constantine, the Christian narrative was invoked to legitimise ecclesiastical and 
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political power on an international scale. This was still the case centuries later, 
when Henry VIII challenged the authority of the pope in Rome over the matter of 
divorce. Yet the question of how that power was exercised within particular 
Christian communities, and its effects on its members, remained a matter for the 
Church to deal with behind its own closed doors. Evidence from medieval and 
renaissance documents, for example, indicates that Roman Catholic clergy were 
not regarded as being subject to secular law. Child sexual abuse by priests is 
known to have occurred in this period, but, because clergy were the responsibility 
of the Church, the perpetrators were tried in ecclesiastical courts under Canon 
Law (Schoener, 1995). 
Media investigations into clergy sexual abuse over recent decades have 
revealed that many churches (not only Roman Catholic) followed the same 
“behind closed doors” approach late into the twentieth century, maintaining 
secrecy and silence as much as possible (Pauling, 1999). In telling the story of her 
own experience of sexual abuse within a New Zealand Anglican context, for 
example, Deans (2001) describes a meeting with her church hierarchy in 1990, at 
which she claims that the archbishop 
stated that the church had its own law, which was separate and different from 
secular law. He said that as priests of the church we did not have recourse to civil 
law and that judgement would be meted out by the law of the church. He then 
informed us that the law of the church differed from civil law in that it was 
concerned with forgiveness and reconciliation rather than with prosecution and 
punishment. . . . We were left with no redress. . . . We had become victims of the 
church twice over. (p. 96) 
More recently, an article in the National Catholic Reporter claimed that secrecy 
“about all clerical sex is sacrosanct within the system” (Sipe, 2010, p. 23). Soon 
after Pope Francis took office, it was reported that he had directed the Vatican “to 
act decisively on ecclesiastic sex abuse cases and take measures against 
paedophile priests” ("Pope orders Vatican officials," 2013, para. 1). While that 
was hailed as progress by some, this newspaper article notes that survivors of 
clergy abuse were quick to point out that this directive amounted to an in-house 
conversation, rather than the beginning of a public and transparent process.  
While this longstanding pattern of dealing with problematic uses of 
religious authority within the confines of the Church reflects a desire to protect its 
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public reputation, it also suggests that the source of the problem has continued to 
be viewed primarily in terms of personal morality and spirituality. At various 
points in the Church’s history, however, there have been moves to bring reform, 
not only to individual leaders, but also to its institutions. The Protestant 
Reformation was a major example of such a movement, and heralded the 
Church’s transition into the modern era. 
 
2.2 Modernist paradigms: truth, professionalism and psychology 
 
Doctrinal truth 
The cluster of events which comprised the Protestant Reformation can, in part, be 
viewed as acts of resistance against the monolithic power of the Roman Catholic 
Church of the 16th century. These events enacted a religious discourse which was 
extant before the Reformation, but became more pervasive as Protestantism 
fragmented into a multitude of denominations and splinter groups. According to 
this discourse, it is incumbent on believers to separate themselves from religious 
authority structures which are no longer upholding “biblical truth.” The primary 
point of concern is the maintenance of doctrinal purity (as defined by the 
separatists), rather than the effects of authoritative practices in the lives of people. 
From the time Martin Luther famously nailed his 95 theses to the door of the 
church at Wittenberg, to the present, the result has been the founding of more than 
a thousand new Christian denominations (Day, 2003), each protesting against 
some perceived infidelity to biblical truth on the part of those from whom they are 
separating. 
This desire to lay claim to the truth can be seen as an expression of the 
epistemological foundationalism which, prior to postmodernity, characterised 
post-Enlightenment Western thought. The systematic, propositional form in which 
competing versions of theological truth have generally been framed is consistent 
with the emphasis on rational thought and scientific principles in the same era. 
Purity of adherence to particular formulations of the truth now became the 
primary litmus test for the proper practice of religious authority, rather than 
resonance with the narrative tradition within which Christ represented the model 
of humble, compassionate leadership. The horrors of the Spanish Inquisition 
(1478–1834), the bloody thirty years war in Europe (1618–1648), and the violent 
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religious divisions of 16th–17th century Britain, all represent extreme versions of 
the hegemony of particular regimes of doctrinal truth (González, 2010). 
Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, developments in natural 
science and biblical criticism saw an erosion of confidence in such truth regimes. 
More recently, there have been attempts to approach theology and biblical studies 
within a postmodern framework (Grenz & Franke, 2001; Vanhoozer, 2003; Ward, 
2001). Nonetheless, discourses of doctrinal purity and separatism still prevail in 
some sectors of the Christian church. At the time of writing, there is considerable 
debate occurring within some of the major Christian denominations in New 
Zealand on the questions of ordination and marriage of people in same-sex sexual 
relationships. Some congregations have signalled their intention to withdraw from 
their denomination if such measures are approved. One Anglican church leader 
has warned that proposals being considered by his denomination could “divide 
parishes in New Zealand and—if adopted—cause a schism with the international 
faith” (Fisher, 2012). In all of these debates and schisms, little or no importance is 
attached the question of how religious authority, or power relations generally, are 
being performed. The concern for truth has its ethical dimensions, but these 
concern norms for personal morality, which are perceived to be biblical, rather 
than a call to practices of justice and compassion (which some would argue is 
more thoroughly biblical than isolated texts concerning sexual relations). 
 
“Spiritual abuse” 
Over the last two decades, there have been attempts within the Christian 
community to address problematic forms of religious authority under the rubric of 
“spiritual abuse.” Using descriptive terms such as “abusive” and “toxic,” this 
literature shines a light on the harmful effects of some understandings and 
practices of religious authority within Christian communities (Blue, 1993; 
Damiani, 2002; Dasa, 1999; Dupont, 2004; Enroth, 1992; Johnson & 
VanVonderen, 1991). The primary solution offered by these authors is, again, for 
churches and their leaders to adopt what they regard as a more a biblical approach 
in handling power and position. However, the focus is on ethical practice, rather 
than doctrinal purity. The authors draw on New Testament material, concerning 
the example and teaching of Jesus, and wider biblical material concerning justice 
and appropriate uses of power. 
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At the risk of over-simplifying this approach, I suggest that it is 
characteristic of most attempts over the last 30 years to address the issue, in that it 
represents a paradigmatic model of diagnosis and prescription. I employ the term 
“paradigmatic” in the sense used by Parry and Doan (1994), who in turn attribute 
it to Bruner (1986). Bruner compares narrative and paradigmatic modes of 
cognition, where the former values meaningfulness and the latter truthfulness. 
There is a narrative aspect to the spiritual abuse literature, in that it often features 
personal accounts and places the Jesus narrative at the centre. Nonetheless, it 
tends to use these narratives in a paradigmatic way, contrasting what is occurring 
in problematic situations with the true paradigm of Christian leadership.  
 
The professionalisation of pastoral ministry 
Even more clearly paradigmatic in style are attempts to address problematic 
practices of religious authority within the frameworks of professionalism and 
psychology. These approaches mirror a trend in recent decades toward the use of 
social scientific models in Christian pastoral care training. In a discussion of 
Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) programmes, Lee (2002) notes that over the 
last century, pastoral care training for ministers and chaplains in the United States 
has followed developments in other disciplines of care: 
The history of pastoral theology as an applied discipline follows the changing 
demographics and consequent socio-political developments of the US at the turn of 
the century. . . . The new professionalization of law and medicine helped to elicit 
concerns in the 1920s about what skills beyond liturgical practice were imparted in 
divinity schools that would equip ministers for their work with the faithful. As the 
fields of psychology and psychoanalysis bloomed in the US, ministers and 
seminarians embraced personality theorists like Erikson, Freud, and Murray 
(Capps, 1979). Pastoral psychology then joined with pastoral theology as the 
fundamental elements of pastoral care. (p. 341) 
Lee’s comments are applicable to similar developments in the New Zealand 
context. The website for the New Zealand Association of Clinical Pastoral 
Education , for example, indicates that its courses “integrate pastoral work and 
theology, with relevant medical, psychological and behavioural sciences.” 
Given this move in pastoral training toward professional, psychological and 
therapeutic models, it is not surprising that these paradigms have also gained 
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prominence in efforts to understand and address problematic expressions of 
religious authority over the last 30 years. In the same time period, it has been the 
issue of sexual abuse by trusted religious leaders which has captured public 
concern and forced churches to look more closely at the issue of power relations 
generally. While there is no excuse for the poor record of the churches in dealing 
with sexual misconduct, one study suggests that in this too they were following 
the social sciences: “The psychological and psychiatric communities in the 1960s 
and 1970s were not focused on the damage to patients and the need to expose the  
problems related to therapist-patient sexual involvement” (Gross-Schaefer, 
Feldman, & Perkowitz, 2011, p. 225). Although the scope of this study is much 
broader than the problem of sexual misconduct by people with religious authority, 
it is this issue which features in much of the available academic literature dealing 
with abuses of power in religious contexts. Much of the remainder of this section 
therefore draws on this literature, while keeping the wider issues in view. 
It was in the 1970s that feminist perspectives and published research began 
to play a key role in drawing attention to abuses that were occurring in medical 
and other therapeutic contexts (Pope, 2001). From that time, and more particularly 
from the second half of the 1980s to the present, significant research, publication 
and efforts to refine professional codes of ethics have been focused on addressing 
sexual misconduct by health care professionals. Beyond the bounds of 
professional associations, the issue has also become the subject of litigation and 
law reform (Ailsop, 2006; Allen, 1996; Birchard, 2000; Rodgers, 1995). All of 
which has anticipated, and strongly influenced, the ways in which churches have 
tried to come to terms with their own ethical and legal responsibilities as 
organisations to which people look for help and guidance (Gross-Schaefer et al., 
2011). 
Initially, the field of spiritual care was not caught up in the explosion of 
public concern around sexual exploitation in other caring professions, despite 
“evidence that religious officials have higher rates of sexual misconduct than 
other caring professionals” (Birchard, 2004, p. 81). In this period, churches and 
other religious communities continued mainly to deal with the issues behind 
closed doors, and the media was reserved in its handling of abuse in religious 
contexts. By the 1990s, legal indictments of clergy were beginning to capture 
public attention, but it was not until 2002 that people became aware of the extent 
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to which Catholic church authorities had been protecting abusive priests (Frawley-
O'Dea, 2007, p. 195). Legal cases involving clergy began to make headlines in 
New Zealand at around the same time. An article in the New Zealand Herald in 
2002 ("Judgment day for nine black sheep of the faith," 2002) named nine priests 
or religious brothers who had gone before the courts, charged with sex offences 
since 1990. The article indicated that others had been investigated by the police, 
with no further action being taken. Some of these were “dealt with internally by 
the Catholic Church.” 
If media attention and criminal prosecutions in relation to sexual abuse by 
clergy have followed the pattern of other helping professions, so have institutional 
efforts to address the issue. Religious denominations and organisations have been 
engaging in developing professional associations, codes of ethical practice, 
improved training, procedures for claims of sexual harassment or abuse, and 
indemnity insurance (Clark, 1993; Fortune & Poling, 1994; Gross-Schaefer et al., 
2011; Pauling, 1999). The nature of these efforts as work in progress is 
highlighted by the fact that “the first article to compare a variety of religious 
organizations’ codes of conduct when dealing with clergy sexual misconduct” was 
published only in 2011 (Gross-Schaefer et al., 2011, p. 223). 
 
Psychological models 
Alongside this emphasis in recent decades on training and professionalism in 
ministry, psychological models have increasingly been invoked to make sense of, 
and address, situations where the use of religious authority has been problematic. 
Some of these approaches focus primarily on the psychology of the 
individual self. They draw attention, for example, to Freudian notions of 
transference and counter-transference (Celenza, 2004; Kennedy, 2003; Muse, 
1992), the role of sexual addiction or “predilection” (Birchard, 2004; Plante, 
2006), variations on themes of “neediness” and “deficit” (Birchard, 2000; Cooper-
White, 1991), role identity theory (Pooler, 2011), and various forms of 
psychological profiling of those responsible for abuse (Blanchette & Coleman, 
2002; Francis & Baldo, 1998; Francis & Turner, 1995; Plante & Aldridge, 2005). 
Cooper-White (1991) takes the view that there are identifiable “internal 
dynamics” at work in male ministers who abuse women, as well as some “learned 
susceptibilities that incline women to overlook, forgive and tolerate a pastor’s 
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sexual exploitation” (p. 198). In some cases, a distinction is made between 
religious leaders who are naïve or poorly trained and those with “personality 
disorders” that “predispose” them to abusive behaviours (Francis et al., 1995). 
Such analyses suggest that the way to address the problem is a mix of better 
training and appropriate therapeutic help for those concerned. 
Other psychological approaches treat Christian communities as social 
systems, often looking to family systems theory for their paradigm (Benyei, 1998; 
Bowen, 1978; Davis, 2008; Friedman, 1985; Friedman, Treadwell, & W., 2007; 
Giesbrecht & Sevcik, 2000; Howe, 1998; Lebacqz & Driskill, 2000, p. 133; 
Richardson, 1996, 2004). It is not unusual to find writers on the subject of 
problematic forms of church leadership calling on an eclectic mix of 
psychological theories, including individualistic and systems paradigms, in their 
analyses. Minnich-Sadler (2005), for example, combines family systems theory 
with constructive-development theory: “Constructive-development theory 
deepens my understanding of individual thought and relational processes; family 
systems helps me pull it all together in the context of the congregation as a whole” 
(p. 8).  
 
Evaluation 
Some of the developments outlined in this section have benefited people whose 
lives have been negatively affected by practices of religious authority. The 
spiritual abuse literature and the increased emphasis on professionalism in 
ministry have both helped to move the issues out from behind closed doors and to 
strengthen structures of accountability for Christian leaders. Together with the use 
of psychological models, these approaches have also offered those who have been 
oppressed or abused some ways to name and evaluate what has happened to them. 
This in turn has supported some people in taking action to challenge abusive 
leaders, or to remove themselves from destructive circumstances (see, for 
example, Deans, 2001; Grace, 1996; Noll & Harvey, 2008). There is less evidence 
that the quest for doctrinal purity, or its accompanying separatist strategy, has 
helped to address problematic practices of religious authority. The stories re-
presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 tend to suggest that these approaches can 
become part of the problem, when leaders take it on themselves to impose “the 
truth” on their congregations. 
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In terms of helping to answer my research questions, however, these 
approaches have a number of limitations. Those that trace the problem to some 
kind of deficiency in particular leaders—whether moral, spiritual, theological, 
professional, or psychological—tend to pathologise the individuals concerned and 
divert attention from wider social and historical factors which may be complicit in 
the subversion of freedom and justice in Christian communities. With the 
therapeutic context in mind, Paré (2012) observes that “when we overlook culture, 
we have nowhere to turn to explain people’s difficulties but the people 
themselves” (p. 20). This leads to a focus on “dysfunction and deficit,” while 
contextual factors are rendered invisible. The turn to systemic paradigms, such as 
those based on family systems theory, addresses this weakness in part, but only in 
part. Freedman and Combs (1996) suggest that the systems metaphor both 
highlights and obscures certain things about families: 
It has given us useful ways to talk about the processes by which people connect in 
patterns that transcend individual bodies. . . . However, just as the idea of 
individual minds in individual bodies once limited our ability to conceptualize and 
work with mind as an interpersonal phenomenon in family systems, the idea of 
“family systems” now can limit our ability to think about the flow of ideas in our 
larger culture. (p. 2) 
In their review of developments in family therapy, the authors trace a shift from a 
focus on individual minds and actions, to an exploration of interpersonal 
psychological dynamics within social systems, to the interrogation of taken-for-
granted ideas within the wider social context about gender, identity, power, rights 
and duties. Their summary points to the kind of analysis which is missing from 
the approaches reviewed so far in this chapter: one that asks how the regimes of 
knowledge and power which become problematic are constructed and maintained 
within their social contexts. Such an analysis is less intent on identifying deficits 
in particular individuals or groups, and more engaged in critically evaluating the 
taken-for-granted ideas embedded in church and wider societal culture that 
produce unhelpful practices of religious authority. 
This kind of analysis is not entirely absent from the literature. In the next 
section, I summarise the perspectives of a number of feminist authors who further 
highlight the inadequacy of individualistic and psychological accounts of what is 
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happening when religious ideas and practices become complicit in the oppression 
of women. 
 
2.3 Feminist analysis 
In what follows, I highlight four aspects of feminist analysis of power relations in 
Christian communities. 
 
Gender inequalities as historically and culturally situated 
In the 1970s, a growing number of Christian women in the west began to express 
concern at fundamental inequalities between men and women in their churches’ 
teachings and practices. Inspired by the wider feminist movements of the 1960s, 
Christian authors began to call for change. Bammert (2010) notes the early 
influence of a book published by Scanzoni and Hardesty (1974), entitled All we’re 
meant to be: A biblical approach to women’s liberation. The authors argued that 
many of the biblical texts used to support patriarchal practices belonged to 
particular historical and cultural contexts, and could not be regarded as normative 
or predicated on essential differences between men and women. So, Bammert 
suggests, they demonstrated “how conservative orthodox positions on the role of 
women are value laden rather than objective, promoting an epistemic skepticism 
that lays the groundwork for their feminist activism” (p. 159).  
Feminist scholarship in biblical and theological  studies has flourished since 
those early beginnings, offering more radical critiques of patriarchal traditions and 
structures of oppression endemic to religious contexts (Brock et al., 2001; Brown 
& Bohn, 1989; Schüssler Fiorenza, 1983, 2001, 2007; Schüssler Fiorenza, Collins, 
& Lefébure, 1985; Trible, 1984). Such work highlights the inadequacy of efforts 
to address oppressive practices of religious authority which focus only on internal 
psychological processes, or local systemic factors, while overlooking the 
historical and cultural roots of gendered forms of inequality and oppression. 
Several of the stories re-represented in this thesis show how much consciousness-
raising work is still required in this regard, in the 21st century. 
 
A nostalgic desire for patriarchal privilege 
Predictably, feminist challenges to male privilege in Christian contexts have often 
been met with resistance and hostility by those in privileged positions of 
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authority. Writing in the mid-1990s, Fortune and Poling (1994) suggested that 
sexual abuse by men in Christian ministry was at that time on the increase, and 
argued that this abuse was a punitive response to the efforts of women to 
challenge male power: 
I believe that clergy sexual abuse is a part of this same backlash against the 
liberation of women with the purpose of the reassertion of male dominance. . . . 
Many complainants about clergy sexual abuse are women who are training for 
ministry and other forms of religious leadership in the church. As I review the 
dozens of cases of clergy sexual abuse I have heard about personally, I am 
astounded at the number of women whose careers have been damaged or derailed 
because they were abused by mentors serving as gatekeepers of the church’s 
power. (p. 58) 
Poling (1994) further argued that patriarchal motives were evident in the way 
abuse by clergy was covered up and abusers were protected by church leaders. 
While more recent efforts to require clergy commitment to professional and 
ethical practices mean that there are now more safeguards against such overt 
assertions of male power in many churches, a hankering after the past can still be 
discerned. Having interviewed twenty women pastors from diverse Christian 
communities in the USA, Bammert (2010) concludes that the continued 
predominance of masculine authority finds support through social longings for a 
warmly remembered yet imaginary stable past: 
Perhaps what many church communities offer is a return to the past where family 
values are honoured, the “home” provides nurture and comfort, basic needs are 
met, and there is a sense of care among neighbors. Repercussions for living in this 
imagined past are reinforcement of antiquated oppressive structures, systemic and 
attitudinal, resulting, for example, in gender hierarchies that naturalize male 
dominance and female subordination. (p. 174) 
Bammert suggests that women, as well as men, are drawn to communities which 
maintain gendered hierarchies because those communities focus on traditional 
values and family life, despite the cost for women being “intractably high” (p. 
157). This cost is reflected not only in power imbalances within church structures, 
but in domestic situations where women are expected to adopt a submissive, and 
supposedly biblical, stance in relation to their husbands. In a study of the 
experience of white Pentecostal women in Australia, Fraser (2003) writes of 
25 
battered women who “cannot escape their devastating shame without first 
enduring the additional torment of arrogant and insensitive androcentric voices’ 
invasive and humiliating emotional pressure to persevere in their marriages” (p. 
145). 
 
Ministerial and sexual power 
In addition to churches’ historical inclination to deal with clergy misconduct 
behind closed doors, sexually abused women face a further injustice when they 
are blamed for preying on their ministers. Schoener (1995) cites several romantic 
novels, written in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which portray 
innocent young ministers being ensnared by the seductive ways of women who 
seek their counsel on ostensibly spiritual matters. The persistence of this tendency 
to blame women is reflected in Deans’ (2001) account of her personal experience 
of sexual abuse in the New Zealand church context. She points out that the 
displacement of guilt from male perpetrators to female victims has a long history 
in Jewish, Christian and Muslim religious discourse. Women are held responsible 
for men’s desires, while “men’s so-called ‘red-bloodedness’ is given cultural and 
religious acceptance” (p. 167). 
Addressing the problem of clergy sexual abuse, Kennedy (2003) points out 
that it is those who approach ministers for pastoral help who are in the vulnerable 
position. Moreover, the trend toward therapeutic models of ministry (referred to in 
the previous section) means that the women who seek help may wrongly believe 
that their ministers have a level of training and skill equivalent to an accredited 
counsellor: “Women in the Church have been hoodwinked to believe in the vast 
power of the priest or minister. This has become profoundly dangerous” (pp. 234-
235). That danger is increased when clergy with limited training attempt 
misguided therapeutic interventions. Reflecting on factors in the sexual abuse 
which she and others experienced from a particular priest, Deans (2001) 
speculates on the influence of therapies which were vogue in the 1960s and 
1970s: 
My guess is that he was influenced by the sexual revolution of the sixties and 
seventies, when women’s sexuality was put under the microscope by Kinsey, 
Masters and Johnson, and Shere Hite and these investigators declared that women 
were now free from sexual inhibitions. . . . This is about the time that R, as far as 
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we can ascertain, began to engage sexually with women in his care as part of their 
‘therapy’. He seemed to assume that all women were sexually liberated and, if they 
were not, then he would teach them how to be sexually liberated with him if they 
were privileged enough to have been chosen by him. (p. 138) 
Kennedy (2003) rejects the argument that clergy who misuse their position to 
sexually exploit women in this way must have some pathological dysfunction: 
It is as if they have, because of their desires, no way of accessing responsible 
behaviour. What the medico-pathological model does not account for is the deep 
cultural and ingrained patriarchal misogyny within the male clerical system. If such 
men are truly disturbed and pathological it would follow that the Church authorities 
should be careful to remove them from ministry. (p. 232) 
The risk of sexual exploitation by those in positions of religious authority is 
further increased by certain theological beliefs, as the next and final aspect of 
feminist analysis shows. 
 
Theologies which support domination 
The role of religious beliefs in supporting domestic violence against women, 
noted above in relation to Fraser’s (2003) discussion of Australian Pentecostal 
contexts, features in research in other Christian contexts (Bent-Goodley & Fowler, 
2006; Cooper-White, 2011; McMullen, 2003; Nason-Clark, 2000; Wendt, 2008). 
This in turn is part of a wider pattern of discrimination based on certain readings 
of the Bible, as Monroe (2009),writing as an African American lesbian Christian, 
observes: “The Bible has played a salient role in discrimination against many 
people at different times in the United States. Both religious intolerance and 
fundamentalism foster a climate of spiritual abuse that exiles people spiritually for 
the rest of their lives” (p. 185). 
Beyond the interpretation or use of particular biblical texts, feminist 
analyses of patriarchal practices in Christian contexts point to the influence of 
ideas and images which pervade religious life (Brock et al., 2001; Brown et al., 
1989; Furlong, 1991; Stockton, 1992). A combination of negative images of 
women (such as Eve the temptress) and predominantly male images of God, for 
example, supports the belief that men are inherently closer to God than women, 
and that women need to be controlled and guided by men. Certain theological 
interpretations of the crucifixion of Christ emphasise the anger of God against his 
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disobedient children, with the Son suffering a violent death in place of those 
children. Fortune and Poling (1994) argue that abusive relationships are not an 
aberration of the church’s theology, they are inherent in the very symbols of that 
theology: “A sexual relationship between a male clergyman and a female 
parishioner replicates the dynamics of the drama between a patriarchal God and 
an obedient, self-sacrificing Jesus standing in for a sinful humanity” (p. 39). They 
therefore call for a commitment on the part of the church to deeper change—not 
merely to the policies and procedures of professionalism—including a willingness 
“to challenge the patriarchal core of our collective religious life” (p. 26). 
 
2.4 Rationale for adopting a poststructuralist conceptual framework 
This brief overview of feminist perspectives underlines the concerns which gave 
rise to this project. It highlights ways in which freedom and justice for women 
have been, and are still, subverted by the practices of religious authority in many 
Christian communities. It also reinforces the conclusion arrived at in the previous 
section (2.2), that efforts to understand and address this disturbing history need to 
go beyond the use of psychological, professional and theological paradigms which 
identify deficiencies in particular individuals or communities. Weedon (1997), 
writing more generally about patriarchal power relations, argues that they “exist in 
the institutions and social practices of our society and cannot be explained by the 
intentions, good or bad, of individual women or men. This is not to deny that 
individual women and men are often the agents of oppression, but to suggest that 
we need a theory which can explain how and why people oppress each other ” (p. 
3).  
The feminist discussions cited in the previous section suggest that 
explaining the “how and why” of women’s oppression in religious contexts 
requires analysis of its construction by historically and culturally situated ideas, 
language, powerful vested interests, and theologically produced notions of 
personhood and power. Poststructuralism represents a “field of critical practices” 
(Butler et al., 1992a, pp. xiii-xiv) which is well suited to this complex task. 
Weedon (1997) agrees that poststructuralist theory is useful in relation to feminist 
interests because it can “address forms of social organization and the social 
meanings and values which guarantee or contest them,” and at the same time 
offers “a theory of the relation between language, subjectivity, social organization 
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and power” (p. 12). This description of the critical power of poststructuralist ideas 
points to its usefulness in relation to the particular concerns of this project—not 
simply those which overlap with feminist interests, but the wider question of 
“how and why” the practices of religious authority have oppressive effects for 
women and men in Christian communities. I am not suggesting that men and 
women have suffered to an equal extent in this regard, but I undertake this project 
on behalf of all those whose lives are diminished by such practices, including 
people who may not easily identify with either gender (Monroe, 2009). While I 
draw substantially in this study on the work of poststructuralist feminists, 
particularly Butler, Davies, Drewery, and Weedon, I also look to Foucault, 
Derrida, and others whose interests are not identified with feminism. 
There is another way in which this project extends beyond the feminist 
analyses referred to in the previous section, and it relates to my second research 
question, concerning the possibility of resistance to religious authority (see page 
3). Poststructuralist feminist authors have much to say that is helpful in theorising 
agency and resistance, and I draw heavily on that work in the next chapter (section 
3.3). In feminist discussions of specifically religious contexts, however, the focus 
appears to be more on the construction of oppression, and its effects, than on 
resistance to such oppression. While some attention is given to the role of 
Christian movements in advocating for justice for women, and to the stories of 
women who have contributed to such movements, less attention is given to 
everyday stories of women’s resistance at the “grassroots” level. I am not sure 
why this is the case. Perhaps the task of highlighting the ongoing subjugation of 
women within religious communities has greater urgency than foregrounding 
women’s stories of agency and resistance. Whatever the reason, my intention in 
this study is to re-present women’s and men’s accounts of their resistance to 
religious authority, and to enquire into the “how and why” of these accounts. 
 
I conclude this chapter with a brief summary of my rationale for adopting a 
poststructuralist conceptual framework for this study, and my hopes for what this 
will contribute: 
i Pre-modern approaches to problematic practices of religious authority 
tended to regard the issue as a matter of personal morality and spirituality. 
The question of “how and why” such practices occurred needed no further 
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explanation. They were to be dealt with before God and behind the closed 
doors of the church. 
ii Modernist analyses of these issues, framed in terms of deficiencies in 
individuals or groups, and reliant on professional, psychological or 
theological paradigms, have brought a wider awareness of the problem. 
However, they tend to pathologise individuals and communities, while 
leaving the contributions of taken-for-granted ideas and vested interests in 
the wider church and social culture unexplored. 
iii Feminist discussions extend their analyses into this neglected territory, 
highlighting the historical, cultural, and theological roots of the oppression 
of women in Christian communities. This represents a significant step 
toward answering my first research question, although the concerns behind 
that question are not restricted to gendered forms of oppression. While there 
is an extensive feminist literature dealing with the question of agency, this 
has not yet encompassed an enquiry into women’s agency or resistance in 
religious contexts. 
iv Poststructuralist theory offers an approach to analysis which is able to 
address the social construction of oppressive practices of religious authority, 
including, but not limited to, their gendered aspects (my first research 
question). In theorising the interrelatedness of knowledge, power, and 
subjectivity, it also suggests a way to think about the question of how 
people are able to resist such practices (the second research question). 
 
In Chapter 3, Theoretical and ethical orientation, I develop a poststructuralist 
conceptual framework, and an ethical orientation, for this project. In Chapter 4, 
Research methodology and design, I explain in methodological and practical 
terms how this theoretical and ethical orientation informs my analysis of the 
participants’ narratives of resistance to religious authority. 
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Chapter 3: 
Theoretical and ethical orientation 
 
In the previous two chapters, I have outlined the issues arising from my context 
which have motivated this project and the research questions which emerged from 
those concerns. I have argued that a poststructuralist analysis of problematic 
experiences of religious authority has the potential to shed fresh light on the 
subversion of freedom and justice in Christian communities, without rehearsing 
the individualising, psychologising, or pathologising approaches often applied to 
these issues. The four main sections of this chapter set out the theoretical ideas 
and ethical stance which underpin the way I approach such an analysis in this 
project. 
The first section interacts with Foucault’s (1988) work on his own question, 
“What are the relationships between truth, power, and self?” (p. 15). This provides 
the framework for discussing poststructuralist notions of discourse, power and 
subjectivity, which are in turn taken up in the formulation of my research 
methodology, discursive narrative analysis, in Chapter 4. In the second main 
section, I explore several aspects of the discursive production of subjectivity, 
laying out a number of ideas which inform my analysis of the narratives produced 
in my interviews with the participants in this project. These first two sections 
provide the conceptual framework within which I address my first research 
question, “Within Christian communities, how is it that some regimes of power 
and knowledge can subvert the call to freedom and justice which is pervasive in 
longstanding streams of Christian tradition?”  
The third main section of the chapter engages with poststructuralist 
discussions concerning the possibility of human agency and its relationship to 
resistance. I explore several ideas, including discursive complexity, 
intertextuality, and re-authoring, each of which has relevance to my second 
research question, “What has enabled some people to resist the practices of 
religious authority constructed by such regimes?” 
The final section of this chapter returns to an issue implicit in the first 
research question, namely, what is meant when I refer to freedom and justice? 
Drawing on the theoretical ideas of the previous sections, together with the ethical 
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reflections of Derrida, Foucault, Levinas and Sampson, I suggest that the notion 
of dialogic power relations provides a useful way to address this question. 
 
3.1 Poststructuralist paradigms: discourse, power and subjectivity 
In my initial acquaintance with narrative therapy, it was Foucault’s 
power/knowledge paradigm which first suggested the potential of applying a 
poststructuralist analysis to the issue of religious authority. Here I give further 
precision to the terms poststructuralism and discourse, before presenting my 
understanding of Foucault’s analytics of power and its relevance to this study. To 
add further clarity to these descriptions, I contrast poststructuralist ideas with 
those of liberal humanism. 
In western societies—including New Zealand society and its Christian 
communities—liberal humanism is embedded in much taken-for-granted thinking 
about personhood. White (1997) summarises some of these key ideas as “the will 
to truth, the repressive hypothesis, and the emancipation narrative” (p. 220). He 
notes that, among those positioned by such ideas, there are commonly heard 
laments such as, “What is it that stands in the way of us becoming truly who we 
really are?” (p. 221) In the latter half of the 20th century, this mix of psychological 
and humanist discourses was not infrequently harnessed to religious themes of 
selfhood, authenticity and liberation of the true self. White’s critique of what he 
regards as narcissistic tendencies within liberal humanism is balanced by his 
acknowledgment that the emancipation narrative has often supported people in 
their resistance to oppressive forms of authority. This is evident in the stories of 
some of the participants in this study who spoke of the need to be true to 
themselves as a factor in their resistance. In my analysis, I argue that there was 
more than a desire for authenticity at work in their acts of resistance, but I also 
want to echo the tone of respect in White’s (1997) comments concerning 
“humanism’s achievements”: 
I would like to emphasise that this critique is not a criticism of all that humanism 
stands for—it is not a disqualification of all of those ways of being and thinking in 
the world that humanism is an emblem for. And this critique does not constitute a 
disqualification of many of humanism’s achievements on a personal and social 
level—in the support that many persons have drawn from it in challenging the 
various acts of domination they are being subject to, and in the significant role that 
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it has played through its employment by the various human rights movements that 
have challenged different forms of discrimination and oppression. (p. 234) 
Having acknowledged this picture with regard to humanism, I turn to a review of 
selected poststructuralist ideas and highlight further inadequacies within humanist 
accounts of personhood, power and change. 
 
Poststructuralism 
Poststructuralism is a stream of postmodern thought, characterised by a particular 
view of language and radically opposed to the liberal humanist view of 
personhood. The humanist paradigm begins with the thinking, feeling, choosing, 
human subject as the primary entity within the social order. On that view, 
language is a tool used by people to give expression to thoughts, feelings and 
meanings which originate in their inner worlds. This view was challenged by 
structuralist philosophers such as de Saussure (1966) who argued that in using 
language to make meaning, human beings participate in something beyond 
individual, conscious intention. Language is a system of signs with socially 
agreed meanings. Therefore human experience and meaning-making are 
ultimately shaped by social structures. Poststructuralists take a further step in the 
decentring of the individual by focusing on language, rather than on social 
structures (which themselves are interpretations made in language), as Jones 
(1997) explains. 
Derrida, considered by some to be the ‘creator’ of post-structuralism, emphasised 
that we cannot reach outside language; that everything is mediated by language and 
meaning. Not only that, but we can never fix meanings; they are deeply contextual 
and shifting, endlessly taken from other meanings which are taken from others, and 
so on. There are a range of historically and culturally specific possible meanings, 
so researchers/thinkers can never get to the final, ‘real’ meaning or structure of a 
society or action or text. (pp. 264-265; emphasis in the original) 
For poststructuralists, then, personality, experience, and identity are effects of 
language, and the “psychological centre of gravity” is located in the social realm, 
rather than in the essentialist core self of humanistic understanding (Burr, 2003, 
pp. 53-54). Poststructuralists’ particular interest is in language as a site of 
variability and potential conflict. So “we are drawn into a view of talk, writing 
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and social encounters as sites of struggle and conflict, where power relations are 
acted out and contested” (Burr, 2003, pp. 54-55). 
This last statement of Burr’s shows why poststructuralist ideas are often 
taken up on behalf of projects of social change, and why I consider them to have 
particular ethical force for this project. Words, language, and meaning-making are 
objects of central importance within religious contexts, especially where any or all 
of these are considered to be God-spoken and sacred. To control meaning and 
interpretation signifies dominance in an ordinary social sense, but in a religious 
community it may also imply a divine right to exercise authority over others. As 
suggested in the previous chapter, part of the contribution of a poststructuralist 
account of what is occurring in such communities is to shift the analysis from the 
internal psychological and/or spiritual worlds of individuals to what is being 
constructed in the language and dominant discourses of their contexts. 
Having mentioned discourse, a term used in the previous two chapters with 
minimal definition, I now expand on the particular (Foucauldian) understanding 
of that term which is central to this study. 
 
Discourse 
The poststructuralist concern with language and the way it constitutes our 
knowledge of the world leads naturally to an interest in the ways in which it is 
structured to produce these effects. According to what rationalities do history, 
culture, and language operate within social systems, beyond individual intention 
and awareness? In Chapter 1, I noted Burr’s (2003) view that a discourse “refers 
to a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements and 
so on that in some way together produce a particular version of events” (p. 64). 
For Foucault (1972), discourses are “practices which form the objects of which 
they speak” (p. 49). In introducing his archaeological project of delving into the 
discursive strategies which produce taken for granted knowledges or “unities,” 
Foucault (1972) explains his intention. 
I shall take as my starting-point whatever unities are already given . . . but I shall 
not place myself inside these dubious unities in order to study their internal 
configuration or their secret contradictions. I shall make use of them just long 
enough to ask myself what unities they form; by what right they can claim a field 
that specifies them in space and a continuity that individualizes them in time; 
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according to what laws they are formed; against the background of which 
discursive events they stand out. (p. 26) 
He goes on to contrast a form of discourse analysis which is concerned with 
language and its rules and structures with his own project of interrogating the 
ways in which discourse constructs what is spoken: 
The question posed by language analysis of some discursive fact or other is always: 
according to what rules has a particular statement been made, and consequently 
according to what rules could other similar statements be made? The description of 
the events of discourse poses a quite different question: how is it that one particular 
statement appeared rather than another? (p. 27) 
Here Foucault alludes to the relation between discourse and power in ways that 
again bear directly on my research. Foucault’s “quite different question” is closely 
allied with my concerns: what are the discursive strategies which construct 
oppressive practices of religious authority in some Christian communities? How 
do such practices achieve the subjugation of knowledges about the possibility of 
power relations which could enhance freedom and justice? These questions are 
addressed in detail in my discussion of the findings of this study (Chapter 8). In 
anticipation of these specific findings, I note Parker’s (1992) helpful summary of 
three aspects of the relation of discourse to institutions, power and ideology: 
Discourses support institutions. The discourses of an institution, which exist 
in its texts, speech, symbols and practices, structure and reproduce the institution. 
Other discourses which might subvert the institution are likely to be suppressed.  
Discourses reproduce power relations. As explained below, the discourses 
which support institutions also structure power relations. In some Christian 
churches, as I show in my findings, the position of a leader is supported by a 
discourse of submission, in which the language of leadership includes ideas of 
being chosen and specially endowed by God to exercise authority over the 
congregation. This supports protocols as to who may speak, how and when they 
may speak, and what authority will be attached to their speech. 
Discourses have ideological effects. At a particular place and time, a 
discourse may function with ideological effects (rather than being an ideology per 
se). Parker suggests, for example, that Christian discourses function in an 
ideological way if they support racism as a dominant world-view. The same can 
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be said of their role in maintaining patriarchy. Alternatively, other Christian 
discourses have been invoked by movements opposed to racist and sexist 
ideologies and practices. 
Finally, although I have referred to discourse(s) doing things (constructing, 
reproducing, subjugating and so on), these effects needs to be understood as 
occurring through human actions and within social systems. Davies and Harré 
(1990) therefore speak of discursive practice, by which they mean “all the ways in 
which people actively produce social and psychological realities” (p. 45). So 
while discourse is more than the ideas people intentionally produce, or have 
awareness of, human communities and practices are nonetheless the means by 
which discourses reproduce, evolve, and vie for dominance. Even at the micro-
social level of individual conversations, people find themselves participating in 
discursive struggles which transmit and transform discourse (Moissinac, 2007). In 
approaching the stories of the participants in this project, I am concerned with 
both the macro- and micro-social spheres of discursive practice, understanding 
with Winslade (2005), and others before him, that the personal is also political:   
Because there is a range of possible meanings, we often find ourselves in the 
middle of a contest about which meanings will prevail. The discursive field of 
contested meanings that is thus established can be thought of as a political field. (p. 
354) 
Whether considering a participant’s account of their relationship to their 
community or world-wide movement, or of a conversation between individuals, 
my analysis seeks to shed light on the discursive struggle that is represented in 
their description. The political significance of “a discursive field of contested 
meanings” indicates the presence of power relations, and it is to the relationships 
which exist between discourse and power that I now turn. 
 
 Power/knowledge 
Foucault’s aim was to provide an analytics of power which was contextual and 
historical, rather than a general theory of power. He was inclined to trouble any 
such unified theory, as I have indicated above. Nonetheless, there are consistent 
threads in his writings about power which are pertinent to this project. As I have 
suggested already, the shift from thinking of power as the possession of certain 
individuals or groups to Foucault’s notion of power circulating in social systems, 
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inextricably connected with the dominant discourses of those systems, offers a 
fresh way to think about the operations of power in religious contexts.  
In order to highlight some distinctive aspects of Foucault’s analytics of 
power, and their potential application in this study, I here point out several 
contrasts with liberal humanist perspectives on power. My starting point is a 
helpful set of comparisons offered by Davies and colleagues (Davies et al., 2002). 
Some of the areas of contrast which they develop are rather closely 
interconnected, so I streamline them here into three categories. 
 
i Power circulates throughout social systems 
A taken-for-granted idea about power is that some people possess more of it than 
others, and that it is these people who can be said to have agency. In this view, 
generally taken up within the humanist paradigm, the operations of power tend to 
be conceived of as unidirectional and hierarchical, with power manifesting itself 
in the effects of some (more powerful) subjects acting on other (less powerful) 
subjects. In contrast to these assumptions, Davies et al (2002) suggest that, for 
Foucault, power itself “has no essence; it is simply operational. It is not an 
attribute but a relation . . . a set of possible relations between forces which passes 
through the dominated forces no less than the dominating” (p. 297). Here the 
authors are citing Deleuze (1988, p. 24), with minor modifications. In Foucault’s 
(1980) own words, power 
must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only 
functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in 
anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is 
employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. . . . In other words, 
individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application. (p. 98) 
Here Foucault depicts power as being always in motion, and not in a fixed 
location or relation to discourse or subjectivity. Moreover, the workings of power 
may be conceived as being like multiple lines of force in a “field of force 
relations” (Foucault, 1978, p. 101), continually changing in their relationship to 
each other. 
People within the discursive networks by which power circulates within 
social systems are therefore viewed by Foucault as active participants, rather than 
passive objects. This highlights one of a number of paradoxical aspects of 
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poststructuralist thought. The paradox in this case is that those whose lives are 
being constrained and constructed by the operations of power within a community 
are at the same actively participating in the maintenance of those operations. How 
this is so will become clearer in the second and third points to follow. 
Discussions of the use and abuse of religious authority often conceive of 
power in unidirectional, hierarchical terms. This project is an attempt to provide a 
more nuanced consideration of the particular fields of force relations evident in 
the stories of my participants, including the discursively produced institutions and 
practices through which such fields have been constituted, and the effects on those 
who participate in these institutions and practices. In pursuing this aim, I note 
Deleuze’s (1988) suggestion that the key question is not so much, “What is power 
and where does it come from?”, but “How is it practised?” (p. 60). 
 
ii Power operates through freedom and productivity 
Foucault maintains a distinction between violence and relations of power. Violent 
domination acts directly on the other in a way that closes off all possibilities. It is 
the brute, destructive force of one person exercised against another. For Foucault, 
this is the power of the old order—the centralised power of the king (1977a; 
Foucault et al., 1980). In contrast, the kind of power relationship envisaged by 
Foucault in post-monarchical societies necessitates that those involved are 
recognised as acting and having a degree of freedom. “Power is exercised only 
over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (Foucault, in Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982, p. 221). 
For Foucault, again paradoxically, it is while this freedom remains, while 
there is the possibility of refusal or revolt, that power can subject an individual to 
government (Dreyfus et al., 1982, p. 253). Rose (1996) summarises Foucault’s 
understanding of the way power thus both shapes and depends on human 
subjectivity: 
We often think of power in terms of constraints that dominate, deny and repress 
subjectivity. Foucault, however, analyzes power not as a negation of the vitality 
and capacities of individuals, but as the creation, shaping, and utilization of human 
beings as subjects. Power, that is to say, works through, and not against, 
subjectivity. (p. 151; emphasis in the original) 
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Davies et al (2001) speak of the “ambivalent project of subjectification . . . the 
processes through which we are subjected, and actively take up as our own the 
terms of our subjection” (p. 167). This is a particular expression of the previous 
description of subjects actively participating in the circulation of power while also 
experiencing its effects. 
Even where power is not outright domination, there can be a tendency in 
liberal humanist thinking to view it as negative and oppressive in the way it 
suppresses the autonomy and core identity of the individual. On this view, power 
inevitably corrupts and distorts the truth, and is best given away in order to 
empower the powerless (Davies et al., 2002, p. 297). In contrast, Foucault (1980), 
who refers to these ideas as the “repressive hypothesis,” insists that power is also 
productive in its effects. 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, 
do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold 
good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as 
a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, 
forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive 
network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative 
instance whose function is repression. (p. 119) 
Foucault is not distinguishing here between repressive and benevolent forms of 
power. Rather, he is arguing that it is mistaken to assume that power works in 
inherently repressive ways, or that people accept the curtailment of their freedom 
because they are powerless to do otherwise. Even power exercised with repressive 
intent operates within a social system in ways that are productive. The effects 
(forms of knowledge, discourse, pleasure, pain, resistance, identity and so on) 
may or may not be considered to be positive, but they are not simply a negation: 
Power would be a fragile thing if its only function were to repress, if it worked 
only through the mode of censorship, exclusion, blockage and repression. . . . If, on 
the contrary, power is strong this is because, as we are beginning to realise, it 
produces effects at the level of desire—and also at the level of knowledge. Far 
from preventing knowledge, power produces it. (Foucault et al., 1980, p. 59) 
The issue of freedom, in the way Foucault speaks of it, has particular relevance in 
social systems such as churches in western societies. Belonging to, or leaving, a 
particular church community is a matter of choice for adult members. Most of the 
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participants in this project stayed for long periods in churches where they were 
experiencing significant discomfort. However, this was a seldom a consequence 
of outright domination. Nor were their experiences uniformly negative. My 
analysis of their accounts shows how the practices of religious authority both 
presumed and produced the ideas which held them there. This anticipates the final 
point I want to highlight in relation to Foucault’s power/knowledge paradigm. 
 
iii Power relations presuppose and actualise knowledge 
Foucault’s (1980) account of the relationship between power and knowledge is 
very pertinent to religious contexts where, as I have suggested, truth and 
knowledge are often the focus of much attention. While humanism may hold a 
view of knowledge as being neutral and outside of power, Foucault understands 
knowledge and power relations to be inseparable and productive of one another. 
Power relations both presuppose and actualise knowledge. The lines of force 
operative within power relations call people into alignments in which they see and 
speak in certain ways. These ways of seeing and speaking are in turn performative 
of certain types of power relations. So the knowledges and the power relations 
constructed by dominant discourses cohere and buttress one another. 
Foucault points out that there are specific forms of knowledge (rationalities) 
which make any particular form of power seem reasonable or inevitable. These 
rationalities are integral to the dynamic of governmentality, that is, “the way in 
which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed . . . to structure 
the possible field of action of others” (Foucault, in Dreyfus et al., 1982, p. 221). 
The rationalities which give meaning to a situation assist people to perform the 
operations on their own bodies, thoughts and conduct which are necessary for 
them to become, or remain, appropriate(d) subjects within given networks of 
power relations. In some religious contexts, for example, such rationalities might 
be spoken of as “spiritual principles.” Such principles might typically include the 
God-given authority of leaders and the spiritual consequences of submitting/not 
submitting to their authority. These rationalities are transmitted both explicitly 
and implicitly, producing submissive subjects and thereby a self-sustaining nexus 
of power and discourse. 
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A further category of knowledge which deserves specific mention is expert 
knowledge. With reference to Foucault’s (1977a) work in Discipline and Punish, 
Hook (2003) notes the objectifying and disciplinary aspects of expert knowledge: 
The criminal, for example, became a species to be known, the crime something to 
be exhaustively coded and classified. . . . Here one finds a particular object-relation 
of knowledge to be duplicated throughout the human/social sciences: one in which 
the individual is known and specified through the categorial knowledge to which 
the finer details of specific and individual cases are ceaselessly contributed. (p. 
609) 
To name and codify a human being as belonging to a particular species of the 
criminal class is an action of disciplinary power; and this taxonomy of crime at 
the same time supports the exercise of—indeed the need for—such disciplinary 
force. Disciplinary power functions not only through the objectifying effects of 
expert knowledge, but also through humanisation, individualisation, 
“psychologisation,” and confessional practices. While the sphere of crime and 
punishment may seem remote from the religious domain, such disciplinary 
strategies are recognisable in my participants’ accounts, as I show in Chapter 8. 
It is evident from the discussion so far that the notions of power, knowledge, 
discourse, subjectivity and governmentality are closely interrelated in Foucault’s 
analysis. Having given some attention to power and discourse, I now consider 
poststructuralist conceptualisations of subjectivity. 
 
Subjectivity 
The term subjectivity is used in a variety of ways within different paradigms. I use 
it here to suggest the psychological awareness that people appear to have of 
themselves as selves. This includes their ideas, metaphors, self-narratives, desires, 
hopes and fantasies (Burr, 2003, p. 119). It is in their accounts of subjectivity that 
humanist and poststructuralist perspectives are particularly at odds with one 
another. Davies (1991) suggests that in humanist paradigms the individual has (or 
should pursue) a continuous, unified, rational identity. On this view, early 
socialisation is followed by the individual’s internalisation of values which, in 
healthy adults, is the internal core on the basis of which coherent, rational choices 
can be made. Stories are versions of events that occur in the real world, and an 
important distinction is made between true and fictional stories. In contrast, as 
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Davies (1991) points out, poststructuralists view subjectivity as “constituted 
through the discourses in which the person is being positioned at any one point in 
time” (p. 43). These discourses are often contradictory, and so, therefore, is 
subjectivity. In Davies’ view, there is no individual I, other than that spoken into 
existence by discourse. Similarly, stories are “the means by which events are 
interpreted, made tellable, or even liveable. All stories are understood as fictions 
providing the substance of lived reality” (p. 43). Henriques et al (Henriques, 
Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984) offer a view of subjectivity in 
similar terms: 
We use ‘subjectivity’ to refer to individuality and self-awareness—the condition of 
being a subject—but understand in this usage that subjects are dynamic and 
multiple, always positioned in relation to the discourses and practices and produced 
by these—the condition of being subject. (p. 3) 
Alongside subjectivity, poststructuralist writers also refer to subjectification and 
subjection. In simple terms, I take subjectification (sometimes referred to as 
subjectivation) to mean the process by which discourses act on people to produce 
them as subjects. Dominant discourses make certain subject positions available to 
people, and the process of subjectification is continued in their taking up and 
mastery of these positions. Subjection is a term sometimes used to describe the 
state of being fully installed into the subject position(s) prescribed by dominant 
discourses. So Davies et al (2001) write of subjectification as “the process through 
which we are subjected, and actively take up as our own the terms of our 
subjection” (p. 167). A further related term is subjugation, which is perhaps a 
stronger way of expressing the idea of subjection. Drewery (2005) notes that 
when people converse, for example, the effects of certain ways of speaking 
are to constitute, or produce, a relationship in which the meanings of one are 
hidden and/or not understood. The outcome of this is to subsume the meanings of 
the one into the meanings of the other. Selves or identities produced in such a way 
are already inscribed by the meanings of those who determine, without the offer to 
negotiate, the terms for continuing in conversation. Such interactions, therefore, 
produce subjugated subjects. (pp. 311-312) 
The ways in which I understand discourse, power relations and subjectivity to be 
interrelated are central to the approach taken in my analysis, as I show in outlining 
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my research methodology and design (Chapter 4). In the next main section I 
therefore explore the processes of subjectification in some detail. 
 
3.2 Subjectification: the discursive production of identity 
There are various ways in which discursive processes of subjectification can be 
understood and described. Here I outline five particular approaches which inform 
my analysis and discussion of the participants’ accounts: discursive positioning, 
embodied inscription, self-surveillance and confession, mastery and submission, 
and storying and intertextuality. I view these as five vantage points from which to 
view the same complex process, rather than as entirely discrete aspects of 
subjectification. 
 
Discursive positioning 
Willig (2000) regards positioning theory as a “set of conceptual tools with which 
to explore the relationship between discourse and subjectivity” (p. 556).This 
echoes an influential description of positioning offered by Davies and Harré 
(1990): 
We shall argue that the constitutive force of each discursive practice lies in its 
provision of subject positions. A subject position incorporates both a conceptual 
repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights for those that use 
that repertoire. Once having taken up a particular position as one’s own, a person 
inevitably sees the world from the vantage point of that position and in terms of 
particular images, metaphors, story lines and concepts which are made relevant 
within the particular discursive practice in which they are positioned. (p. 46) 
Alongside a “conceptual repertoire” and a “structure of rights,” a particular 
subject position often also provides a set of duties, associated storyline(s) and 
categories of identity (Harré & Slocum, 2003; Slocum-Bradley, 2010a, 2010b). 
The language of subject positions and positioning, then, offers a way to speak of 
the (re)production of power relations and subjectivity through discursive practices 
such as speech. The discursive contexts in which positioning occurs determine the 
repertoires of ideas, practices, storylines, categories of personhood, entitlements, 
and obligations which are associated with available subject positions. With regard 
to subjectivity, Davies and Harré (1990) speak of “imaginatively positioning 
oneself as if one belongs in one category and not in the other” and developing “a 
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sense of oneself as belonging in the world in certain ways and thus seeing the 
world from the perspective of one so positioned” (p. 47). 
The term “position call” denotes a social exchange, usually a speech act, 
which invites a person into a particular subject position, as Drewery (2005) 
explains: 
In conversation, interactions can be characterized in terms of the positions that are 
offered, and the positions that are taken up. It is this invitation to take up particular 
positions that we have termed a ‘position call’ (Drewery & Winslade, 1997). (p. 
314) 
Such a position call may be accepted by the person to whom it is issued, or it may 
be refused (explicitly or otherwise), leading to the negotiation of new subject 
positions (Bamberg, 2004, p. 335; van Lagenhove & Harré, 1999, p. 17). For 
example, suppose a man in a heterosexual marriage says to his spouse, “Where 
are my socks?” This may be experienced by the person spoken to as a gendered 
call into the position of domestic assistant. A response like, “I’m sorry, I haven’t 
washed them yet,” might constitute an acceptance into that subject position 
(depending on tone, facial expression, etc). A refusal might be explicit—“I’m 
your wife, not your housekeeper!”—or indirect, through humour for example—
“What did your last slave die of?” 
The possibility of refusal suggests a degree of indeterminacy as to the 
outcome of positioning events. It also raises the question of agency, which is 
addressed in the next main section (3.3). As outlined in that section, however, the 
possibility of agency does not imply a return to the idea of an autonomous self, 
“actively negotiating his or her way through available accounts in order to live a 
meaningful life” (Rose, 1996, p. 177). Rather it testifies to the likelihood that 
subjects have been and are positioned within an array of discursive contexts and 
histories. Associated with the complex nature of positioning, experiences of 
subjectivity are characterised by a “shifting, contradictory multiplicity and 
fragility” (Davies et al., 2004, p. 363). This in turn creations the conditions in 
which agentic positions may be taken up. 
 
Embodied inscription 
Earlier I cited Drewery’s (2005) account of the relationship between ways of 
speaking and the production of subjugated subjects. In describing that process, she 
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suggested that selves or identities produced in this way “are already inscribed by 
the meanings of those who determine, without the offer to negotiate, the terms for 
continuing in conversation” (p. 312). Reflecting on his work on sexuality, 
Foucault (1980) describes the embodied nature of such inscription: 
What I want to show is how power relations can materially penetrate the body in 
depth, without depending even on the mediation of the subject’s own 
representations. If power takes hold on the body, this isn’t through its having first 
to be interiorised in people’s consciousnesses. There is a network or circuit of bio-
power, or somato-power, which acts as the formative matrix of sexuality itself as 
the historical and cultural phenomenon within which we seem at once to recognise 
and lose ourselves. (p. 186) 
 
This notion of inscription speaks to the effect of repeated experiences of 
positioning within dominant discourses, so that even when a person is no longer 
compelled to assume a particular subject position within a discourse, they may 
still carry with them the embodied force of the repertoires of meaning associated 
with that discursive position. As Foucault notes, this process transcends conscious 
awareness and cognitive understanding. Pfohl (2007) argues that “restricting the 
study of social construction to the realm of cognition limits our analytic 
appreciation of the complex operations of knowledge by which effective 
constructions wield their power” (p. 658). One consequence of this complexity, as 
Davies (1991) observes, is that the translation of new cognitive positions into 
everyday practice is not easily achieved. Attempts to practice new subject 
positions come up against “the inscription in one’s body of the ways of being that 
are appropriate to the subject positions usually taken up” (pp. 49-50).  
The embodied effects of positioning emerged as an important theme as I 
engaged in the analysis of my participants’ accounts, highlighting the importance 
of paying attention to the process of inscription. I offer further comments on the 
significance of embodied effects in my discussion of agency and resistance 
(section 3.3). 
 
Self-surveillance and confession 
Foucault draws on aspects of religious life to illustrate the strategies of 
subjectification which operate in secular social contexts. The pastorate, for 
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example, provides a way of thinking about governmentality, the shaping of 
subjectivity to a common end, while the confessional offers a model of the micro-
politics of subjection. Here I briefly explain these analogies and highlight the 
relevance of Foucault’s analysis of the religious practices to this study. 
Hook (2003) summarises three forms of pastoral power which Foucault uses 
to illustrate the rationality of the state. First, the role of the pastoral shepherd is to 
watch over his or her flock with close, individualised, loving attention, and so to 
ensure their progress toward salvation. This implies knowledge of the conscience 
and an ability to direct it (see below on the confessional). Second, the shepherd is 
an intermediary of a greater religious structure, and so leads with an 
unquestionable authority. Accordingly, the flock’s relationship to the pastor is 
characterised by complete obedience and dependence. Third, the pastor bears the 
responsibility for the destiny of the flock, and is bound by a complex moral tie to 
each member. The pastor’s exercise of authority is therefore not simply about 
maintaining control. It is, as for the flock, a matter of obedience and 
accountability (ultimately to God). 
This analysis has been applied by Hook and others (Dean, 1999; Rose, 
1996) to psychological forms of care, but Foucault’s discussion of religious 
governmentality has direct relevance to this project in its own right. As I show in 
Chapter 8, there are striking parallels between the three elements of the pastorate 
outlined above and themes which emerged in my analysis of my participants’ 
accounts. In many religious contexts, these dynamics of pastoral leadership and 
subjectification are given particular force by notions of an everywhere-present and 
all-seeing God. This can be illustrated by reference to Foucault’s (1977a) 
application of the Panopticon model of prison, described by Hook (2003) as 
a watchtower within the prison, into which the outsider cannot see, and that thus 
assures that prisoners know at all times that they may well be under surveillance. 
Prisoners, or ‘souls’ more generally, thus come to operate as if under constant 
surveillance, taking on a self-policing role over themselves, hence power-relations 
are reproduced, implemented from within the internal position of the subject (p. 
611). 
To believe that “God is watching us,” monitoring even private inner thoughts, is 
to live in a permanent state of panoptical self-surveillance and self-
subjectification. My analysis chapters show the critical function exercised by 
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practices of religious authority in the discursive production of self-surveillance for 
some of the participants in this project. This connection between belief and 
subjectification provides a further illustration of Foucault’s power/knowledge 
paradigm. 
Allied with self-surveillance is the practice of confession. In The History of 
Sexuality, Foucault (1978) describes the dynamics of the confessional (as 
developed within Roman Catholicism) to explain the subtle operations of power 
and discourse in the social production of subjects. In making confession to a 
priest, a person (a penitent) is subject in several senses. In an active sense, as a 
speaking subject, the penitent discloses the inner workings of conscience. The 
penitent is also the subject of the confession being made, and in this is subject to 
religious discourses concerning sin, its consequences and the means of grace. The 
priest acts on behalf of Christ in granting absolution, thereby guaranteeing the 
subject position of the penitent before God (as the ultimate Other). 
This understanding of the way in which subjects, and in particular their 
sexuality, are both constituted and governed through disclosure of their inner 
selves is applied by Foucault (1965, 1970, 1973, 1977a, 1978) to a range of other 
disciplines, including medicine, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis. In each case, as 
Weedon (1997) observes,  “the subject of the discourse is at once constituted by it 
and subjected to it, and she has her position as subject guaranteed by the ‘expert’ 
enquiring voice” (p. 116). The interpretations offered by this voice enable the 
individual to know the truth of the self even more deeply, in the terms of expert 
knowledge and/or normative discourse (Hook, 2003). While the traditional 
practice of confession did not feature in my participants’ accounts, the principle of 
disclosing one’s private world to another, for their authoritative interpretation, 
was evident in some cases. In non-Catholic contexts, confession is most often 
considered to be something which a person makes to God directly, and this 
connects closely with the panoptical sense of living one’s life constantly under the 
gaze of God. Either way, whether in the context of disclosure to another, or in 
direct relationship to their God, self-surveillance, and confession are effective 
means of subjectification. 
 
Mastery and submission 
In outlining Foucault’s theorisation of power, I noted the paradoxical way in 
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which subjection is achieved through subjects’ apparently free participation in a 
power/knowledge regime: “Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only 
insofar as they are free” (Foucault, in Dreyfus et al., 1982, p. 221). I also cited 
Foucault’s (1980) argument that power operates through the production of 
“effects at the level of desire—and also at the level of knowledge” (p. 59). This 
suggests that people who are actively engaged in the production of their own 
lives—through participation, pursuing their desires, and gaining knowledge—are 
at the same time being inscribed as subjects within their social systems. Drawing 
on Althusser’s work, Butler (1997) describes this paradoxical simultaneity of 
submission and mastery: 
The more a practice is mastered, the more fully subjection is achieved. Submission 
and mastery take place simultaneously, and it is this paradoxical simultaneity that 
constitutes the ambivalence of subjection. Though one might expect submission to 
consist in a yielding to an externally imposed dominant order and to be marked by 
a loss of control and mastery, paradoxically, it is marked by mastery. . . . In this 
view, neither submission nor mastery is performed by a subject; the lived 
simultaneity of submission as mastery, and mastery as submission, is the condition 
of possibility for the emergence of the subject. (pp. 116-117; emphasis in the 
original) 
The interwoven nature of mastery and submission can be related to the previous 
section, which considered the production of self-surveillance as an aspect of 
subjectification. Suppose, as was the case for several participants in this study, 
that according to the discourses of a religious community, a person’s wellbeing is 
premised on keeping their life—including their actions, inner thoughts, and even 
their desires, “right” in the sight of God. These are, in the words of Davies et al 
(2001), “the conditions of possibility—the discourses which prescribe not only 
what is desirable, but what is recognisable as an acceptable form of subjectivity” 
(p. 172). Then self-surveillance and confession become practices to be mastered in 
order to achieve the life the person desires, and, at the same time, this mastery 
ensures their submission to the dominant religious discourses of their context. 
There is a fundamental aspect of mastery to which Butler pays particular 
attention in her work, namely achieving recognition of one’s own existence as a 
subject. In Butler’s (1997) view, this explains the subject’s vulnerability to 
subjugation. 
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Bound to seek recognition of its own existence in categories, terms, and names that 
are not of its own making, the subject seeks the sign of its own existence outside 
itself, in a discourse that is at once dominant and indifferent. Social categories 
signify subordination and existence at once. In other words, within subjection the 
price of existence is subordination. . . . Subjection exploits the desire for existence, 
where existence is always conferred from elsewhere; it marks a primary 
vulnerability to the Other in order to be. (pp. 20-21) 
In speaking of “the desire for existence,” Butler is not referring to an 
individualistic form of subjectivity outside of discourse, but to something that is 
irreducibly social. 
If one accepts Spinoza’s notion that desire is always the desire to persist in one’s 
own being, and recasts the metaphysical substance that forms the ideal for desire as 
a more pliable notion of social being, one might then be prepared to redescribe the 
desire to persist in one’s own being as something that can be brokered only within 
the risky terms of social life. . . . If the terms by which “existence” is formulated, 
sustained, and withdrawn are the active and productive vocabulary of power, then 
to persist in one’s own being means to be given over from the start to social terms 
that are never fully one’s own. (pp. 27-28; emphasis in the original). 
The final sentence in this quotation usefully captures the interconnectedness of 
power, discourse and subjectivity. It also pinpoints a key factor in several 
participants’ accounts of having stayed for years in Christian communities in 
which they experienced considerable discomfort. When the social terms of one’s 
ongoing existence include warnings about the spiritual (perhaps even eternal) 
consequences of failing to submit to God’s appointed leaders, then life itself can 
seem to be in the balance and the possibility of removing oneself from the 
situation remote. 
 
Storying and intertextuality 
The operations of power/knowledge are evident not only in specific instances of 
positioning, inscription and submission, but also in the stories people tell about 
their lives. This idea informs an exercise in collective biography undertaken and 
described by Davies et al (2002): 
We set out as archaeologists of our own lives, searching for moments in which 
power and knowledge might be said, in a Foucauldian sense, to intersect, shape 
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each other, and act as lines of force in relation to each other. We thus use our 
embodied selves as vehicles for observing the plays of power and knowledge in 
relation to the processes of (gendered) subjectification. (p. 293) 
In accordance with Foucault’s analytics of power, these “lines of force” are not 
viewed by the authors as having originated from sources external to those who are 
narrating their lives (such as parents or other powerful figures), but as having been 
in circulation in their social networks. In the exercise described by Davies et al, 
such lines are traced in the actualisation of knowledges within the subjectivities of 
the participants, including particular moral principles and ideas concerning 
identity. As Sparkes and Smith (2007) observe, “Narratives, in significant 
measure, constitute human realities and our mode of being” (p. 295). Embedded 
within the stories people tell, therefore, are artefacts of the discursive regimes 
which have acted on and shaped their lives. 
From the point of view of discourse, stories have more than archaeological 
significance. The processes of selection, ordering and emplotment entailed in 
constructing a narrative also reproduce discourse. I explore the relationship 
between narrative and discourse in more detail in the next chapter (section 4.1). 
Here I focus on one feature of narrative’s production by, and reproduction of, 
discourse, namely indeterminacy. This indeterminacy arises in part because the 
storying of experience is a complex and selective process. Harré and Gillett 
(1994) argue that the “relation of symbol to brain function and brain function to 
behaviour is more subtle than a simple causal production” (p. 122). The 
conceptual structure available in discourse both “constrains and makes available 
ways of using information that equip an individual to take genuine initiatives in 
their life contexts” (p. 122). Moreover, discourse, as text, is not a repository of 
unambiguous meaning, but may be performed in a variety of ways. White (1990) 
speaks of the “relative indeterminacy” which belongs to all texts. 
The presence of implicit meaning, of the varying perspectives of the “readers” of 
particular events, and of a diverse range of metaphors available for the description 
of such events consigns a degree of ambiguity to every text. And, in Isler’s (1978) 
sense, this ambiguity or indeterminacy requires persons to engage in 
“performances of meaning under the guidance of the text.” (pp. 12-13) 
People’s construction of the narratives of their lives therefore entails a twofold 
intertextuality. First, the production of the texts of their life narratives is situated 
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within, and guided by, other texts, namely the stories and discourses of their social 
contexts. Second, “every telling or retelling of a story, through its performance, is 
a new telling that encapsulates, and expands upon the previous telling” (White et 
al., 1990, p. 13). This second kind of intertextuality, implicit in the storying and 
re-storying of life and identity, is also subject to an element of indeterminacy. As 
Epston et al (Epston, White, & Murray, 1992) observe, “every telling 
encapsulates, but is more than the previous telling” (p. 100). 
White (2004) therefore argues that the constitutive role of discursive 
knowledges and practices in people’s expressions of life is not deterministic. He 
suggests, rather, that life-production and storying take place under “conditions of 
indeterminacy within determinacy,” and involve “the complexities of the social 
negotiations that provide the basis of this achievement, as well as all of the 
personal exertions, compromises, struggles, and dilemmas associated with the 
production of meaning” (p. 42). This language hints at the possibility of agency, 
and I develop this connection further in the discussion of agency and resistance 
which follows. 
 
3.3 Agency and resistance 
The work of this chapter to this point bears on my first research question: “Within 
Christian communities, how is it that some regimes of power and knowledge can 
subvert the call to freedom and justice which is pervasive in longstanding streams 
of Christian tradition?” My second research question concerns resistance: “What 
has enabled some people to resist the practices of religious authority constructed 
by such regimes?” In speaking of enabling, I am suggesting a view of resistance 
which entails the possibility of agency, which, for now, I will regard as the 
capacity to exercise choice. Preoccupation with discourse, power, and 
subjectification can lead to the view that this apparent human capacity is illusory. 
Some poststructuralists, like Rose (1996), claim that the notion of agency is 
nothing more than a nostalgic echo of the heroic individual of humanism, and is 
unnecessary when giving an account of resistance. 
Resistance—if by that one means opposition to a particular regime for the conduct 
of one’s conduct—requires no theory of agency. It needs no account of the inherent 
forces within each human being that love liberty, seek to enhance their own powers 
or capacities, or strive for emancipation. . . . One no more needs a theory of agency 
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to account for resistance than one needs an epistemology to account for the 
production of truth effects. (p. 35) 
For Rose, the discourses and practices which subjectify individuals in conflicting 
ways are sufficient to explain why opposition to particular regimes arises. Further, 
the choice to call particular expressions of this conflict and opposition 
“resistance” is, he suggests, purely a matter of perspective. Such naming can only 
reflect the interests of those making the call, since poststructuralism allows no 
transcendental ethical position by which such judgments can be made. Rose’s 
argument on this point is compelling, but I suggest that to take a position on 
resistance does not equate to foundationalism. As outlined in the final section of 
this chapter (section 3.4), I stand in this project with others who take up 
poststructuralist ideas on behalf of ethical or political projects. I therefore find 
little value in a view of resistance which has no room for notions of agency, 
ethical positioning, or political struggle. Some readings of Foucault’s theorisation 
of power suggest that it leaves little hope of agentic change (Bleiker, 2003; de 
Certeau & Rendall, 1984; McNay, 1991). However, as I show in the final section 
of this chapter (section 3.4), Foucault himself expressed the purpose of his work 
precisely in terms of freedom and change. 
In contrast to Rose, Davies (1991) asserts that it is possible to give an 
account of agency without it being “any of the things that it is assumed to be in 
humanist thought” (p. 42). In fact, Davies and Harré (1990) suggest that it is a 
particular strength of the poststructuralist research paradigm that it recognises 
“both the constitutive effects of discourse, and in particular of discursive 
practices” and the possibility of people “exercising choice in relation to those 
practices” (p. 46). In this project, I am taking up this hopeful claim for 
poststructuralist approaches to research, and I see direct parallels between its two 
aspects and my two research questions. 
In what I have already outlined in this chapter concerning “the constitutive 
effects of discourse,” I have touched on several aspects of theory which speak to 
the question of agency. In what follows these are recalled, expanded, and 
connected with the notion of resistance. 
 
Agency and discursive complexity 
For most of the participants in this study, the Christian community in which the 
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events they describe took place was only one of several discursive contexts which 
had shaped their subjective experience. When people have complex discursive 
contexts and histories, their subjective experience often involves, as 
acknowledged above, a contradictory multiplicity of position calls (Bleiker, 2003; 
Davies, 1991; Davies et al., 1990). In this light, agency could be construed as a 
person’s capacity to recognise multiple positioning in such a way that no one form 
of discursive practice or positioning entirely captures or controls their 
subjectivity. Agency in this understanding does not stand outside of discourse. As 
Weedon (1997) observes, if the subjectivity of the individual is a site of discursive 
conflict, then “it is a battle in which the individual is an active but not sovereign 
protagonist” (p. 40). Armed with an awareness of how she or he is positioned 
within discourse, a person is able to utilise the space opened by multiplicity and 
contradiction to move and choose between discourses. Harré and Gillett (1994) 
qualify this picture of agency by suggesting that the conditions in which such 
awareness becomes available to people will influence their capacity to take up the 
possibilities available to them: “If . . . they are threatened for any departure from a 
relatively rigid set of signification, then one would expect them to be unable to 
profit from discursive diversity” (p. 127). 
How might a person become aware of their multiple positioning within 
discourse(s)? One avenue of awareness is through participation in deconstructive 
conversation, as in some poststructuralist forms of research, or in narrative 
therapy. Another is suggested by my earlier reference to the embodied effects of 
inscription. There I observed the effects of repeated positioning within a particular 
discourse, which linger even after an intellectual rejection of that discourse and 
complicate the process of change. These embodied effects of inscription can also 
play a positive role in supporting agency and resistance. When embodied 
experiences invite a person to question “what is going on,” they are more likely to 
become aware of being positioned within contradictory discourses and eventually 
to take up a more agentic position. This pattern is identified in my analyses of 
several interview transcripts (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), and explored further in my 
discussion in Chapter 8. 
This feature of embodied inscription shows that processes of subjectification 
can become self-subverting in ways that support agency and resistance. As Butler 
(1997) observes, “What is enacted by the subject is enabled but not finally 
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constrained by the prior working of power. Agency exceeds the power by which it 
is enabled. One might say that the purposes of power are not always the purposes 
of agency” (p. 15). Practices of self-surveillance and confession, for example, 
might also invite awareness of, and reflection, on what is happening in bodily 
terms. Similarly, Davies (2000) suggests that when people are subjectified in 
ways that construct mind/body binaries and privilege rationality, they 
can also learn how to use the very powers they gain through being subjected, to 
turn their reflexive gaze on the discursive practices and the habituated ways of 
being those practices make possible, making them both visible and revisable, and 
opening up the possibility of developing new ways of knowing. (p. 168) 
The discussion to this point has focused on the agency of individuals, based on 
their awareness of multiple and contradictory positioning. But in practice, life 
production and identity are relational achievements. The very notion of discursive 
positioning presumes a social context. Discursive positioning generally occurs 
within conversation, a process which unfolds “through the joint action of all the 
participants as they make (or attempt to make) their own and each other’s acts 
socially determinate” (Davies et al., 1990, p. 45). Drewery (2005) therefore pays 
particular attention to the relationship between agency and the use of language. 
Because language is primarily a social activity, “no single individual has complete 
control over the meanings that are conveyed by the language he or she uses” (p. 
319). Rather than thinking of agency as something possessed by individuals in 
isolation, therefore, it can be thought of actively and relationally, in terms of 
participation. Drewery suggests that “persons who are participants in the 
conversations that produce the meanings of their lives are in an agentive position” 
(p. 315). 
The concerns underlying this study, as reflected in the first research 
question, include discourses and practices of religious authority which position 
people as non-participants “in the conversations that produce the meanings of 
their lives.” In my analysis and discussion I show that repeated experiences of 
being positioned without agency (in Drewery’s participative sense) were integral 
to participants’ stories of discomfort, distress, and eventual resistance.  
 
Agency and re-authoring 
In discussing people’s storying of their lives as an aspect of subjectification, I 
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noted White’s argument that life-production and storying take place under 
“conditions of indeterminacy within determinacy.” From the point of view of a 
modernist concern for accuracy and definitive statements of the truth, notions of 
indeterminacy and intertextuality are problematic. As in a child’s whispering 
game, an originally true story—if such a thing existed—is progressively distorted 
and lost through repeated telling and retelling. In the same way, the endless 
variety of ways in which identity stories may be told, retold, and remade, would 
render the finding of a true self a hopeless quest. From the point of view of 
agentic resistance to hegemonic discursive regimes, however, indeterminacy and 
intertextuality are potential allies of hope and transformation. Like discursive 
complexity, indeterminacy contributes to the possibility of agency, where agency 
is expressed in preferring one telling of one’s own story over another. In narrative 
therapy, for example, this perspective is applied in helping clients to develop 
preferred identity narratives, and to take a position against problem-saturated 
stories of their lives and achievements (White, 2007). 
As noted already, some pessimistic readings of Foucault’s work suggest that 
it marginalises any possibility of creativity or change. White’s (1990) account of 
the relationship between discourse, power, subjectivity, and narrative provides a 
hopeful complementary perspective. He cites Geertz to make his point: 
For Geertz, the indeterminacy of texts and the constitutive aspect of the 
performance of texts provide good cause to celebrate: 
The wrenching question, sour and disabused, that Lionel Trilling somewhere 
quotes an eighteenth-century aesthetician as asking—“How Comes It that we all 
start out Originals and end up Copies?”—finds . . . an answer that is surprisingly 
reassuring: it is the copying that originates. (1986, p. 380; White et al., 1990, p. 
13). 
Christian writings and sermons are often replete with stories (from biblical and 
other sources) which people are encouraged to imitate in their own lives. The 
Imitatio Christi tradition, perhaps the best known example along these lines, calls 
on Christians to produce their lives in “imitation of Christ” (à Kempis, 1957). I 
noted this theme in the previous chapter, in referring to first century exhortations 
to church leaders to imitate the humility and servanthood of Christ in the exercise 
of their authority. 
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The language of some of my participants also reflected their recalled sense 
of obligation to produce their lives according to given narrative templates. Over 
time they found themselves resisting, or reconfiguring, aspects of these given 
versions of their lives. I view this kind of re-authoring activity as an example of 
Geertz’s “copying that originates.” As people negotiate the ambiguous and 
indeterminate aspects of the stories by which they perform the meaning of their 
lives, and as they draw on their lived experiences and their imaginations, this 
process of origination emerges (Epston et al., 1992, p. 100). Depending on the 
discourses with which they may be re-inscribed along the way, it is a process 
which offers the possibility of making agentic re-storying moves. 
More broadly, Davies (1991) links the idea of agency to authorship, in the 
sense of “speaking and writing in ways that are disruptive of current discourses” 
(p. 50). This is not authority on what Davies regards as male terms (claiming and 
enforcing knowledge), but an agentic mobilisation of existing discourses in new 
ways by “inverting, inventing and breaking old patterns . . . imagining not what is, 
but what might be” (p. 51; emphasis in the original). Nor is there any thought here 
of an agency which exists separately from discourse. A person’s ability to speak 
with this kind of authority “does not stem from the essence of the person in 
question but from the positions available to them within the discourses through 
which they take up their being” (p. 52). So while agency is the discursive 
constitution of a person as the “author of their own multiple meanings and 
desires,” this means being “a protagonist inside the storylines she is living out” 
(pp. 51-52). 
I suggest that Davies’ notion of agency as authority can be viewed as a 
further kind of intertextuality. I referred earlier to an intertextuality in which the 
dominant texts (discourses) of a person’s context act on, and through, the 
production of their own narratives. I also noted a second kind of intertextuality 
which occurs in the telling and retelling of their identity stories, as indeterminacy 
produces difference. Through the exercise of authority, as described by Davies, a 
third level of intertextuality can be recognised, in which the re-authoring of a 
person’s life story includes a creative subversion and reconstitution of the very 
texts (discourses) which previously defined the limits of that story. The subversive 
effects of this re-authoring process may then extend to influencing the way others 
are positioned by those same discourses. This hints at a fourth level of 
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intertextuality, in which others are recruited to re-authoring processes of their 
own, as a result of disturbances to the previously unquestioned discursive regimes 
within which they performed the meaning of their lives. I return to this idea 
below, in discussing the relationship between agency and resistance. 
 
Agency and resistance 
While my second research question is framed in terms of resistance rather than 
agency, I view these two ideas as closely related. Simply put, resistance is “a 
specific response to power tactics in a power relation” (Guilfoyle, 2002, p. 86), 
and I am interested in intentional responses which can be seen as an expression of 
agency. With regard to positioning, for example, to refuse a position call, or to 
assume a speaking position when none is offered, is an agentic act amounting to 
resistance. To re-author one’s life story in ways that depart from the plots 
constructed by the dominant social discourses of one’s context is an act of 
resistance. Resistance is embedded in Davies’ (1991) description of agency as the 
capacity to “resist, subvert and change the discourses themselves through which 
one is being constituted” (p. 51). 
In seeking to offer an account of my participants’ descriptions of resistance 
to religious authority, I therefore focus on aspects of their narratives which 
describe agentic responses to discursively produced strategies of power within 
their communities. In some cases, these were individual acts on behalf of gaining 
personal freedom from oppressive practices. Other accounts of resistance reflected 
a concern for others in the community. In a few instances, their acts of resistance 
reflected a desire “to change the discourses themselves,” to use Davies’ words. 
Even where such desire is not explicit, however, acts of resistance have the 
potential to make power visible. Taking up Foucault’s (1980) argument that 
“resistances . . . are formed right at the point where relations of power might be 
exercised” (p. 142), Guilfoyle (2005) notes that “resistance is often obvious and 
visible, while power works partly because it is hidden from view” (p. 107). Even 
small acts of resistance have the potential to attract notice (and notoriety) in a 
Christian community, and thus to provoke in others a questioning awareness of 
discourses and strategies of power that have previously been taken for granted. 
This is why, as I show in the re-presentation of several of the participants’ 
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accounts, those who resist are often “quarantined,” before they “contaminate” 
others. 
The potential for individual acts of resistance to make visible and subvert 
previously unquestioned discursive regimes connects with the fourth kind of 
intertextuality I proposed earlier. When people engage in resistance and the re-
authoring of their lives, then there is the potential for the discursive regimes of 
their contexts to be unsettled, opening space for others to make their own re-
authoring moves. As I have declared from the beginning, my hopes in undertaking 
this project include this kind of unsettling of the regimes of power and knowledge 
which subvert freedom and justice in Christian communities. In methodological 
terms, I view my re-presentations and analyses of the participants’ stories of 
resistance as a strategy for change within Christian communities. As the product 
of my engagement with those stories, the text that is this thesis is both a product 
of, and a contribution to, this fourth kind of intertextuality. 
 
In this section I have explored theoretical perspectives on the possibility of agency 
and resistance, given poststructuralist understandings of discourse, power and 
subjectivity. These perspectives are integral to the research methodology outlined 
in the next chapter, and therefore to my re-presentations of the participants’ 
stories in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The light they shed on these stories in relation to 
my second research question, concerning the possibility and production of 
resistance, is discussed in Chapter 8 (section 8.3). 
 
3.4 Ethical stance: freedom and justice 
In this final section of the chapter, I outline more fully the ethical ideas that 
produced the concerns out of which this project arose. The aim of this discussion 
is to give greater precision to the terms “freedom” and “justice” as used in my 
first research question. These ideas inform (i) the issues of concern which are 
named in that first question, (ii) what I hope to promote through presenting the 
results of my discursive narrative analysis of the participants’ stories of resistance 
to religious authority, and (iii) the way in which I have approached the task of 
research itself. Here I deal with the first two issues. The third is addressed in the 
next chapter, where I discuss various reflexive strategies intended to help keep my 
research process in line with the dialogic ethical stance developed in this section. 
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The first two sections of this chapter highlight the ways in which human 
lives are produced in social contexts in which power relations, discursive 
positioning, and processes of subjectification are inescapable. This picture 
contrasts with other paradigms in which power is considered to be something 
people can possess, give away and take back. As St Pierre (2000) notes, within 
such an understanding, power “is often thought to be evil; therefore, those 
concerned with social justice often try to give away some of their power to avoid 
domination; they try to ‘empower’ those less fortunate than themselves” (pp. 488-
489). 
Foucault’s compelling account of the inescapability of power relations 
shows the inadequacy of these ideas about power, yet the concern for social 
justice is something which many poststructuralist writers take up. How is this 
concern for social justice to be expressed, if not in humanist terms? Parker (1992, 
p. 99) cautions against the temptation to assume that “a simple turn to language,” 
that is, an abstract focus on discourse, will relieve the material constraints that 
affect people’s lives. He therefore speaks of the challenge of retrieving “the values 
of humanism from the traditional functions of humanist discourse” (p. 99). In so 
far as this means seeking to address the harmful effects (material, social, and 
psychological) of certain arrangements of power, truth regimes and subjugating 
practices, I want to take up Parker’s challenge. It is precisely that ethical concern, 
summarised in my first research question in terms of “freedom and justice,” and 
applied to the particular case of religious authority, which underpins this project. 
I referred to freedom and justice in rather general terms in my first chapter, 
mentioning resonances between my concerns in this project and the biblical 
traditions on which Martin Luther King Junior drew, in his call to “let freedom 
ring.” But similar resonances are claimed on behalf of other projects, including 
humanistic approaches to psychology focused on “empowerment” and 
“emancipation” of the individual. Sampson (1993) suggests that at the height of 
the humanistic movement, a linking of “Eastern religion and philosophy with the 
Western way of self-contained individualism produced a formula in which the 
individual’s ego seemed to stand in the way of achieving a fully actualized self” 
(p. 58). He draws a powerful contrast between the kind of freedom sought by this 
individualistic movement and others’ simultaneous struggle for basic civil rights. 
60 
While the African-American population was listening to Martin Luther King 
Junior’s call to be “free at last, free at last”, the humanistic movement also led its 
cheers on behalf of becoming “free at last, free at last”. The words may have been 
the same, but the aims could hardly be more different. One group was trying to rise 
up to full citizenship and respect after decades of oppression, and joined together in 
a genuinely cooperative movement of mutual caring and aid. The other group, 
already living at the top, still felt empty and so found appeal in a message that gave 
each one of them, on his or her own, and without much consideration for anyone 
else, permission to probe their insides, discover their selves and express everything 
that was truly theirs: a genuinely Dionysian feast for the self. (p. 58) 
As a way of differentiating my own ethical stance from the humanist project, I 
find it useful to connect the language of justice and freedom to ethical positions 
articulated by Derrida, Levinas, Foucault, and Sampson. In what follows I explore 
and elaborate on those connections, and give greater precision to the way I am 
using these terms in this study. 
 
Derrida, Levinas, justice and relation to the other 
In a published roundtable conversation, Derrida (1997) reflects on the difference 
between legal and social forms of justice, and highlights relation to the other as 
being at the heart of what he means by justice. 
I cannot know that I am just. I can know that I am right. I can see that I act in 
agreement with norms, with the law. . . . But that does not mean that I am just. To 
speak of justice is not a matter of knowledge, of theoretical judgment. That’s why 
it’s not a matter of calculation. . . . Justice, if it is to do with the other, with the 
infinite distance of the other, is always unequal to the other, is always incalculable. 
You cannot calculate justice. Levinas says somewhere that the definition of 
justice—which is very minimal but which I love, which I think is really rigorous—
is that justice is the relation to the other. That is all. Once you relate to the other as 
the other, then something incalculable comes on the scene, something which 
cannot be reduced to the law or to the history of legal structures. (pp. 17-18) 
Levinas (1999), whom Derrida acknowledges here, offers an evocative image 
when he speaks of encountering the face of the other. It is in face-to-face 
encounter with the other that people are led beyond themselves and can become 
sensible of their unconditional ethical obligation to the other. 
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I have always described the face of the neighbour as the bearer of an order, 
imposing upon me, with respect to the other, a gratuitous and non-transferable 
responsibility, as if the I were chosen and unique—and in which the other were 
absolutely other, i.e. still incomparable, and thus unique. (p. 170) 
In the language of Martin Buber, this is “I–Thou” encounter, as opposed to “I–It” 
(Buber & Kaufmann, 1970). In contrast, the application of abstract rules by 
political or legal systems in ways which prevent “the face of the other . . . from 
being recognised,” and which assign to human beings an “anonymous 
individuality,” de-faces the other and risks totalitarianism (Levinas, 1999, p. 176). 
Beals (2007) suggests that for Levinas, “the Other is irreducible to any category of 
thought—the Other always exceeds any concept I might try to use to ‘capture’ or 
understand her” (p. 4). 
While it would be simplistic to equate these ideas to understandings of 
justice derived from the religious texts of Judaism and Christianity, it is possible 
that they share a common genealogy of ideas, especially in light of the Jewish 
heritage shared by Derrida, Levinas, and Buber. Parry and Doan (1994) suggest 
that in critiquing western philosophical thought (with its quest for universality), 
and focusing his ethical challenge on relation to the Other, Levinas recalled “the 
point of view of the Biblical prophetic tradition that recalls each person to the 
Other’s absolute claim of responsibility upon him/her” (p. 31). In the roundtable 
conversation referred to above, Caputo (Derrida et al., 1997) similarly describes 
the resonance he experiences between Derrida’s description of justice and  
“biblical notions of justice and care for singularity, as opposed to the 
philosophical notion, where justice is defined in terms of universality, of the 
blindness of justice” (p. 20). Derrida’s (1997) response to this observation is that 
he has “no stable position” on the biblical texts, but can “receive the most 
necessary provocations” from them, as well as from Plato and other texts (p. 21). 
The ethical position which I take up in this project reflects my own sense of 
the resonance between biblical traditions of justice and Levinas’ call for 
unconditional respect for the otherness of the other. A lack of such respect is 
integral to practices of religious authority which characterised both the stories 
which motivated this project (heard in the context of my work) and the stories of 
the participants. I hear these as stories of injustice. If justice is about relating to 
the other as other, then regimes of power which disregard, incorporate, or erase 
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the otherness of the other are unjust. It is in support of just practices of religious 
authority that I re-present the participants’ stories of resistance to religious 
authority in ways that attempt to shine a light on the discursive construction of 
injustice (Chapters 5, 6, and 7). In this I find a further resonance with Derrida 
(1997), in his explanation of the ethical intent he holds in deconstruction: 
That is what gives deconstruction its movement, that is, constantly to suspect, to 
criticize the given determinations of culture, of institutions, of legal systems, not in 
order to destroy them or simply to cancel them, but to be just with justice, to 
respect this relation to the other as justice. (p. 18) 
There is more I want to say to round out this account of justice as regard for the 
otherness of the other, and it has to do with the conduct of relationship to the 
other. My first inclination is to say that this means something like, “seeking the 
good of the other.” Yet that is problematic, since the good of the other may not be 
what I think it is. Imposing one’s own version of the good, on one’s own terms, 
may in fact disregard the otherness of the other. What the good might mean is, as 
Derrida (1997) asserts, “something incalculable . . . something which cannot be 
reduced to the law or to the history of legal structures” (pp. 17-18). 
Before returning to the question of what kind of regard for the other is 
implied in my ethical positioning, I consider the notion of “freedom.” 
 
Foucault, freedom and participatory agency 
If Derrida named justice as integral to his deconstructive project, Foucault (1988), 
in a 1982 interview, pointed to freedom as a goal for his work: 
My role—and that is too emphatic a word—is to show people that they are much 
freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which 
have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called 
evidence can be  criticized and destroyed. To change something in the minds of 
people—that’s the role of an intellectual. (p. 10) 
This statement begs the question, “freedom for what?” In the later stages of 
Foucault’s career, the answer, according to one of his colleagues at least, seems to 
have been freedom for the self to produce the self as an aesthetic project: 
Clearly no one will charge him with aspiring to renew the Stoic ethics of the 
Greeks. . . . In a sempiternal new deal, time endlessly redistributes the cards. 
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Foucault’s affinity with ancient morality is reduced to the modern reappearance of 
a single card in a completely new hand: the card of the self working on the self, an 
aesthicization of the subject, in two very different moralities and two very different 
societies. (Veyne, Porter, & Davidson, 1993, p. 2) 
Winslade (2009), drawing on Deleuze’s (1995) reading of Foucault, agrees that 
there is in the Foucault later work an emphasis on “care of the self” and an 
“assertion of life” against regimes of power/knowledge which constrain the 
possibilities of life production: 
Deleuze attributes to Foucault the working through of an analysis of power 
relations during the course of his academic career to the point where he reached an 
impasse. His admiration for Foucault’s achievement lies especially in the latter’s 
working through of this impasse to a place of joyful assertion of life, especially in 
his later work about the care of the self. For Deleuze, Foucault . . . writes with an 
increasing sense of joy . . . the joy of wanting to destroy whatever mutilates life. 
. . . It is the pursuit of such joy that animates Foucault’s writing and Deleuze’s 
reading of Foucault. (p. 337) 
I have a mixed response to the idea that the freedom which Foucault pursued was 
the freedom to produce one’s life as a work of art. On the one hand, I resonate 
with an ethic of freedom on behalf of life and creativity. It evokes for me some 
positive intertextualities with biblical themes of shalom (the Hebrew word for the 
kind of peace which enables life to flourish) and Christian texts which proclaim 
release to captives (Luke 4:18) and an abundance of life (John 10:10). For many 
of the participants in this project, it was precisely the lack of such freedom which 
provoked their resistance to the practices of religious authority in their 
communities. On the other hand, I find that talk of “the self working on the self” 
too readily evokes the humanist identification of freedom with the autonomy of 
the individual. It takes me to Sampson’s critique of the pursuit of this kind of 
freedom as a “Dionysian feast for the self.” White (2002) argues that the later 
Foucault’s emphasis on the care of the self as “ethically prior” was not at odds 
with the need to attend ethically to one’s relationship to others. He therefore 
extends Foucault’s language of the care of the self to “self- and relationship-
forming activities” (p. 75). I am not sure that this is clear in the writings of 
Foucault himself. 
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Whether or not White is justified in finding a relational ethic in the later 
Foucault, I want to take up the latter’s poststructuralist strategy for freedom on 
behalf of life production, but to be clear that, in my own ethical stance, this is not 
primarily about the production of an individual self. In this regard, I stand with 
poststucturalist feminists such as Davies and Drewery in their relational accounts 
of agency, as outlined in the previous section. In construing agency as authority, 
Davies (1991, p. 51) does speak of freedom: “the freedom to recognise multiple 
readings such that no discursive practice, or positioning within it by powerful 
others, can capture and control one’s identity.” But it is clear that such freedom is 
not an individualistic form of autonomy. 
The model of the person being developed here is of an embodied speaker who at 
the same time constitutes and is constituted by the discursive practices of the 
collectives of which they are a member. Each person speaks from the positions 
made available within those collectives through the recognised discourses used by 
that collective, and has desires made relevant by those discourses. (p. 51) 
Drewery’s (2005, p. 315) description of agency, cited earlier in this chapter, is 
even more explicitly relational: “Persons who are participants in the conversations 
that produce the meanings of their lives are in an agentive position.” This 
participatory emphasis stands against humanist notions of the sovereign individual 
self, since “it is a concept that necessarily draws upon the collaborative (rather 
than individual) production of forms of language as forms of life” (p. 315). On 
this view, a person cannot act agentically in isolation from others: 
Thus to be positioned agentively is to be an actor in a web of relationship with 
others who are also engaged in coproducing the conditions of their lives. Such 
agency does not therefore afford us the freedom to do what we like. Indeed, we 
never have complete control or autonomy. (pp. 315-316) 
Drewery suggests that to act agentically on the world is “less like being the cue 
that moves the first billiard ball, and more like throwing your two cents worth into 
a conversation among several people” (p. 316).  
It is this participatory view of agency, rather than the notion of a self 
autonomously producing itself, which informs the use of the word “freedom” in 
my first research question. This is also the kind of freedom I have in mind when I 
refer to biblical texts of freedom. Such texts were produced in cultural contexts in 
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which individualistic notions of the self, or the autonomy of the self, would have 
seemed strange. As I show in my findings and discussion chapters, an 
understanding of freedom as participatory agency also resonates with the ethical 
hopes and intentions which the participants in this study held for the production of 
their lives within their religious communities. None of them named the intentions 
which informed their resistance in terms of gaining autonomy or control. 
So this project is undertaken on behalf of an ethic of freedom—the freedom 
for people to participate in the conversations which produce the meanings of their 
lives. As with the ethic of justice, there is more that needs to be said about the 
relational quality of that participation. Many of the participants in this study were 
offered opportunities for conversation which left them feeling more constrained 
than ever in the production of their lives. In order to address the question of what 
kind of conversational participation, and what kind of regard for the other, are 
implied by the ethic of freedom and justice I take up in this project, I turn finally 
to the notion of dialogic power relations. 
 
Sampson and dialogic power relations 
Drawing heavily on the ideas of Bakhtin (1981), Shotter (1990), and feminist 
authors including Code (1991), Sampson (1993) argues that life and ethics are 
relational accomplishments which, if they are to be justly accomplished, require 
unconditional celebration of the other. He describes this as a “dialogic” approach 
to relationship: “two separable presences, each coming from its own standpoint, 
expressing and enacting its own particular specificity” (p. 15). Sampson’s account 
of dialogic relationship presumes an understanding of subjectivity which is 
entirely consistent with the theoretical position I have developed in this chapter: 
The dialogic position challenges the primary Western understanding of ownership 
over one’s own psychology, over one’s mind, self and personality. Although, when 
I speak, it is my vocal chords that are vibrating, the voices which I use—the words, 
if you will—are never mine alone. . . . Furthermore, we not only speak in many 
voices but participate in a process that is always jointly constructed and jointly 
sustained or transformed. How can I own myself, my mind or my personality, if all 
that is presumably mine requires you for its completion? (p. 135) 
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Sampson contrasts dialogic encounter with “monologic” or self-celebratory 
interactions, in which the other and the other’s interests are given regard only 
insofar as they are “serviceable” to the interests of the dominant party: 
When I construct a you designed to meet my needs and desires, a you that is 
serviceable for me, I am clearly engaging in a monologue as distinct from a 
dialogue. Although you and I may converse together, in most respects the you with 
whom I am interacting has been constructed with me in mind. Your sole function 
has been to serve and service me. (p. 4) 
The serviceable other may speak, but only on the terms prescribed by the 
dominant discourse. Monologic power relations are therefore antithetical to the 
kind of participation envisaged in Drewery’s account of agency. As Sampson 
observes, “merely having a voice is not sufficient if that voice must speak in a 
register that is alien to its own specificity, and in so doing lose its desires and 
interests (p. 11). 
If dialogic power relations are essential to an ethic of freedom, where 
freedom is understood in terms of participatory agency, the same can be said for 
justice and Levinasian regard for the other. Shotter (2005) speaks of the need for 
us to “appreciate that another being has a life of its own, not independently of us, 
but in relation to us” (p. 129). When “the you with whom I am interacting has 
been constructed with me in mind,” then the specific otherness of the other has 
been lost. Paré (2012, p. 20) suggests that because people’s ways of making 
meaning constitute their lived realities, the question of who gets to define 
meaning is an issue of social justice. The notion of dialogic relationship therefore 
gives some specificity to justice as the call to have regard for the other. It offers a 
way of speaking about the good—a relational good—without calling on 
monologically prescribed definitions of what is good for the other. 
Some authors turn to narrative, image, or metaphor to evoke a sense of what 
this dialogic quality of relationship means. These modes of description avoid 
paradigmatic formulations and allow for spontaneous and creative applications in 
particular encounters. Sampson (2003), for example, following Levinas and 
drawing on the biblical narratives of the Jewish heritage which he shares with 
Levinas, advocates “unconditional kindness to strangers” as a bedrock ethic for 
human sociality and dialogism. In searching for a metaphor to express this, he 
considers “the caretaking metaphor most apt; for example, parent-child, teacher-
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student, gardener-garden, and so forth” (p. 168). He argues that this metaphor 
implies an unconditional, non-reciprocal obligation to seek the well-being of the 
other.  
Drewery (2005) supports the intention of Sampson’s argument for the 
caretaking metaphor, but finds it problematic due to gendered presuppositions 
about power relations with which notions of care and parenting are inscribed. I 
would add that within religious communities there are further problems in using 
the caretaking metaphor. In addition to its gendered associations, such as those 
alluded to by Drewery, “pastoral care” is sometimes alloyed with notions of 
pastoral authority which are far from dialogic. Drewery’s own preference is for 
the metaphor of hospitality for strangers, arguing that this 
enables us to see and perhaps deal more clearly with the power valences involved 
in a contextualized relationship of care. In addition, this metaphor does not 
presume that we necessarily know what will count as care in any particular meeting 
of strangers, only what the offerers of hospitality count as care; and more 
importantly, the notion of hospitality invites a sense of space, and an ongoing 
relationship with place and cultural context. It also begins with an assumption of 
difference. (p. 309) 
The metaphor of hospitality is closely allied with the biblical tradition of kindness 
to strangers on which Levinas draws, and is consistent with Sampson’s emphasis 
on caretaking. Rather than opting for one controlling metaphor, however, I 
suggest that maintaining a plurality and a fluidity of metaphors is useful in 
conveying an open-ended sense of unconditional responsibility to pursue dialogic 
ways of relating to the other. In responding to another who is helplessly suffering 
extreme pain or deprivation, the caretaking metaphor may be apt. In responding to 
a client in the counselling room, hospitality may be a more helpful notion, in view 
of the power differential implied in caretaking. 
In the context of this study, which centres particularly on the use of 
religious authority in Christian communities, it is in the pursuit of dialogic power 
relations that the ideas of justice and freedom which inform this project come 
together. Dialogic encounter supports justice, where justice is understood as 
acting with respect for the otherness of other. Dialogic encounter supports 
freedom, where freedom is understood as people having the opportunity to 
participate, using their own voices, in the conversations and processes which 
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produce the meanings of their lives. I am not suggesting that this provides a 
comprehensive view of freedom and justice, but it captures both what is ethically 
important about this research, and what I have learned from the participants, 
whose own ethical hopes and desires emerged as an important theme in my 
analysis (see section 8.1). 
 
3.5 Concluding comments 
In this chapter I have outlined the theoretical and ethical orientation of this study. 
The major theoretical ideas have been located in Foucault’s analysis of the 
relationships between discourse, power and subjectivity. I have drawn on these 
ideas in engaging with various perspectives on the discursive production of 
identity, and with poststructuralist discussions concerning the possibility of 
agency and resistance. The ethical concerns which gave rise to this project have 
been connected with a dialogic approach to the notions of justice and freedom. 
This work provides the foundation for my research methodology, my analysis and 
discursive re-presentation of the participants’ narratives, and the concluding 
discussion. In the next chapter, I explain discursive narrative analysis, my 
approach to reflexivity as a researcher, and the design and method of my research. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology and Design 
 
In the previous chapter I established a rigorous theoretical and ethical framework 
within which to approach my two main research questions: 
“Within Christian communities, how is it that some regimes of power and 
knowledge can subvert the call to freedom and justice which is pervasive in 
longstanding streams of Christian tradition?”  
“What has enabled some people to resist the practices of religious authority 
constructed by such regimes?” 
I now offer an account of my research methodology and design. Using a semi-
structured interview format, I invited ten people3 to talk about their experiences of 
religious authority and their efforts to resist practices of religious authority which 
had affected their lives in adverse ways. The transcriptions of these interview 
conversations provided the narrative data which became the focus of my analysis. 
This analysis has two aspects. First, I offer a selective re-presentation of the 
narrative development of each account (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), identifying aspects 
of the accounts which bear most directly on my research questions, and 
identifying their discursive aspects for further discussion. Second, in Chapter 8, I 
step back from the stories, and from the subjectivities of the narrators, to reflect 
critically on what has been shown in relation to the original research questions. 
I refer to this methodology as “discursive narrative analysis.” While this 
term is not commonly used in the qualitative research literature, there are a 
number of exponents of narrative inquiry who attend to the social and discursive 
production of narrative (Chase, 2003; Peterson et al., 2006; Riessman, 2002, 
2003; Smith et al., 2008; Sparkes et al., 2007; Taylor, 2005, 2007). As a 
descriptive label, “discursive narrative analysis” has occasionally been applied to 
studies which draw on discursive psychology and more technical, linguistically 
oriented, forms of discourse analysis (Georgakopoulou, 2007; Moissinac, 2007; 
Polanyi, 1985). However, as I make clear in the next section, I do not draw on 
these technical approaches to discourse analysis in this project. 
In developing this methodology, I have discovered that its dual focus on 
narrative and discourse, familiar to narrative therapists, creates a number of 
                                                 
3
 Of these ten stories, nine are included in this thesis, for reasons explained in section 4.3 below. 
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challenges for researchers. Some poststructuralist writers are concerned that the 
inclusion of a narrative focus may result in social and discursive perspectives 
being overwhelmed by prevalent cultural identities, interpretations, and genres 
associated with the telling of personal stories in western humanist contexts. I 
provide a detailed discussion of, and response to, such concerns in the next 
section. 
 
4.1 Discursive narrative analysis 
Narrative research which draws on constructionist ideas is, as Smith and Sparkes 
(2007) observe, “a varied, ongoing, and contested enterprise” (p. 296). There are 
no ready-made formulae for undertaking narrative analysis with a discursive 
focus. In this section I therefore develop my own version of this methodology. To 
this end, I set out my understanding of narrative, clarify my approach to discourse 
analysis, and reflect on key aspects of the social construction of narrative. I then 
summarise my discursive narrative analytical strategies in table form (Table 1).  
 
What is narrative? 
There is, according to Riessman (1993), “a considerable disagreement about the 
precise definition of narrative” (p. 17). As indicated in Chapter 1, I view narrative 
as talk (whether spoken or written) which has the intention of telling about life 
and events (Riessman, 1993, p. 17). As Murray (2003) asserts, narratives are 
performed as a way of giving structure and meaning to our lives: “we tell stories 
about our lives to ourselves and others. As such we create a narrative identity” (as 
cited in Sparkes, 2005, p. 192). Conventionally, the structure of an individual 
narrative has a beginning, middle, and end. These are the rudimentary elements of 
plot, or storyline, which help to impart a sense of continuity and meaning to a 
narrative. According to Riessman (2002), “Narration is distinguished by ordering 
and sequence; one action is viewed as consequential for the next. Narrators create 
plots from disordered experience” (p. 698). Chronological order is a common way 
of structuring of narrative, although the linking of events may be achieved in other 
ways, such as consequential or thematic ordering (Riessman, 1993, p. 17). This 
variety of ways of ordering narrative was evident in my interviews with 
participants. Sometimes I would ask a “what happened then?” question, only to be 
answered with an account of an earlier event, presumably because the earlier 
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event was important for the person to relate in giving shape and significance to 
their narrative. Besides words, meaning may be conveyed by narrators’ use of 
tone, volume, silence, body language, repetition and other means. Finally, a 
narrative is not simply an individual performance, but is co-produced in the 
context of the relationship between narrator and listener/interviewer, and within a 
larger social setting (Riessman, 1993, pp. 20-21; Sparkes, 2005, p. 193). 
The field of narrative analysis is vast and multi-faceted (Atkinson & 
Delamont, 2007; Bamberg, 1997; Chase, 2003; Czarniawska, 2002; Fischer & 
Goblirsch, 2007; Gergen & Gergen, 2006; Gubrium & Holstein, 2009; Josselson, 
2007; Josselson, Lieblich, & McAdams, 2003; Peterson et al., 2006; Riessman, 
1993, 2002; Sparkes, 2005; Sparkes et al., 2007). There are many potential 
avenues of narrative analysis which I will not be pursuing, because my interest is 
primarily in the discourses which are discernible in the narratives produced 
through my interviews with participants. In other words, in naming my 
methodology as discursive narrative analysis, the accent is on discourse, with 
narrative providing the ground within which I prospect for discursive material.  
In the previous chapter (section 3.2), I explored the ways in which subjects 
and subjectivity are produced by discourse, through processes of positioning, 
embodied inscription, self-surveillance and confession, mastery and subjection, 
and storying and intertextuality. Careful analysis of narratives, paying particular 
attention to traces of such processes in the ways events are remembered and 
retold, can help to shed light on the discursive regimes which produced them. It is 
these traces I am listening for through the various iterations of my work with the 
transcripts, as described below (section 4.3). There is a resonance here with what 
Davies et al (2002) have to say about the implicit knowledges and rationalities 
which emerge when close attention is paid to accounts of lived experiences. 
Describing their own work on the “archaeology of the everyday” in a collective 
biography exercise, the authors explain that in 
choosing to examine gendered social relations in our memories, we do not intend to 
rail against the powers of patriarchal oppression, but rather to look . . . at the forms 
of rationality through which the particular relations of power manifested in our 
memories are constituted and maintained. (p. 299) 
In discussing the storying of subjectivity, I suggested in the previous chapter that 
the telling and re-telling of stories, together with a researcher’s own re-telling, 
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involves multiple layers of intertextuality. The first kind of intertextuality 
concerns the way people produce the narratives of their lives in relation to stories 
and other discursive texts within their cultural contexts. A second layer of 
intertextuality is implied by the way that each new performance of a story 
includes an element of indeterminacy as it “encapsulates, and expands upon the 
previous telling” (White et al., 1990, p. 13). In the context of a research interview, 
such re-tellings are co-productions, meaning that the researcher’s own stories 
influence (and are influenced by) this second aspect of intertextuality. I put 
forward Davies’ notion of authority as a third kind of intertextuality, in which an 
agentic re-authoring of one’s identity and life narrative may subvert and 
reconstitute the very texts (discourses) which previously defined the limits of 
those narratives (thus troubling the first layer of intertextuality). When this re-
authoring process influences the ways in which others perform their identities and 
life narratives, then a fourth layer of intertextuality may be discerned.  
I also suggested in the previous chapter that the research story told in this 
thesis is both an outcome of, and a potential furtherance of, this fourth kind of 
intertextuality. Describing my role in those terms understates the editorial and 
interpretative power which I exercise in re-presenting the participants’ stories. My 
intention has been to exercise that power with respect for their hopes in 
participating in this project, but it remains the case that what I present is my own 
performance. This performance may be viewed as a fifth kind of intertextuality, in 
which my own life narrative and interests are active in shaping my re-presentation 
of the participants’ stories. As I have declared throughout the previous chapters, 
this is not a neutral or objective re-telling, but rather a strategy pursued on behalf 
of freedom and justice in Christian communities (see sections 1.2, 2.4, and 3.4). 
 
Discourse analysis 
Here I want to locate the discursive aspect of my approach to discursive narrative 
analysis within the variety of approaches which share the description discourse 
analysis. I have indicated already that I am not utilising a linguistic/conversational 
form of discourse analysis. Following Parker (2005), I also distinguish my 
approach to discourse analysis from a merely thematic form of analysis. I do note 
and discuss themes which are present in several of the interview narratives. But 
where thematic analysis focuses mainly on the meanings which words and phrases 
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have for those who are using them, discourse analysis is interested in “how words 
and phrases are linked at the level of discourse” and in the effects which the terms 
have may have “beyond what people immediately mean by them” (Parker, 2005, 
p. 99). Like narrative analysis, this kind of discourse analysis cannot be reduced to 
techniques to be applied in a formulaic manner (Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor, 
& Tindall, 1994). Finlay (as cited by Frohmann, 1994)  suggests that 
discourse analysis is the study of the way in which an object or idea, any object or 
idea, is taken up by various institutions and epistemological positions, and of the 
way in which those institutions and positions treat it. (p. 121) 
I approach discourse analysis as the study of a text, a point of view, a position 
call, a social practice, a performance, an embodied response—or a representation 
of any of these—in terms of the discourses which (a) have constructed it, (b) are 
reproduced by it, and (c) support the relations of power implied by it. This 
understanding of discourse analysis is informed by Foucault’s theorisation of 
discourse and power, as outlined in the previous chapter (section 3.1), as well as 
by the writings of other poststructuralist authors cited there.   
As with my re-presentation of the interview narratives, I undertake 
discourse analysis with a critical intention and on behalf of change. This is not to 
say that my main aim is to portray churches in general, or their leaders, in a 
negative light. Critique, as Foucault (2001) suggests, “consists in seeing on what 
type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of 
thinking the accepted practices are based” (p. 456). The original appeal of taking a 
discourse analytical approach to the issue of religious authority was its usefulness 
for “showing how powerful images of the self and the world circulate in society 
. . . and for opening a way to question and resist those images” (Parker, 2005, pp. 
88-89). To transpose Parker’s words into this project’s key, and to be explicit 
about the kinds of discourses I want to analyse, I turn to discourse analysis in the 
hope of shining a light on the ways in which powerful ideas about religious 
authority circulate and position people within some Christian communities, and of 
opening space for people in those communities to reconsider and resist those 
ideas. 
Speaking of my ethical intentions in the research touches on one of the 
tensions entailed in utilising a narrative form of research on behalf of enquiry into 
discursively produced social issues. As Koro-Ljungberg (2007) notes, research 
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which draws on constructionist ideas requires an approach to interview narratives 
that “involves looking at both the whats of the content and the hows of the 
production” (p. 431; emphasis in the original). Content that raises compelling 
ethical issues can divert attention from the hows of discursive production, with the 
result that narrative accounts may be treated as empirical evidence, heroic tales of 
individual achievement, or exemplars of universally applicable themes. While 
respecting the position of Atkinson and Delamont (2006), who call on narrative 
researchers to “sustain a commitment to an analytic stance, and not a celebratory 
one” (p. 169), I stand with others who argue that narrative analysis can shed light 
on historically located discourses, practices and power relations in ways that 
provoke ethical reflection and response (Smith, 1993; Sparkes et al., 2007). 
Riessman (2002) argues that work with personal narratives offers a powerful 
strategy in the study of social movements. In support of this, she cites the 
potential for storytelling to counteract abstraction, bridge gaps between 
institutional discourse and the language of people’s everyday lives, and gather 
communities of action. 
Having clarified my understanding of narrative, and my approach to the 
analysis of discourse, I now consider more closely the social construction of 
narrative and the bearing this has on my approach to analysis. 
 
The social construction of narrative 
As a meaning-making performance, narration is a discursive activity. The social 
construction of narrative is reflected in Parker’s (2005) suggestion that narrative 
can be viewed as “the performance of the self as a story of identity,” with this 
performance being constructed from “cultural resources” (p. 71). Similarly, Smith 
(1993) refers to the “dialogic encounter of subject and culture” which personal 
narrative entails (p. 395). Smith’s description underlines two of the elements in 
Parker’s view of narrative: the subjectivity which seeks life-shape and a sense of 
identity on the one hand, and the dynamic of discursive production implied by 
“cultural resources” on the other. Given these discursive aspects of what narrative 
is and does, I want to highlight the importance of three particular relationships 
within the social construction of narrative which inform my approach to 
discursive narrative analysis: (i) history and materiality, (ii) discourse and power 
relations, and, at greater length, (iii) social and individual subjectivities. While 
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these three areas are closely interrelated, I address them separately in order to 
highlight the relevance of each to my methodology, and also as an opportunity to 
name specific challenges which each poses for a discursively focused approach to 
narrative analysis. 
 
i History and materiality 
Drawing on Parker (section 1.3) and Foucault (section 3.2), I have acknowledged 
in earlier chapters that discourses develop, and have material effects, within 
particular historical and social conditions. Language and narrative also are rooted 
in bodily capabilities and situated in history. Pfohl (2007) suggests that it is 
through the symbolic constructions of language that “humans act economically to 
reduce the chaos of material flux to relatively stable categories of meaning” (p. 
649). While narratives, as social constructions, can never be said transparently to 
represent the “truth” about materiality or historical conditions, they are 
constructed in and concern “the world of living energetic matter” which exerts 
itself in ways that have real effects (p. 651). As Koro-Ljungberg (2007) observes, 
materiality and embodiment are therefore present in all social interactions, 
including the research interview. 
Additionally, knowing subjects are not only discursive and psychological social 
beings who construct their sense of selves in relation to discourses and other 
individuals, but they are also embodied subjects who have a sense of physical 
body, emotional self, and biological function. Thus it is important to highlight that 
all knowing subjects are constituted by the historical and cultural context of the 
interview and the other subjects involved. As a result, power and materiality are 
ever-present conditions that shape the interview and the relational selves of 
knowing subjects. (p. 432) 
These acknowledgements of materiality—sometimes overlooked in the narrative 
literature—are important for my research. The embodied effects of positioning, 
for example, feature as a recurring theme in several of the participants’ accounts. 
Sparkes and Smith (2007) assert that, “we not only tell stories about our bodies, 
but we also tell stories out of and through our bodies; the body is simultaneously 
cause, topic, and instrument of whatever story is told” (p. 302; emphasis in the 
original). My approach to discursive narrative analysis therefore includes paying 
attention to participants’ descriptions of their embodied responses to being 
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positioned within the dominant discourses of religious authority. My assumption 
is that traces of those discourses, and of other, perhaps subjugated, knowledges, 
may be discerned in these descriptions. 
In paying attention to historical materiality, I include the significance of 
events which are the subject of narrative. While eschewing any suggestion of 
naïve realism, Parker (2005) argues that 
narrative research is concerned with how someone relates events that are about 
something; that thing may be disturbing or incomprehensible, or it may be an event 
that brought about an unexpected change that was then viewed, or is now viewed, 
as positive. We term this thing event, and we mean by that something that intrudes 
or hinders, but which also then becomes a necessary reference point for the 
narrative. In this way narrative research makes salient the embodied material 
character of human life. . . . But, this positive or negative event is always seen as 
interpreted by the subject as agent, as woven into a certain causal structure, as 
understood in relation to other events and narrated within a particular kind of plot. 
(p. 73) 
Unsurprisingly, given the nature of my interview questions, all of my participants 
spoke of particular historical events in relation to their experiences of, and 
resistance to, religious authority. Their narratives cannot be regarded as providing 
access to these events, other than through discursively produced interpretations 
and plots (Davies et al., 2007). In analysing these accounts, some of which 
describe disturbing experiences, I am aware of the challenge of keeping this 
discursive perspective firmly in view. Nonetheless, the very existence of the 
narratives themselves is an effect, as Parker notes, of something “that intrudes or 
hinders.” In undertaking discursive narrative analysis, I seek to locate and 
understand this “something” in terms of the social and discursive contexts which 
produced the effect, and in relation to the participants’ ethical hopes and 
intentions which produced a sense of intrusion or hindrance. 
In addition, I pay particular attention to connections between the 
participants’ stories, where similar patterns of intrusion are described. Such 
patterns may suggest the presence of discourses which are influential across 
Christian social contexts. At the very least, they signal areas worthy of self-
reflection and investigation for any religious community intent on reviewing its 
own practices of power. 
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ii  Discourse and power relations 
Personal narratives are, as cited above, “meaning-making units of discourse” 
(Riessman, 2002, p. 705). From a social constructionist perspective, therefore, it is 
the meanings that a narrator makes of events, and how these are located in history 
and culture, that are of particular interest. Bourdieu (as cited in Riessman, 2003) 
suggests that “narratives about the most ‘personal’ difficulties, the apparently 
most strictly subjective tensions and contradictions, frequently articulate the 
deepest structures of the social world and their contradictions” (p. 24). 
Narratives are not simply subject to discursive influence, they are also an 
effective vehicle for the transmission of discourse and the maintenance of power 
relations: “Narrative forms of knowledge inform us about why things are the way 
we apprehend them” (Pfohl, 2007, p. 659). They not only communicate cognitive 
forms of knowledge, but also convey implicit messages as to how people should 
feel, how they should behave, what moral judgments they should make, and so on. 
This is particularly evident in religious contexts, where many sacred texts take a 
narrative form. As I noted in the previous chapter (section 3.3), biblical stories are 
not infrequently used as morality tales, in order to influence behaviour. Their 
moral force is greatly magnified for those who believe such stories to be God-
inspired. I return to this point under the next heading.  
In line with my earlier comments about discourse analysis, discursive 
narrative analysis therefore requires attunement both to the discourses embedded 
in narrative and to the role of narrative in maintaining and reproducing existing 
relations of power and knowledge. In my analysis of transcribed interview 
narratives, I have therefore paid particular attention to discursive aspects such as: 
 Recollections of explicit ideas or values which were dominant within the 
participants’ communities, or taken up in their own responses. E.g. “There’s 
quite a strong teaching about not leaving the church . . . If you leave, you’ve 
walked away from God” (Jenny); “I don’t have—you don't have to have 
things your way. And it’s more important to value people than get your own 
way” (Andy). 
 Taken for granted ideas and moral positions implicit in participants’ 
descriptions of life in their communities, or of their responses. E.g. “A failure 
to respect him was a failure to respect God” (Andy); “I've got to see him, I've 
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got to confront him. He's just re-abused her. He's totally re-abused her” 
(Cathy). 
 Discourses reflected in participants’ descriptions of power relations, position 
calls, and their own responses to position calls. E.g. “You have to pleasure me, 
I am the leader, you have to obey” (Lynne); “I turned myself inside out and 
upside down and back to front, to be perfect—to be the perfect wife” (Lynne). 
 
iii Social and individual subjectivities 
As Coffey and Atkinson (1996) observe, “storytelling is culturally situated and 
relies for its success on culturally shared conventions about language and the 
hearing of stories” (p. 77). These socio-cultural aspects of the construction of 
narrative are closely connected with the discursive perspective just discussed. 
There the main concern was with discourse, power and positioning, as reflected in 
the interview narratives. Under this third heading, I want to highlight the interplay 
of social influences and individual subjectivities in the production of narrative. 
In addition to “conventions about language and the hearing of stories,” 
social factors in the shaping of narrative include culturally shared identity 
categories and storylines (Georgakopoulou, 2007; Riessman, 2003; Sparkes et al., 
2007). For example, in my analysis of several of the participants’ accounts I 
explore the influence of specific biblical narratives. As noted above, sacred stories 
function as vehicles for theological and moral truths within religious contexts. 
Where shared knowledge of such stories can be presumed, merely mentioning a 
name (e.g. “Judas”), identity category (“Pharisee”), or place (“Hell”) is a 
positioning move which can evoke a storyline, value judgement, or moral 
warning. So Jenny described to me the consequences of her efforts to challenge 
her leader simply by saying, “it was just throwing me more and more in the role 
of—well, ‘Jezebel’ was bandied around a lot.” I was aware of stories in the 
Hebrew bible about a queen named Jezebel. These narratives cast Jezebel as a 
rebel against God and a persecutor of God’s chosen prophet. I speculate that 
Jenny assumed that my knowledge of these texts as an “insider” would enable me 
to make my own meaning of her narrative at this point. Her recollection that in her 
community the name Jezebel was “bandied around a lot” suggests that this was a 
socially shared identity category in her community, with an associated storyline of 
rebelliousness and making trouble for God’s appointed leaders. 
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Alongside the acknowledgment of the social construction of narrative and 
subjectivity, I want to recall my discussion in the previous chapter of the 
possibility of individuals producing their life narratives with an agentic intention, 
that is, with authority, in Davies’ (1991) terms. In Chapter 3 (section 3.3), I noted 
Davies’ argument that a subject may perform her identity as “a protagonist inside 
the storylines she is living out” (p. 52). In that light, narratives, and the 
subjectivities they perform, are a product of both authorial intention and social 
influence. My analysis therefore includes reflection on the ways in which the 
participants make meaning of their own acts of re-authoring and resistance to the 
prevailing storylines of their contexts. 
Performance is another aspect of narrative production which involves the 
interrelation of social and individual subjectivities. Peterson and Langellier (2006) 
emphasise the performative nature of narrative as “both a making and a doing—
both poiesis and praxis, to use the classical Greek terms” (p. 173). So, the authors 
argue, narrative “is not merely the performance of an underlying communication 
competence; rather, narrative is performative in that it produces that to which it 
refers” (p. 174). Again it is possible to view these performative aspects of 
narration as expressions both of socially available repertoires and of individual 
agency (in the sense of authority). 
So, for example, Sparkes (2005) argues that narrative coherence is “both 
artfully crafted in the telling and drawn from the available meanings, structures 
and linkages that comprise stories” (p. 203). Sparkes and Smith (2007), drawing 
on Brooks (1984), describe emplotment as “an active process by which people 
creatively engage with and make sense of a story so as to determine what is really 
going on and what is likely to happen as the story progresses” (p. 303). As an 
interpretive activity, emplotment involves the interweaving of individual and 
social subjectivities as personal stories are connected with larger cultural 
narratives. 
In paying attention to participants’ subjectivities and narrative performances 
in these ways, I have encountered another of the challenges which arise when 
narrative analysis is approached discursively. As I have re-presented their stories, 
I have found myself at times called into the position of narrating what Smith 
(1993, p. 394) describes as a “heroic” account. This socially approved storyline—
a favourite in popular journalism—tends to reproduce humanistic notions of an 
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individual self who has struggled against the odds to gain control of his or her 
own destiny. In so doing, it “constructs a history of the biographical subject that 
situates the subject outside history” (Smith, 1993, p. 394). To counter this 
individualising tendency, I have worked at highlighting the relational and 
discursive aspects of participants’ accounts of their efforts to find agentic places 
to stand and/or speak. My analysis also probes beyond resonant moments of 
pathos or courage and brings forward social and discursive influences which have 
shaped the production and content of each of their narratives. 
Before concluding these reflections on the interplay of social and individual 
aspects of subjectivity in the production of narrative, I want to acknowledge that 
some poststructuralist researchers completely reject the use of personal subjective 
experience as a suitable starting point for discourse analysis. In Chapter 1 (section 
1.4), I alluded to the argument that such a focus can result in the political being 
overwhelmed by the personal, and the personal defaulting to a form of humanistic 
individualism. Hook (2001, 2005), for example, is highly critical of approaches to 
analysis which include a focus on individual subjects at the expense of Foucault’s 
concern with history and materiality in relation to discourse. Citing Foucault 
(1977b), Hook (2005) argues that 
genealogical analysis permits “the dissociation of the self, its recognition and 
displacement as an empty synthesis” (pp. 145–46). Genealogy moves its focus 
away from capturing a precise category—a precise subject or object—to fixing 
instead a vector of forces, a network of elements within which an object of 
knowledge attains epistemological coherence. (p. 16) 
This negativity toward the inclusion of the subject is echoed by Fish (1993), who 
takes issue with narrative therapists White and Epston for what he regards as their 
selective and flawed use of Foucault. Fish regards their privileging of “the 
person’s lived experience” as contradicting Foucault: “if there is one thing which 
Foucault consistently and explicitly does not privilege, it is the subject’s 
experience” (p. 224). For similar reasons, Fish is critical of the prominence given 
to story by White and Epston, seeing in this a non-Foucauldian confusion of story 
and discourse.  
The assertion that Foucault was unequivocally opposed to the inclusion of 
subjectivity in analysis has not gone unchallenged. Redekop (1995) has responded 
to Fish’s criticisms of White’s and Epston’s use of Foucault, noting the irony of 
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any totalising reading of Foucault, who himself “argued against the totalization of 
theories and ideas” (p. 310). He also points to Foucault’s presentation of the 
individual stories of Hercule Barbin and Pierre Rivière, on behalf of his studies 
(1975, 1980) of the construction of sexuality and madness, noting the sense of 
outrage and astonishment reflected in Foucault’s comments on these texts. This, 
Redekop observes, “is a caution against too great a separation between stories and 
discourse in Foucault’s work” (p. 311). This point is reinforced by the way in 
which Foucault presents the stories of Barbin and Rivière, with accompanying 
legal and medical documents. He is explicit in his intention that these stories 
should be read within, and shed light on, the discursive contexts of their times. 
While heeding Hook’s warning against allowing the singular subject 
surreptitiously to become the centre of meaning and interpretation, I choose in this 
project to stand with Willig and others (2000; Willig, Potter, Wickham, Kendall, 
& Hook, 2005) who argue that the personal also has political potency, and whose 
interest in subjective experience is taken up on behalf of social change. 
A better understanding of how subjective experience is constituted through the 
ways in which we position ourselves within available discourses and practices over 
time (as Foucault puts it, ‘(…) the history of how an individual acts upon himself’) 
may help us to think more creatively about how to facilitate alternative 
subjectivities for ourselves and those we work with. Whilst this cannot be done in 
the absence of wider social change, such change in turn does not come about 
without the active involvement of subjectivities. (2005, p. 33) 
In reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of personal narrative as a means of 
challenging “the certitudes of bourgeois individualism,” Smith (1993) reflects on 
a particular narrative study which “points to the ways in which subjects are 
situated in multiple discourses of identity,” and so by implication “offers a 
critique of the myth of unified selfhood” (p. 395). In a similar way, I consider that 
my re-presentation of participants’ stories—including their accounts of their own 
subjective positioning with its contradictory and at times confusing aspects—to be 
an effective strategy for raising awareness of social and historical conditions and 
their effects, for bringing forward subjugated knowledges, and so for contributing 
to social change. 
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Summary of discursive narrative analytical strategies 
Table 1: Strategies for analysis and reflexive considerations 
Analytical strategies Reflexive considerations 
Treat participants’ narratives as effects of 
particular social and discursive contexts 
(including but not limited to the religious 
communities they describe), and offer 
tentative suggestions as to discursive and 
historical features of these contexts. 
These narratives and my representations of 
them are discursively co-produced effects, 
not empirical descriptions of historical 
contexts or events. Other narrators, and other 
listeners, would almost certainly co-produce 
different accounts. 
Prospect for artefacts of discourse embedded 
in the interview narratives, including: 
o recollections of explicit ideas or values 
which were dominant within the 
participants’ communities, or taken up in 
their own responses; 
o taken for granted ideas and moral 
positions implicit in participants’ 
descriptions of life in their communities; 
o discourses reflected in participants’ 
descriptions of power relations, position 
calls, and their own responses (including 
embodied responses) to being positioned; 
o participants’ descriptions of their ethical 
intentions, their hopes for their lives, their 
reflections on their identities, and other 
ways in which they make meaning of their 
own acts of re-authoring and resistance. 
Again, there is a delicate balance here 
between not claiming an empirical status for 
participants’ constructions of events, ideas, 
or people’s actions and intentions, while 
respecting them as important aspects of 
participants’ meaning-making and identity 
work. Nonetheless, all of their accounts 
reflect the interdependence of religious 
discourse and power relations. If, as Sparkes 
(2005) suggests, narrative coherence is 
crafted from available “meanings, structures 
and linkages,” then those accounts are likely 
to have embedded within them discursive 
artefacts which can help to shed light on the 
kind of cultures in which they originated. 
These are tentatively named in my analysis. 
Power relations, position calls and embodied 
effects are present in the interview situation 
also, and worthy of reflexive attention. 
Consider performative aspects of 
participants’ accounts, asking what they 
suggest about socially available repertoires 
(e.g. cultural stories) and participants’ ways 
of making meaning (e.g. ways of imparting 
order to the narrative) and establishing 
agency and identity (e.g. use of first person 
pronoun with active verbs). 
I am aware that at least one storyline in the 
interview narratives (authoritative practices–
effects–resistance) is an effect of the nature 
and order of the questions I asked. However, 
my re-presentation of those narratives in the 
next three chapters attends to the nuances 
and variations to this pattern through which 
participants made meaning of their 
experiences. 
As the researcher, I avoid as much as 
possible re-presenting participants’ stories 
according to socially approved storylines, 
such as the heroic tale. 
Note common patterns across participants’ 
accounts of their positioning within the 
discourses of religious authority within their 
communities, with a view to offering 
suggested areas of review for Christian 
leaders and their communities. 
Finding such patterns is not a basis for 
making universalising claims about the 
discourses and practices of authority in 
Christian churches. That said, I suggest in 
Chapter 9 that the patterns I identify in this 
study provide a useful basis for self-
reflection and investigation for any religious 
community interested in reviewing its own 
practices of power. 
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Table 1, shown on the previous page, draws together what I have said to this point 
about my approach to discursive narrative analysis in this project, and about 
particular challenges posed by combining a focus on discourse and narrative. The 
left column shows the strategies which I pursue in my analysis of the interview 
narratives, while the right column highlights reflexive considerations in relation to 
those strategies (which are discussed further in the next section). Some of the 
strategies overlap, but I list them separately for the sake of clarity. 
 
4.2 Further thoughts on reflexivity 
In an interview published in 1981, Foucault (2001) spoke of his work as being 
inextricably connected with elements of his own life, experience and perceptions:  
Every time I have tried to do a piece of theoretical work it has been on the basis of 
elements of my own experience: always in connection with processes I saw 
unfolding around me. It was always because I thought I identified cracks, silent 
tremors, and dysfunctions in things I saw, institutions I was dealing with, or my 
relations with others, that I set out to do a piece of work, and each time was partly a 
fragment of autobiography. (p. 458) 
I understand reflexivity in research to refer to a researcher’s intention to make 
such autobiographical elements of their work visible, as far as they are able. As 
Davies et al (2004) suggest, this entails the development of a critical literacy in 
which 
the researchers understand that they are also caught up in the processes of 
subjectification and see simultaneously the objects/subjects of their gaze and the 
means by which those objects/subjects (which may include the researcher as 
subject) are being constituted. . . . Researchers see meaningful actions in the world, 
analysing them both in their own terms and at the same time, as the result of the 
constitutive acts engaged in and made visible by the researchers themselves. (p. 
361) 
I recognise the tension named here, between producing myself as a researcher—a 
competent critical theorist and discourse analyst—and reflecting critically on the 
way my subjectivities and research processes have at the same time been 
constituted within discourse. Pillow (2003) advocates a “move to use reflexivity 
in a way that would continue to challenge the representations we come to while at 
the same time acknowledging the political need to represent and find meaning” (p. 
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192). I see both poles of this tension at work in every aspect of this project: in the 
ways in which I have positioned myself as the researcher, chosen the theorists 
with whom I want to be in conversation, related to the participants, generated my 
interview data, selected, represented and analysed that data, oriented my 
discussion, and presented my conclusions. While endeavouring to write 
reflexively throughout this project, I address two of these aspects specifically 
here: my positioning in the project, and my positioning in relation to the 
participants. 
 
My positioning in the project 
In Chapter 1, and throughout this chapter, I have written about personal 
experiences, values and concerns which shape my subjectivity as a researcher. In 
outlining my approach to discursive narrative analysis I have been explicit about 
my intention to shine a light on the ways in which powerful ideas about religious 
authority circulate and position people within some Christian communities, in the 
hope of opening space for people in those communities to reconsider and, should 
they choose to, resist those ideas. While standing by this intention, I am mindful 
of Ellsworth’s (1989) warning that any claim to be the bearer of “emancipatory 
authority” is far from unproblematic. Her comments relate to teaching and critical 
pedagogy, but can equally well be applied to critical research methodologies. For 
example, a claim that my work somehow constitutes “emancipatory research” 
might imply that I position myself as knowing what is best for others, that is, that 
they need emancipating from particular regimes of religious authority. Rather, as 
noted above, my intention is to contribute to people’s awareness of the ideas about 
religious authority which may be at work in their communities, on behalf of 
agentic choices between a plurality of possible subject positions. This, for me, is 
consonant with the ethical stance I developed in the last chapter (section 3.4), 
where I noted Foucault’s (1988) declared aim of helping people to see “that they 
are much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some 
themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history” (p. 10).  
Ellsworth’s discussion also challenges me to consider whether I implicitly 
position myself an emancipated researcher. If my work is on behalf of freedom for 
others, do I assume that I am somehow outside of the systems that support 
oppressive forms of religious authority? Certainly there is an allure in viewing 
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myself as striving virtuously on behalf of those who produce their lives within the 
strictures of religious authority, skillfully deconstructing dominant discourses, and 
helping to bring subjugated stories and knowledges to light. But I am aware, albeit 
imperfectly, of many ways in which my life and career have been, and remain, 
inextricably bound up with discourses and interests that support the oppression of 
others. For example, over thirty years ago I enjoyed a privileged position in a 
church where women were barred from certain forms of participation. I did not 
agree with this restriction, and worked with others to see it changed, but 
meanwhile I availed myself of opportunities that were not available to half the 
congregation, and enjoyed recognition as an up-and-coming leader. Throughout 
the period of my research, I have occupied a relatively privileged position as a 
white, middle-aged, middle-class, educated, heterosexual male, with a senior 
position in an established religious academy.  
The relevance of these acknowledgments to my research is to invite 
reflection on whether my positioning made it difficult for me to hear some aspects 
of my participants’ experience, or for a participant to disclose something to me as 
an established insider. By virtue of this positioning, it is very difficult to know 
whether this has happened or not. In hindsight, it would have been helpful to build 
in an extra interview with the participants, as an opportunity to ask participants 
about their experience of the research, and of me as the interviewer. The only 
point during the main interviews where this issue became explicit was in relation 
to a participant’s recollections of how she was regarded and treated as a woman in 
her community. When I asked her to say more about this, she did, but not before 
describing to me, a male interviewer, the difficulty for her of doing so. 
I mean it’s very hard as a—yeah, talking as a female about gender issues is really 
hard. It’s really hard because it’s very easy for it to come across like you’re 
whinging or whining or, you know, whatever. 
As I have engaged in the analysis and writing of this thesis, I have acknowledged 
the points at which I have become aware of significance of my own positioning in 
relation to a participant. Positively, the feedback given by one female participant 
after reading a draft version of my re-presentation of her story affirmed my 
capacity to recognize and respects some gendered aspects of her experience: 
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Thank you for “truly hearing.” I have been pondering lately how few men have 
listened to this story and truly heard, felt, understood, and seen what it has been 
like, might still be like, for women. 
As I have noted already, the insider position, despite its risks, has been helpful to 
me as the researcher. As Davies and Davies (2007) observe: 
The very capacity we have to recognize others and recognize ourselves in relation 
to those others means that we have something psychically in common—a 
commonness that comes from being part of common landscapes, of being 
positioned within common discourses. (p. 1143) 
The benefit, for me, extends beyond this mutual recognition to having helpful 
starting points for the challenge of discursive narrative analysis. Areas of 
commonality have suggested clues as to where to start in the search for the 
discourses, both within the interview situation and in the subsequent analysis. On 
the other hand, the churches described in most of the participants’ stories are very 
different to any church that I spend time in. So in this respect, together with my 
gender, academic position, and initiating role in this research, there are ways in 
which I am positioned as an outsider in relation to the participants. This awareness 
of difference has been helpful in producing a sense of intrigue or ethical concern 
which again takes me to the analysis of discourse. In both of these ways, my own 
positioning has contributed positively to the task of finding ways 
to treat talk and other textual productions as archives, the study of which enables us 
to see how the very categories inside of which we and our research subjects 
accomplish ourselves as natural, normal human beings (if indeed we do) are 
constituted and lived and made real, and with what effects. (Davies et al., 2007, p. 
1144). 
My positioning in relation to the participants 
In considering the range of possible relationships between researchers and 
participants, Denzin and Lincoln (2005) offer a typology of three voices or 
narrative strategies: authoritative voice, supportive voice, and interactive voice. In 
the second category (supportive), researchers give prominence to participants’ 
voices, and keep their own in the background. In the third strategy (interactive) 
researchers submit their own voice to that of the participants. While I have 
endeavoured in my analysis to privilege the voice of the participants, and while I 
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have given the participants opportunity to comment on draft versions of my 
analysis, it is the first category of “authoritative voice” which most accurately 
names my positioning in this project. This narrative strategy both connects and 
separates the researcher’s and narrator’s voices, with the separation arising 
through the interpretative elements of my analysis and discussion. 
For example, during an interview, both narrator and listener are interested in 
developing the fullness and particularity of the narrator’s story, but when it comes 
to interpreting, the researcher turns to how and what questions that open up 
particular ways of understanding what the narrator is communicating through his or 
her story. (Denzin et al., 2005, p. 664) 
While I make frequent use of the words of the participants, my analysis of the 
interview narratives is presented in language that may not be familiar (or even 
comprehensible) to the participants. In adopting a methodology of discursive 
narrative analysis I am therefore aware that I am pursuing my own particular 
interests and exercising my own author-ity in producing the research story. 
Similarly, my interviews were not undertaken with an explicit intention that they 
would in some way be as beneficial for the participants as they would for me in 
furthering my project. 
Having acknowledged these aspects of my positioning in the research, I 
want to affirm again my commitment to the intention which Denzin and Lincoln 
(2005) ascribe to the use of the authoritative voice, namely  
making visible and audible taken-for-granted practices, processes, and structural 
and cultural features of our everyday social worlds. . . . By taking up an 
authoritative sociological or psychological voice, the researcher speaks differently 
from, but not disrespectfully of, the narrator’s voice. (p. 664) 
Using the term “authoritative,” especially in a study concerned with the uses and 
misuses of religious authority, raises an important ethical question. How do I 
ensure that the notion of authoritative voice does not become an excuse to use the 
interview material in ways that override the participants’ intentions and hopes in 
privileging me with their stories? On this question, Denzin and Lincoln (2005) 
join with Czarniawska (2002), who advocates a position of “narrative 
responsibility and respect” (p. 742). To this end, they recommend that 
“researchers attend to diversity in the stories that various narrators tell, to 
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dominant and marginal readings of narrators’ stories, and to narrators’ responses 
(including opposition) to the researchers’ interpretations” (p. 664). I have pursued 
this strategy in my analysis and discussion, and, as stated above, have given 
participants the opportunity to provide feedback on draft versions of my analysis. 
Some have offered corrections on matters of factual detail. Some have asked for a 
greater level of care to protect their privacy. Some have offered comments for me 
to consider regarding my representation or interpretation of their story. 
These efforts to hear and trustworthily re-present the words of the 
participants, and to invite their responses to my words, enact the dialogic ethical 
stance developed in the previous chapter (section 3.4). In the terms of Drewery’s 
(2005) notion of agency, I have tried—within the limits of a research thesis—to 
offer some space for each person I interviewed to participate in conversations that 
concern the production of their lives. But a PhD thesis is not a collaboration 
between authors with equal contributing rights. As the researcher and the final 
author of this study, I acknowledge that mine remains the authoritative voice. 
 
A note on excluded voices 
Before leaving the issues of my relationship to the participants and my 
representation of their voices, I want to acknowledge others whose voices are 
heard only as performed by the participants. These are the individual or collective 
bearers of religious authority who feature in the participants’ accounts, often as 
those responsible for acts of power and positioning which affected the latter 
adversely. As explained in Chapter 2, my decision to use a research strategy 
informed by poststructuralist ideas was in part an attempt to avoid the 
pathologising tendency of some other approaches to the issue of religious 
authority. Yet in listening to, and planning how to re-present, the participants’ 
accounts, I found myself at times rehearsing versions of their stories within which 
the religious authority figures appeared as “the enemy.” This taken-for-granted 
way of allocating subject positions is often associated with the heroic tale genre 
referred to earlier. Noticing the gravitational pull of these familiar tropes has 
reinforced for me the importance of utilising poststructuralist forms of analysis, 
not simply in relation to the interview data, but also to the ways in which I 
position myself in relation to the data. Pfohl (2007) describes well why such 
reflexivity is crucial. 
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Under the spell of dominant (or hegemonic) social constructions, artificial things 
become “second nature” to those they most captivate, blessing a particular order 
of things while cursing others. . . . The ritual historical positioning of humans in 
relation to cultural objects and stories that we both make and are made over by—
this, perhaps, is the elementary form of an effective social construction. (pp. 645-
646; emphasis mine) 
Again I emphasise that it is not my intention to vilify leaders such as those 
described in my participants’ accounts. I acknowledge that narrative accounts, 
including narrators’ representations of others and of dialogue, are social 
constructions, not verbatim reports. There is discomfort for me in the following 
challenge to narrative researchers from Atkinson and Delamont (2006): 
While the ‘voices’ of otherwise muted groups may be charged with political 
significance, we cannot proceed as if they were guaranteed authenticity simply by 
virtue of narrators’ social positions. The testimony of the powerless and the 
testimony of the powerful equally deserve close analytic attention. Moral 
commitment is not a substitute for social-scientific analysis. (p. 170) 
From the beginning, the limited scope of this study meant that I did not plan to 
interview both leaders and led. As it happened, three of the ten participants were 
in positions of authority at the time of their experiences, although their stories 
were focused on experiences of authority used by others against them. In my work 
as a supervisor to Christian pastors, I have heard many stories from the leadership 
side of the authority divide, and it may be that in post-doctoral research I will 
have opportunity to engage analytically with the “testimony of the powerful.” In 
the meantime, one of my hopes for the present project is that it will provide a set 
of perspectives and questions that will challenge both leaders and their 
communities to reflect on the effects of the ideas and practices of authority which 
they have together been taking for granted.  
For all these reasons, it is not my intention to construe those who take up the 
demanding and often thankless task of pastoral leadership as being in themselves 
“the problem,” even though they sometimes engage in problematic behaviours. In 
the spirit of narrative therapy, “the problem is the problem,” and is to be located 
in the realm of discourse (White et al., 1990). As Foucault has so effectively 
shown, the subjectivities of all the members of a social system are constructed 
within its dominant discourses, and all participate in the maintenance of its power-
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knowledge regimes. This is not to deny moral responsibility on the part of the 
leaders for how they exercise the authority with they are positioned, but to suggest 
the possibility that in some cases even their own ethical hopes and intentions may 
be subverted by these regimes. 
 
4.3 Research design 
Having outlined key conceptual aspects of my research methodology I now 
describe the methods by which these were applied. 
 
Ethical considerations 
During the first year of my engagement with this project, I worked with my 
supervisors to formulate a draft research plan and submitted an ethics application 
to the School of Education Ethics Committee of the University of Waikato.  The 
main ethical concerns addressed in this application were as follows. 
 
i Contacting potential participants 
I developed an information sheet (see Appendix 1) which indicated the focus of 
my research and invited potential participants to contact me for further 
information and explanation.  I gave this information sheet to several counsellors 
and spiritual directors, with an invitation to pass it on to people whom they 
considered to be suitable potential participants. My intention was that anyone who 
chose to contact me did so at their own initiative, rather than at my direct request. 
As it turned out, four people to whom I had given the information sheet 
volunteered themselves as participants. One person offered herself as a potential 
participant on hearing me talk about the project. 
 
ii Selection of participants 
When my initial contact with a person indicated that they might be a suitable and 
willing participant, I provided them with a follow-up questionnaire (Appendix 2), 
which also invited them to ask me any questions concerning the project. On the 
basis of the responses I received I then made a list of ten people to approach again 
in order to invite their participation. The criteria I used for this selection process 
are outlined in Appendix 3. The intention of these criteria was to ensure that the 
participants (a) had experiences of the kind that I was researching, (b) were at 
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least 12 months on from these experiences, to lessen the risk of the interviews 
causing emotional distress, and (c) represented a spread of age, gender and church 
affiliation. 
Of the eleven people who contacted me, indicating their openness to 
participate in my research, only 1 did not meet the criteria. I accepted the ten 
remaining people as my participants on obtaining their informed consent. These 
were made up of six women and four men, with ages ranging from late thirties to 
early sixties. The church affiliations which these people were recalling in telling 
their stories included established traditional Christian denominations (i.e. those 
which have been in existence for at least 400 years), independent Christian 
communities of more recent origin, and two movements which many Christians 
would consider to be on the fringe of orthodox Christianity.  
In terms of the ethnicities of the participants, one included Māori ancestors 
in her whakapapa, while the other nine were of European descent, with one born 
outside of New Zealand. All belonged to churches with a predominance of Pākēha 
members and leaders. I have mixed feelings about this relatively narrow range of 
cultural diversity within the data. On the one hand, it would have been interesting 
to discover what discourses might have been dominant in communities with a 
prevalence of non-European members, and to hear how people experienced and 
resisted the practices of religious authority in these contexts.  
I have some ideas about what this might have been like, having listened 
over the years to students from a range of other cultures talking about their church 
experiences. I speculate that cultural ideas about authority and respect would have 
played a significant part in the stories told about Māori, Pacifica or Korean 
churches, for example. On the other hand, as the researcher, I am a New Zealand 
born Pākēha male. The range of participants has presented the challenge of 
working with difference in the areas of gender, age and church affiliation. While 
working with people of other ethnicities and cultures would have enriched and 
extended my learning in this project, it would also have meant grappling with 
additional layers of complexity in relation to the values and knowledges of the 
communities concerned (Davies, Larson, Contro, Reyes-Hailey, Ablin et al., 
2009; Liamputtong, 2008, 2010). 
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iii Obtaining consent 
Having selected ten participants I sent a formal letter of invitation to each person, 
along with a consent form (see Appendix 4). This letter indicated the nature of the 
questions which I would be asking in the interviews, the process that I planned to 
use to analyse the interview material, and policies relating to confidentiality and 
recording/data storage policies. 
 
iv Confidentiality 
In order to maintain anonymity and confidentiality, participants’ (and any other 
parties’ or communities’) actual names and other identifying information have not 
been included in the thesis. Pseudonyms have been used in the transcripts, reports 
to supervisors and seminar presentations, as they will be in any subsequent 
published documents. In checking the transcripts of their interviews, two 
participants asked that pseudonyms I had chosen be changed, and I have made 
those changes.   
In the case of two of the church movements in which participants had been 
involved, it was evident that the features of those movements were such that they 
would be difficult to disguise in presenting the stories. In these cases I have 
named the wider church movement, but omitted any details that would identify 
the location and name of the particular individual churches. The two participants 
concerned have approved the material included in the chapters that concern their 
stories. 
 
v Minimising potential harm to participants 
Two areas of risk were addressed in my ethics application. The main risk was that 
despite a minimum distance in time of twelve months from the events, a 
participant might reconnect with painful memories in relating their earlier 
experience of religious authority. I provided for this by asking participants to 
indicate on the consent form (Appendix 4) a professional person to whom they 
could go for counselling and/or spiritual direction should the need arise. This form 
indicated that I was willing to assist them in finding a suitable person if necessary, 
and that the cost of one session would be covered. None of the participants took 
up this provision. 
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The second area of risk was that a person or group might perceive that a 
situation described in the dissertation pertained to them, and make a complaint or 
a direct approach to the person whom they assumed to be the participant who had 
given the account. As indicated above, I have endeavoured to minimise this risk 
by striving to protect the anonymity of the participants and their contexts, and by 
offering the participants the opportunity to negotiate changes to details included in 
the dissertation. Only one participant requested such changes, and after two 
iterations of suggested changes we were able to agree on a revised version of the 
material. 
 
vi Conflicts of interest 
My ethics application noted two areas of personal involvement which could be 
seen as representing a conflict of interest. At the time of submitting the 
application, and at the time of conducting the interviews, I held a leadership role 
in a Presbyterian church. This meant that I was one of a group of around eight 
people who were collectively responsible for the general direction of the church 
and the pastoral care of its members. I acknowledged that holding this position 
might construct a bias in my research in defence of those who hold religious 
authority, and that this may affect my approach to and analysis of interview 
narratives that are critical of religious authority. However, as I have made clear at 
several points in this thesis, this research has in part been motivated by a serious 
personal concern with regard to the way in which religious authority is exercised 
in some Christian religious communities. Rather than feeling an obligation to 
defend those in positions of religious authority, I feel an obligation to explore 
what constructs practices authority that have negative effects in some people’s 
lives. The opportunity given to participants to comment on a draft version of my 
analysis provided a further check on any defensiveness that may have been 
apparent. 
While my training and experience as a counsellor and spiritual director 
inform my interest in and approach to this project, the information provided to 
participants (Appendix 4) made it clear that I would not be conducting the 
interviews with the intention of doing either counselling or spiritual direction. I 
indicated that if the need for either became apparent, then I would refer the 
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participant to the person they had designated on the consent form and be willing 
to pay for the first session. 
 
Introducing the participants 
Here I briefly introduce the participants, with more detail to follow in the chapters 
where their stories are represented. All names used in these chapters are 
pseudonyms. As noted already, one had Māori ancestry and the others were of 
European descent. I interviewed seven women and three men. Sadly, one of the 
participants passed away before the completion of this project, and before her 
consent to the inclusion of her material could be obtained. It was a privilege to 
hear and to reflect on this person’s story, and I regret that I have not been able to 
honour the generosity with which she shared it by including it here. Some of what 
I learned from listening to her story remains present in my writing, albeit 
“between the lines.” 
The results of my analysis of the remaining nine stories are distributed over 
three chapters, according to the discourses of religious authority which were 
dominant and the nature of their communities and/or their roles in their 
communities. I am mindful that any kind of grouping entails a risk that the 
naming of common elements will override the individual character of each 
interview narrative. As much as possible I have heeded Denzin and Lincoln’s  
(2005) call, noted earlier, to “attend to diversity in the stories that various 
narrators tell” (p. 664), as an important aspect of exercising narrative 
responsibility and respect in the research process. I have not, therefore, attempted 
to press the results of working with grouped stories into any kind of schema, other 
than identifying the discourses or contextual features which were the basis of the 
initial grouping. I undertook my analysis of each interview transcript before 
deciding how the chapters would be arranged, thereby lessening the likelihood of 
looking for traces of particular discourses while overlooking others. 
 
Chapter 5: Cathy, Bill, Jenny, and Selina. In this chapter I represent the stories of 
four people who told of their experiences in churches which might broadly be 
described as independent of, and more recently formed than, the Christian 
denominations which have been in existence for at least the last four centuries. As 
will be evident from their stories, these churches have often been characterised by 
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hierarchical (and patriarchal) views of religious authority, with the local senior 
pastor being positioned at the top of the hierarchy. Cathy and Bill are married to 
each other, providing an interesting opportunity to hear experiences they had in 
common being described from both female and male perspectives.  
 
Chapter 6: John and Lynne. The stories of John and Lynne concern two very 
different religious communities. Despite that difference, their stories are informed 
by common discourses of separation from the “outside world” and unquestioning 
obedience to divinely appointed leaders. 
 
Chapter 7: Andy, Sarah, and Martin. What links the accounts given by Andy, 
Sarah, and Martin is not the nature of their communities, but the fact that each 
held a recognised position of leadership in their church as a pastor or priest. Their 
stories focused on the way various forms of religious authority affected their lives 
and their efforts to fulfil the pastoral role each felt called to exercise. 
 
Generating the data 
Interviews 
I conducted one main interview with each participant, lasting from 75 minutes to 
nearly three hours. Most interviews took place in the participants’ own homes, 
when they and I were comfortable with that arrangement. Two interviews took 
place at the participant’s workplace, and one at my workplace. I recorded these 
interviews using a digital recorder. 
While I had a range of possible questions to use in the interviews, as 
indicated in Appendix 5, my primary intention in each interview was to engage in 
a conversation which would result in the co-production of a narrative, rather than 
a list of answers to set questions. In this I was guided by Chase (2003) who 
recommends (a) beginning with a broad question that invites the telling of a story; 
(b) following up with questions which emerge from close listening to the story, 
rather than sticking rigidly to prepared questions (many of which will end up 
being answered anyway); and (c) asking questions which invite rich descriptions 
of lived experience, rather than opinions, generalisations or hypothetical answers. 
These aspects of my approach are consistent with an unstructured interview 
model, in that I had to “develop, adapt and generate follow-up questions reflecting 
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the central purpose of the research” (Qu & Dumay, 2011, p. 245). On the other 
hand, the fact that my project revolves around two key research areas meant that I 
sometimes redirected the focus of the conversation to issues which reflected these 
questions, rather than simply allowing the narrative to unfold in a completely 
unstructured way. My interview method is therefore better described as “semi-
structured,” but with a high degree of flexibility as to how and when my key 
questions were pursued. 
The semi-structured interview involves prepared questioning guided by identified 
themes . . . the focus is on the interview guide incorporating a series of broad 
themes to be covered during the interview to help guide the conversation toward 
the topics and issues about which the interviewers want to learn. Generally 
interview guides vary from highly scripted to relatively loose. (Qu et al., 2011, p. 
246) 
I began each interview by briefly reiterating the focus of my research, before 
asking the person to tell me something of how they came to be a part of the 
Christian community in which their experiences of religious authority took place. 
In most cases the participants moved early in their account to descriptions of how 
religious authority was practiced, the ideas that supported these practices, the 
effects of these practices on people, and their eventual acts of resistance to this 
authority. Where necessary I would ask further questions about these issues, 
inviting the participant to expand on the brief description of their resistance which 
they had supplied as part of their written response to my invitation to take part in 
my research (Appendix 2).  
Without using terms such as “positioning” or “discourse,” I was particularly 
interested in asking questions which offered me an opportunity to hear how 
participants recalled being positioned within the dominant discourses of religious 
authority in their communities. So in addition to “what happened then?” type 
questions, I asked how other people had made sense of the events at the time, how 
they, the participants, made sense of them then and now, what values they were 
standing for in their resistance, and so on. While there was no therapeutic or 
transformative intent in my conversations with participants, the pattern of my 
questions was similar to a narrative therapist’s movement back and forth between 
accounts of what happened and the ways in which participants made sense of 
these events (White, 1995, 2007). My use of meaning-focused questions 
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represents a significant aspect of my contribution to the co-production of the 
interview narratives, and to the second layer of intertextuality (telling and 
retelling) referred to earlier. My regular return to such questions reflects the 
concern I held as a researcher, in relation to having sufficient material with which 
to engage in discourse analysis. 
 
Transcription 
The recorded interviews were transcribed by a professional transcriber who had 
signed a confidentiality agreement. McLellan, MacQueen and Neidig (2003) 
suggest that “text selected for transcription should take into account the analytical 
contribution it will provide to the overall study” (p. 67). However, in order not to 
prejudge what data would be most relevant to the analysis, I decided to have each 
interview transcribed in full. I checked these transcriptions for accuracy against 
the original recordings. I then arranged each transcript into a numbered sequence 
of conversational turns, for ease of reference in my analysis. Because my 
methodology did not entail technical, sociolinguistic forms of discourse analysis, I 
represented each conversational turn simply as continuous text, without special 
notation or structural arrangement.  
In terms of data generation, I left the text of each transcript largely unedited, 
apart from removing the occasional “um” or stumble over words. Grammatical 
errors, use of slang, and incomplete sentences were not corrected. Where a laugh 
or sigh was audible in the recording, this was noted in brackets in the 
transcription. When presenting material from the transcripts in this thesis, a pause 
is indicated by three periods without spacing (…), as distinct from spaced ellipsis 
points (. . .) which are used to indicate omitted material. 
These measures were important in producing transcripts which were 
trustworthy representations of the interview conversations. I acknowledge that a 
sequence of typed, numbered paragraphs exists at a significant remove from in-
the-moment conversation between embodied persons. As Poland (1995) observes, 
“the very notion of accuracy of transcription is problematic given the 
intersubjective nature of human communication, and transcription as an 
interpretive activity” (p. 292). That said, I regard trustworthiness as an essential 
goal. I view it not only as “an aspect of rigor in qualitative research” (Poland, 
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1995, p. 295), but also as an important expression of the dialogic ethic which 
informs my work, as outlined in the previous chapter. 
 
Methods of analysis 
From the beginning of this project, and throughout this chapter, I have been clear 
that I wanted to bring narrative and discourse analysis together. What wasn’t clear 
until I actually engaged in the task of analysis was what that would mean in 
practice. Using the transcript of the first interview I had completed, which was 
with Cathy, I worked through several iterations of analytical approach. 
My first approach was to read and re-read the transcript looking for, and 
coding, narrative themes and discursive aspects relevant to my research questions 
(page 3). I developed a grid in which I summarised patterns I was finding in the 
transcript, with the intention that this might become a template for analysis of the 
other transcripts. This grid, together with selected examples from Cathy’s 
interview, is shown in Table 2. Note that the examples shown within the same 
column represent a variety of themes, rather than one consistent thread. 
 
Table 2: Analysis iteration 1 
Elements of analysis Example 1 Example 2 
Storylines in narration A = This church is different B = I was treated differently 
as a woman, wife, mother 
Dominant discourses Patriarchal: women should 
let men take the lead 
“Anointed” leaders have 
divinely revealed insight 
Sites of discursive struggle Freedom to make informed 
decisions about own future 
Women positioned as not 
credible—their experience 
discounted 
Position calls Trust that “we [the leaders] 
know better” 
Assume the role of silent, 
supportive spouse 
Experience of positioning “Feels” difference, 
contradiction, shock 
“Just about went crazy” 
Resistance/agentic action Requests voice in the 
discussion of their future 
Challenged husband’s 
apparent collusion with her 
exclusion from discussion 
Creative identity work Efforts to produce life & 
work in dialogic 
relationship with others 
Recalls & rehearses 
evidences of her own 
competence/achievements 
 
This initial approach was helpful in requiring me to become closely acquainted 
with the detail of Cathy’s story, to appreciate the shape of her narrative, and to 
begin to think about it discursively. On the other hand, it presented me with a 
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multitude of items that felt fragmented. In the category represented by the last 
row, for example, I listed 38 examples of creative identity work. 
 
My second approach was to undertake what I called a “synthetic analysis,” 
collating the data which I had generated using the first approach under the 
headings shown below. My intention was to preserve something of the narrative 
coherence of each participant’s story, while paying particular attention to their 
“account of producing his/her own life/identity, the resulting experiences of 
discursive struggle / positioning, and his/her negotiation of these” (the wording I 
used in my notes at the time). I arranged this second iteration of analysis under the 
following headings, hoping that they would be transferable to other interviews, 
and listed key examples from the data under each one: 
Life prior to membership of the main community which features in this story 
The way he/she hoped to relate to this community, its people and leaders 
While in the community—plans, actions, positioning and resistance 
His/her post-community life/self-descriptions/reflection 
Account of how he/she experienced discursive struggle and positioning 
Working through these two iterations of analysis brought about a significant shift 
in the way I had been thinking about the participants’ experiences and accounts. I 
write about this shift in some detail in my discussion chapter (section 8.1), under 
the heading, “A reflexive pause: regarding ethical intentions and hopes.” Briefly, 
the data itself invited this shift, as I came to terms with the importance for my 
participants of the issues represented in the first two headings. Because of the way 
I had framed my research questions—with an emphasis first on regimes of power 
and knowledge, and second on resistance—I had constructed for myself an 
expectation that the participants’ narratives would follow a pattern in which they 
would begin by describing the discourses and practices of religious authority in 
their communities, including their own compliance with these discourses, and 
then give an account of how it was they began to think differently and eventually 
engage in acts resistance. 
This pattern wasn’t entirely absent from the participants’ narratives, but a 
different pattern emerged, as reflected in the difference between the headings in 
the first and second iterations of my analysis. In the first iteration, the final 
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heading was Creative identity work. This was added in recognition of the way that 
many participants talked about the hopes and values which were important to 
them in the production of their own lives, including their participation in Christian 
community. Significantly this theme shifted from being the last item (a kind of 
afterthought) in my initial grid (Table 2) to being represented in the first two 
headings in the second iteration of analysis:  
Life prior to membership of the main community which features in this story, and  
The way he/she hoped to relate to this community, its people and leaders.  
At the time, I wrote the following in my notes for discussion with my supervisors: 
In this “second take” I am attempting to see this as not so much the story of 
Cathy’s attempts to resist and deal with discourses and practices of religious 
authority, as her account of the production of her life and the way she deals with 
the “resistance” of those dominant discourses and practices! . . . It could be thought 
of as at least two stories in collision—one a discursive/social (hi)story of religious 
discourses and power-knowledge, the other the story of a life . . . told from the 
point of view of individual subjectivity. . . . I was constructing a narrative structure 
which gave the initiating, active role to the “religious authority” my participants 
found themselves resisting—as though there was no prior story in which they were 
already actively seeking to construct a life with their own guiding convictions. 
It will be evident from these considerations why, earlier in this chapter, I have 
argued at some length for consideration of individual subjectivities within my 
formulation of discursive narrative analysis.  
 
My third and final template for analysis (Table 3, next page) became the one 
I eventually used with all of the transcripts. This framework preserved a degree of 
narrative order as I worked with each person’s story, although in practice most 
people moved back and forth through the elements listed in the first column as 
they related their experiences. There is a danger, as I acknowledged earlier, that a 
grid such as this may be superimposed on a set of quite varied narratives, resulting 
in a misleading impression of order or commonality. I have tried to be sensitive to 
that danger in re-representing the participants’ stories in the chapters which 
follow, noting Riessman’s (1993) challenge to researchers engaged in narrative 
analysis: 
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Precisely because they are essential meaning-making structures, narratives must be 
preserved, not fractured, by investigators, who must respect respondents’ ways of 
constructing a meaning and analyze how it is accomplished. (p. 4) 
 
Table 3: Analysis iteration 3 
Elements of analysis Areas for discursive narrative analysis 
Participant’s accounts of 
their initial positioning, in 
terms of their expectations 
and hopes for the way 
relationships would be 
conducted within their 
communities. 
What expectations/hopes did they hold in relation to 
conversations/decisions that would affect the conditions of 
their lives, and the lives of people to whom they were 
connected in significant ways? 
What/who positioned them in these expectations/hopes? 
What discourses are reflected in the participant’s accounts of 
their initial positioning? 
Participant’s accounts of 
being positioned by those 
with authority in their 
community. 
Their accounts of their experiences of positioning—
descriptions of particular memories, bodily/affective 
experiences, cognitive/psychological, etc). 
The ways they made/make meaning of these experiences 
(including their accounts of any rationales invoked in the acts 
of positioning). 
Discourses reflected in the participant’s accounts of the ways 
in which they found themselves being positioned within the 
community (again including their accounts of any rationales 
invoked in the acts of positioning). 
Indications in the participant’s accounts of particular sites of 
discursive struggle, and of what was at stake. 
Participant’s accounts of 
their response/resistance 
to this positioning. 
Their accounts of the ways in which they responded to these 
experiences, and the ways in which they made meaning of 
their own responses. 
Their descriptions of their own sense of agency & acts of 
resistance. 
The presence and role of contradictory discourses in the 
participant’s accounts of their response to experiences of 
positioning. 
Evidence of discursive shifts in the participant’s accounts of 
their response/resistance. 
Their accounts of what supported their response/resistance. 
Participant’s accounts of 
the eventual outcomes of 
these experiences. 
Their accounts of what happened subsequent to the main 
experiences of struggle. 
The ways in which they now make meaning of what 
happened. 
Participant’s descriptions of their present positioning in 
relation to Christian communities and to power relations 
within Christian communities. 
Evidence of further discursive shifts in the participant’s 
present accounts of their experiences and of their present 
positioning. 
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As I worked with the material that was highlighted by the application of this 
process, the main challenge was to maintain both this sense of narrative integrity 
and the intention to offer a discourse-analytical response to my research questions. 
An awareness of dealing with stories in collision, as alluded to in the supervision 
notes cited above, was never entirely absent throughout the project. The positive 
contribution of this tension has been to keep me mindful of both priorities. 
 
4.4 The question of validity 
Within research which utilises a poststructuralist, or even a critical realist, 
epistemology, there is no access to “a ‘God’s eye view’ that is independent of any 
particular perspective or stance” (Maxwell, 2009, p. 111). Lather (1993) suggests 
that, in the absence of epistemological guarantees, validity is “not a matter of 
looking harder or more closely, but of seeing what frames our seeing. . . . Such 
post-epistemic concerns reframe validity as multiple, partial, endlessly deferred” 
(p. 675). Validity in this perspective is therefore not about historical veracity, 
verifiability, repeatability, or generalisability. It is, above all, about reflexivity. 
Seeing, and making visible, the seeing which is presented in the research as data, 
analysis, results, interpretation and discussion. 
Brinberg and McGrath (1985; cited in Maxwell, 2009), assert that, “Validity 
is not a commodity that can be purchased with techniques. . . . Rather, validity is 
like integrity, character, and quality, to be assessed relative to purposes and 
circumstances” (pp. 112-113). I suggest that validity in qualitative research might 
therefore be thought of in terms of the quality of its relational connections, rather 
than in terms of maintaining an objective distance. Such connections include my 
relationship to my own work as a researcher (reflexivity); the relationship 
between the participants’ accounts and the re-presentations, analyses, 
interpretations and theoretical links which I construct; and the relationship of my 
analyses and conclusions to the contexts which gave rise to the research and its 
stated objectives. 
Denzin (2009) contends that qualitative research is more about 
understanding than prediction, and seems to align himself with what he describes 
as a nonfoundationalist approach to evaluation. Nonfoundationalists, he suggests, 
“conceptualize inquiry within a moral frame, implementing an ethic rooted in the 
concepts of care, love, and kindness” (p. 61). While appreciating the relational 
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emphasis in Denzin’s description, I identify also with what he calls a 
“quasifoundationalist” approach, in which there are criteria for evaluation which 
are unique to qualitative research (p. 61). These include demonstrating rigour in 
the areas of relational connection named above. I see this as one way of giving 
specific shape to my intention to proceed with “care, love, and kindness” toward 
my participants and the stories they have generously offered to this project. 
In addition to reflexive strategies already outlined in this chapter, I have 
attended to these concerns in a number of ways. I provided an opportunity for 
each participant to read and comment on the transcript of their interview, and, as 
noted above, a draft version of my re-presentation of their story (see Appendix 6). 
This was not so much about verifying “truth,” as checking the trustworthiness of 
my account in the eyes of the participants. Riessman (1993) notes the delicate 
balance between checking correspondence—checking that the researcher’s 
reconstructions of participants’ narratives “are recognizable as adequate 
representations”—and acknowledging that over time, “meanings of experiences 
shift as consciousness changes” (p. 66). I value the responses offered by the 
participants to the draft versions of what I have written about their stories, and 
they are incorporated in the final form of my writing. However, I cannot claim 
that what I have written speaks for views which participants have held, may now 
hold, or will hold in the future. To cite Riessman (1993) again, “Narratives are 
interpretive and, in turn, require interpretation. . . . Our analytic interpretations are 
partial, alternative truths that aim for ‘believability, not certitude, for enlargement 
of understanding rather than control’ (Stivers, 1993, p.242)” (p. 22). 
While affirming the value of researchers checking with participants 
regarding re-representations of their individual accounts, Riessman (1993) argues 
that it is questionable whether the validity of “our theorizing across a number of 
narratives” can be affirmed in the same way (p. 66). During the writing process, 
therefore, I have not asked the participants to comment on my discussion chapter 
(Chapter 8), in which I draw together the results of my analyses of individual 
transcripts and theorise my responses to my two research questions. I have offered 
them the opportunity to read this chapter when the project has reached its final 
form, and a few participants have expressed interest in doing so. To address the 
relationship between participants’ accounts and theoretical analysis and 
conclusions, Riessman (1993) draws on the notions of persuasiveness and 
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plausibility, suggesting that persuasiveness “is greatest when theoretical claims 
are supported with evidence from informants’ accounts and when alternative 
interpretations of the data are considered” (p. 65). That offers a good description 
of how I have approached the writing of my discussion of the findings of this 
project. 
Riessman acknowledges the subjectivity implied in this view of 
persuasiveness, which depends partly on rhetorical skills of the researcher, 
including selective use of the data, and on reader response. This highlights the 
importance of the previously discussed issues of correspondence and 
recognisability. If participants recognise the correspondence between their 
original accounts, including their discursive contexts, and the ways I have re-
presented their stories, then the onus is on me to provide a theoretical discussion 
which visibly coheres with those re-presentations, rather than drawing on them 
selectively or without regard for context. To further strengthen the plausibility of 
my theoretical discussion, I have as much as possible tried to articulate my 
reasons for theorising aspects of participants’ stories in a particular way. Where 
the connection may seem tenuous, I acknowledge the speculative nature of my 
comments. 
The final area of relational connection named above is that between my 
analyses and conclusions and the contexts which gave rise to the research and its 
stated objectives. Riessman’s (1993) suggests that the pragmatic usefulness of 
research, that is, “the extent to which a particular study becomes the basis for 
others’ work” (p. 68), is another criterion for validity. In the final chapter of this 
thesis (sections 9.2 and 9.3), I reflect briefly on what this study might contribute 
to Christian communities committed to practicing religious authority in ways 
which support freedom and justice. 
 
4.5 Concluding comments 
In this chapter I have offered a careful explanation of, and case for, the bringing 
together of narrative analysis and discourse analysis in my discursive narrative 
analysis methodology. I have named a number of analytical strategies through 
which this approach to my data and research questions has been pursued, and I 
have acknowledged associated challenges which have required vigilant attention 
to maintaining reflexivity at every step. In outlining my research design, I have 
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described the actual steps taken in practice to generate the data, maintain ethical 
processes, undertake analysis and produce trustworthy results. These results are 
presented in the next three chapters. 
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Chapter 5: 
Discourses of “covering” and “submission” 
 
You could never actually have a conversation because your point of view wasn’t 
actually valid. All that they were interested in as leaders was, were you submitting? 
(Jenny’s story) 
 
Introduction to results chapters 
Having developed a methodology of discursive narrative analysis in the previous 
chapter, I present in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 the results of my analysis of the 
participants’ accounts of their encounters with, and resistance to, the practices of 
religious authority in their communities. At the end of each of these three chapters 
I sketch a brief outline of discussion points which have emerged from the 
analysis. In Chapter 8, I draw these points and the theory of Chapter 3 together in 
a discussion which sets out what this project has shown in relation to the two 
research questions at the heart of this project: 
i Within Christian communities, how is it that some regimes of power and 
knowledge can subvert the call to freedom and justice that is pervasive in 
longstanding streams of Christian tradition? 
ii What has enabled some people to resist the practices of religious authority 
constructed by such regimes? 
The analysis which produced the results presented here and in the next two 
chapters employed the strategies summarised in Table 1 (Strategies for analysis 
and reflexive considerations, page 82) and focused on the areas listed in Table 3 
(Analysis iteration 3, page 101). 
This chapter presents the results of my analysis of the stories of four people: 
Cathy, Bill (Cathy’s partner), Jenny, and Selina. As outlined in the previous 
chapter, I have grouped these participants on the basis of a common cluster of 
discourses which informed the practices of authority in their communities. In the 
process of finding participants for this project, people with stories of resistance to 
practices of religious authority within Christian communities, I did not target any 
particular Christian denominations or groupings. Nor did I use denominational 
allegiance as a criterion for accepting or rejecting participants who identified 
themselves as belonging, or having belonged, to a Christian community. As it 
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transpired, my analysis of the four stories presented in this chapter revealed a 
cluster of similar discourses and practices of authority. In relation to the first 
research question, I summarise these discourses using the terms often applied to 
them by the participants, namely “covering” and “submission.” Each of the four 
participants came to a place of resisting calls into subject positions of submission, 
and each took agentic steps out from under the covering of their leaders’ 
authority. With my second research question in mind, the questions which I 
brought to this aspect of their narratives were: Why did they resist? What 
supported them in this resistance? How did they reposition themselves in relation 
to subjugating practices of authority? In what ways did they re-author the stories 
of their positions within their communities? 
In this chapter, I consider each person’s account in three parts: (i) 
beginnings: the hopes, values and experiences which they recall taking up in 
relation to their involvement in the church community which forms the context of 
their story; (ii) discursive positioning and its effects: the ways in which their 
narratives reflect experiences of being positioned by the dominant discursive 
practices of authority within the community, together with the effects of this 
positioning; (iii) agency and resistance: their accounts of their efforts to negotiate 
a more agentic position in relation to, and to resist, subjugating practices of 
religious authority within the community. This threefold structure embodies a 
sense of narrative development (beginning, middle and end), although in practice 
most of the stories unfolded in a cyclical telling process, rather than in a linear 
chronological sequence. The second and third stages of this structure parallel the 
first and second research question respectively. The first, beginnings, emerged 
from the initial rounds of my analysis. In ways I had not anticipated, the 
participants’ consistent references to the ethical hopes and desires which they held 
in relation to their participation in their communities proved to be a significant 
factor in relation to both questions. 
 
5.1 Cathy’s story 
 
Beginnings 
Cathy joined the church which is the focus of her story as a result of her marriage 
to Bill (also a participant in this project). It had been his church for some years 
previously. Together they spent a further eight years in this community, until their 
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decision to leave it in the mid-1990s. Prior to this, Cathy had been involved in two 
other churches. These earlier involvements were a mixed experience for her. In 
the first church she had her first taste of monologic practices of authority when 
she discovered that an application for acceptance into a particular programme, 
which she had entrusted to the pastor, had never been passed on by him. 
He didn't want me to go. He didn't think it was right. So he never sent the forms in 
that would confirm that I was a possible person to be, to be going. And he didn't 
tell me he hadn't sent them. 
In contrast, in Cathy’s second church, she found that people had “an incredible 
ability to accept you.” Cathy’s recalled experience of the leaders in that church 
was that it operated in a more dialogic manner: “they put it back on you . . . they 
discerned with you.” In telling her story, Cathy later referred back to her 
experience of this second community as a benchmark for how she thought 
churches ought to operate when it came to acceptance of difference and 
collaborative approaches to decision making. 
Immediately prior to joining the church where her main story was set, Cathy 
went overseas to work with a Christian organisation that was seeking to assist a 
very poor urban community. This too was a mixed time in terms of her experience 
of religious authority. On the one hand, what Cathy was able to achieve in that 
context positioned her with a sense of her own competence. She worked there for 
a year before being joined by Bill, and in that time had developed a good grasp of 
the local language and started up new programmes. 
I guess my experiences [there] showed me that I could do things. I could, you 
know, start up a Bible College, and I ran a little school and did some amazing 
things. Out of sheer, I don't know, hard work, and that sort of gut, nervous, wow, I 
can’t do this but I'm going to!  
On the other hand, after her marriage, Cathy found herself being called into a 
position of inferiority in relation to Bill. She was told, not by Bill, but by one of 
the leaders, “not to be the best at language” in comparison to Bill (which she 
naturally was, having been there a year before him). This was Cathy’s first 
acquaintance with a gendered religious storyline which, later in the interview, she 
entitled “being second best.” She recalled that for some time she “took that on, 
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hook line and sinker.” Cathy described the effects on her of trying to live out this 
storyline: 
I think I nearly had a nervous breakdown. Yeah, I remember just crying in the little 
slum house one day, thinking I've got to be allowed to be who I am. 
Cathy’s stated need to be allowed to have existence and identity in her own right, 
and the embodied effects of her positioning, are themes which reappeared later in 
her account. The same themes also feature in other participant’s accounts. The 
need to “be who I am” could be framed in essentialist terms, as a construction of 
humanist discourses of “authenticity” and the “true self.” Yet those discourses 
also carry notions of autonomy and independence which were not represented in 
Cathy’s narrative. 
As Cathy moved on to tell the story of her subsequent involvement in Bill’s 
church, she continued to include threads from past experiences, suggesting that 
they were important in the way she was making meaning of her own story of 
resistance. These hopes, values, and memories were with her as she actively tried 
to find a speaking position in the community and resist the ways in which she and 
others were being positioned by religious authority. Specifically, she carried 
hopes of finding a community in which people, with all their differences, were 
accepted and supported as agentic participants in the production of their own 
lives. Her experience overseas had provided her with a repertoire of stories of her 
own competence, but also with the memories of the effects of gendered 
positioning that constrained the possibilities of what she was capable of achieving. 
 
Discursive positioning and its effects 
Early in the interview, Cathy recalled a set of events which occurred when she and 
her partner Bill wanted to consult with their church leaders concerning their future 
plans. Already Cathy had realised that the church to which she and Bill had 
returned after their time overseas was very “different” to the earlier church in 
which she had experienced acceptance and collaborative decision making. 
Looking back, she accounted for this difference in terms of the identities that were 
constructed for her within the gendered discourses dominant in the church: 
So coming up back to here, and starting to think, starting to feel . . . that there was 
something different. Very quickly. What it was, was, that I was a woman and a 
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wife, and I hadn't been treated like that before. Well, I hadn’t been a wife before, in 
Christian circles, and I had a child. 
Cathy further illustrated the religious and gendered aspects of the positioning 
which she experienced by describing a meeting she and Bill had with the church 
leaders to discuss their plans. Those plans included some time studying at a 
certain theological college where Bill had spent some time before their marriage.  
So there was one significant episode at a meeting at our house, a prayer meeting, 
and a discussion about our future because we wanted to come to [the theological 
college]. And the words were that the Holy Spirit wasn't there.  
Cathy’s description of this meeting as “a prayer meeting” suggests an openness on 
her and Bill’s part to the possibility of receiving divine guidance and wisdom as 
part of the decision making process. How was such wisdom to be known? The 
phrase “the words were that the Holy Spirit wasn’t there” is significant in this 
regard. In several of the interviews discussed in this chapter, the mention of 
‘word’ or ‘words’ refers to divinely given insight or knowledge. So when Cathy 
refers to leaders receiving or giving words, the epistemology which undergirds 
this terminology imputes a divine source and authority for what is spoken (Fraser, 
2003). The words which Cathy recalls being offered by the church leaders 
constituted a forceful call into a subject position in which Cathy’s and Bill’s own 
ideas regarding this theological college should be set aside. To do other than 
accept this call would be to reject what God was saying, or to call the leaders’ 
God-given authority into question. 
Cathy went on to describe the strongly gendered nature of the positioning 
she experienced at that same meeting. 
And then at that meeting they spoke to Bill, totally Bill, “What are you doing for 
your future? What are you?” And I sat there for an hour and a half, I remember, 
and I said, “Could I say something about my future?” . . . And they looked around 
and they listened, and then they just looked back and started talking to Bill again. 
And I sat there thinking, did it happen or didn't it? I couldn't grasp it. I couldn't 
really see. And then the wife of one of the pastors came over and whispered in my 
ear, “Don't you think it's time to put the pizzas on now?” And then I thought, Aah! 
And got up and did it—which I still look back and it really annoys me! I should 
have said, “Do it yourself!” 
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The difficulty which Cathy recalled experiencing in grasping or seeing what had 
just happened can be understood in terms of the discursive conflict between her 
treatment by the leaders and the value she placed on collaborative decision 
making. This confusion seemed to shift when the pastor’s wife prompted her to 
take up a different mode of participation, namely, fulfilling her domestic duty as 
the woman of the house by putting the pizzas in the oven. These position calls, to 
be silent when the men are speaking of important things, and then to serve them, 
sparked recognition in Cathy: “Aah!” Here was a subject position which felt 
familiar—a deeply inscribed way of performing identity as a woman. 
Looking back on this incident, Cathy remembered challenging Bill, after the 
meeting, about the fact that he had not supported her inclusion in the 
conversation. This was out of character for him, as “overseas he’d been an out of 
the box sort of person.” In telling the story, Cathy took herself to task also, for 
having accepted the call into the position of domestic helper. She rehearsed the 
subject position of resistance she would have preferred herself to have taken: “Do 
it yourself!” When I asked Cathy how she made meaning now of what had 
happened, and of her response, she connected it with the gendered positioning she 
had experienced overseas, with its “second place” storyline, and also with 
memories of her parents’ “traditional marriage.” 
Being slotted into second place, I call it. But what it kicked into was my own 
traditional childhood. My parents were not Christians. My father especially. But 
they had a very traditional marriage. And so I remember thinking, “Oh, I've just got 
to try and be the perfect wife, the perfect mother,” but very confused, very 
confused. 
A little later in the interview, Cathy spoke again of her efforts in this period to 
produce her life and identity according to this “traditional marriage” discourse: “I 
slipped into trying to be the perfect little wife, and the perfect little stay at home 
mother, and just about went crazy.” At this point, the “gut” kind of knowing, of 
which Cathy had spoken in relation to her experience overseas—the embodied 
experience of discursive conflict—became an important theme in the story that 
she was telling. 
I think that having come from [that earlier church], and being [overseas], and then 
coming back here, it was like my gut, my whole body, is telling me there's 
something wrong. However, there is a whole traditional group within Christianity, 
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that tell you, no, the husband is the leader. And I didn’t know a lot about [the 
Bible]. . . . So there was within myself that whole confusing journey of what my 
body and my gut is telling me. How can that be right? You know, I've got to pull 
myself in and, and be this sort of person. . . . I worked really hard at being the 
perfect wife. Just trying to repress my thoughts and feelings. 
How were the discourses which constructed the voice of the “traditional group” 
able to exert such a powerful influence on Cathy’s attempts to produce her life 
and formulate her identity, given the strong reaction of her “body and gut”? 
Cathy’s own account of those discourses, and of the values which were then 
informing her own thinking about decision making, shows how she made sense of 
the embodied confusion she experienced: 
The beliefs were that they heard from God for you. Underlying, underneath to me, 
as I began to look and watch, people were not allowed to make a decision even for 
their own lives almost, without having it go through leadership. And that to me was 
ironic, it was like aren’t we all responsible for our own lives? Yes, we could submit 
it to you, but not be told whether it's right or wrong. . . . Like, like having been told 
that about [the theological college]. That was for me fairly powerful. To have 
someone like that actually say that about a Christian community for a starter. So 
people looked on them as the all-knowing I suppose, yeah, yeah, they did. 
It seems to me that traces of the conflicted discursive space in which Cathy was 
trying to produce her life in this period linger in this account. Certainly, “we could 
submit it to you” marks a significant shift from “submit to you,” yet the language 
of submission still sits uncomfortably alongside the expectation of deciding for 
oneself “whether it’s right or wrong.” 
A second main narrative thread emerged in Cathy’s story as she described 
the impact she felt as she witnessed the way other people in the church, especially 
women, were treated by their religious leaders. After several years of involvement 
in the church, Cathy and Bill found themselves engaging fully in the life of the 
community and offering pastoral care to other members of the church. This 
included listening to the stories of people who were struggling with the way 
authority was being practiced in the community. Some of these people were 
themselves in positions of responsibility in the church. Cathy recalled a pattern in 
these stories: 
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The more they grew in confidence, the more they wanted to try doing things their 
way, and maybe doing something a little bit different. Or their personalities were 
such that they needed to do things different. But they could only go so far, and 
that's what people were saying, that were coming to us. “You can only get so far 
and if you don't toe the line you have to leave.” 
It is not surprising that notions of having a divinely mandated authority should 
position leaders with a sense of duty to ensure that those they lead do “toe the 
line.” To believe that one has received divine guidance as to the direction of the 
church leaves little room for others to do things “their way” or to try “something a 
little bit different.” So Cathy spoke of emerging leaders in the church being “dealt 
to” and leaving the church “bruised and battered” from their encounters with the 
senior leaders.  
While those who were “dealt to” included both women and men, Cathy 
recalled how she saw the same “second place” gendered discourse which she had 
encountered calling other women in the church into subjugated subject positions. 
She described the impact on one woman in particular: 
A Māori lady. Beautiful woman. Incredible woman. And that's what she said, I'm a 
shadow of my former self. And that, interesting thing with the women, with that, if 
the women were stronger than the man, or more creative, or more up front—they 
were knocked back. You were not allowed to be—the man was definitely supposed 
to be the leader and the up-front person. And then—particularly that woman, but 
significantly other women, had been elders—had been told to allow their husbands 
to be up front in leadership, in the right place in their marriages. They needed to 
submit, and if they didn't, they were rebellious, and, and, what do you call it, 
[under] deception. 
Cathy’s account makes explicit the way in which a woman’s refusal to accept the 
position of submission in relation to her husband would be regarded as evidence 
that she was “rebellious” and under “deception.” These are serious accusations, 
which, I infer from my own acquaintance with such contexts, imply that some 
kind of evil force is at work when a person refuses to assume “the right place” in 
relation to God-given authority. To refuse to submit to God’s appointed order of 
authority is to put oneself in opposition to God—a fearful prospect for those who 
believe, as they have been taught, that theirs is a God of wrath and punishment. It 
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is precisely at this point that the coercive power of this nexus of discourses 
concerning divinely given authority and knowledge is most evident. 
As indicated in the introduction to these stories, submission, in the terms of 
these discourses, is sometimes referred to as being under the “covering” of the 
authority which God has ordained. So, for example, a wife should be under the 
covering of her husband’s authority, and all in the church should submit to the 
covering of the authority held by the pastor and other senior leaders. To be under 
this covering is to be in the place of God’s protection and blessing. To step 
outside of the appropriate covering is to place oneself in spiritual and physical 
danger. The extent to which this covering discourse inscribes the subjectivity of 
those who spend time in such communities, and persists even after they have left, 
is evident from Cathy’s response to my question as to the source of the ideas: 
Oh, from the church. Absolutely. “We're your covering.” Yes, yes. You need it. 
You can't be outside of the church, you can't be outside of the covering. If you are, 
you know—and one other woman who left a wee while later came to me with that, 
and her son was incredibly ill, and she was really tussling with, was it because they 
had done what they had done? You know? Had God moved away, or—? 
Looked at from the point of view of religious leaders, the covering discourse also 
offered ways to discipline—in the name of pastoral care—those who refused to 
submit to their leadership. The strongest of these disciplinary measures was for 
the leaders to withdraw from relationship with the rebellious person(s). Cathy 
described this treatment as a source of great pain and confusion for some of those 
who came to them feeling bruised and confused, speaking of “the powerfulness of 
the relationship withdrawal from those people.” In withdrawing relational 
connection the leaders were implicitly withdrawing their covering also. The 
strength of Cathy’s language in describing the effects of the loss of covering, 
whether by having it withdrawn or by rejecting it, is striking. It suggests to me 
that the covering discourse not only constituted a sense of safety for those who 
“toed the line,” but affirmed and legitimised them as spiritual subjects, that is, as 
subjects who could have confidence that their lives were under God’s approval. 
The woman who had left the church, and now had a very ill son, was left in 
uncertainty, according to Cathy: “Had God moved away, or—?”  
A second disciplinary practice supported by the covering discourse was to 
forbid people from having significant influence in the church. Bill, Cathy recalled, 
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was told not “to pray and touch anybody or do any sort of ministry stuff.” She 
suggested that this was because “we had begun asking questions.” Later Cathy 
was visited by the pastor’s wife who told her to get her “hands off the women of 
the church.” These “hands off” demands were not merely metaphorical. Because 
Bill and Cathy were perceived to be out of step with the leaders, the dominant 
discourses of religious authority constructed them as being not merely in danger, 
but as spiritually dangerous to others. In a reversal of the notion of conferring 
spiritual benefit through the religious practice of laying hands on someone when 
praying for them, there is an implication here of passing on a kind of spiritual 
contamination if they were to do this while not under proper covering. 
Cathy’s reference to receiving the “hands off the women” message from the 
pastor’s wife related to a sequence of events which, for her, marked a significant 
milestone in her journey toward resistance. I turn now to that aspect of her 
account. 
 
Agency and resistance 
Cathy traced her questioning of the leaders’ authority back to the meeting 
described earlier, in which she and Bill had wanted to discuss their future plans 
with the leaders. She recalled that after being given “words” at that meeting, 
which implied they should drop their idea of going to the theological college they 
had in mind, she and Bill had spoken to the leader of their church denomination’s 
own training college and explained what they hoped to study. His response had 
been to say that their own college couldn’t offer what they wanted, and that they 
should go to the college they first had in view. Cathy linked this contradiction 
between the respective leaders’ views with a subsequent agentic move on her part. 
She described her questioning of the original words, and her attempt to negotiate a 
more dialogic process of conversation with the pastor: 
And it was like, well! So I actually asked the pastor, “How long is it since you have 
been to [that theological college]?” And he said, “About fifteen years.” And I said, 
“Well, isn't that going on hearsay, that you think the Holy Spirit’s not there?” 
Which really shocked us. Yeah. 
The ripple effects of the contradiction, and the shock which Cathy reports, went 
beyond this specific challenge to an increasingly questioning stance on Cathy’s 
part. “That was the first, one of the first, first questioning things,” she recalled. 
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The deconstructive import of this “first questioning” should not be overlooked. 
The thought that what was offered as divinely given insight might actually have 
just been hearsay “shocked” the discursive framework in which Cathy had been 
positioned. At the same time, to have had that thought, let alone to have put it to 
the pastor in the form of a question, suggests that the discourses which supported 
notions of divinely granted authority and knowledge were from the beginning 
only partially successful in recruiting her allegiance. Her description of her earlier 
mixed experiences of religious authority, including a positive experience of 
collaborative decision making, may help to account for this. 
More serious question-asking was to come, and Cathy traced this to the 
impact on her of hearing about, and seeing, the way others in the church 
community were “dealt to” by their leaders. There is a violent thread in the 
metaphors which Cathy used in describing the effects of this treatment on people, 
men and women, including phrases such as “knocked back,” “bruised and 
battered,” and “bruised and confused.” Most impacting for Cathy was the series of 
events, alluded to above, which led to the “hands off the women” warning from 
the pastor’s wife. At the time of these events Cathy had undertaken some training 
in counselling and was assisting in a local women’s centre course. 
I was working with a bunch of women at the women's centre doing a course called 
"Living with and without violence." Now, I walked into the room on the first day 
and I actually had to walk out again. Eight out of the eleven women were from the 
church, and I—it was just overwhelming. 
With her counselling training, Cathy was aware of the violence which women 
sometimes experience in domestic situations, and of strategies for helping women 
toward agentic responses to this violence. But the “overwhelming” impact of 
finding that the majority of the women present in the room were from the church 
suggests that she was also positioned with an expectation that such violence did 
not, or should not, trouble Christian families. Cathy’s surprise indicates not only 
this personal discursive confusion, but, I speculate, a silence within her church in 
relation to the problem of domestic violence within church families. She was, by 
this time, helping with pastoral care in the church, but it seems that nothing had 
prepared her for this dis-covering of the extent to which violent male practices of 
power were being reproduced in the families of these women from the church. 
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Cathy connected her recollection of this experience with an account of 
seeing these same women at church, lining up to be prayed for by the leaders.  
And each Sunday they would go forward for prayer, and a significant—three of 
them would end up rolling and yelling and just writhing, you know making all the 
demonic—what’s described as demonic—but their kids were left sitting in the 
congregation. So I looked—I remember looking over and thinking, “Shit! What are 
those kids seeing?” Yeah, and so I would move over to them and ask them, “What 
do you think mummy’s doing?” And they were petrified. Absolutely petrified. 
In churches such as Cathy’s, the implication of “going forward for prayer” is that 
the person has a problem which requires spiritual help. The bodily responses, 
“rolling and yelling and just writhing,” would, as Cathy noted, be interpreted by 
many in that context as evidence of “demonic” influence. The immediate concern 
she described feeling for the children—“Shit! What are those kids seeing?”—
evokes scenarios in which some of these children had been equally “petrified” as 
they watched what was happening to their mothers at home. 
This twofold witnessing on Cathy’s part—seeing women taking steps on 
their own behalf to live without violence, and then watching them subject 
themselves to discursive practices which constructed the problem as spiritual and 
located within them, and which recruited them into stylised and violent bodily 
responses—raised major questions for Cathy. Her descriptions of her subsequent 
actions tell an increasingly agentic story of resistance to the discourses which had 
positioned the women with responsibility, in the form of internalised spiritual evil, 
for their own troubles. She pursued theological conversations about this issue with 
people outside of her church. This research supported her in rejecting the idea that 
the women’s difficulties were due to spiritual causes within them. She also began 
asking the women what was being achieved through the spiritual practices to 
which they were subjecting themselves at church. Cathy reported that “going 
forward for prayer” was not bringing any lasting change into their lives: “they 
said, ‘Look, three days later we’re back to normal.’”  
In terms of the witness positions outlined by Weingarten (2010), the actions 
which Cathy reported taking in response to what she had observed show her 
assuming an “aware and empowered position.” Weingarten suggests that, “Taking 
action, and clarity about what actions to take, goes along with the experience of 
this witness position” (p. 11). This is even more clearly evident in Cathy’s 
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account of what took place after she witnessed the way one woman in particular, a 
woman who had experienced ongoing domestic abuse, was treated by the pastor. 
Cathy’s own account tells the story best. 
And there was a significant happening in the church where she told the pastor up 
front—she was asking for prayer—that her partner, that they were battling around, 
battling over, had done something the night before. And [the pastor] literally just 
went like this [lifting hand gesture] over her, and she actually had to move. And he 
yelled, and said, “He's become a Christian, he wouldn't do that!” 
   Now, she came out to me just absolutely shocked, and I was wild! I was, I hadn't 
really experienced that sense of wildness, and I said to her in front of everybody, “I 
will deal with this, this is totally wrong.” And I was really shocked at myself. And 
I went home and got on the piano and I played. I remember playing the piano, 
grrrrr! and banging away. But came to a point where I thought, “I've got to see him, 
I've got to confront him. He's just re-abused her. He's totally re-abused her.” 
   So I did. I rang up and made an appointment for Monday night. Now between 
that Sunday night and Monday night the police had been involved, and the guy had 
confessed. So when the pastor came to see me, he was in a different mood. But I 
tried to explain why I felt he’d re-abused her. But I don't think there was a lot of 
understanding. And then the pastor's wife came and saw me, and told me to get my 
hands off the women of the church. And I said, “But every woman that is in that 
group has come up those stairs. They didn't even know that I was taking it.”  
   But that really messed me around actually. I got really sick, I got really, really 
sick, and had to—I remember praying and lying on my bed thinking, “God, what is 
this, and what do you want?” And I had to make a choice, to carry on and grow in 
it, I suppose. It was a significant sickness. I knew I was sick because of that 
meeting with her. . . . At the end of the meeting, I said to her, “You don't even 
know me. Why all this mistrust?” And she couldn't give me an answer. I mean, 
looking back now, I should never have let her sit down. But, you do these things. 
The same feeling of shock which overwhelmed Cathy in the women’s community 
centre, as she came to terms with the fact that eight women from the church were 
seeking help to live without violence from their partners, seems here to have 
recruited the pastor into a position of anger, disbelief and complicity with 
domestic violence: “He's become a Christian, he wouldn't do that!” These words 
also embody the idea which called women in the church to “go forward for 
prayer,” namely, that problems which are deeply embedded in dominant social 
discourses of masculinity can be solved by spiritual means. 
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The effects of these events on Cathy have strongly embodied aspects, which 
she describes in terms of “wildness,” “banging away” on the piano, and, after the 
visit by the pastor’s wife, “sickness.”  It seems to have been especially through 
her body that she knew that what had she had just witnessed was “totally wrong” 
and amounted to the women being “re-abused.” That Cathy viewed her sickness 
as “significant,” that is, as having sign value, is evident in her sick-bed prayer: 
“God, what is this, and what do you want?” 
Both forms of bodily experience, the wildness and the sickness, were 
productive of agentic action on behalf of Cathy’s deep concern for the welfare of 
others in the community. Her frequent use of the first person and active verbs 
underline the agentic character of her response to the pastor’s action: I said . . . I 
will deal with this . . . I did . . . I rang up and made an appointment . . . I tried to 
explain . . . I said . . . I had to make a choice, to carry on and grow in it . . . I knew 
. . . I said . . . Beyond the polite action of making an appointment, there is no 
remnant here of buying into the covering discourse. In an echo of her earlier 
annoyance at herself for accepting the position of pizza attendant, Cathy chided 
herself for even allowing the pastor’s wife to sit down.  
Interestingly, unlike the woman who came to her wondering if her son’s 
illness was due to stepping away from the covering of the church, and perhaps 
therefore from God’s protection, Cathy’s sickness led her toward God and an 
agentic choice: “I had to make a choice, to carry on and grow in it.” What this 
meant in practice was further acts of resistance. Ignoring the “hands off” demand, 
Cathy continued to co-facilitate the group at the women’s centre, and invited the 
women from the church to reflect on what was happening in that context. “What 
is happening for you there on Sundays, when you are enticed, encouraged, invited 
up the front, and you end up doing what you do?” When the women’s centre 
course was finished, these women continued to meet with Cathy who led a course 
for them, exploring other approaches to spiritual life. 
Cathy spoke of other acts of resistance which preceded her departure from 
the church. She arranged a farewell celebration for a key couple in the church that 
had been “dealt to.” In the end, the leaders took it over, and Cathy recalled, “I 
partly let them and partly I just carried on myself with one other woman.” She and 
Bill also asked for a meeting with the church elders to discuss their concerns 
about what was happening in the church. “And we’d already decided if it went a 
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certain way we’d just resign and come away.” When they did eventually resign 
they asked for a chance to say goodbye to the community. 
So for me that was like a bit of a red rag to a bull. It was like, right! I'm going to 
write to everybody. We wanted to say why we were leaving, not, not in specifics, 
and not in any detrimental way. But they had supported us for years overseas. It 
was like, Bill's been here for fifteen odd years, we can't just walk out. People are 
going to ask. And I don't know what happened, but in the end, on Sunday morning, 
he rang up and said, you can as long as, you know, you toe the line. 
Even their leaving, in Cathy’s recollection, had to be performed in submission to 
authority, expressed once again in terms of the need to “toe the line.” She 
described their feelings as they left the church for the final time: 
We both got in the car and drove far enough away from the church, and just went, 
“Yes!” You know? We both came away just, just very, very happy with the 
decision we made. It was an incredible sense of release. 
After leaving, Cathy continued to question and reflect on the discourses which 
had supported the practices of religious authority in their church community. A 
significant moment, and movement, occurred in her relationship to the covering 
discourse, when she realised that she and Bill were no longer under the authority 
of the church leaders. This registered with Cathy as she was hanging out the 
washing. 
And just the metaphor of being covered by the, by the line, I thought, “Oh, we 
haven’t got a covering!” You know? . . . It was amazing! It was beautiful! It was 
like, “Wow!” 
The embodied effects of the covering discourse on Cathy, described earlier, are 
matched by the joy that accompanied her agentic movements (driving away, 
stepping out from under the covering): “Yes!”, “an incredible sense of release,” 
“amazing!”, “beautiful”, “Wow!” When I asked Cathy how she accounted for 
these agentic responses and her acts of resistance, she spoke of training (as a 
counsellor), education, and meeting people with alternative viewpoints and 
experiences (in the theological college she and Bill did eventually attend) as 
having opened up alternative viewpoints. This variety of discursive contexts 
created a space in which Cathy could experience herself as sifting beliefs, making 
choices and challenging the supposedly divinely given wisdom of her leaders, 
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especially as it was enacted in their treatment of people. Her counselling training 
had taken her back to her childhood, with its “traditional” aspects, and this, Cathy 
recalled, had increased her awareness of the gendered nature of the religious 
discourse operating within the community.  
Cathy also recognised that the gendered aspects of the practices of authority 
which she had encountered, such as the “second place” storyline, were part of 
wider social discourses concerning gendered roles for men and women. She 
acknowledged that this was something that she and Bill continued to wrestle with 
in their efforts to “run life” collaboratively. Cathy expressed an awareness of 
gendered positioning when it came to the possibility of having the right to make 
choices in life: “for me, the whole thing about choice has been a long journey . . . 
being woman for a starter.” She also connected this with her sense that as a 
woman it was not easy to go against, or question, authority. 
I also asked Cathy what supported her in the continuing “long journey” 
toward taking up her own agency. She had two responses to this question. The 
first involved inviting other people to speak into her life; that is, to affirm and to 
challenge, but not tell her what to do. Secondly, Cathy reported that she was 
learning to trust her own experience more, and her capacity to search out the 
understanding she needed to make meaning of her experience. She acknowledged 
that the experience most likely to cause her to “stand up and speak” was 
witnessing injustice to others. Then “wildness” would support the action she felt 
she needed to take. Cathy traced the development of this sense of justice back to 
her knowledge of her father and his practical compassion. Looking further back, 
research into her whakapapa4 and connection with her hapū5 was connecting 
Cathy to cultural knowledges which were enlarging her perspectives on life, 
relationships, spirituality, and justice. 
Cathy’s concluding comments in the interview reflected her openness to one 
day engaging in restorative conversation with the leaders of the church, without 
surrendering her own agentic position. 
There is still part of me that wants one day to be able to speak to those people in a 
way that— Well, that’s a hope, it’s a dream, whether it will ever happen—to be 
able to sit and kōrero, to talk, without the same atmosphere, judgment. Whether 
                                                 
4
 Māori word for genealogy. 
5
 Māori word referring to subtribe or clan. 
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that will ever happen, or whether it’s just a healing hope of mine ... Because 
whenever I see them, there is a significant—I choose not to go any further than, 
“Hi, how are you?” 
5.2 Bill’s story 
 
Beginnings 
Bill has been mentioned in introducing Cathy’s story. Whereas the church they 
attended after their marriage was new to Cathy, Bill had been involved in it since 
his late teenage years. Originally brought up in a more traditional style of church, 
Bill was drawn to this community as a teenager, partly because he experienced the 
pastor as a “fatherly kind of character.” 
I lived with them for three months or so and became sort of part of their extended 
family, and was often invited to family things. And I felt very comfortable in that 
environment. 
In his mid-20s, Bill decided that he was going to work overseas with a mission 
organisation (the one where Cathy also worked). The pastor told him that he was 
“both really pleased that I was going, but also sad because he had hoped that I 
might take over—pastor the church when he came to retire.”  
With this advantageous positioning as an honorary family member and 
possible future leader of the church, Bill left the community for some eight years 
to work overseas and then study at a theological college. On his return to the 
church he found that the community had changed little, whereas he had changed. 
“I’d changed from experience overseas, learning a new language, doing a degree.” 
Bill now saw his mentor’s leadership through different eyes and with a new 
awareness of power relations. 
 
Discursive positioning and its effects 
Bill described his position in the church in the period following his return as one 
of being “recognised and supported and honoured and appreciated.” He used 
similar words in relation to how both he and Cathy were regarded by people in the 
church. “We were well liked and respected and appreciated within the 
congregation.” This language resonated with Bill’s description of his position in 
his earlier church, where again he had been “appreciated and acknowledged.” He 
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connected this sense of positive regard with a “need to be needed and need to be 
wanted,” which, he observed, resulted in overdoing his involvement in youth 
work in the church to the point that he “burnt out.” Alongside his own account of 
this process in terms of personal deficits, I want to highlight this theme of 
appreciation within Bill’s story as a significant aspect of his subjectification 
within the leadership culture of both churches. In his own words: “I was so richly 
rewarded for the work that I put in.” This is not to suggest that people in either 
church cynically manipulated Bill’s desire for recognition, but that they and Bill 
were reproducing discourses of sacrificial service which are present in New 
Zealand society, and which have particular potency in a faith tradition which 
emphasises the sacrifice of its founder. Within this discursive framework, taking 
up the subject position of sacrificial service offered Bill a way of being “being 
recognised as someone, and in particular someone of value” (Davies et al., 2002, 
p. 302; italics in the original).  
While Bill and Cathy were both appreciated by the people in the church, 
especially those to whom they offered pastoral care, Bill recalled his awareness of 
difference in the way they were treated by the church leaders. He accounted for 
this in terms of his longer involvement, but also, echoing Cathy’s own account, as 
an expression of the gendered positioning of women in the church. 
Women in that context don’t, or can’t, hold as much authority as men. . . . I think 
her ideas, opinions and so on were not as held in such weight ... not listened to as 
much. Whereas, I think I was—as I say, towards the end I think I was listened to—
not appreciated, but was listened to. 
Bill also spoke of seeing women being prayed for “in quite a violent way” at the 
front of the church. He recalled that this way of praying involved “hands on 
heads, sort of pushing.” Like Cathy, he was struck by parallels with what was 
happening to the women at home, where “they were pushed by men, they were 
yelled at,” and with the impact on their children who saw “their mothers being hit 
and hurting” at home. 
 
Agency and resistance 
Despite the relatively agentic subject position which Bill was able to maintain in 
the church, the process of changing his relationship with the senior pastor of the 
church was challenging for Bill. Again drawing on psychological discourse he 
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described their early relationship as a “parent-child thing that I’d felt for so long, 
and hadn’t, couldn’t, really break through.” He also reflected on the extent to 
which his ideas and decisions had been shaped by this first phase of his 
involvement with the pastor, the pastor’s family and the church community. 
I grew up in that, but I did decide to go to [a theological college] which wasn’t his 
first choice. He thought I should have gone to the denominational college. So I did 
have—I did maintain some level of independent thinking and ability to sort of . . . 
to make my own decisions and opinion. But on the other hand, I was quite 
absorbed into that community’s belief system, I suppose, at a young age. 
In the years he spent away from the church, and from the influence of the pastor, 
Bill described himself as having “grown up” and “changed hugely.” He had lived 
and worked in a difficult foreign setting, he had married Cathy and he had 
engaged in theological study. One significant way in which Bill had changed is 
reflected in his account of what struck him on his return: “things that I would have 
called misuse of power, or abuse issues in the church. . . . There was quite a lot of 
power-over stuff happening.” 
How did Bill respond to what he saw? In his narration of events, Bill moved 
immediately from these comments about misuse of power to very agentic 
language: “And so I just started raising those questions and just asking him or 
asking other leaders ... just asking those questions.” Whereas Cathy’s account 
conveys a difficult journey toward a more agentic position and eventual 
resistance, Bill seemed to locate that shift as having taken place in his “growing 
up” time away from the church. Moreover, the factors he named in relation to the 
way he was heard more readily than Cathy—the length of his connection with the 
community and gendered discursive practices—seem to have positioned Bill with 
an agentic speaking position from the beginning. 
The difference in their positioning was evident in Bill’s description of his 
response to the witnessing the way women were being prayed for in the church. In 
listening to Cathy, it seemed to me that she spoke of the strength of her embodied 
response, her “wildness,” as having provided the ground for her confrontation of 
the pastor over the treatment of these women. As a woman in the church, she 
made no assumption of automatic entitlement to speak. In contrast, Bill said little 
about how these events impacted on him physically or emotionally, but rather 
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spoke of pastoral concern and his intention to use his speaking position to “talk it 
out” with the pastor collaboratively (noting his use of “we”): 
I just wanted to talk it out and say, “Look, is this—do you realise what’s 
happening? Can you make the connections? Is there anything here that we can 
change about the way we pray and work?” 
However, Bill’s account of what ensued after his initial questioning gives a 
picture of a painful struggle as he and the pastor both tried to come to terms with 
the ways his perspective had changed. 
And he—he didn’t quite know how to cope with it, because he hadn’t been asked, 
or hadn’t been challenged, in that way before, by someone who is reasonably 
theologically articulate and could—and had some experience. And he took it as a 
personal affront, really, and became quite defensive, and so sort of wanted to shut 
me down and stop me asking questions. So, um—basically I felt there was no 
context to ask questions anymore. So it came to a bit of a head at one of the AGMs, 
which of course is a public forum. And I asked him fairly pointed questions at an 
AGM. Because that was the only—he’d shut down all the other contexts that I 
could try and raise some issues that I was concerned about. And um—and that 
became really difficult for him and difficult for me. 
The language here conveys a shift in Bill’s attitude to the man who was formerly 
for him a “fatherly figure.” Themes of appreciation and collaboration give way to 
challenge and “pointed questions.” No space for questioning remained where Bill 
could ask questions and stay under the covering of the pastor’s authority and 
blessing. Supported by his awareness of alternative theological discourses, in 
which the practices of authority within the church could be named as a “misuse” 
or “abuse” of power, Bill found a speaking position within the constitutional 
process of the church AGM.  
From this point, having stepped outside of the covering, Bill’s recalled 
experience began to sound more like Cathy’s. Now he was positioned as out of 
line, “rebellious” and “unable to accept authority.” A number of meetings with the 
leaders followed, and Bill began to feel “increasingly unsafe in those kind of 
contexts.” In one of these meetings, which Bill had requested permission to 
record, a metaphorical narrative emerged through which the leaders and Bill were 
able to agree that they were sailing on the same harbour, but were now in different 
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ships heading in different directions. This helped Bill to name his preferred 
version of the narrative, albeit with some sadness. 
I agreed with this, the—that metaphor of being on different ships and deciding, 
well, I don’t know what ship we want to be on, but I think I don’t want to be on 
this one anymore. Which after sixteen years of being in the same community and 
having been recognised and supported and honoured and appreciated within that 
community for so long, it was really hard for me. 
When the tape recorder was turned off, Bill became aware that the tone of the 
discussion changed. If Bill felt sadness, the pastor’s response appeared to him to 
be one of anger. 
I was very conscious that he was angry, and I sort of stayed away from him 
physically. And he came over towards me and he was shaking. He was literally 
shaking and holding himself back from hitting me—that’s how I—he was shaking 
and I interpreted that as him holding back from wanting to hit me. 
Whether the physical anger he perceived in his pastor on this occasion was 
produced by a sense of entitlement to be obeyed, or by a sense of disappointment 
that Bill would not be his successor, Bill did not speculate. Looking back on the 
dynamics of power at work in the church community, however, he concluded that 
people who were part of the “hierarchical system” of religious authority were 
unable to cope with challenges to the system. The religious discourse of authority 
in which they were positioned constructed a view of leadership as “something to 
do with God’s authority on earth, and so challenging his authority on earth is like 
challenging God.” There was also, Bill recognised, “a lot of vested interest in 
maintaining the system. . . . Maintaining power, and the perception of control.” In 
Foucauldian (1980) terms, the discourses and relations of power are inseparable 
and mutually productive. A discourse within which a leader is “God’s authority 
on earth” is productive of power relations of unquestioned authority and trusting 
submission. These power relations in turn re-produce the discourse. 
In summing up what supported his acts of resistance to this discursive 
system, Bill highlighted two things: justice and sadness. Like Cathy, his overseas 
experience and theological training had positioned him with strong values of 
social justice and community involvement. His sense of justice is evident in his 
willingness to challenge “power-over” practices of authority in the church, 
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especially those reflected in the way women were being treated. His sadness was 
in response to the realisation that the church could not grasp the possibility of 
serving the local community, and “couldn’t accept that we wanted to work with 
non-church people and not have our primary focus as converting them.” 
Cathy was already involved with the local women’s centre, and, after 
leaving the church, Bill and a group of others formed a trust with a view to 
working with men and boys in the local area. This group, Bill reflected, was now 
fulfilling the hopes that he had for the church. In a sense, it was his church. 
We never prayed; we never sang worship songs. We sang other kinds of songs and 
we listened to music and read poetry and did all sorts of stuff.  Um, but it didn’t 
specifically have a God-focus. But for me, there was a sense of connectedness that 
was very godly, you know. . . . And it's about the spirit for me. It's about the spirit 
moving, um, very naturally and organically. There’s nothing that me or anyone else 
has to say or … except create a fertile ground of trust and honour, and respect and 
listening—and spirituality grows. 
 
5.3 Jenny’s story 
 
Beginnings 
Jenny and her family immigrated to New Zealand not long before her involvement 
with a church in their new town began. She was keen to embrace relational 
opportunities and to fit in with the local setting. She saw a sign in a church 
window advertising a “ladies’ group” and decided to attend. 
It was friendly and it was very pleasant and they just talked differently. They had a 
whole language and a whole way of being that was totally different to me. Even 
that word “ladies” is really significant, if you know what I mean? . . . It implied so 
much about what it was to be female, to be a woman. You know, you had to be a 
lady. . . . And dreadful things were said that I would have got quite angry about, 
but I sort of took it on as part of being a Christian, you know, like, you know, 
obeying your husband, and even if he said outrageous things or did ridiculous 
things, he was still head of the house and—I struggled with it. But I was a stranger 
in a foreign land. 
Jenny’s description of this meeting foreshadowed several key aspects of the story 
that she went on to tell about her years of involvement in this church. She had 
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previously trained as a social worker, and her comments on the term “ladies” 
indicate her awareness of patriarchal language and practices. On the other hand, 
being in, and working at maintaining, quality relationships featured prominently 
in Jenny’s account of her hopes for life in community. Later in the interview, she 
spoke of having taken up an idea which supported these hopes, namely that 
quality communication within relationships “is like the heart of the gospel, it’s the 
heart of God ... to actually be relating to one another.” Her initial experience of 
this church as “incredibly friendly” and caring therefore made it an inviting 
context to join. 
The priority of maintaining relationship, the disarming friendliness of the 
people and the sense of being “a stranger in a foreign land” all positioned Jenny 
with a preparedness to tolerate patriarchal language and practices with which she 
admittedly “struggled.” There were also powerful discursive factors within the 
church context that made it difficult to resist these ideas and practices, and Jenny 
names one of them here. She quickly discovered that “being a Christian” implied 
a position call to take on “dreadful things” that were said about women “obeying” 
their husbands as “head of the house,” regardless of what they said or did. 
 
Discursive positioning and its effects 
Jenny began her story with an acknowledgement that her journey toward 
eventually saying “no” to “something that was evidently very unhealthy” had 
been a “huge process.” Her own reflection on why it had taken so long to 
negotiate that process centred on the ideas which constructed and bounded her 
thinking: 
And I think there would have been people around me that would have said—a bit 
like, a bit like the thoughts one might have around, perhaps, women that are in an 
abusive marriage, or whatever—“For goodness sake, why don’t you just say no?  
Why don’t you just—?” And the same applies, really, that because of my thinking, 
I didn’t just say “no” to something that was evidently very unhealthy. But, because 
of the mindsets and all that being linked to God, it’s very hard to think that you can 
say “no,” or it’s right even to think “no.” 
What were the “mindsets,” the discursive practices, which proscribed the 
possibility of even thinking “no”? The discourses of covering and submission, 
encountered already in Cathy’s story, also featured prominently in Jenny’s 
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narrative. A particular incident epitomised, for her, the impact of these ideas on 
her family. Having bought a new home, Jenny explained, she and her husband 
wanted the church leaders to come and pray with them in the house. They were 
aware that some tragic things had happened there in the past. 
And by then we’d become aware, and had thought that it was the correct teaching, 
to—you sort of submitted yourself to the elders. And there were things like—
things said that sort of groomed you, if you like. Like, “Oh now,” it would be said 
in church, “Oh now, this couple are thinking of moving. Now isn’t that great? 
They’re asking us to pray for them before they make any decisions. I love it when 
people do this. They come to us first. They submit themselves to us. And it’s just 
great. This is the sort of stuff we want to see.” And that was put to you, that this 
was the way to go, you know. Anyway, so we sort of thought that was the right 
thing. 
But Jenny and her husband had already made the decision to move, without 
consulting the elders. So, Jenny recalled, the pastor came to them with several 
elders on the day of the move and informed them that they would not be praying 
with them, because, he said, they “weren’t under his covering.” Moreover, they 
were told that if anyone from the church prayed with them, they would be opening 
themselves to evil influences, because they would be stepping out from under his 
covering. Such was “the strength of the few,” Jenny observed, that no one came to 
pray. The language used by Jenny in describing her own response strikingly 
demonstrates the power of the covering discourse to position people with fears of 
dire consequences—life and death consequences—should they refuse the call to a 
submissive position. 
So it was very distressing, because in my mindset at the time it was really—
although I felt God was in it, and we were doing this because it was 
God-inspired—parts of me felt, because of the training I’d had over six years I 
guess, that I was actually upsetting God. And we did move, but I just thought, 
“God might actually kill me.” I know it sounds ridiculous, you know, but I actually 
felt God might actually kill us. That it was a distinct possibility. 
The move went ahead. No one came to pray, but many people from the church 
community came to offer practical assistance with packing and cleaning. Jenny 
remembered being overwhelmed by these people’s genuine kindness, but still 
conflicted, “very distressed” and “shamed.” On the one hand, she recalled, “I just 
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felt people were being kind to us, even though we’d done wrong.” On the other 
hand, “there was still a spark in me that knew we hadn’t.” Jenny’s reference to her 
“spark” of knowing, and her feeling at the time that their move had been “God-
inspired,” reflect a theme that pervaded her narrative. She spoke of having 
“always had an awareness of God” and from childhood had “enjoyed” her 
relationship with God. Whatever account might be given of this alternative 
knowledge, Jenny saw it as something that supported a thread of self-belief 
through the years when the dominant discourses of religious authority recruited 
other “parts” of her subjectivity into fear and shame.  
Alongside the covering and submission discourses, which so effectively 
supported the authority of the leaders, Jenny, like Cathy, also encountered 
authoritative practices which reflected a belief in leaders’ privileged, divinely 
imparted knowledge. Jenny was one of a group of women who felt that they also 
had some wisdom from God which was relevant to the direction the church was 
taking. When they asked if they could talk to the church leaders about this, with a 
view to conversation, rather than as a claim to superior insight, they were refused. 
Anyway, so we kept trying and the more we kept trying the worse it got. And in the 
end we were told “You will not talk about this.” You know? “You will not—you 
will just shut up now.” Woops, woops, woops. And he got really nasty. It was 
horrible. It was so harsh ... The leadership had a view that they were sort of 
infallible—a bit like the Pope really. 
The sense of entitlement to exert authority in a unilateral fashion, constructed by 
the discourses of divinely sanctioned authority and knowledge, was reflected in 
other practices described by Jenny. There were unwritten rules: “silly rules that 
they have in those sort of churches, about your parenting, or the way you—you 
know—the clothes you wear.” Jenny described what happened when she 
expressed a personal opinion to the pastor concerning the head of their church 
denomination: 
He insisted that I meet him and I had to face him. And I said, “I don’t want to. I’ve 
got nothing against the man.” And he brought him to our house. And I had to meet 
with him. And I didn’t want to. It was awful. 
In Jenny’s view, it was impossible to have dialogic relationship with the leaders of 
the church because of the silencing effects of the discursive practices of authority. 
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You could never actually have a conversation because your point of view wasn’t 
actually valid. All that they were interested in as leaders was, were you submitting? 
Again echoing Cathy’s experience, gendered practices of authority placed further 
limits on Jenny’s capacity to make agentic choices in the production of her own 
life. She recalled expressing a desire to attend a conference and being told by the 
pastor, “you should stay home and look after your family.” Often the high priority 
she placed on honest communication in relationships positioned Jenny with a 
desire to talk to the pastor about things that concerned her. Eventually she realised 
that the more she did that, the more she would be positioned as spiritually 
rebellious and out of line: 
And curiously part of the strength of that church was on relationship. I wanted to 
say to [the pastor], “Look, I don’t understand that,” or, “that really hurt.” But that 
was all a waste of time. And I just realized that it was just—it was just throwing me 
more and more in the role of—well, “Jezebel” was bandied around a lot—“a 
Jezebel spirit.”6 
As she told her story, Jenny described further effects which the practices of 
religious authority in this community produced in her and others: 
It could have just—it could have robbed me completely of my faith. And it did a 
lot of damage, I believe, to myself and my family. It took us a long time to get over 
it. 
Throughout the interview, Jenny named these damaging effects with a striking 
array of terms: shame, being crippled, being lessened, confusion, flatness, anger, 
agony and feeling devastated, undone, wild inside, and horrible. 
I can’t, I wouldn’t be able to, get the words to say how huge it was—there aren’t 
words big enough—or how painful it was. It was extraordinarily painful. 
Again the embodied nature of the effects of religious authoritarianism is striking. 
The pain has significance for Jenny which no words can adequately capture. I 
asked her what she now understood to be the source of this pain. She explained 
that it was not so much the petty rules and attitudes she encountered, but the way 
she found her personhood, including her spirituality, being put in question. 
                                                 
6
 As noted in Chapter 4, Jezebel is portrayed in the Hebrew Scriptures as a queen who rebelled 
against God and persecuted God’s chosen prophet. 
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Well, I think it was a denial. I suppose one of the most important things—I mean it 
was a denial of my sense of self. Who I was wasn’t acceptable. That was—and my 
personhood, if you like, wasn’t acceptable. Who I was before God wasn’t 
acceptable. And even it put into question my relationship with God, and that’s 
probably the most painful. 
Jenny’s narrative again suggests that, for her, personhood and spirituality were 
inherently relational notions. Her accounts of her efforts to value even difficult 
relationships, to engage in dialogic conversation, and to pursue restorative 
possibilities in the face of conflict, indicate the perseverance with which she 
rehearsed these values. Jenny described the constant thwarting of her relational 
efforts as crippling: “there’s something that actually cripples me in a way, or 
lessens me, when I’m stuck in that mode.” At the same time, Jenny acknowledged 
that it was partly the strength of the values she placed on relationship which held 
her in that “stuck” place. The covering discourse constructed a separation between 
those under and those outside of the covering of church allegiance. So to move 
away from the pain of relationship refusals would be to lose access to other valued 
relationships. So Jenny was held in this stuck position by 
a sense of being connected to these people. Like if you leave, you can’t really have, 
you’re not allowed to really have, a relationship with them anymore. There was a 
sense of that as well. 
Jenny offered two further perspectives on why she stayed so long. Through the 
lens of her counselling profession, she saw her earlier family experiences as 
producing within her a vulnerability to “disastrous marriages.” She also felt that 
these difficult relationships had given her “training” in her “reality being denied.” 
So, it seemed to her, “there was sense with me that people could do what they 
liked and I had to just get over it.” But Jenny could also see that the fact that she 
remained in the community for years, despite the pain, was about more than 
internal psychological dynamics. There were religious discourses, “teaching,” 
within the church context that positioned her with an obligation to stay, just as 
“being a Christian” had earlier recruited her to discourses which demanded 
unquestioning submission to her husband, no matter how much he denied her 
account of “reality.” 
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And that teaching feeds that, you see, of course. You just have to get over it, get on 
with it, and it’s a godly thing to do. 
Jenny identified another form of the covering discourse, again familiar from 
Cathy’s story, which produced fear at the prospect of choosing to leave the 
church. 
I thought at that time that—oh, there’s a real—there’s quite a strong teaching about 
not leaving church, you know. . . . And there was a sense of, “You’ve really done 
the wrong thing.” If you leave, you’ve walked away from God, if you’ve left 
church. And again, that ties into that whole idea of church being God, really. And I 
suppose I bought into that for a long time. I couldn’t see that there was actually a 
difference. 
To leave the church is to walk away from God. This disturbing discourse on its 
own offers a compelling answer to the question of why so many people like Jenny 
stay in church contexts that diminish their lives, and find it hard to say, or even 
think, “no.” So how did she account for the cracks that developed in her own 
subjection to “the system,” opening space for agentic action, resistance and her 
eventual repudiation of the covering discourse? 
 
Agency and resistance 
Two main strands emerged in Jenny’s story of resistance. One concerned 
questions that began to arise in her thinking about the ideas and systems of 
authority in the church. The other related to the embodied effects of witnessing 
the impact of those systems on the lives of others.  
Jenny identified her contradictory subjective experience on the day of the 
house move as having opened a space in which the practices of religious authority 
within the church could be questioned. On the one hand the covering discourse, 
enacted in the pastor’s refusal to allow people to pray with Jenny and her family 
in their new house, produced disturbing thoughts and fears: “God might actually 
kill me.” The thought of going to church the next day left her feeling “totally 
shamed.” On the other hand, she still felt that the move was “God-inspired,” and 
experienced care and support from the community in the form of practical help. 
Jenny’s account of people’s support suggests that they too were being positioned 
in contradictory ways, by the covering discourse on the one hand, and by the ideal 
of being a caring community (which strongly informed the church’s teaching) on 
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the other. It suggests that they managed to negotiate a space for themselves in 
which they could enact discourses of practical care without refusing the position 
call to remain under the covering of religious authority. Looking back, Jenny 
recalled: “that was the turning point for me; that started to make me question, and 
I began to notice things.” 
In discursive terms, what Jenny “began to notice” was a system of ideas, 
flagged by certain recurring “keywords” which she heard not only in her own 
church, but in the teaching of other churches also: “covering, excellence, 
leadership, submission, authority.” 
Every meeting, you’d hear all these men who are going to make fine leaders one 
day. “These children are going to be our leaders. We want to draw them into 
excellence.” So those to me began to be keywords that I always felt suspicious, you 
know, when I heard them. 
Eventually Jenny’s curiosity about these ideas and practices led her to do some 
research into their origins. In particular, she “started doing some reading around 
the Shepherding Movement.”7 This research opened further space for Jenny to 
question (and so deconstruct) a system of ideas which had formerly seemed God-
given. This system of ideas now became an “it,” a “mindset” to be understood 
within a “framework”: 
But there was actually some stuff that was useful to me, because it gave me a 
framework. You know. And I just thought, “Oh this is it. This is what this is.” . . . 
It was the thinking, yeah. It was the thinking. It was a whole mindset, a whole way 
of—a whole doctrine I suppose. And I thought, “This is it. This is what’s got into 
the church.” 
Jenny described the discovery of this framework as “liberating,” and she began 
talking to others about it, “trying to prove that this was a real thing, and it really 
was there, and it really wasn’t healthy, and it really had slipped into the church.” 
In this she was motivated by feelings of grief at the way this system of ideas about 
authority was diminishing the spiritual possibilities of people’s lives. 
                                                 
7
 This is a reference to a school of thought, influential in some British and North American 
churches in the 1970s and 1980s, which strongly emphasised that every Christian should be under 
a mature leader (“shepherd”) to whom they would be accountable for their conduct of the Christian 
life (Moore, 2003). While this movement was largely discredited by the end of the 1980s, the ideas 
appear to have been transmitted beyond their original contexts, circulating and reproducing 
through discursive practices such as covering and submission. 
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Because I’m so—Ah, it just—it really—it robs people. And I think that really 
grieves me, because I think it must grieve God.  It just robs people of—really of 
their relationship with God. 
Jenny had experienced a long period of paralysing conflict between the discourse 
which condemned people who were not submissive and the discourse in which 
relationship was “the heart of God.” Now that the former discourse could be 
viewed, through her research, as a framework of thinking which was capable of 
critical evaluation, the priority of relationship could assert itself in her responses 
to what was happening. At the same time, Jenny acknowledged that it was in part 
her own agentic efforts to practice her relational values in responding to the 
leaders that had delayed a more challenging stance. 
I was determined to be generous. I was determined to try and come from a place 
that I believe God would want me to come from. But I hadn’t quite yet grasped the 
fact that he might actually want me to get a grip on—you know, on speaking out 
for what was right. 
Even at the time of our interview, Jenny acknowledged that the value she placed 
on certain ways of being in relationship, together with what she described as her 
“nature and training,” still sometimes invited her into a subject position of 
acquiescence. 
I think I am still probably—although I have grown a lot, and I’ve changed a lot—I 
would still be a little too ready, probably, to acquiesce to another, or to succumb to 
another’s power or influence. Although that’s changed—I mean, will continue to 
change. That’s a tension as well, I find, when I’m trying to walk a path that keeps 
some grasp on the concepts of humility and kindness and generosity and preferring 
the other, when you’ve got my nature and training. You know? So I’m trying to 
move away from that. 
Jenny recalled that it was the effect of seeing other people being treated unjustly 
by the pastor, rather than her own treatment, which was “pivotal” in supporting 
her eventually to think and say “no.” 
When he was so unpleasant, and so unkind to other people, and ridiculous really in 
some of his stuff, that caused something in me to rise up. Because it was wrong and 
unkind and unjust, and that made me say, “No,” you know? That made me say, 
“This is not OK.” 
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Jenny described the impact of witnessing a particular incident, which involved the 
pastor’s treatment of a woman in the church, and the way her own sense of anger 
“really helped” her to move from her stuck position, to finally say the “No” which 
previously could not even be thought. The following week some comments were 
made in the church service which Jenny regarded as very dishonouring to people, 
like this woman, who didn’t fit the espoused profile of “solid Christians that make 
good parents and that are just wonderful members of the church.”  
I thought, “How dare you!” I couldn’t believe my ears. . . . “I can’t—I’m not going 
to be in this environment!” So it was more offence that impacts other people, 
probably, or stuff that he was saying about God, rather more than what he did to 
me. . . . It was only when I saw his treatment of people—that tipped it for me. . . . I 
suppose that was hard evidence in front of my eyes. 
Jenny’s anger at what she was seeing and hearing can be understood as an 
embodiment of the discursive conflict between the leader’s claim to represent God 
and her understanding of the priority which Jesus placed on relationships of 
“humility, of serving, of gentleness and kindness and all that stuff.” At the time of 
the interview, she was continuing to align herself with the Christian faith, but 
expressed real doubts as to whether any church community could actually resolve 
this conflict. As to the possibility of having close involvement with a church in 
the future, Jenny’s prediction was: “I’ll never go to church again.” 
Having offered this pessimistic view of the church, Jenny went on to 
describe an alternative picture of how it might be—a picture that she felt was 
God-given. In this picture, the church, with its structures of authority, no longer 
stood between God and people. Rather, the church was a circle of people, all of 
whom had the capacity to listen to God and to share their ideas of what God might 
be saying with each other. The church, then, becomes “the person sitting next to 
me, it’s the person sitting next to that, it’s the person sitting next to that.” In 
Jenny’s picture, no one person, including her, had the right to unilaterally tell 
others what God thinks or wants. Rather, “if the person happens to say, ‘What 
about—?’  I could say, ‘Well, I think—’” 
As our two hour conversation drew to a close, Jenny summed up what was 
important for her in this way: 
I mean if the power of God is life, you know? And joy. And love. And all that 
stuff. . . . Well then, it isn’t evident in that system of thinking. . . . Like the other 
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day . . .  I was walking—I go walking in the morning—and there was a solid 
concrete or tarmac pavement, and there was a crack. And this plant was growing 
up? That’s it, isn’t it? Life will overcome. 
These words aptly captured Jenny’s years of struggle to negotiate a hospitable 
space—described by her in terms of mutual love, openness, humility, kindness 
and joy—in which life, her life and others’ lives, could flourish. The solid 
concrete was the system of thinking that made it very hard to say, or even think, 
no, to practices that diminished life. Jenny remained pessimistic about the system, 
but could testify to the possibility of finding cracks in the system in which life 
would make its way nonetheless. 
 
5.4 Selina’s story 
 
Beginnings 
Selina had connections with the church at the centre of her narrative for more than 
twenty years. In describing the first main phase of her involvement, she named 
values which continued to shape her narrative throughout our conversation. She 
spoke warmly of the diverse and inclusive character of the community: “it was 
gentle, it was respectful and it was embracing . . . it was good.” She had 
encountered these values earlier, during her university years. There she 
encountered a diverse group of people who related to one another with mutual 
respect and care. Selina also relished her memory of university as a place where 
she learned “that thinking is good and that development is really important and 
that change is good.” All of this was in marked contrast to the way Selina recalled 
being positioned in her family of origin, where loyalty meant conformity to the 
family’s way of doing things.  
So in my family culture, there is a very powerful push that I should—rather than be 
who I am—that I should be who they want me to be, and do things the way they 
want. And, you know, there’s just absolutely no space or room for, “Who are you?” 
All it is, is “You are not who we want you to be.” 
Another positive experience in the first phase of Selina’s involvement in the 
church at the centre of her narrative was a shared form of leadership. There was 
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one main leader, but leadership was understood to be the collaborative 
responsibility of a team of equals. 
In naming the relational values which she had taken up as a result of these 
earlier experiences, Selina was making meaning of the difficulties and 
disappointments she experienced when leadership practices in the church began to 
enact discourses which were at odds with collaborative notions of leadership. 
While the language of covering did not feature explicitly in Selina’s narrative, 
parallel notions of divinely sanctioned authority and submission were evident. She 
subsequently realised that these discourses were characteristic of the wider 
network of churches to which her church belonged, but they had not been 
aggressively rehearsed in the collaborative leadership style of the earlier pastor. 
When that situation changed, her resistance, her efforts to actively hold on to the 
values of inclusivity, freedom and respect, began. 
To frame Selina’s resistance simply in terms of holding on to these values 
does not do justice to another important strand within her narrative. In an echo of 
Jenny’s “life will overcome” metaphor, Selina also told her story of resistance as a 
struggle for survival, which began with the effects of her positioning within the 
discursive practices of conformity within the family, and continued in her 
experiences within the church. 
From their point of view, it’s definitely my fault that the family doesn’t work. And 
I’m selfish and off doing my own thing, and, yeah. And so, because of all of that, I 
am like really, really—I get very nervous if I feel that anybody’s telling me what to 
do. I mean, I have an irrational, you know, response to that—reaction to that. . . . 
For me it’s just sheer survival. It is just trying to be able to—I’ve been haunted for 
decades by this enormous sense of annihilation, you know, that I will actually 
cease to exist, which was very frightening and very powerful. 
I return to this striking language of fear and survival in considering the themes of 
agency and resistance in Selina’s story. 
 
Discursive positioning and its effects 
As mentioned already, Selina did not use the term “covering” in describing the 
discursive practices which became problematic for her (and others) in the second 
phase of her involvement in the church. Her recollection of the language of 
leadership included phrases like “God’s man” and “God’s appointed leader.” 
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When the new pastor was called to lead the church, the leaders were convinced 
that he was “God’s man.” 
This was God’s man! And it was that language that was used—absolutely. This 
was God’s man. It was said over and over again. I remember. 
Both words in that phrase were significant: leadership was God-appointed and 
male. In theory, Selina recalled, the new pastor was appointed as “one amongst 
equals,” in line with the previous practice of shared leadership. But as time went 
on it became clear that his language and practice of leadership was constructed by 
quite different discourses. In her view, the new pastor believed that he was 
specially chosen by God to be the leader, and that God would speak to the church 
through him: 
The kind of spirituality that [he] brought into the church was—and there would 
have been some of it already, but there were kind of counterweights, if you like, to 
it. . . . He used to call himself, “God’s man.” . . . Yeah. “I’m God’s man for here. 
God speaks to me before he speaks to anybody else. I know what’s necessary for 
this church and you guys don’t.” 
From the beginning, Selina did not accept these ideas, nor the authority with 
which they positioned the pastor. She quickly identified three ways in which the 
changes were at odds with the values which had informed the community up to 
that point: it was a shift from shared leadership toward hierarchy; a shift from an 
embrace of diversity toward conformity; and a shift from collaborative 
participation in decision making to control from the top. 
Initially, Selina was reluctant to raise her concerns, but, in line with the third 
of her concerns, she felt a responsibility to do so. As she attempted respectfully to 
put her concerns before the pastor and other leaders of the church, she discovered 
how difficult it was going to be to resist the prevailing discursive tide, especially 
as a woman. She put her concerns in a letter and arranged to meet with the leaders 
(all men) to discuss them. Before the meeting, one of the leaders rang to tell her to 
bring her husband with her: “You’ll find it more comfortable if you do.” Selina 
rejected this advice, preferring to speak as a person in her own right. As people 
gathered for this meeting, she recalled, there was an awkward silence in the room, 
broken when the pastor finally asked her what she wanted to say. 
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I was quite surprised, because I thought, well, it was all in the letter, and so I 
expected that [the pastor] would say, “Now Selina, in this letter you said this, and 
can we—do you have anything else to say?” Or, “We’ve talked about it, and we 
think this,” or whatever. But [he] just—he just said, “What do you want to say?” 
And I said, “Well, it was all in the letter.” And so [he] looked at everybody, and 
this look came across his face. And he just looked at the others. He said, “Got your 
letters boys?” And I hate that voice. I hate it. Anyway … I had my copy of the 
letter, so I sort of started, and I launched through the points. And it was just—I just 
delivered it to this very cold silence basically. 
Afterwards, Selina “drove home in a daze,” overwhelmingly aware of how 
different this experience had been to any previous meetings with the church 
leaders. The other leaders had clearly known the pastor’s view, and were 
unwilling to step out of line to offer her any support or response. She “never heard 
another word” about her letter. 
Selina related another encounter with the pastor, which occurred a few 
months after this meeting. She sometimes helped with leading worship in the 
church, and the pastor told her that she was doing too much speaking while in the 
up-front role. “Just do the music,” she was told. “If you want to speak, I will put 
you on the preaching roster.” Selina was surprised at this offer, but responded 
that, yes, she would like to be on the preaching roster. But over six months had 
passed, and her name never appeared on the roster. During a subsequent visit from 
the pastor to her home, Selina asked him about the fact that no invitation to preach 
had yet come. Her memory of his response was still vivid at the time of our 
interview. Her question was met with a defensive and very angry tirade that left 
her feeling “totally traumatised.” “I really, really thought he was going to actually 
punch me!” Selina recalled. She resolved after this to “lie very, very, very low” 
and not to do or say anything “to even be a blip on [his] radar.” 
When I asked Selina why she made this resolution, she spoke of having had 
“the strong sense that something very terrible, that shouldn’t have happened, had 
happened.” There was an understandable element of wanting to protect herself 
against further angry responses: “I felt probably as if I actually had been hit.” But 
the “something very terrible, that shouldn’t have happened” was not simply this 
man’s inappropriate display of anger. Selina was speaking of her sense at that 
time that there was something that she had done, as a woman confronting a man, 
which was wrong. Looking back on this, she offered an articulate account of her 
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experience as a woman in the church context, bridging from these historical 
incidents to the general situation for women in the church: 
[I thought], clearly the culture is now completely different, and so I will do my best 
to lie down and float with the current because that apparently is what’s expected. 
So, clearly I’ve been a naughty girl. . . . I think in church—well, I mean this is ten 
years ago, so maybe things are different—but if you’re a female, and you stand up 
with an opinion, or try and be a person, you very easily can be labelled somebody 
who’s trying to control things, or somebody who’s being inappropriate somehow. 
It’s like the culture says that it’s inappropriate for women to hear from God, or act 
like a normal person. 
With some hesitation—she was speaking to a male interviewer—Selina continued 
her reflection on gendered practices within the church, before and during the new 
pastor’s time. 
Talking as a female about gender issues is really hard. It’s really hard, because it’s 
very easy for it to come across like you’re whinging or whining or, you know, 
whatever. 
As she continued, I was privileged to hear Selina give further personal examples 
of gendered positioning and male-centred language within church practices. She 
was aware that the pastor had probably found her independent stand as a woman 
threatening in some way, and offered a compelling account of how deeply “awful” 
it felt for her to violate the “given order” by making a man feel threatened. 
And I—and it’s a horrible thing—it’s like an awful thing, to feel that you make 
anybody feel threatened. But I think as a woman, you’re very aware that basically 
men hold the power in society. So when you become aware that you’re making a 
man feel threatened, that is awful. Because you feel like—you feel that you are 
actually somehow going against the whole kind of given order of—you know, like 
I’ve—somehow I’ve done something wrong here. Somehow I’ve stepped out of the 
place that I’m supposed to be in, and I am behaving in a way that must be 
inappropriate. Because here’s this person feeling like somehow I have removed 
some power from them, when that never was my intention. So what am I doing 
wrong? 
In raising her questions, respectfully, Selina had done what she felt to be right. 
More than right, she had done what she felt to be required of her by God. Yet the 
143 
forcefulness of the response, the response of male power under threat, invited her 
into a conflicted subject position of having done something wrong, and of lying 
“very, very, very low.” Having tried to challenge the new culture of authority, she 
vowed, “I just was not going to do that anymore, ever.” The imagery of lying 
“very, very, very low”—in an attempt to preserve life and avoid violating deeply 
inscribed cultural structures of male authority—had a telling connection with a 
metaphor Selina used later in describing to a friend the consequences for her of 
assuming this submissive subject position:  
I said to her, “I feel like I’ve been presented with this very, very, very shallow 
coffin that I’m being asked to lie down in. And I don’t think I can fit my body in 
there.” 
This striking word picture anticipated Selina’s account of her movement toward a 
decision to leave the church. 
 
Agency and resistance 
A sense of agency was evident throughout Selina’ narrative. She presented herself 
as having been clear as to the values and hopes she had taken up for life in 
community and the practices of leadership. These values, along with her previous 
experiences of community, enabled her to recognise and critique the discourses of 
religious authority which were reproduced through the new leaders’ words and 
actions. Rather than finding space for agency in the experience of contradictory 
positioning, as Cathy and Jenny did, Selina seems to have assumed the position of 
respectful critic from the beginning. In fact, Selina explained, this position was 
not so much a matter of freedom as it was “a sense of responsibility.” She saw 
herself as someone gifted with an ability to “see” things that sometimes she would 
rather not see. But having seen something, she needed to act: 
And so yes, I guess a sense of responsibility. And a sense of, I’m not going to just 
be pushed around by this guy who thinks that he can just march in here and change 
everything when people are—a lot of people were leaving the church without 
saying anything. They were just not coming back. So it was like a sense of the 
church haemorrhaging, and it was well, we can’t just let this happen! 
Did the point at which Selina decided to “lie down and float with the current” 
represent a surrender of this sense of responsibility and agency? Temporarily, 
144 
perhaps. But there is no indication that she simply gave up and allowed herself to 
be re-inscribed by the same discourses of divinely bestowed authority and 
knowledge which she was consciously resisting. In one sense, her temporary step 
back was an agentic move, intended to protect her from a repetition of her 
traumatising experience of the pastor’s anger. On the other hand, as Selina herself 
reflected, there was in her withdrawal a sense of having been disciplined 
according to longstanding and deeply inscribed forms of subjecthood (the “given 
order”) which forbid women to threaten male potency. 
Selina’ vow not to challenge authority again was in fact short lived. The 
new leadership team formed by the pastor continued to act in ways that confirmed 
her three concerns. By this time others in the church were also waking up to the 
significance of the changes that were occurring. No matter how respectfully she or 
others tried to raise concerns, the leaders were inclined to see such challenges as 
“rebellion.” Selina recalled how one of the leaders portrayed the situation during a 
meeting to discuss some of the issues: 
“We’ve got you guys and we’ve got us, and really we don’t have a lot in common. 
And we have to ask ourselves, can this continue to work?” And everybody just sat 
there, you know. And I looked at everybody, and I thought, “They can’t hear what 
he’s saying” I said, “N.,” I said, “are you saying N. that it would be better if we 
actually went away and did our thing somewhere else and were no longer part of 
[this church]?” And everybody went, “Oh!”, like this. And he just looked straight 
at me, and he said, “That is what I am saying.” And the other leaders were like, 
quite shocked! But I was thrilled, because I thought, “Great! Finally what they 
actually think is out in the open for all to see.” I was really pleased. And sad. But 
pleased to say, “Well look, this is where we’ve got to now.” 
Some weeks later the leaders issued what Selina regarded as very restrictive 
conditions on which people could continue to exercise any roles within the 
church. This was the point at which she and her partner decided to leave the 
church. In part, they hoped their decision would shake others into realising what 
was happening. People were shocked and upset, Selina recalled, but, as in Cathy’s 
and Bill’s leaving, “the church people were told after we’d gone that they weren’t 
to have anything to do with us.” Again it is evident how the discourses of the 
‘covering’ variety construct those who do not submit to authority as being 
spiritually dangerous. 
145 
Learning of these restrictions was also the occasion for Selina’s use of the 
coffin metaphor, mentioned earlier. In that light, the act of leaving the church was 
not simply a measured next step for Selina, it was an act of survival. On the day of 
their leaving, her body, within which the annihilating effects of repressive 
religious authority had been felt so strongly, resonated even more powerfully with 
a joyful sense of freedom: 
I remember really clearly walking down the central aisle of the church, and as I 
stepped outside, it was like this explosion in my head. I physically felt the freedom 
of it. It was like I went—whoah! It was physical. It was—it shocked me. I 
physically felt this great weight, this huge weight, lift right off my head, and it was 
just like a total like clear sky straight up to God. And all this garbage just gone. It 
was amazing! 
 
5.5 Discussion points 
I conclude this chapter by briefly noting points for further theoretical reflection in 
relation to my two research questions. These, together with discussion points from 
the next two chapters, are taken up in my final discussion (Chapter 8). 
 
First research question 
Within Christian communities, how is it that some regimes of power and 
knowledge can subvert the call to freedom and justice which is pervasive in 
longstanding streams of Christian tradition? 
Traces of several interrelated discourses recur in my analysis of these four 
stories. There is a notion that leaders are not simply elected by their communities, 
but are divinely appointed. This is implicit in all of the accounts, but explicit in 
Selina’s reference to her leader’s self-designation as “God’s man.” Bill suggests 
that people were called into a subject position in which to challenge the pastor’s 
authority was like challenging God. According to this cluster of ideas, then, 
leaders have special authority and knowledge, given by God. These ideas support 
the promotion within these communities of the notion that spiritual wellbeing 
consists of being submissive to the authority and wisdom of one’s leaders, an idea 
that in two of the churches referred to here is captured in the metaphor of 
covering. All four participants featured in this chapter highlight a strongly 
gendered aspect in this call to assume a submissive subject position. The three 
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women relate their experience of “second-place” positioning within the church to 
their life-long acquaintance with gendered forms of positioning and 
subjectification. 
In Chapter 8, I explore the ways in which such regimes of power and 
knowledge subvert the possibility of dialogic power relations—which, I have 
argued in Chapter 3, is the necessary condition of freedom and justice—within 
Christian communities. I also consider what may be learned from the results 
presented in this chapter concerning the technologies of subjugation and 
hegemony which are supported by such discourses. 
 
Second research question 
What has enabled some people to resist the practices of religious authority 
constructed by such regimes? 
Resistance takes a number of forms here, but is most commonly recalled by 
the participants in terms of respectful attempts to question or challenge particular 
practices of authority, followed by their eventual decisions to leave their 
communities. Often this is connected with witnessing the effects of these practices 
on others in the community. Three of the narrators tell of their actions in ways that 
suggest that they were on behalf of the ethical commitments to justice, 
collaboration and inclusion which they brought to their life in community. Other 
issues which I take up and theorise in Chapter 8 include the importance of the 
embodied effects of subjugating practices, and of access to alternative 
knowledges, in the participants’ accounts of their move to a more agentic position 
in relation to religious authority. Finally, I note the recurrence of strikingly joyful 
metaphors and descriptions of freedom as the narrators told their stories of 
departure from the contexts which had constrained their lives for so long. In my 
discussion I reflect on the adequacy of purely discursive accounts of such joy. 
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Chapter 6: 
Discourses of separation, knowledge and authority 
But what they’re actually doing is they’re taking you away from your support 
networks, from all your friends, from all your families—totally isolating you, 
totally making you, well, do the programme, and obey the programme, even though 
it’s completely and utterly mad! (Lynne’s story) 
This chapter presents the results of applying discursive narrative analysis to the 
transcripts of my interviews with John and Lynne. Their narratives describe 
experiences in two very different religious communities, yet both are strongly 
informed by discourses of separation from what insiders of their communities 
referred to as “the world.” Themes of divinely privileged knowledge and authority 
are also present in both accounts, as they were in the last chapter. By comparison 
with the stories related in the previous chapter, however, the technologies of 
subjection within these communities tended toward domination and demanded 
compliance in almost every area of their members’ lives. 
 
6.1 John’s story 
Only two religious communities are named explicitly in this thesis, one being that 
which features in John’s story: the Exclusive Brethren. The historical features of 
the movement which are described here are a matter of public record, and are 
sufficiently distinctive to enable easy identification. 
 
Beginnings: born into belonging 
John’s story began with his birth into this religious community. 
Pretty well all the Exclusive Brethren are born into the Exclusive Brethren 
community. So you’re brought up in a family environment that embraces this 
particular point of view. 
In speaking about his experiences of religious authority in this context, his 
resistance, and his eventual departure from the Exclusive Brethren (hereafter EB), 
John was telling the story of more than half his life. Within that period, according 
to John’s account, the discourses and practices of religious authority within the 
EB movement underwent several changes. It is important to acknowledge that 
there have almost certainly been further changes in the years since John’s 
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involvement. What is described in this chapter cannot be assumed to accurately 
describe the EB movement in its contemporary form. 
Before describing what happened to him in the years of his involvement in 
the EB, John noted an irony in relation to the beginnings of the movement. It 
arose in the early decades of the nineteenth century in Britain and was, John 
suggested, “a protest against the formality and authoritarian approach of the 
establishment.” Within a short time, however, this relatively spontaneous 
development, centred on a network of house meetings, solidified into “a 
monolithic sort of structure where it became inevitable that leadership would be, 
and world leadership would become, very important.” This tension between an 
original ideal of collective, egalitarian approaches to leadership, and the 
authoritarian dominance of a series of “world leaders,” caught John’s attention at 
an early stage. John’s awareness of this dissonance became an important factor in 
his eventual disillusionment with the movement. 
 
The discursive shaping of identity: chosen and separate 
According to John’s account, the founders of the EB movement believed that 
through them, God was restoring important truths of the Christian faith, and that 
they were “the chosen remnant of the last days.” In other words, within the 
foundations of this community was an idea that it was in some way specially 
chosen by God, and that it was holding onto truth that had been lost or corrupted 
by the established church. This sense of special “chosenness” developed into a 
call to maintain separation from the world, and from churches who did not share 
EB beliefs. In explaining this, John referred to words from the New Testament 
which had provided a key metaphor within EB discourse. 
The main scripture, of course, was in 2 Timothy 2: “In the great house there are 
vessels to honour and vessels to dishonour and if anybody separate himself from 
these, the vessels to dishonour, he shall become a vessel to honour—fit for the 
Lord and fit for every good work.” And so, you know, we were encouraged to fulfil 
that. 
He also pointed back to the beginnings of the movement, and to the language of 
one of the founders, J. N. Darby. 
One of . . . Darby’s mantras was, God’s principle of unity is separation from evil. 
Separation from evil is your point of gathering almost. This is what makes you a 
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group. And that mantra had been very central to the whole Exclusive Brethren 
teaching. 
John acknowledged that there were balancing points of view in Darby’s teaching, 
but “separation from evil is the one that really captured the imagination and 
became central.” The discourse of separation made a deep impression on John and 
his siblings as younger children. They were intrigued by an aunt and uncle who 
were not part of the EB movement and whom they seldom saw. “But we could tell 
that our parents were very cautious that we shouldn’t be too much influenced by 
them.” Looking back, John could see a conflict for his parents between this stance 
of fear and exclusion and their positioning within other Christian discourses 
which called them to a more outward looking stance. 
I think our parents had a big problem, particularly my mother, between their own 
concepts of the outgoingness of Christianity and the growing trend for it to become 
more enclosed and cut off from the rest of the world.  And my mother, I know, 
suffered a tremendous amount in regard to that in her spirit. 
Originally intended as a “principle of unity” for the movement, the discourse of 
separation from evil seems to have become a fertile breeding ground for fear, 
suspicion, and control within its constituent elements, down to the level of the 
family. John further explained that this discourse became even more dominant, 
and began to take on extreme forms, under a particular worldwide leader of the 
movement, James Taylor Jr. In the early decades of the movement, successive 
leaders had exerted considerable influence, yet there had been room for dialogue 
and discussion at the level of local communities. 
So, my earlier experiences of our meetings . . . as a child was—our important 
meetings were our “dialogue meetings”, “reading” meetings rather than preachings, 
and these were—I thought they were very interesting.  We'd go through a passage 
of the Bible and somebody would stand up and read the chapter for the night and 
somebody would make some opening remarks and we'd go from there. 
John related less positive memories of what happened when James Taylor Jr 
became the leader (by now known as “the Man of God”) in 1953, when John was 
in his late teenage years. The principle of separation began to be extended to more 
and more areas of everyday life (down to shared walls and sewer pipes), and again 
this had a direct impact on John’s family. James Taylor Jr decreed that EB 
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members could not belong to what he called “associations of men.” This included 
workers’ unions and professional associations. As a result John’s father led a 
delegation to Parliament to request exemption from union membership for the 
Exclusive Brethren. His mother, he recalled, had a deep love of nature, and had 
been a devoted member of the New Zealand Forest and Bird Society. 
And then this question came up about belonging to the associations. And I was in 
our lounge when they started talking about this, and she had to arrive at it that she 
must write a letter and resign. And I could see the pain on her face, but she dare not 
go against the authority of her husband. My father, and the Exclusive Brethren 
generally, were very male dominated, and the hierarchy of Christ–man–woman–
child was very, very strong. 
As John put it, his mother “had to arrive at it” to resign. Two discourses—
separation from the world and submission to male authority—positioned her with 
a choice that was effectively no choice: between loyalty to her husband and 
continuing her membership of this “association of men.” In fact, the choice was 
even starker than that, since to reject her husband’s wish would have been to 
reject Christ. The divinely ordained hierarchy of authority for the EB was now, in 
effect, Christ–Man of God–man–woman–child. 
 
Conflicted positioning: life in two discursive worlds 
How did the discourse of separation, mediated via this hierarchy of authority, 
position John the child? He remembered making an effort at school to conceal the 
fact that he belonged to the EB. The policy of EB children “standing out from 
school assembly” had not yet started, and he found ways to blend in with other 
children. Within EB communities the discourse of separation produced a fear of 
influence from the evil outside world, and so EB families were not permitted to 
have radios (nor televisions later). John recalled pretending to the other boys that 
he had heard the radio shows they were talking about, and laughing along with 
them. At the same time, he began to have “terrible anxiety” about whether he 
really did belong to those who were “truly saved.” In line with the movement’s 
self-understanding as a small remnant of true believers, separated from the many 
that have it wrong, the question of eternal safety hinged on believing and doing 
the right things. For John at this time “it was all about ... the anxieties of eternal 
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safety.” He hoped that he had done all that was needed to be “absolutely safe,” but 
fears “still hung around.” 
Using his own version of the practice of separation, John managed to keep 
his school friendships and his life in the EB in discrete compartments. This 
enabled him to maintain an uneasy hold on two important kinds of belonging, 
albeit (the adult John suggested) with “an element of hypocrisy.” This “two 
worlds” strategy—and with it, a bifurcated process of subjectification—continued 
well beyond his school years. As noted already, the discourse of separation 
produced within EB communities both a sense of spiritual specialness and a fear 
of the contaminating influence of the outside world. John’s capacity to move 
between the worlds inside and outside of the EB exposed him to just such an 
influence, in the form of alternative ideas and “being able to think a bit wider.” 
This widening of his thinking began in high school and eventually gave rise to 
some significant doubts. 
Firstly, you know, the possibility of evolution being true, the scale of the universe 
and the insignificance of man in the whole scheme of things. And I also began to 
think about the other nations. If I’d been brought up in India or something like that, 
I would have been right out of all this sort of thing. It just didn’t seem fair that 
circumstances should weigh so heavily in regard to your eternal consequences. And 
the Brethren always had arguments about this—well, their day will come and 
they’ll be given another opportunity—and things like this. Sort of palliative stuff, 
which didn’t quite settle me too well. 
Immediately following high school, while he was still just sixteen, John left home 
to study at university. To his knowledge, he was the last member of the EB in 
New Zealand to have been allowed to complete a university degree. It was a risky 
move on his leaders’ part, destined to trouble further the dominance of EB 
discourses in John’s life. 
It had already been suggested that this wasn’t a good place for believers; it wasn’t a 
safe place. Um, and you know, my uncle and aunt who had been at university and 
didn’t come into fellowship through—the influences of the world got them in the 
end and I’d always thought they’d succumbed to temptation, rather than thought 
through it. Yes, so I felt I was quite strong . . . and my parents were concerned, but 
they knew I was a very committed young brother, so they thought I would handle it 
alright. And I was there on trust in that respect. 
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John continued to pursue his ‘two worlds’ strategy while at university, and, as a 
result, the unsettling influence of wider thinking continued to grow. A fellow 
student who took an interest in him turned out to be an atheist, “but in his lifestyle 
and his attitude he just seemed more like what I imagined Jesus would have been 
like than anybody else around.” After failing to convert this friend John took up 
his challenge to read Tolstoy, Freud and Jung. “I was as scared as anything about 
reading, particularly the psychologists.” But in Jung’s approach to spirituality he 
found “amazing stuff” that shed new light on his reading of the Bible. He boarded 
with an EB family for a year, where a family member who had already “come 
under influence” gave him James Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man to 
read.  
That was quite an experience reading that. Yes, that caused me a lot of anxiety. But 
he just uncovered, talked about all the struggles I was going through in that book.  
. . .  And then I came to a point where I felt, “Look, I’m just—I  don't know what I 
believe and why.” 
It seemed that the world of alternative ideas was in danger of overwhelming the 
tightly knit discourses of his faith, yet John couldn’t bear the thought of what his 
family and friends would think if he left the EB movement. He took his doubts 
and concerns to the EB leaders for whom he had a high regard, and they 
challenged him to sort out where he stood. 
I went away, and on the one hand I was thinking, “Well, you know there is 
something in the Bible that I feel happy with, but I can't take it in the same way 
they do.”  When I met them a fortnight later they asked me how I’d got on, and my 
response was, “I accept God’s authorship in creation,” which allowed me a fair bit 
of freedom as to what that meant. And they just gasped, “Oh, we’re so thankful 
John.” I think they were pretty relieved too, and accepted me on those terms. 
Rather than close down the possibilities of the life he found in the EB, or of the 
pursuit of truth, John had once again agentically negotiated a discursive space 
where he could hold on to preferred aspects of both. This meant reframing the 
separation discourse, just as he had reframed a fundamentalist belief in divine 
creation using the idea of “authorship.” He now saw the principle of separation 
from the world not in absolute terms, but “but in the sense of the world being a 
pretty grotty place and far as integrity and that sort of thing goes.” So he 
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continued to have contact with his university friends, but declined their invitations 
to go to certain movies. While other EB members were, he felt, “merely 
conforming,” John took up his own “agenda,” which was to make decisions “on a 
moral basis,” informed by his own understanding of Christian values. It became a 
matter of abiding by his “convictions.” 
I was curious to know what held open this discursive space in which John 
felt the freedom to pursue a moral agenda which was not simply dictated by the 
edicts handed down by the Man of God. John identified three factors which 
supported him in this. The first related to the ongoing tension within the EB 
movement between those who held to the original ideals of freedom from 
authoritarianism, preferring collective decision making within local contexts, and 
those who saw the authority of the Man of God as binding. As noted already, John 
had been attuned to this discursive complexity from his earliest experiences in the 
meetings, and “it was very evident even as a child that there were groups; there 
were factions.” The same tension was there in his teenage years. 
There was always two factions wherever you were, two points of view, and 
Auckland had their big conflict where they had a division. And it was pretty much 
about the same thing really, about the authority of the Man of God versus people 
that were more liberal and flexible in their approach to conduct. And the arbitrary 
ones always win ... The ones that make rules. 
Throughout our interview, John consistently expressed his preference for the 
collective, flexible approach. So, as a young adult, he took up the position that the 
process of sorting out his own moral convictions—while noting the views of the 
Man of God—was parallel to what was happening corporately in the movement. It 
was, he said, “a whole agenda in my own mind which was running parallel to 
what was happening in the meetings.” 
A second factor which supported John in his agentic efforts to pursue life in 
the EB context on his own terms can again be traced to the original intentions of 
the movement. From the beginning there had been a belief that this “remnant” 
community was recovering Christian truths that had been lost or corrupted by the 
institutional church. The espoused guide to all truth was held to be the Bible, as 
interpreted within the community. John was still firmly positioned within this 
discourse, even if he now sometimes read the Bible differently to the EB leaders. 
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I was still the person that felt as though the Bible was, you know, God’s manual for 
life; shall we put it that way? And that the whole idea of the Brethren—it wasn’t so 
much the authority of the leader, in theory, as the fact that everything was actually 
decided, not in somebody’s lounge, but in the collective position where everything 
was open to challenge, right? . . . And, so there was a wonderful—earlier on—there 
was a wonderful feeling of consensus about it all, and if anybody challenged it or 
anything, it was always listened to. 
As John looked at the way the discourses and practices of separation were 
developing under the new Man of God, James Taylor Jr, he felt that they were 
departing from his (John’s) understanding of Christianity and his understanding of 
the Bible. “I thought, you know, this is getting right away from what Christianity 
is all about. . . . The restrictions of separation actually made you unavailable for 
anything useful.” There are traces here of John’s memory of his parents’ belief in 
the “outgoingness of Christianity.” He also perceived a lack of integrity in the 
way people obeyed the literal words of the Man of God, while in practice “it was 
more a matter of what you could get away with.” This did not sit well with John’s 
awareness of certain sayings of Jesus which called for congruence between 
conviction and action—a principle clearly reflected in his own moral agenda. 
Significant although these two areas of discursive tension were, they were 
destined to be overtaken by John’s increasing concern at the reported behaviour of 
James Taylor Jr. “I think one of the things that worried me more than anything 
was the conduct of the leader himself, as he became more under the influence of 
his alcohol. And we were never allowed to suggest that he had an alcohol 
problem.” This led to some bizarre pronouncements from Taylor, including a 
declaration that alcohol was created by God and therefore people should be 
drinking it. 
Overnight, the Brethren became changed from being predominantly tee-total to 
being, um, whiskey drinkers. And it was absolutely ludicrous, the things that were 
done. People would have alcohol at their breakfast table and think that this was the 
way to live—the Lord’s indicated this. Bizarre, absolutely bizarre, the whole 
history of things. 
John conceded that initially it hadn’t seemed so bizarre. “When somebody steps 
out and [is] so radical like this—obviously it's either of the devil or it's of God.  
Well, it couldn’t be of the devil, so it was of God.” But soon he began to realise 
155 
that Taylor was very unwell. The latter began to make sexual references in his 
public meetings “and sort of became obsessive in regard to woman’s bodies, and 
spiritualizing it all of course.” The end result of this deterioration came during a 
series of meetings in Aberdeen, when Taylor was discovered in bed with 
somebody else’s wife: 
There's a huge story around the whole thing, but all you really need to know is that 
here was a man who was in a leadership, power position. He’d become paranoid; 
he’d gone down the slippery slope of an alcoholic who does not admit that he’s an 
alcoholic, and he actually died, I think, of alcoholic poisoning a few months after 
those meetings. 
John recalled that many people in the northern hemisphere left the EB after this 
incident, whereas those in Australia and New Zealand heard only a “sanitized 
version” and very few left the movement. John indicated that he would have left, 
but by this time he was married and had a young family. Moreover, for reasons 
explained in the next section, to openly voice doubts and questions, even to a 
family member, was by now too dangerous. 
I think if I had’ve been on my own, I would have walked out at that stage. Like 
happens with most, um—you're sort of trapped into a situation. And I remained 
trapped. . . . They make sure that you are so involved with the whole system that it 
is very difficult for you to escape. I carried my concerns, and I couldn’t speak to 
my wife about them. I tried once or twice, but I knew that if I was too vocal, she 
would dob me in. 
The space between two discursive worlds, where John had for a number of years 
felt that he could stand and pursue his moral agenda, was rapidly shrinking as the 
practices of authority within the EB movement departed further and further from 
anything he could recognise as having integrity. Ironically, it would be the 
ramifications of a new push by EB leaders for moral purity which would finally 
tip the balance for John. 
 
Resistance and rejection: life beyond the EB 
Prior to John’s marriage he had spent time working overseas. While he was there, 
James Taylor Jr had begun teaching that “there’s only one basis for leaving home 
and that’s to marry.” At that stage, John recalled, he was still “very compliant.” 
So he resigned his job and returned home to New Zealand. At about the same 
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time, Taylor also began insisting that if EB members “had any moral misconduct” 
in their lives, then “this should be cleared up, which meant confessing to people 
that were supposed to be pure.” Members could not be trusted to have their own 
judgment on whether something in their past was already laid to rest. “You must 
lay your case out before somebody else for their judgment.  So, all over the world 
people were coming out with their histories.” For John, coming back to New 
Zealand 
was no sort of glorious return. It was rather ignominious, and I made no hesitation 
or delay in telling them what I had been involved in, in my earlier years. They 
decided that it could be covered privately—that had it been anything worse, then it 
would have to be brought to the assembly and confessed amongst all the brethren. 
And there was sort of lines drawn as to what degree of uncleanness or impurity that 
you were involved in as to whether you had to come before all the brethren. 
Looking back, John felt there “was no understanding of healing” in this drive for 
purity. Rather, he suggested, there was “a fair bit of voyeurism” and “a big 
opportunity to get power over people because they’d been sinners.” If serious 
misdemeanours came to light, then people could be “put out of fellowship” for as 
long as the elders deemed necessary. This discipline could take more than one 
form, as John was later to experience, and could split families apart. So, as noted 
above, when John began to have very serious doubts about the integrity of the 
Man of God and the direction of the EB movement he was too afraid to voice 
them fully to his wife lest she inform on him. 
Eventually, however, John was “put on the mat” over a different issue. By 
then a new leader had succeeded Taylor as the Man of God. In John’s view, the 
new man was “a textbook case of a dictatorial leader.” All important decisions 
had to be referred to him for judgment, continuing the pattern of authoritarianism 
which had concerned John for many years now. John’s handling of a family trust 
came under scrutiny, despite the fact that it had earlier been approved. 
And I said, “Well, you know we were told that it was okay.” And then I got in 
trouble for putting what he’d said back then in over against what he's saying now. 
Yeah, it was totally unjust. And so I was shut up for questioning. 
I asked John about the significance of being “shut up.” He explained that it was a 
term drawn from the law of the Hebrew Bible. If a house was suspected of being 
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infected by disease, then it was shut up and observed until considered clean again. 
So this form of discipline was an expression of the fear-based separation 
discourse, now applied within the EB movement. 
So this term “shut up” came in, and you’re under observation—you don't go to any 
meetings, you don't have contact with anybody else; because you're potentially 
leprous and a contagious person. 
Consequently, John and his wife were socially isolated and their children were 
sent away to stay with another family, while they were tested for any further 
moral impurity. So the leaders started asking John if he had “any other doubts or 
things.” He took the opportunity to voice his doubts and questions about “this 
whole Aberdeen thing and the whole principle of leadership.” As a result, his 
discipline moved to another level and he was “withdrawn from,” meaning that the 
whole community was instructed to maintain separation from him. This was, John 
explained, the ultimate form of discipline. It placed people in a position in which 
there was no hope “unless God in his mercy granted repentance.” While John at 
times entertained the possibility that he was the one in the wrong, he chose to 
stand by his commitment to act on the basis of conviction, rather than conformity. 
I . . .  was not about to just take the easy way out, and say the right things, in view 
of getting back in fellowship and getting my household together. I just couldn’t 
face the dishonesty of doing that. 
It was a costly position for him to maintain. His wife, seeing no hope of John 
changing his mind, asked for a legal separation from him. This was, John 
observed, “the expected thing,” and he agreed to the separation, knowing that it 
meant losing his children as well. He made over the house to his wife and moved 
into the office where he worked. 
Promoted as a basis of unity, the discourse of separation had, in John’s 
experience, propagated suspicion and division within the EB community, down to 
the level of individual families and now his own marriage. Rather than ensuring 
that its members remained “fit for every good work,” they were, John remarked, 
trapped, controlled, and isolated from the outside world, and therefore 
“unavailable for anything useful.” This was the final turning point for him. 
So, it was about that time that I sort of made a pact with God. “God is light and in 
him there is no darkness at all. I will not hold back; I will come out in the open 
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with everything, and leave the consequences with God.” And from that moment 
on—look, they were not honest about—they just didn’t have an honest answer for 
anything that I raised. And I sort of felt more and more comfortable. 
The theme of ambivalence and anxiety which had persistently threaded itself 
through John’s story—“Is it me that’s wrong or is it them?”—seems to resolve 
itself in these statements. A sense of agency had been evident throughout his 
narrative, as in his taking up of the moral agenda which supported him against the 
absolute demands of the separation principle. But here his language takes a boldly 
agentic turn: “I . . . made a pact with God . . . I will not hold back; I will come out 
in the open . . . I raised . . .” Rather than continue to inhabit the ever diminishing 
space between two discursive worlds, John had stepped into “the open”—into the 
“light” which he understood to be the nature of God. 
Years of inscription and living with the internalised gaze of EB discourses 
meant that a sense of pressure to say “the right things,” in order to be accepted 
back, was ongoing. But John resisted this call, and never returned to the EB. “It 
took me three years before I was really comfortable about walking down the street 
and feeling okay about myself. . . . I’d use back streets and feel as though I was 
being looked at, or brethren might see me and so on.” For several years he 
continued to be involved with various Christian communities of a more open kind. 
In the end, he found even these “a bit circumspect in some of their attitudes,” 
whereas his own moral sense was now attuned to “global issues, care of the earth, 
and that sort of thing.” After a period of having no involvement with any 
Christian community, John found his way to a Quaker group, where he still felt at 
home at the time of our interview. His concluding comments reflect the huge 
distance he had travelled from the exclusivity, conformity and fear-based 
separatism of the community into which he was born. 
I am very happy meeting with people that don't think the same ways I do, and I 
tend to read books that challenge me rather than reinforce. . . . I’ve not been afraid 
anymore of reading things that challenge, that are a challenge. . . . I don't have to 
agree or buy into any of these points of view, but I do enjoy the challenge and I 
think that the whole thing is a lot more fluid. And I’m very much in favour of the 
fact that God is not something that can be defined. 
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6.2 Lynne’s story 
The religious community which dominated Lynn’s life for ten years was very 
different to the Exclusive Brethren. It was, in her terms, an international “cult.” 
Lynne was recruited into it when she was twenty five, rather than being born into 
it as John was into the EB. Nonetheless, as will become evident, her account of 
the discursive practices which held her in subjection in this movement contains a 
number of thematic parallels with John’s narrative. For reasons of confidentiality, 
I refer to this movement as “The Fellowship,” rather than by its real name. 
  
Beginnings: the promise of power and knowledge 
Lynne described herself as “a missionary’s child,” and was brought up in the 
Christian faith. As a teenager she left that part of her life behind for a time, 
thinking “it was all a bunch of rubbish.” She had a successful job, bought a house, 
and lived with her partner. In her early twenties she started going to church again 
and “had some amazing spiritual experiences to do with spiritual healing.” The 
impact of these experiences, which had brought some significant healing to 
Lynne’s immediate family, evoked in her a desire to help others. 
So there was a decision in my life, back when I was twenty one, that “I want to 
help people; I want to learn to heal people,” you know. . . . I’d gone, sort of, a 
complete 180 turnaround to “Oh my God, there’s power here.” So—and I’d spend, 
sort of, the next few years reading the Bible trying to learn, trying to learn. 
Lynne identified this quest for learning as a key factor in her initial attraction to 
The Fellowship. She was drawn in by a perception that within this community 
there was power, healing and miracles. Above all, there was the promise of 
learning. 
The power and the promises . . . they ran a class . . . And the class in itself is 
actually almost a form of brainwashing because it’s very intensive—I think forty 
hours of intensive scripture just crammed into three weeks. So it’s sort of—it’s a 
real “Whoah!”  . . .  And so you come out of this three-week intensive course, sort 
of feeling like you can conquer the world. 
Lynn also accounted for her attraction to this community in terms of the 
emotional vulnerability she experienced when her relationship with her partner 
ended painfully: “my whole world came crashing down, and the rug had been 
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pulled out from under me and I was extremely vulnerable.” She was looking for 
love and support. 
So that’s a sort of a common pattern that I was seeing, when people get invited to  
. . .  these organisations. You’re at a very low point. You’re searching. You’re 
vulnerable. And so I think, yes, my partner had left on the Thursday and on the 
Monday I’d been invited to a Fellowship [meeting]. It was like . . . a supernatural 
intervention. 
Lynn was also spiritually vulnerable. By her own account, she had been 
successful in life to this point, but in the wake of her relationship breakup she was 
troubled by the idea that she had failed God by doing things in her own way. 
Despite her awareness of her own competence, therefore, she surrendered her 
moral and spiritual agency to those who claimed to know and represent God’s 
way. 
I hadn’t been—you know, I wasn’t married. I’d gone and done my own thing. I’d 
rejected God, so therefore I thought, “Well, I’ve made such a hell of a mess of my 
life doing it my way that I might as well try God’s way.” So, in actually making 
that decision to give my power over to God because I felt I’d failed—The fact that 
I’d bought a house at the age of twenty, and I’d, you know, had a successful job 
and was, you know, was actually quite successful, didn’t seem to matter.  In my 
own mind, I’d failed. I’d failed. And that was—it wasn’t real, but I felt that I had 
failed in my life. So, to give my power over to them, and say, “Well, I’ll just do it 
God’s way. And I’ll just do everything God wants me to do, and I’ll be fine.” 
In these ways, Lynne described her initial acquaintance with The Fellowship as 
having been full of promise. It offered training that would fulfil her desire to help 
and heal others. With seemingly supernatural timing, it represented support at a 
time of pain and loss. Within this community she could return to the way of 
obedience to God, with all the hope implied in that surrender: “You can make it 
better. . . . You can do it right. . . . God will bless you.” 
 
“Like the spirit of a python”: the processes of discursive subjection 
The hopes which Lynne brought to her involvement with The Fellowship were not 
realised. Instead, she said, she “lost everything.” 
So they were offering you all this power. And by the time I [had] got and done all 
the courses which, you know, take a long time and cost a lot of money, they didn’t.  
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But by the time you’d actually done it, you were trapped. You were brainwashed.  
. . . It was empty promises. 
Early in the interview, Lynne offered a powerful metaphor for this process of 
becoming “trapped” within the movement. It was, she said, “like the spirit of a 
python” which slowly and gently wraps its coils around its prey, and then steadily 
begins to tighten its grip. “Every minute of my day I had to account for what I did, 
when I did it, you know, who I talked to . . . everything was just being controlled 
and controlled.” As the interview continued, a number of these coils became 
evident in the form of discursive practices which held her ever more tightly in a 
position of subjection to the leaders and doctrine of the movement.  
Lynne indicates, in the excerpt just cited, that the courses offered by The 
Fellowship were an effective means of attracting and binding people to the 
movement. There was a series of such courses, based on the teaching of the 
movement’s founding president, beginning with the three-week intensive 
described above. 
And then they do another course, so there’s a foundation or course, and then there’s 
an intermediate course, and then there’s an advanced course . . . And in each course 
there’s the carrot that you’re going to learn more, and you’re going to learn more, 
and then you become a better person. 
For Lynne, the “carrot” was the promise of learning and spiritual empowerment 
that would enable her to help others. She described the ways in which the leaders 
would play on people’s desire to please their God. “If you love God, you’ll do 
this.” “You’re going to do it right . . . God’s going to bless you.” Each course 
promised access to a higher level of knowledge in the next. Lynne recalled that 
these higher levels of privileged knowledge were spoken of in terms such as “the 
locked box,” and “a very private secret.” Implicit in all of this was the message 
that the leaders of the movement knew what doing it “right” under the gaze of 
God meant, while Lynne’s own knowledge was discounted. 
As Lynne progressed through the courses she began to ask questions. 
Because she knew the Bible well, she sometimes challenged the content of the 
lessons. At such times, the strategy of playing on her hopes gave way to playing 
on her fears. The discourses of privileged knowledge extended now not only to 
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God’s right future path for Lynne, but also to interpreting the life she had lived to 
that point. 
The fear of, you don’t want to return to the life you led before. And I sort of 
thought well, you know, apart from the fact that, you know, they’d got me in a 
vulnerable time, my life wasn’t actually that bad. But they start to make you think 
that your life was, you know, terrible. And because I was hurting so much, and I 
felt, you know, they—it made it very easy for them to say, “Well you don’t have to 
experience that pain ever again because,” you know, “that pain’s because you 
weren’t on God’s path and the reason you fell flat on your face, and the reason the 
rug was pulled out from under you, was that you were not being obedient to God.” 
A second strategy of subjection targeted Lynne’s social networks in ways that 
have parallels with the discourses of separation and exclusion described in John’s 
story. Lynne indicated that she was drawn in by the promise of support at a 
difficult time, but that she soon felt that the movement was demanding more and 
more of her time. “So eventually, you know, you’ve maybe got one night a week 
left to yourself.” After the initial courses the next step was to go on a year-long 
programme to establish the ministry in another city. 
But what they’re actually doing is they’re taking you away from your support 
networks, from all your friends, from all your families—totally isolating you, 
totally making you, well, do the programme, and obey the programme, even though 
it’s completely and utterly mad! 
Lynne’s account suggested that the isolating effect of this programme was 
increased by a pattern of late nights and early mornings, to the point of sleep-
deprivation. “So they just completely take you away from the world.” Lynne did 
two years of this intensive programme, during which time, she recalled, some 
people became disillusioned with The Fellowship and left. Such people, she 
recalled, were written off by the leaders as being influenced by evil spirits, or as 
“losers” whom God would not bless. Again the strategy of fear was invoked, as 
warnings were given that the children of such people “would become 
homosexuals and want sex-change operations.” These messages share some ideas 
with the ‘covering’ discourse discussed in the previous chapter. Only within the 
safety of The Fellowship could God’s protection be assured. The outside world 
was considered evil, and, followers were told, “Any outside criticism towards the 
group was actually just from the devil.” 
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After her first year of involvement in The Fellowship, Lynne noticed a shift 
in attitude toward people outside the movement. Initially there seemed to be a 
genuine desire to help people, but steadily the attitude toward outsiders became 
more and more negative. The first target was people who were gay or lesbian. 
Then it was, “we can’t be bothered with losers anymore.” People were to be 
related to only as targets for recruitment. If they did not respond to one or two 
invitations to come to a class, they could not continue to be a friend. No “worldly 
friendships” were permitted. “It just became more and more arrogant in that we 
are better than everybody else.” Followers of the movement were even taught that 
they had no moral obligations toward “unbelievers.” In effect, the movement was 
becoming a self-contained world in its own right, with its own doctrines, values 
and ethics. 
The fact that the leaders’ pronouncements on these issues carried such 
weight reflects a third discursive coil of control. Authority was not only divinely 
sanctioned, it was hierarchical, heterosexual, and male. In further parallels with 
John’s account, the international president decided on the doctrine for the whole 
movement, while the leader of the local community was spoken of as “the Man of 
God.” With regard to the latter, it was instilled in Lynne that “he is the Man of 
God ... he is all knowing ... he must be obeyed and he is to be trusted.” Texts from 
the Bible were used to buttress these discourses and to name expressions of 
difference as evil. 
They’d take on a chapter and verse, chapter and verse, in of course obeying 
leadership, you know. You have to obey the leadership. You have to obey the 
leadership. You have to obey the leadership. . . . And of course if you couldn’t 
obey, then you had the problem. You know, if you couldn’t obey, you were devil 
possessed. If you couldn’t obey, you were a witch. You know. You were 
rebellious. 
These extreme expressions of authority, and the notions of entitlement that 
accompanied them, took a sexually abusive turn when the New Zealand leader 
requested that Lynne come and stay at his house. 
And, of course, you know, you have to sleep in my bed, you know. And even 
though, you know, “Thou shalt not commit adultery”—and it’s like, you know, sort 
of this Clinton style affair of, you know, you have to pleasure me, I am the leader, 
you have to obey. 
164 
The abuse continued over several months. Lynne reflected on the fact that prior to 
involvement with The Fellowship she had learned how to protect herself from 
unwanted relationships. Yet such was the grip of the dominant discourses around 
leadership and authority that she felt “terrified” and “powerless” in this situation.  
I was absolutely, “How could this happen?” You know? And it was the 
manipulation, you know, looking back to think, you know, I didn’t have to stay 
with him. You know. But he said, “You have to stay with me.” And to think, “Oh, I 
have to obey the Man of God.” 
Lynne later discovered, through her research on the movement, that other leaders 
had engaged in similar forms sexual exploitation. This was rationalised on the 
basis that they were “the men of God,” and in the Hebrew Bible leaders often had 
several wives. “So they had it all sewed up, you know, that they could use women 
for, you know, to meet their needs, you know.” The word “needs” in this sense 
speaks of a more pervasive discourse of male sexuality which has here found a 
particular religious expression. 
This experience, Lynne reflected, had initiated her into one of the secrets 
entrusted to those at the higher levels of the hierarchy. “It’s the locked box. You 
know, this is a very private secret, you know, that you’ve been entrusted with.” If 
the world outside the movement was regarded as a domain where generally 
accepted ethical obligations do not apply, so, in a different sense, was the secret 
world of privileged authority, knowledge, rights and duties at its centre. Lynne 
was aware that having this information made her a “dangerous person.” She also 
knew that if she betrayed the secret, people would be told that she was mad and 
not to be trusted in anything she said. Like the right to commit adultery, the right 
to lie was apparently justifiable for the inner circle. Sexual exploitation therefore 
became an effective means of controlling and silencing women. 
Discourses of male authority and entitlement found further expression when 
Lynne married a man she had met in the movement.  
A married woman would—you know, you had to obey your husband. You had to 
obey your husband. It didn’t matter if he was right, wrong—you know, you had to 
obey, you had to submit, you had to obey. 
Lynne indicated that she found the marriage difficult from the beginning, but was 
unable to disagree with, or question, her husband. Moreover, the discourses of 
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separation from the evil outside world were invoked to isolate her from her 
family. If she did not stop seeing her mother and wider family, she was warned, 
the child she was expecting would be born with deformities. When Lynne looked 
to another family within the movement for help in dealing with the marriage 
difficulties, including her husband’s anger, the onus was put back on her to make 
it better.  
Don’t make your husband angry. . . . And that I wasn’t being obedient enough. And 
I wasn’t doing this, and I wasn’t doing that. . . . I turned myself inside out and 
upside down and back to front, to be perfect—to be the perfect wife. I baked 
beautiful biscuits. I cooked cordon bleu dinners. I had the house immaculate. You 
know. My child was perfect, obedient, and respectful. Everything was perfect. And 
I’d—I couldn’t have—I wasn’t allowed permission to leave the house, and I had to 
have a plan of where I was going, and what time I was going to leave, and what 
time I would come home, and who I was going to go with. 
This analysis of Lynne’s narrative has highlighted a number of the discourses and 
practices which seduced and held her for ten years in the python-like grip of The 
Fellowship:  
 The leaders’ claim to divinely granted knowledge that promised to unlock the 
secrets of a life of power and blessing and usefulness. 
 Acceptance of a subject position of unquestioning obedience and trust as the 
means of gaining access to this supposed knowledge and its fruits. 
 The leaders’ assumed authority to interpret the meaning of Lynne’s story and 
to prescribe the paths she must follow in order to be right with God. 
  The language which constructed the world and people outside the movement 
as evil, dangerous and unworthy of respect.  
 The call to separate herself from the infectious influences of the world, and to 
invest unreserved loyalty, time and money in the movement.  
 Assumptions of male authority and entitlement, religiously described, which 
supported leaders’ sexual exploitation and domination of women. 
 Notions of marriage which positioned Lynne with minimal freedom to 
produce her own life, while holding her responsible for her husband’s anger. 
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The long path out: questions, refusals and realisations 
How did Lynne account for her eventual decision to break free from the grip of 
these discourses and practices of religious authority? While it took her ten years to 
come to it, her account represents her decision to leave as the culmination of her 
ongoing efforts to challenge and resist her positioning within the movement. Her 
resistance shows itself in three main aspects of her account. 
The first and most pervasive expression of resistance evident in Lynne’s 
narrative is her questioning of the leaders and their teaching. Looking back, she 
viewed herself as never having “swallowed the entirety of the doctrine hook, line 
and sinker.” As John did in relation to Exclusive Brethren teaching, Lynne 
privately sifted some of the ideas and maintained her own position on some 
issues. “I’d go along with it as far as go through the motions, but it never sat as 
all-encompassing truth.” She accounted for this ability to maintain her own 
thinking in this way in terms of her intelligence and her prior knowledge of the 
Bible and traditional Christian beliefs. 
I had come from sort of a very intelligent stock. . . . And so I knew I came from—
even though I hadn’t particularly chosen an academic field, I had achieved success 
in my own path. So I had memory retention, so I knew. And I had all this scriptural 
knowledge to go on. So, when I [would] . . . throw little scriptures into the 
conversations, and sort of say, “Well what about this? What about this? What about 
this?” You know, I sort of became the enemy, sort of thing—just in a subtle way. 
In challenging some of the leaders’ teaching, and their attitudes toward the world 
outside the movement, Lynne’s intention was not to be “the enemy.” Rather, she 
was taking up a belief that her original hopes in joining the movement, allied to 
her own values of Christian healing and compassion, could still be realised.  
So, and I was trying to sort of, I guess, change the system from within. I was 
trying—I was hoping desperately that they’d come around, and they’d actually see 
that, you know, we are to look after the weak people, and we are to help the sick 
people, and we are to be, you know—we can talk to people more than twice, you 
know?  And so I was desperately trying and trying and trying and trying and trying 
to get them to actually behave according to the standard of the compassion of 
Jesus. 
Only after several years did Lynne finally accept that the “carrot” which had 
enticed her to join The Fellowship, and to remain in it, was in fact “a plastic 
167 
carrot. . . . It just left a bad taste in my mouth and didn’t satisfy me.” Having 
initially accepted the leaders’ claims to special knowledge, which required her to 
restory aspects of her own life and achievements, this realisation enabled Lynne to 
reclaim the value of her own knowledge and experience. “And it’s like realising, 
well, I’ve actually had more practical experience than they have!” 
A second thread of resistance was reflected in Lynne’s account of a key 
moment of courage and agency on her part. It occurred after three years in the 
movement and several months of being subjected to demands by the Man of God 
that she should meet his “sexual needs.” Throughout this time she had 
experienced significant discursive conflict between the ways in which she wanted 
to produce her life and the movement’s teaching that positioned her in subjection 
to this man’s authority: “I have to obey the Man of God.” Lynne spoke of this 
experience in ways that suggested that the imposition of religious authority 
undermined her agency to the point of feeling the terror and powerlessness of a 
sexually abused child: 
Well, you know, when you end up in bed with a married man, it’s like totally 
against your will, you know, totally against. Like, “This is wrong. This is wrong.”  
I was, you know, just absolutely terrified. As an adult—I was an adult. I was a 
grown woman. I wasn’t a child. When children are, you know, preyed upon, I 
mean it’s, you know, they’ve got that—they’re having the same terror of, “This is 
wrong. What the hell is happening? How can this happen?” 
The sense of wrongness was located for Lynne both in the violation of her will 
and in her Christian values around marriage and sexual relationships. It left her 
with a lingering sense of shame, confusion, and disbelief as to how she had ended 
up in this situation despite her clear preferences and values. “I was just so 
absolutely frozen in fear and shock and horror that I could not for several months, 
as I said, comprehend.” 
Finally, Lynne recalled, she recovered sufficient “power” to tell the leader, 
“this is wrong, this cannot continue ... no, I can’t do this anymore.” I asked what 
had enabled her to do that. Her answer reflected a pattern which became evident 
in the stories of the three women discussed in the previous chapter. Each of them 
suggested that it was witnessing the effects of oppressive forms of religious 
authority on others, particularly on women, that played a significant role in 
mobilising their agency and resistance. For Lynne also, the power of “no” was 
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activated not merely out of concern for herself, but “more out of respect and love 
for his wife, because I was, you know, she was my friend.” The memory of her 
own experience of betrayal by a friend, as well as her identification with the 
interests of “womankind,” supported this sense of care for the leader’s spouse and 
outweighed the call to subject herself to this man, even if he was the Man of God. 
The love for his wife was stronger than—the love for womankind I suppose—you 
know, the sense of sisterhood is like ... You just don’t do that to another woman. 
You don’t—it’s just not right. It’s just not right, you know. 
This was a significant moment of resistance for Lynne, yet the grip of the python 
was such that she remained in The Fellowship for a further seven years. How did 
she account for the fact that she stayed for so long, despite the questions she held 
about some of the teaching of the leaders and this experience of sexual 
exploitation? She acknowledged that even after her first year in the movement 
there were times when her “whole body just wanted to run away.” In part what 
held her there was her hope that she could “change the system from within,” as 
noted above. Two further reasons emerged during the interview.  
The first concerned her positioning in relation to the leader. The second was 
her marriage to another member of The Fellowship. Alongside her sense of moral 
wrongness and her love and respect for the leader’s wife, Lynne pointed to a 
further factor in her refusal to continue to meet the leader’s sexual demands. It 
was one which held a certain sad irony for her. Despite his exploitative behaviour, 
she had feelings of love, respect and loyalty toward him, supported by the Man of 
God discourse, and the bond that had developed through their physical 
connection. Because of her Christian values, Lynne believed that his actions were 
placing him in spiritual danger. So she felt a desire “to protect him.” 
The reverence and trust was just so—you know, I would have rather died than had 
any harm come to him. Such had been the conditioning. And also the intimacy 
which had developed was, you know—basically, I held his life in my hands. I had 
the power to destroy his marriage. I had the power to destroy his ministry. 
The irony in these words was evident to Lynne as she looked back. “I had the 
power to destroy him . . . he eventually destroyed me.” But her earlier statement, 
“I would rather have died,” bears striking testimony to the extent to which the 
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dominant discourses of the movement had positioned her in a place of loyalty, 
despite all that had happened.  
Lynne’s marriage was the second factor she identified in accounting for the 
time it took her to finally leave the movement. “I think had I maybe not met my 
husband, I might have left a bit sooner.” As observed earlier, the patriarchal 
discourses of marriage promoted within the community positioned her with few 
rights and a heavy responsibility for her husband’s moods. In spite of these 
difficulties, Lynne did not want to leave him. “I adored him. I loved him. I 
thought I couldn’t cope.” Yet in order to see her family outside the movement, she 
had to go behind her husband’s back. “I was becoming dishonest, and I didn’t—
that wasn’t the model Christian woman I wanted to be—that I had to lie to my 
husband, or omit the truth, to actually say where I’ve been, to visit my family.” 
So once again Lynne found herself in a conflicted position constructed by 
the discourses of separation and submission on one hand and particular Christian 
and family values she held on the other. Still Lynne hoped that she might 
somehow be an instrument of change, and that one day this tension would be 
resolved. Her mother, whom she visited on these covert excursions, was less 
optimistic. She didn’t criticise the movement or tell her daughter to leave, but 
asked a question which eventually helped Lynne to see things as they were: “Is it 
going to get any better?” 
I did absolutely everything perfect, and I still made him angry. And I realized, “I 
can’t win.” And that was the turning point. I—even though I am being the perfect 
model housewife—I can’t win. Because he’s still angry at me. And then my mother 
said, which I—“Is it going to get any better?” 
It was not getting better. In fact, Lynne recalled, it was getting “harder and harder 
and harder to keep up the façade that everything was wonderful.” She found 
herself becoming withdrawn, depressed and even suicidal. She obtained 
permission to get some medication to help her cope with it all. Rather than 
helping her to accept things, however, the medication—along with her mother’s 
question—helped her see things in a new way, and finally to act on what was she 
was seeing, on her own behalf. 
The medication actually made me volatile, and gave me the anger. Because I’d just 
completely introverted. I’d completely just—yeah, sort of shut down. And then it 
actually gave me that kind of backbone, instead of sort of, well—I realised that I 
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didn’t want to live any longer. And I didn’t—of course, I couldn’t die, because that 
goes against my beliefs, but I didn’t want to keep living. And I’m like—and I 
couldn’t keep living with the situation being just so bizarre. So I managed to get 
permission to get the medication and of course the medication gave me the 
aggression to actually just pick up my son and walk out the door and leave. And 
then I rang my husband and said, “Look, I just need some time to calm down. I just 
need some time to calm down.” He said, well, “Come back now. You have to come 
back right now.” And I said, “I just need some time.” “Nope. It’s over then.” You 
know? So they didn’t want me back—which is quite wonderful really! 
That last statement represented Lynne’s viewpoint at the time of our interview. 
But at the time of her leaving, she had not wanted to make a complete break with 
The Fellowship. “I didn’t want to leave, because I’d been so brainwashed into 
thinking that the world was evil.” She had not wanted to leave her husband 
permanently either, but his response was uncompromising. At the time of the 
interview they were divorced and he was still in the movement. Lynne had a sense 
that people in the movement were pleased to be rid of her. She was dangerous 
because she thought differently and asked questions. 
So then they dumped all my stuff on my mother’s doorstep. And my mother was 
just horrified, you know. I think a week later, you know, within a week, they’d just 
put all my possessions and just completely cleaned, cleaned, you know, just 
cleansed the house of me. You know, it’s like … which is very nice of them! My 
mother was absolutely horrified, you know, because she’d known how much I’d 
given and given and given and given. 
I asked Lynne if she had any doubts now about leaving the movement. Her 
answer was an unequivocal no. But she did speak of legacies of her past 
involvement. 
I mean, the first three months, I was just so afraid to leave the house. I was 
absolutely. . . . I’m not under my husband’s protection. And I can’t. I’m just so 
afraid that God’s not going to protect me. You know, there’s so much fear like 
when you come out. Because I didn’t want to leave. I just couldn’t cope. 
There are strong echoes of the covering discourse here, discussed in the previous 
chapter. There are also reminders of John’s post-EB experience. Lynne reflected 
that “it took four years to really start to feel like a normal human being again.” 
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Lynne added that, five years after leaving, she continued to have nightmares that 
she was still in the movement, “trapped under their control.” 
Lynne told me that she had recently taken the step of being baptised, an 
action which had powerful symbolism for her. She explained that for her it was a 
way of repudiating the teaching of the founder of The Fellowship, who had 
declared that baptism was unnecessary. “And actually it healed me of all that 
twistedness and to actually see his doctrine for the arrogant, twisted load of crap 
that it was!” One ongoing challenge for her was the fact that her ex-husband was 
still taking their children to meetings of The Fellowship. 
My son came home just a few weeks ago saying, you know, “Everybody else’s 
gods are wrong and not right, and we’ve got the true God.” And I’m like, “Mummy 
and daddy think differently darling, and it’s okay to think differently.” 
Knowing that Lynne was attending a church in her area, I asked her how she now 
thought about religious authority. Would she submit her life again to someone 
else’s leadership? “On no terms.” She now believed that God spoke to her 
personally, and also through others, in contradiction to the discourses of 
privileged knowledge and exclusivity she encountered in The Fellowship. On the 
morning of our interview, Lynne remarked, the owner of her local dairy, a Hindu 
man, had spoken to her in a way that encouraged her. The discourses of The 
Fellowship would have regarded him as subject to the evil of the world, but Lynne 
felt that God had spoken to her through him. She respected and supported the 
woman who led the church she was now attending, but “that’s as far as it goes.” 
To . . . submit blindly without questioning is—I would like to think I would never 
be so stupid to . . . go against my, my, my inner gut, and go against my, my 
intuition, or my heart and my soul. 
 
6.3 Discussion points 
 
First research question 
Within Christian communities, how is it that some regimes of power and 
knowledge can subvert the call to freedom and justice which is pervasive in 
longstanding streams of Christian tradition? 
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The discourses of religious authority traced in my analysis of John’s and 
Lynne’s narratives support hierarchies of control which are more blatantly 
espoused than those of the previous chapter. Whether on a local basis, as in 
Lynne’s community, or an international basis, as in John’s community, the Man 
of God is discursively positioned with authority which adherents must obey if 
they are not to risk exclusion from the community and isolation from friends and 
family. In these communities discourses of separation from an outside world of 
corruption and evil influence construct a deep fear of the spiritual consequences of 
exclusion. There is again a gendered aspect to the hierarchical levels of authority 
in these communities, and an explicit chain of command: God–Man of God–man–
woman. The stories of both participants include accounts of the Man of God 
exploiting this hierarchy for his own sexual gratification. The extreme nature of 
such practices verges on domination, recalling Foucault’s account of sovereign 
power, as distinct from modern technologies of power. 
In the discussion in Chapter 8, I draw heavily on the results of this chapter 
in theorising the processes of subjugation which are performed in some religious 
communities through discursive practices of monologic power relations, 
surveillance, confession, discipline, and separation. 
 
Second research question 
What has enabled some people to resist the practices of religious authority 
constructed by such regimes? 
Despite the coercive regimes of power and knowledge which dominated 
their communities, both John and Lynne testified to strategies by which they were 
able to maintain spaces of reserved judgment as to the trustworthiness of all they 
were taught. They were supported in this by their access to alternative knowledges 
and contact with people outside their communities. One of the intriguing 
questions connected with my second research question is how and when people 
reach a “tipping point,” which marks a shift in their relationship to religious 
authority from ambivalence to resistance. I offer theoretical reflections on this 
notion of a tipping point in Chapter 8 (section 8.3). Lynne’s narrative relates this 
shift to the cumulative embodied effects of her subjugation. For John, the loss of 
his marriage and children, due to the disciplinary practices of his community, 
marked the point at which he decided to step into “the light.” Both speak of 
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continuing to experience the lingering effects of life in their communities for 
several years after making a final break from their communities, suggesting how 
deeply they had been inscribed by the dominant discourses of those communities. 
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Chapter 7: 
The discursive construction of call and conflict 
There was an issue there that I really had to resolve. And the tension was between 
feeling the call to love, and knowing that that was part of what the Christian life 
was really all about, and . . . the commitment to obey the order—the demand for 
order within the Church. (Martin’s story) 
 
This final set of results emerged from the discursive narrative analysis of the 
transcripts of my interviews with Andy, Sarah and Martin. At the time of these 
interviews, each of them was, or had been, an ordained Christian minister. That is, 
they had been theologically trained and formally inducted into their ministry roles 
by the three different church denominations to which they had belonged. A unique 
feature of these stories, then, is that the narrators’ experiences of religious 
authority occurred while they themselves were holding such authority. 
 
7.1 Andy’s story 
Andy was an experienced Christian minister who had led other churches before 
moving to the particular community which was the main focus of his story. In this 
large church, which comprised several distinct congregations, he was taken on by 
the senior minister to look after one of the congregations. His relationship with the 
senior minister soon became difficult, and he began to feel that the latter’s 
authority was being exercised in abusive ways. What follows explores Andy’s 
account of the values which informed his approach to ministry, the discursive 
construction of controlling practices which called him and others into a 
subjugated position, and his efforts to resist these practices by holding on to his 
own values. 
 
Beginnings: the value of persons 
Andy was clear as to his ethical stance in relation to Christian ministry and 
relationships. This stance was grounded in his understanding of God and of 
human beings. In this regard, two key ideas were prominent throughout the 
interview.  
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First, he valued persons above any other “things,” including ministry goals. 
The basis of this stance for him was his belief that “to be a human being is to be 
loved and held precious to God.” Andy saw this valuing of persons as an ethical 
position to which all Christians were called, and regarded it as subversive of value 
systems in which people were treated as objects or as means to an end. 
The second important idea which informed Andy’s approach to ministry 
was that it was not about him formulating a plan and forcing it on others. Rather, 
he saw himself as “the fortunate and surprised recipient of an invitation from God 
to participate in what [God is] already doing.” His intention in church ministry 
was therefore not to impose his own agenda on people, but to cooperate with 
them, and with God, as together they became aware of a sense of direction. 
I don't need people to agree with me, and it doesn't matter that they don't. And they 
don't have to do things my way. You know, there is no sense of that. There’s more 
a kind of sense of attentiveness to the larger influence, if you like, or the larger 
presence of God, shaping and moulding us together and journeying with us, you 
know? I don’t have—you don't have to have things your way. And it’s more 
important to value people than get your own way. 
When these values are upheld, Andy suggested, it “enlarges life.” When they are 
not, it “diminishes life, squeezes life away.” This translated, for him, into 
exercising leadership with the intention of being “facilitative and relational.” 
A corollary of these values was that Andy approached relationships with the 
hope that he too would be respected as a person, rather than being used as a thing. 
That hope was not fulfilled under the leadership of the senior minister, and Andy 
identified this as the primary factor in the deep pain he experienced in that 
relationship. 
 
The discursive construction of success and entitlement 
The congregation for which Andy was given responsibility was composed 
primarily of older people, and was not growing. He felt that the brief given to him 
by the senior minister was, in effect, to “kind of let it collapse and go away.” Far 
from dying, however, this congregation trebled in size during the first two years 
of his involvement. At that point, it seemed to Andy, the senior minister began to 
reassert his authority over this congregation and to “sideline” him. On several 
occasions he was reminded by this man that “he was my boss.” In his facilitative 
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style, Andy had developed a leadership team from within this congregation. But 
now the senior pastor began to take over the roles of preaching or leading worship 
at some of the services, sometimes without prior warning. 
I asked Andy how he had made meaning of the senior minister’s efforts to 
take over control. His answer highlighted two areas of discourse which he 
believed were operative in this man’s actions. The first concerned ideas about 
leadership, while the second was anchored in the way their national denomination 
equated success with achieving numerical growth in its constituent churches. 
Andy remarked that their denomination was at that time “very busy extolling the 
virtues of church leaders who were producing growth.” A successful church was a 
growing church, and a successful leader was one who could achieve such growth. 
In his view, these notions of success strongly informed the senior minister’s 
approach to leadership. They displaced other concerns, such as respect for others 
as persons, and created a pressure, not just to be successful, but also to be seen to 
be successful. Andy later discovered that when his own congregation began to 
grow, the senior minister had gone “off to conferences and everything, telling 
everybody what a great job he was doing. So he was taking the credit for this and 
using it to add to his lustre.” 
The extent to which the senior minister had been recruited by these 
discourses of church growth and successful leadership became evident to Andy in 
other ways also. When growth did not happen in the way he hoped, for example, 
he had a tendency to see it as the fault of the people, because they were failing to 
follow his vision. 
The fact is, the congregation never grew under him. In fact it declined steadily right 
throughout his ministry. And he had two ways of dealing with that. One was that 
when it was obvious that that was happening, it was happening because the rest of 
us weren't cooperating with his plans. Right? Because if only we'd seen it his way, 
and only we'd done exactly what he wanted, then the results would have been 
assured. 
In Andy’s view, the pressure to be seen to be growing, numerically, was also 
reflected in his leader’s handling of attendance figures. 
But the other thing was, he tended to deceive himself too. So when he did things 
like, you know, counting how many people were at church, he would often count 
people twice . . . and he would include, say, kids who were just at Sunday school in 
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the counts. . . . So there was an element of deception there, which I don't think was 
done for anybody but himself. 
Andy further speculated that the senior minister’s approach to leadership was 
influenced by “American high profile Pentecostal type leaders,” who exercised 
“supreme authority” over their communities. This was not, Andy suspected, 
because he agreed with their theology, but because it appeared to get the results 
that mattered in the current denominational climate. These high powered leaders 
were renowned for growing large, “successful” churches. This way of thinking 
seemed to bring forward a bullying style of leadership in the senior minister.  
So he used to, when he would come and take over the services, he would stand in 
front of the church there, and he would harangue the people—abuse them for not 
all sitting down the front, abuse them for not giving enough to the church, abuse 
them for not attending if they knew he was preaching. 
Andy generously acknowledged that in all of this, this man probably “genuinely 
believed he was doing this for God, and he was doing the best thing.” It was as 
though he saw himself as God’s “local CEO.” This notion of divinely delegated 
authority also supported a sense of entitlement on the senior minister’s part—an 
idea that has appeared in most of the interviews considered so far. 
I'm sure he felt that somehow or other, that there—along with the job—there was 
an entitlement to treat people the way he did, you know? A God-given entitlement 
to treat people that way. Almost a failure to respect him was a failure to respect 
God. 
This cluster of ideas about leadership also supported a utilitarian view of people. 
This was evident in the senior minister’s leadership practices, according to which 
people were “a thing to be used and cast off.” Utilitarian practices stood in 
marked contrast to the values which supported Andy’s own view of persons as 
“loved” and “precious,” and to his “facilitative and relational” approach to 
ministry.  
Because he was the leader, and because he had a job to do, he was entitled to do it 
his way. And I'm sure he saw us all as fundamentally extensions of himself. You 
know. We were just basically resources, and it was basically all about him. 
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The discourses of leadership within which the senior minister operated seemed to 
produce a sense of entitlement to unquestioning submission from his church 
members, his human “resources.” Anything that stood in way of this position of 
unquestioned authority was “dealt to.” Andy discovered that “shortly after he 
arrived at the church he had the constitution suspended, so he disenfranchised the 
whole congregation.” The expectation of submission in turn supported a 
domineering leadership style which Andy and others experienced as very 
intimidating.  
He used to have regular staff meetings with me, and I—as he did with all the 
staff—and the meetings were set up to intimidate. What he would do—he had a 
low couch in his office—he would bring you in and sit you on the low couch. Then 
he would sit in a higher chair, in his big executive chair, high back on wheels and 
he would wheel that across so it blocked the door. Right? And he would sit with his 
back to the door, up against the door, so you couldn't get out, and then he would 
apply the full force of a very, very strong personality to you. Intimidating, you 
know? You felt like you were being interrogated by the Gestapo really. And either 
you caved in and just became a—I don't know what you would become really—but 
it was very threatening. And even I, I mean, I sat there and I found it frightening. 
Almost—you almost felt you were right on the edge of physical violence. 
Andy related what happened when the senior minister was challenged over 
something by a staff member. The senior minister threatened to fire the person 
from his job in the church, but on this occasion the leadership team stood up to 
him, and the staff member was able to keep his job. Afterwards the senior minister 
said to Andy and the others involved, “No pastor should ever have to put up with 
what you people have done to me.” A discourse of religious leadership which 
connects the pastoral role with entitlement to power and submission speaks 
through these words of frustration. 
In contrast, the discourses of leadership and relationship which informed 
Andy’s approach to ministry invited a sense of utter disbelief that a pastor could 
exercise their role in such a domineering and intimidating fashion. His narrative 
was punctuated with phrases such as “Can you believe this?” and “Hard to 
believe!” He described his attempt to express some of his concerns about the 
senior minister to people in the wider denomination, and being met by disbelief 
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and suspicion that he was “overstating and exaggerating” the case. “Because, after 
all, no pastor would ever behave like this.”  
The senior minister, Andy recalled, took steps to ensure that the more “over 
the top” aspects of his behaviour were not visible, except to those who were 
directly involved. This suggests that he also may have been influenced by the idea 
that “no pastor would ever behave like this.” But this knowledge was apparently 
trumped by the discourses of “supreme authority” and success as church growth, 
which were dominant in his approach to leadership. The tension between these 
conflicting approaches to pastoral leadership was evident in the senior minister’s 
demands that the content of certain meetings be kept confidential. This silence 
enabled him act on his own sense of entitlement to exercise supreme authority, 
without raising concerns among the wider church population. For Andy, this was 
a pattern which had unfortunate parallels with the secrecy that often surrounds 
situations of “abuse.” 
[He] used to regularly demand silence from the people that he was in charge of. 
You know, “This will just be between you and I.” . . . Secrecy—it’s a characteristic 
of abuse. And again, always suppressing the truth, and usually with threats. 
Anyway, I just took no notice of that. So I quite openly talked to the rest of my 
team about what was going on. Well afterwards, honestly, I'm sure if [he] could 
have used physical violence on me, he would’ve. He took me aside and I got a 
tirade of abuse from him, because I'd broken his demand for silence. 
 
Damage and rage, resistance and resignation 
For over two years Andy persevered in this difficult working relationship. 
Frequently during the interview he spoke of the effects of this period on him, and 
on others, in terms of “damage.” He felt a deep pastoral concern regarding the 
impact of the senior minister’s utilitarian approach to people, as these excerpts 
show: 
And if you don't go along with that or support him, and he can't move you around 
just like pieces on a chessboard, then you’re obstructive and useless and you just 
get dealt with in whatever way. . . . So some people got seriously damaged by it. 
He has no compunction about doing damage to other people. You know. Whatever 
it takes to protect himself, to shore up his position, he will do it. And he feels 
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perfectly justified, because, after all, it’s his rightful station in life. Almost a 
mandate from God I think. 
Somehow or other, there was just all these damaged people who were just kind of 
huddling together for protection really. 
As Andy spoke, it was clear that he counted himself among those who had 
suffered this “damage.” For him, the effects of being intimidated and coerced 
were felt most acutely in connection with his own values. 
And I think some of the—some of the kind of damage must have been related to 
the fact that I like good relationships with people. And so, I think it worked—it 
worked on my weakness. So there was this—always this kind of feeling, “If I give 
in to him, maybe he will be nice to me.” 
As noted already, Andy held a strong ethical position regarding the value of 
persons, as people loved by God, and the hope of mutual respect informed his 
approach to relationships. Here he speaks of this as a “weakness” when it came to 
his relationship with the senior minister. He knew that his desire to improve 
relationship was calling him into a subordinate position in order to accommodate 
the other’s desire for dominance. Yet alongside the value he placed on “good 
relationships,” Andy also valued honesty and integrity. So if he was unfairly 
criticised by the senior minister, he faced a choice between accepting blame in 
order to avoid conflict, or holding his ground and facing further threats and 
intimidation. 
Looking back on it, I felt blamed not for only whatever it was he had felt I'd done, 
but also condemned for my unwillingness to face the truth about my behaviour. 
Right? So always he's in a good position, always you’re diminished. 
Andy contrasted this situation with his experience in another church, where the 
congregation had decided they didn’t like his approach to pastoral ministry and 
pressured him to move on. In that case, he recalled, he “didn’t feel damaged by 
what happened there,” painful though it had been. What was different? In that 
situation, Andy reflected, “I was a person. . . . And so I didn’t feel kind of ... just a 
thing to be used and cast off.” So “damage” for him was to be treated as less than 
a person, which struck at the heart of his view of what it meant to be human. 
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Andy reflected on this kind of damage again later in the interview, connecting it 
this time with feelings of having been “abused.” 
I felt damaged, and I can remember often thinking, “This is doing me far more 
damage than anything that ever happened at [the earlier church]”. You know? The 
interior damage. The sense of being diminished and devalued as a human being.  
. . . That’s what makes me feel abused. So over and over again, messages kept 
coming to me, you know: “You’re of no worth, you’re of no account. Your only—
your only value is in how your life serves my purposes.” 
One way in which Andy tried to make meaning of what was happening—and so 
to mitigate the damage—was through psychological discourses of insecurity, self-
image, self-protection and personality type.  
I think a lot of this is shoring up this false self-image that he has, and protecting it. 
And I think that’s why some of the really aggressive stuff occurs, because he needs 
to protect himself. And instead of protecting himself from people, he's really 
protecting himself from the truth. . . . So initially we tried to deal with that, and the 
way we did it was, I tried to help them understand what kind of person we were 
dealing with. . . . So with them all understanding that, I thought it might help us to 
know how he's functioning, why he is dealing with us the way he is, and maybe 
that would create an environment where we can forgive him that. 
That “did work for a while,” Andy recalled, but his own and others’ ongoing 
experiences of being positioned by the senior minister as “serviceable others” 
(Sampson, 1993), within his project of achieving success, produced in him “a 
mounting anger” and “a growing sense of outrage.”  
Really angry about how he was treating other people. So, you know, there was the 
sense of personal outrage that was growing for me. So after two years of working 
for him I was really feeling that quite strongly, as were the rest of the team. 
I have mentioned already that Andy’s leadership team stood up to the senior 
minister over his intention to dismiss a staff member. There was also a growing 
sense of dissatisfaction among church members with his authoritarian style of 
leadership, and a desire to “hold him to account.” One person wanted to take the 
senior minister to court, but Andy refused to be called into a form of resistance 
which he considered contrary to his values. 
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I just wouldn't go along with that. I just said, “Look, no matter what he's doing, 
there is—there is no excuse for us behaving the same way as him.” You know? 
“Yes, maybe he can do damage to us, but for us to retaliate in kind is to be part of 
the same system that we are deploring in him. We're not going to do it.” 
While he refused retaliatory action, Andy was prepared to support another staff 
member who claimed that he been made redundant by the senior minister in 
circumstances which amounted to constructive dismissal. The case was strong, 
and the latter agreed to a generous redundancy package. But to guard his own 
reputation as a leader, the senior minister demanded that a secrecy clause be 
signed. Andy opposed this, and it was agreed that the redundancy would be paid 
with no secrecy clause.  
I think I was just wanting to say, “Look, I'm sick and tired of this. Right? And I'm 
not playing these abusive games anymore. You’re gonna have to face up to what 
you do. Right? Right. And other people are going to see it. You are going to have 
to have some eyes looking at you.” . . . I was so sick of it. I was so sick of the way 
he was treating people. You know, and I mean, it takes a lot to get me going, but I 
think I just got angry, and said, “Right, this is it. This guy is not going any further.” 
And then after that, I resigned my position too. I said, “I'm not staying doing this. 
You know. I'm sick of playing this game, why do I need all this stress?” 
Andy’s account of his resistance shows the values he held, of respect and care for 
people, finally overriding other concerns as his anger “got [him] going.” He could 
no longer tolerate what he saw as “abusive games,” including the senior minister’s 
secrecy and “the way he was treating people.” The language is agentic (repeated 
first person pronoun), and suggests a turning of the tables, in which the senior 
minister would now be on the receiving end of Andy’s decisions: “I’m not playing 
. . . You’re gonna have to . . .  You are going to have . . .  This guy is not going 
any further . . .  I’m not staying . . .” 
At the same time, Andy’s language acknowledges the toll that all of this had 
taken on him, as in his references to being “sick” or “sick and tired” of it all, and 
to “all this stress.” After resigning his position, he and his wife felt unable to leave 
the church. This too was a reflection of his care for people: “I could not desert 
those people.” But looking back he also saw something “scary” about their 
inability to leave, and connected their paralysis with the legacy of “damage.” 
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We had this pool of abused people and we're all in this together. It's kind of—
nobody flees from the prison camp, because we can't live with ourselves for 
deserting our comrades. You know? And so he's got us wound in the web. And I 
think the serious damage to me was really starting at that point, by then, because I'd 
lost the ability to resist. Somehow or other, there was just all these damaged 
people, who were just kind of huddling together for protection really. 
After recalling this difficult time, Andy’s tone brightened as he described how this 
rather grim “prison camp” narrative was interrupted unexpectedly by a story of 
hope. There was joy in his telling of this story, as the conversation shifted from 
the oppressive effects of the discourses of success to a story of liberation which 
was anchored in the biblical tradition of freedom and justice. Andy explained that 
due to daylight saving he had mistakenly arrived at church an hour early, so he 
took the time to pray in the empty building in silence. As he did so, he recalled the 
biblical story of the exodus, when Moses led the people of Israel out of their 
slavery in Egypt. In echoes of that narrative, Andy had a sense that God had 
“heard the pain of the people” and that “there was an exodus coming.” The effect 
of this experience was to reassure him that they were “not abandoned” and to 
release him from the pressure of trying to “do something” to fix the situation. 
The promised “exodus” came just as unexpectedly. It was Easter, and Andy 
felt that his own church was not celebrating this important festival in a way that 
was meaningful for him. He and his wife therefore attended an Easter service at 
another church, of another Christian denomination. The experience of difference 
was so positive that they “just stayed.” 
We never went back. We never went back. It was just such a relief to be 
somewhere where they hadn't lost the plot! 
Andy reflected that “just that little break said to us, it was neither helping nor 
hindering the people by us staying. To stay wouldn’t—it didn't actually matter as 
much as we'd believed it did.” Looking back, he found himself surprised by the 
extent to which he had allowed himself to be subjugated by the practices of 
authority represented by the senior minister, despite knowing at the time that they 
were unacceptable. He speculated that if he found himself in such a situation 
again, he would respond differently.  
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I would probably stick it out for a while to see if it was really happening, but I 
think I would just say, “There is absolutely no point in fighting this, because to 
fight it makes it stronger.” . . . I think would just distance myself, and just say, “No, 
we're not going here again. We're moving.” 
By the time of our interview, Andy had been recognised as a minister in his new 
denomination and was enjoying the opportunity to fulfil that role in ways that 
enacted his values. He spoke positively of the checks and balances that operated 
in this church system with respect to ministerial authority.  
So everybody has a point where they have to front up with their ministry for 
scrutiny by somebody else. And I think that is, to me, that’s fairly helpful. You 
don't get, you don’t get that kind of free from accountability autonomy that you—
certainly we saw with [the senior minister]. 
 
Summary 
Andy gave an account of being positioned by two very different discourses of 
religious leadership. On the one hand, the ethical values which he had taken up 
prior to these experiences positioned him with a view of each human being, 
including himself, as loved by God and worthy of respect. On other hand, 
dominant discourses of growth and success within his church denomination acted 
on him through his senior minister, demanding submission to the latter’s 
authoritarian leadership style, and suggesting to him a diminished, utilitarian view 
of his identity and worth. Andy’s own values, together with certain psychological 
understandings of his leader’s behaviour, supported him in resisting these 
damaging practices of authority on behalf of himself and others. They also invited 
a non-retaliatory approach to this resistance, which for a time left him uncertain as 
to how to effect any lasting change in the situation. Andy’s encounter with a story 
of God’s care and liberating intervention offered him the opportunity to rehearse 
an alternative, hopeful narrative, and prepared the way for his eventual “exodus.”  
 
7.2 Sarah’s story 
In all of the stories considered so far, the focus has been on forms of religious 
authority exercised by appointed church leaders. Sarah’s account is different, in 
that it tells the story of a person who ostensibly held the highest position of 
authority within her religious community being called into a position of 
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conformity by influential lay members of that community. (Lay members are 
those who have not been ordained into official ministry roles within the church.) 
The force of this position call was such that Sarah felt unable to fulfil her ministry 
in this church and eventually resigned her position. 
While this aspect of Sarah’s story is distinctive within the scope of this 
study, it is far from exceptional in the context of power relations within Christian 
churches. In Andy’s account, for example, mention was made of an earlier 
experience of having effectively been fired by a former congregation. Figures for 
the New Zealand scene are not available, but research in the United States 
suggests that in that context as many as “one-fourth of all pastors have been 
forced out of at least one parish” (Lebacqz et al., 2000, p. 148). It is fitting, 
therefore, to have at least one account of such an experience in this study.  
It would be an oversimplification to suggest that Sarah had no influence or 
agency in her situation. She was the minister, and it was in part the exercise of her 
authority as the leader of the church which drew opposition from a sector of the 
congregation. As each of the stories in this chapter demonstrates in different ways, 
a leadership position can become a site of discursive conflict. Such conflict is 
produced when leaders and those they relate to are positioned within different 
discourses and hold different values. Each of the participants in this chapter also 
recalled being positioned in conflicting ways by the discourses which he or she 
had taken up as a leader. In Sarah’s case, the value she placed on collaboration 
and consultation vied with her commitment to making ethical decisions for the 
good of the community as a whole. The latter commitment produced a decision 
which had adverse effects for one member of the community. 
In Chapter 4, I reflected on the way in which narratives may be performed 
differently by the same narrator over time, and that very different accounts of the 
same events might be given by those involved. I noted the dangers for myself as a 
researcher of presenting the results of my analysis in ways that implied judgment 
or cast people in the roles of heroes or villains. Sarah’s story particularly 
highlights the importance of maintaining that position. It is conceivable that had I 
interviewed the person affected by her decision, I might have heard an account of 
how they were called into a subjected position by Sarah’s practice of religious 
authority. The analysis which follows seeks to recognise these complexities, while 
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paying particular attention to Sarah’s account of the ways in which discourses of 
conservatism ultimately asserted their dominance at her expense. 
 
Hopeful beginnings: “our priority is for people” 
Sarah was appointed as the new minister to a church in which she felt hopeful of 
exercising her ministry gifts in a way that would benefit the church and its 
engagement with the surrounding community. The interview process had gone 
well and initially she sensed “a lot of enthusiasm” for her arrival. At that 
interview she had explained the value she placed on exercising leadership 
collaboratively, rather than hierarchically. This view of authority was located in 
her understanding of the Christian gospel.  
Right from my interview I presented myself as somebody who wanted to be in a 
more flat style of leadership, so that the authority that I had would be demonstrated 
by gathering a team of people around me. And that, you know, that was the way I 
felt that, you know, gospel ministry was meant to happen. 
Sarah held that the church’s “priority is for people, and not on buildings.” She 
also hoped to use her gifts to offer services that were “relevant and attractive” to 
people in the wider community. She felt that these values had been affirmed 
during her interview, and that she had been given “a clear mandate . . . that this 
church had a strong recognition of ministry into the community and wanted to 
grow in various areas.” 
 
The disciplinary power of the status quo and its effects 
As Sarah recalled this hopeful beginning, she named an aspect of the situation 
which, on reflection, she “didn’t think about . . . enough” at the time. The 
previous minister had been in the church for quite a few years, and had left only a 
few weeks before she began her role. With hindsight, Sarah speculated that a 
number of people felt a sense of allegiance to the previous minister. She 
remembered receiving an impression that people regarded her as being “so 
different” from her predecessor. His approach to ministry, she acknowledged, had 
probably been “quite different” to hers. With this backward look, Sarah realised 
that some church members may have been “grieving in their own different ways.”  
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The significance of these reflections for Sarah was connected with the 
strength of some people’s response to what she regarded as “small amounts of 
change.” 
The other thing that I wasn’t really surprised about, because it exists in many, 
many churches—that people don’t like change. But it was strong, very strong in 
this church, so that even very small amounts of change—I mean, it’s impossible 
not to change, because you never know exactly how a previous person has operated 
and you can’t be that person. . . . But there was strong reactions to small amounts 
of change, and so this was another kind of power that I didn’t realise was so strong 
until later on. 
At her first meeting with the church council (consisting of elected representatives 
of the congregation) Sarah encountered early indications of this other “kind of 
power.” One member of the council, a man who held an important position in the 
church, greeted her with the words, “Oh, it’s a woman!” While Sarah did not 
regard this as an insult at the time, she viewed it afterward as “very rude,” and a 
“smart Alec thing to do” in front of the other church council members. She also 
speculated, at the time of our interview, that through his apparent jokiness this 
man was making a statement regarding a significant change to the status quo, in 
that a woman was now leading the church. 
Sarah’s reading of this encounter fits with what followed. At the same 
meeting, some of the council members explained to her that there were “issues” in 
the church which had preceded her arrival. These had not been mentioned during 
the appointment process. The issues centred on a group of people who, Sarah soon 
came to realise, exerted considerable influence in the church. 
There was an element of power which was present in the church, which was 
making itself known from an early stage, so that I would—I recognised it as a 
warning to me that, you know, I might think I am the [minister], but ultimately you 
are almost a figurehead. 
Beyond being a woman in leadership, Sarah pinpointed her emphasis on helping 
the church “grow in various areas,” including its “ministry into the community,” 
as a departure from past patterns of church life. Many people embraced these 
changes, she recalled, and “very freely accepted me as being different.” But 
through the actions of one man in particular, and others whom he had “gathered 
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around him,” she experienced a disciplinary power (my words) that seemed intent 
on undermining her authority and protecting interests vested in the status quo. 
This power element was seeking to tell me that that wasn’t the ministry of this 
church. That the role of the church is to maintain, well, not only buildings, but 
maintain a certain status quo. But status quo so that the agenda of these particular 
people would be adhered to. 
It was generally through church council members that Sarah became aware of 
“concerns” that people were feeling, although it was never clear how widespread 
such concerns were. “Often it was hard to determine whether it was their personal 
concerns or their representative concerns.” As we talked about the sorts of issues 
that people would raise—such as changes to the form of the service—Sarah came 
to the conclusion that in themselves they were “irrelevant.” She felt no strong 
emotion in telling me about them, she said. But there was emotion in her voice as 
she explained that what had affected her so significantly was something “present 
and looming just below the surface. . . . Secretive, aggressive, and critical in a 
very nasty way.” 
Sarah recalled being in other churches where making changes had been 
difficult, but in those situations it had been possible to “talk about them fairly and 
recognise maybe that, you know, you need to compromise, or you come to some 
level ground.” This “level ground” approach accorded with her preference for a 
“flat style of leadership.” But in her new context there were forces at work which 
made no room for compromise. 
In the way that this power operated there was no discussion, and where I and others 
would be assertive it would be shot down and criticised. 
With the help of an external supervisor, Sarah tried to sift what was affecting her 
“personally” from what was affecting her “professionally.” The personal effects 
were evident in her account of one church council meeting and its aftermath. She 
recalled that this meeting had been “quite antagonistic and undermining.” To help 
her unwind afterward she decided to watch a DVD and chose Gandhi. As she 
watched the movie, Sarah found herself identifying with Ghandi’s experience, 
including his “persecutions.”  
Yeah—it was a very empowering experience, because I guess it helped me to 
recognise and value my ministry and my calling and that the things I felt strongly 
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about. Things which I felt were—I believe are—fundamental and basic to the 
ministry of the church. But I was having to fight for these things. 
Even more importantly, the resonance she experienced with this narrative helped 
her to see how the opposition she was experiencing was affecting her sense of 
personhood and her own goodness. 
I can remember saying to myself out loud—what was it—something like, “These 
things happened to Gandhi and he was a good person.” I realised—well no, I 
realise now—that what was happening to me was present strongly, much more 
strongly than I realised. 
This emerging awareness prompted Sarah to make a greater effort to recognise 
and protect herself from the kind of criticism which had the potential to sabotage 
her sense of personhood, as opposed to criticism which related to specific aspects 
of her professional role. She acknowledged that this was hard to do in practice, 
partly because of religious discourses which collapse the distinction between 
private and vocational aspects of identity, and which regard sacrifice as inherent 
to the ministry vocation. 
I think particularly with this work that we do, which involves a calling of who we 
are integrally. . . . Because in my ministry training formation there was always an 
awareness that not this is not a job . . . that we are trained to be ourselves in 
ministries, sacrificial ministry. 
 
The struggle for authority and its discursive construction 
I asked Sarah what ideas seemed to be at work on behalf of the status quo “power 
element.” She named “tradition,” elaborating this as, “This is the only way. This 
is what church is about.” The status quo group claimed to speak on behalf of 
“older members” and what was “best for them.” But Sarah’s sense was that those 
who made these claims primarily represented “a pervading demonstration of 
authority.” So once again, the issue was power, and the right to exercise authority 
in the church, rather than any specific action on Sarah’s part. Looking back, she 
concluded that while there were people on the church council that supported her, 
they too “had been having to deal with this stuff for such a long time that they 
were tired.” While they and she “authority on paper in reality there was no 
authority because it wasn’t allowed.” 
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Sarah named a further dynamic which seemed to be at work in this struggle 
for authority—one which played a significant role in events which resulted in her 
resignation. She discovered that the man who had greeted her with “Oh, it’s a 
woman!” was a member of an organisation which engaged in spiritual practices 
about which she felt some concern. Given this man’s important role in the church, 
Sarah felt a double concern—for his spiritual welfare, and for that of the church. 
Subsequently she became aware of other members of the church who also 
belonged to this organisation, including a key person in the status quo group. It 
seemed to her that the “demonstration of authority” with which she was 
contending was somehow supported by this common involvement outside of the 
church.  
It was at this point that the discursive conflict between the value she placed 
on exercising a “flat style of leadership” on the one hand, and her sense of ethical 
responsibility to act decisively for the good of the community on the other hand, 
became acute for Sarah. She asked the man if he felt that his allegiance to this 
organisation in any way “compromised his Christian faith.” At this point, she 
recalled, he “became extremely defensive.” Sarah then told him that she “had a 
problem” with him continuing to hold an important role in the church if he was to 
continue with the other organisation. With hindsight, she reflected, she would 
have approached this conversation differently, but at the time of our interview she 
remained convinced that the man did need to choose between allegiances. 
Supporting this conviction was a view of ministry which produced a sense of 
accountability to something beyond herself: “I was acting out the sense that this 
was the right thing to do and that I had more than me behind me.” 
I realise now that I should have had somebody with me, and that I should have 
given him notice or warning that I was going to say something like that to him. But 
it was one of those things that happened. I don’t regret it and I was sure enough of 
my grounds. Okay, so he left the church. He went home and wrote a letter saying 
that he was resigning from the church, leaving the church, and something like, “I 
can’t be in a church where this woman is the [minister],” or something like that. 
As a consequence, Sarah was asked by the church council to explain her actions. 
Her perspective was, “I felt I was drawing on my calling, my responsibility and 
leadership, and that I had acted out of that.” Only a minority of church council 
members supported her action, and the “primary support went to this power 
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element.” Not long after this, she was visited by a delegation of four church 
members who were not on the church council. 
I was told that I was going to be—he was going to read out a list of—two lists—
one of how things were before I came, and the other list was how things are now ... 
I was given a seven page document of their criticisms of me. . . . And at the end it 
said I was being given, I don’t know, to a particular time to respond to this matter. 
So anyway they went and I can remember I had this—a very overwhelming sense 
that something enormous had happened. 
Sarah felt that while very few of the criticisms were justified, the authority of her 
role had been weakened by this document. She felt personally attacked. 
“Everything about me and my calling has been criticised on paper.” She did not 
doubt her ministry calling, or regret her actions, she recalled, but her sense of 
identity and her ability to live out her calling had been undermined.  
Over ensuing weeks she spoke with the person in the wider church structure 
to whom she was ultimately accountable, and he expressed his support for her. 
Nonetheless, she wrestled with the question of whether she could continue to 
function as the minister in the church in light of what had happened. She did not 
want to leave “in weakness,” and wrestled with a way to make a decision that she 
could be at peace with. 
Eventually what I settled on was that there were power issues that had been evident 
in the church for a long time, and that I believed these issues needed to be sorted 
to—for a person in a [minister’s] role to be able to function. And so I made a 
statement to that effect which I read at the AGM. . . . So when I read that letter of 
resignation out to the AGM, I did this supported by this resolve. 
At this same AGM a new church council was voted in, and “a lot of nominations 
came in from this power sector,” all of whom were elected. The interests bound 
up in maintaining the status quo seemed set to prevail.  
I asked Sarah what she saw as the source of the “resolve” that had supported 
her through all of these difficulties. She spoke of certain key texts from the Bible 
which informed her approach to ministry, and at the root of these identified an 
“awareness of justice.” 
And I think it is quite interesting now to look at that in the light of everything we 
have talked about. Because my desire was to see justice done in other people’s 
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lives, but what I was struggling with was injustices being done to me. And I was 
never completely broken through all of this. I was deeply wounded, but I wasn’t 
broken the way I have seen other people. 
At the time of our interview Sarah had not taken up another position as a minister. 
Understandably, she felt “cautious about getting involved in church leadership.” 
In the meantime, she was developing her capacity to offer professional support to 
others in ministry, drawing on her heightened awareness of injustices and abuses 
of power which occur in church contexts. 
 
7.3 Martin’s story 
The final account to be considered in this chapter belongs to Martin, whose life 
was defined for more than thirty years by his vocation as a Roman Catholic priest. 
That vocation was challenged when he found himself having to choose between 
the call he had felt to priesthood and what he described as “the call to love.” As a 
priest, Martin had held a privileged position of authority within the church 
communities he served, but this in itself was not the primary focus of our 
interview.  His account of resistance rather concerned the discourses and practices 
of authority of the Roman Catholic Church, from which his authority as a priest 
had derived. This centuries-old, powerful, worldwide religious system had 
ordained him into the priestly vocation, rigidly prescribed the boundaries of his 
life as a priest, and finally defined his identity as a person whose ministry was no 
longer valid. 
That’s really, I suppose, the heart of my story and the position that brought me into 
conflict with the Church that had formed so much part of my life, and with which 
I’d never had such a crisis before. 
 
The discursive construction of priesthood: “another Christ” 
Martin grew up in a Roman Catholic family within which the discourses 
supporting the sacred power and position of priesthood had produced a huge sense 
of esteem for this as a possible vocation: “it was a very easy context for me in 
which to feel that this was a useful thing to do with my life.” Immediately on 
leaving school, at sixteen, Martin entered the seminary and began studying, “with 
a great sense of feeling that I was in the right place.” Within his Roman Catholic 
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context, the discourses which supported the notion of priesthood constructed it as 
more than simply one vocation among others. To be ordained as a priest implied 
the creation of a new kind of relationship between himself and Christ, and 
accordingly a new identity which was inscribed in his very being. 
Priesthood was presented to me as a sacrament that involved an ontological 
change. We talked about the priest being “another Christ”—an alter Christus. And 
the call to priesthood was seen as perhaps the closest way that a Catholic male 
could follow the Christian vocation. 
Martin recalled many rewarding aspects of the thirty years of priestly ministry 
which had followed his ordination. He had enjoyed the company of other priests 
and his relationships with the communities of people he served. Being a priest had 
entailed a commitment to celibacy, but, at that time, he hadn’t seen this “as being 
in any way difficult.” While not having had a family of his own, he had enjoyed 
many opportunities in his pastoral role to share in a very close way with families 
the ups and downs of their everyday lives. For much of this time, Martin reflected, 
he had been content: “I suppose I never imagined being anywhere else.” 
 
The discourses of celibacy revisited 
A number of factors conspired in Martin’s experience to trouble his acceptance of 
the dominant discourses of celibacy within the Church. One influence in the early 
years of his priesthood was the new thinking that emerged from the Second 
Vatican Council, which began in the early 1960s.  
There was a great sense of feeling that something new was emerging from that 
meeting of bishops that took place over six years in Rome, and the theological 
experts, the periti, that were with them. . . . There were all sorts of new insights 
filtering through. 
One of these new insights concerned marriage. Prior to this major ecclesiastical 
rethink, the vocation of marriage had been regarded, Martin suggested, as “a kind 
of poor third” after priesthood and monastic life. Following the Second Vatican 
Council, the Church accepted that marriage too was “a way of people growing in 
grace,” and “an opportunity for people to discover God in the centre of their lives 
and their loving.” This recognition lessened the gulf between married life and the 
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privileged spiritual status of celibate callings which had characterised the earlier 
teaching of the Church. 
For Martin, this discursive shift in the church’s view of marriage was 
accompanied by the experience of watching couples “growing in their own love 
for each other” and for their children. He observed what he had considered to be 
some of the privileged functions of priesthood being exercised in the context of 
love relationships—in “the opportunities they had for experiencing things like 
forgiveness and reconciliation in a real life way.” At the same time, as he reached 
his fifties, he saw first-hand “how isolated and lonely and irascible” some of the 
older priests were becoming. 
I could see there was a distinction between priests who lived within the supportive 
environment of a religious community—vowed as they were to celibacy, to 
chastity, obedience and poverty, finding great satisfaction from being part of that 
community—there was a difference between that and the increasing—what I saw 
to be—the increasing isolation of diocesan priests. . . . So, I suppose, for all sorts of 
reasons, at all sorts of levels, I became less convinced that priesthood and celibacy 
had to go together. 
These perceptions and questions coincided, Martin recalled, with the “experience 
of drawing close to the woman who’s now my wife, and developing a love myself 
which responded to hers for me.” (I will refer to this person as Anna). Now, 
alongside his call to priesthood, he felt a new “call to love,” and this became for 
him part of a call to embrace a wider experience of what it meant to be human: “to 
grow as a whole person.” Despite its more positive view of marriage, however, 
the Church’s theology of priesthood allowed no possibility of these calls being 
worked out at the same time. Martin was therefore faced with the “huge dilemma” 
of having to choose between them. 
 
The discursive construction of Martin’s dilemma and its effects 
For Martin, this forced choice between priesthood and a desire to give and receive 
sexual love was a crisis of identity which called into question the whole purpose 
and vision of his life. His Church referred to the process of being released from 
the priesthood and from commitment to celibacy as “laicisation.” The theology 
which understood priestly ordination as inscribing a permanent ontological 
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change constructed a situation in which release from this calling depended on 
identifying a flaw in the original path to ordination. 
The process of laicisation itself is a demeaning one. It meant, in effect, that I had to 
really agree to say that I should never have been ordained; that there was 
something deficient either about my calling, or my discernment, or my maturity or 
my spiritual life—all of those things. 
The necessity of following this “demeaning” procedure, should he decide to 
choose love over priesthood, forced Martin to re-evaluate the earlier experiences 
which had led him into the priesthood. He reflected on the fact that his whole 
education had taken place in single-sex schools, where the teachers were celibate 
Marist brothers. He had entered the seminary at sixteen years of age and was 
trained by celibate priests.  
I mean, in terms of personal growth and psychosexual maturity, I probably was 
very green. And there were issues that I had to agree to which probably were in 
some ways inadequate. But then, I’d say probably some of the seminary staff who 
asked me the questions at the time were in some ways incomplete as people too. 
Nothing had been modelled to help or prepare him to embrace human sexuality as 
an integral aspect of relational personhood. Moreover, he had been granted special 
permission (from Rome) to be ordained at twenty two years of age. This was well 
below the usual minimum age and, from Martin’s point of view, pre-empted an 
informed decision between celibacy and sexual relationship. If there were 
deficiencies, he concluded, they had been as much in the structures and systems of 
the Church as in his own sense of call. 
The theology of priesthood meant that there was far more at stake for Martin 
than re-evaluating his call, as people in other vocations might consider a career 
change. If, according to the dominant discourse of the Church, ordination was 
supposed to have inscribed him permanently with a new identity as “another 
Christ,” what did it mean for this status to be revoked? The laicisation pathway 
offered him no positive way to think about this question. 
For someone who felt, who thought, that his faith was secure and that his 
spirituality was well developed, to suddenly find that I was being faced with having 
to step back from that close identification with the Christ of the Church—to say 
that this ontological relationship that had been established through ordination was 
197 
going to—I was going to have to surrender that—left me in something of a spiritual 
wilderness, really. 
It took Martin more than a year to come his decision to seek laicisation. The 
process of wrestling with that decision, given its consequences, led him into a 
“black hole of depression” where not only his ministry but his faith, his spiritual 
identity and his sense of belonging were in doubt. 
I went into a kind of a spiritual black hole, of not knowing quite where I belonged.  
After years of thinking I was on close terms with God, I suddenly thought—you 
know, people used to ask me to bless them, to pray for them—that maybe I’ve lost 
contact with the God that I thought I was on such good terms with. 
He was conscious, too, of making choices which seemed to dishonour the values 
of his family and the trust placed in him by the communities which he had served. 
Am I turning my back on not just my own calling but on the community that I’ve 
been called—that I felt called to serve? How will the people that I’ve ministered to 
feel? What about the people whose marriages I’ve helped to celebrate, will they 
feel that the ground has been knocked from under their own lives and 
commitment? Anticipating the reaction of family was a big question. . . . My own 
family, my siblings—my sister and my two brothers—but especially my mother, 
who is still alive and who was, for better or worse, very heartened and affirmed by 
the fact that she had a son who was a priest. 
For the first time in his life, and because of a desire to love and be loved, Martin 
recalled, he found himself at odds with the Church which he also loved and 
served. The discourses of priesthood and celibacy left him no other place to stand. 
In fact, the discourses and practices which had been central to the construction of 
his identity for more than thirty years now positioned him with a sense that to 
embrace an experience of love, which included the expression of his sexuality, 
was somehow wrong. 
One of the terrible things about the bind I found myself in was feeling called to 
love in this new way and feeling that, as a priest, this was wrong or I shouldn’t be 
doing this. 
On the other side of his dilemma, Martin was anxious not to abuse the love being 
shown to him by Anna by entering into relationship while still being unable to 
contemplate the surrender of his priesthood. “One of the fears that I had was that I 
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was in danger of abusing Anna’s love for me in drawing close to her, but saying, 
you know, we can’t go anywhere with this.”  
The effect of this discursive vice-grip on Martin was “a kind of paralysis.” 
He found a temporary solution by negotiating permission from his bishop to 
relinquish his parish in a way that would give him space and time to think through 
his decision. 
I remember saying I’d reached a point where I could say that no priest can 
proclaim the Gospel with a divided heart. There was an issue there that I really had 
to resolve. And the tension was between feeling the call to love, and knowing that 
that was part of what the Christian life was really all about, and the commitment to 
obey the order—the demand for order within the Church. 
While acknowledging the importance for the Church of having “order,” Martin 
looked back in our interview on this painful period of paralysis with 
disappointment that the Church’s discourses of priesthood and sexuality had not 
allowed, and still did not allow, space for the coexistence of the two goods 
between which he was forced to choose. 
And when I think about it, I suppose I have to say that I’m resentful there, for 
being put in that position of having to deny and surrender so much of what was 
good in order to make another choice which was also good. 
 
Deconstructing the binary and reimagining vocation 
Unsurprisingly, the process of negotiating a pathway out of the “bind,” which 
Martin and Anna called “the dark hole,” was neither simple nor quick. As it 
turned out, the first step was in itself a choice directed toward love. Anna, who 
was “at her wits’ end,” asked him if he would consider seeing a counsellor. Martin 
initially regarded this option as a “waste of time and money,” but went for Anna’s 
sake. The counselling sessions offered an opportunity to review what was 
important to him, and after several visits he began to see a way ahead. 
The dark hole had some light at the end of the tunnel. And I thought I could see 
that there was a way forward—that my whole life would not collapse. And that the 
things that were becoming so important to me, I could hold onto, and the things 
which I had thought were so important, I could perhaps imagine living without. 
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In time Martin therefore felt able to make a final decision to seek laicisation. He 
identified several key factors which were operative for him—both before and after 
making the decision—in rethinking and reimagining life beyond priesthood. At 
the risk of oversimplifying a long and complex process, I summarise these factors 
here in terms of deconstruction, reimagining, and resistance. 
Deconstruction. I have already noted the way in which the dominant 
religious discourses which tied priesthood to celibacy began to be subverted for 
Martin by a twofold observation: people in marriages and families engaging in the 
priestly roles of forgiveness and reconciliation, and his fellow priests becoming 
isolated and irritable as they grew older. The effects of being forced into “the dark 
hole” of an either-or choice by these discourses, and of the “demeaning” process 
of laicisation, raised further questions. Martin explained that laicisation left him 
with fewer opportunities for participation in church life than a lay person who had 
never been ordained. Experiencing the disciplinary effects of this process invited a 
revised perspective on the structure and purpose of ordination itself, including a 
recognition of its vested interests in “power and control.” 
The laicization document excludes me from having any kind of office. . . . So I 
can’t teach. I can’t preach. I can’t distribute communion. I can’t read the 
Scriptures, as other lay people can. . . . It’s punitive, really. I mean, I also think that 
a good deal of the superstructure which the ordained—which the system of 
ordination, the Episcopacy and the Presbyterate put in place—it’s really about 
control and the exercise of power, rather than the advancement of holiness, which 
is really what the Church ought to be about. 
Reading and writing are significant aspects of Martin’s life, and some of his 
reading also contributed to the process of deconstruction he was experiencing. He 
read an article by a Jewish rabbi who had also left his ministry and had resonated 
with his description of “freefall in a world that had no titles, no religious garb, no 
forms of ritual or liturgy.” For this man it had been the beginning of a new kind of 
faith, without “props.” 
I think something of that happened for me as well. I began to doubt some of my 
own Church’s claims and official lines on some things. I began to see that perhaps 
the absolute claims of the Church of Rome were far more time-conditioned and 
culturally shaped than I’d imagined, and that the Roman take on quite a few issues 
was only one of many. 
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As Derrida (1997) emphasises, deconstruction is not simply about doubting old 
truths or dismantling binaries. Positively it can create space for the emergence of 
new and hitherto suppressed meanings. The painful dismantling of the “props” 
which had supported, but also circumscribed, Martin’s identity and vocation for 
thirty years, cleared the way for fresh perspectives on his faith and his vocation.  
Reimagining. The process of laicisation ended Martin’s access to formally 
recognised ministry and opened the way to marriage. But over time, he began to 
see ways in which the divide between these two callings was not absolute. In 
significant measure these insights came through relational connections. Through 
Anna, in particular, he experienced the call to love in a new way, and discovered 
the power of human relationship to mediate sacred experience. 
I can’t avoid mention of how the experience of loving and being loved has alerted 
me to new way of detecting God’s presence in my life. And things like, yes the 
experience of forgiveness and reconciliation, and the selflessness of love, are 
lessons that I’ve learnt more from being husband and spouse than I ever learnt as a 
priest. 
These discoveries were reinforced in the period of transition out of the priesthood, 
when Martin spent time in a church community outside of the Roman Catholic 
context. 
And the experience of being within [this] community, meeting married priests, 
both men and women; being a friend of a gay priest who’s also in a loving 
relationship—those things have broadened my horizon. 
The genealogy of the Church’s insistence on celibacy for its priests has included 
not just a suspicion of sexuality in general, but an historical view of the female 
sex as spiritually dangerous. In contradiction to this heritage, Martin’s post-
laicisation spiritual imagination was fired and expanded by a growing 
acquaintance with a community of Catholic sisters. He observed that they “had 
developed for themselves a spirituality, and a religious tradition, that was to some 
extent independent of and separate from the patriarchal church.” This was a 
spirituality which highlighted for him 
a different set of values from the ones that I had focused on as a priest and as a 
proclaimer of the Word. I discovered, for instance, that they have a very well-
grounded care for the environment, and a spirituality that reflects that commitment. 
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In time his own theology shifted toward this “earth-centred spirituality” and, as a 
consequence, he gave more importance to “living life well.” This in turn helped to 
address his earlier anxiety and uncertainty about surrendering his priestly identity 
as “another Christ.” In the process, he began to discover “another Christ,” in a 
different sense, with whom he could identify in a new way. This Christ did not 
demand denial of the body, sex, or everyday life in order to achieve a sacred plane 
of existence. 
It’s helped me, too, to realise that even the classic Christological definitions of the 
early church were themselves time-conditioned. . . . I’m more interested in what 
the message of Jesus can do to help me to understand my own humanity. And 
that’s probably more important to me now than wanting to be an alter Christus in a 
disembodied, sexless, cultic sense, which perhaps was what it was. 
The spirituality and practices of this community of women also demonstrated a 
political awareness, including a commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi, which 
seeded another important element in Martin’s reimagining of faith and work. 
As a priest, to my shame, I have to say I never—apart from saying kia ora8—that 
was about the limit of my Māori. Now when I go on formal occasions to engage 
with groups, I’m sometimes called on to provide the mihi,9 and with help from one 
of my colleagues I’ve developed a—I can’t say I speak Māori—but a fluency that 
enables me to do that. 
A third strand of the Catholic sisters’ way of life which affected Martin spoke to 
the Church’s patriarchal discourses and practices of power, which had become 
problematic and oppressive in his own experience. Within their community he 
observed a non-hierarchical, participatory approach to leadership. 
They have a system of shared leadership. It’s a community of equals. Yes, 
obedience is still there, but it’s obedience to God’s Word that comes through 
prayerful discernment. It’s not a case of Reverend Mother Superior saying, “Sister 
you do this.” And if it works for women, it should work equally well for men. 
In time, Martin’s view of God and faith broadened considerably from the 
prescriptive orthodoxy of his training. In keeping with his increasingly earth-
centred spirituality, he came to see the divine as “being within the heart of 
                                                 
8
 Informal Māori greeting. 
9
 Māori word for the speaking structure in a formal welcome. 
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creation,” rather than conceiving of a God who exists in a different, celestial 
world. Accordingly, he reimagined the Christian life as a call to “the letting be of 
being,” and saw many of the Church’s moral laws as a denial of this. 
I think I’ve come to see that Christian life is more than anything about the letting 
be of being.  And the circumscriptions which the Roman Church puts in place 
around the lives of lots of people, but especially around the lives of its own priests, 
is not about the letting be of being. It’s about keeping people where they need to be 
kept. 
So Martin looked back on the choice he was forced to make as more than a false 
choice between two loves and callings, it was “a denial of being—it’s a refusal . . . 
in the letting be of being.” With some sadness, he recalled how, in the early years 
of his ministry, he and other young priests used to receive letters from the New 
Zealand poet James K. Baxter. 
I remember in one of those, he talked about the Roman Church having, as it were, 
the crown jewels but not knowing the preciousness of what they held. The 
sacraments are powerful sources of grace; of God’s presence coming into people’s 
lives, setting them free, and helping them to grow. 
All the potential was there for the Church to assist people in the setting free and 
letting be of being. Yet, Martin reflected, the effects of the way the Church 
handled the jewels with which it had been entrusted were too often constricting 
and inhibiting of growth.  
Resistance. When the official document arrived, dispensing Martin from his 
vow to celibacy, on condition of withdrawing from the priesthood, it contained a 
recommendation that he move away from places where he was known. “I mean, 
the institution would like me to have just vanished, and to resurface somewhere 
where I wasn’t known and said nothing about it.” He refused to do that, for 
several reasons. Not least of these was his resistance to any notion that what he 
had done was shameful.  
I haven’t abused kids. I’ve—simply put, I found myself in a situation where 
because of the rules of my Church, which I think are stupid, I’ve had to surrender 
what was actually a very fruitful ministry, for myself and for the people whose 
lives I served. So I’m staying put! 
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Implied in Martin’s “staying put” was a desire to remain not just in his location, 
but within the Catholic Church. Some of his colleagues who had also withdrawn 
from priesthood in the Catholic Church had found ordained positions in churches 
where celibacy was not an issue. He refused that option, and saw his refusal as a 
protest which testified to a situation which was fundamentally wrong. Several 
times in our conversation, Martin referred to a statement that he had heard 
attributed to Heidegger, “Hell is to live between the ages.” It was important for 
him to remain in the hellish place in which his Church had placed him, and others 
like him, as it struggled to let go of an old age and accept new ways of being. It 
was also important for him to bear witness to this plight from within his Church, 
rather than as an outsider. For example, he explained, he had written about his 
situation for Catholic publications, and his story had featured in a national 
newspaper. 
I think the only way we’re going to have change is for people like me to continue 
to talk about how things are. One of the results about—the final results of the 
[newspaper] article was that people got in touch with me to say that they had never 
realized that the rules of our own Church was so severe and so, yes, so punitive. . . . 
The Church has, I suppose, a right and a duty to provide for good order. But the 
point at which it becomes destructive of people and destructive of love, is the point 
at which we need—everyone needs—to sit up and say, “What’s happening here?” 
Beyond the desire to provoke this important question, Martin has never regarded 
his priestly call as being no longer valid. 
I feel that I’m—there’s part of me that’s—there’s a priesthood that can’t be 
undone. It’s there. It’s part of my life, but I’m not able to use it. I think it’s stupid. 
It’s a waste. . . . There’s a priestly ministry there that’s gone into cold storage. It’s 
not used. 
In support of that part of his calling which cannot be undone, Martin has found 
new ways to reimagine his priestly vocation. In his regular opportunities to write 
for Catholic contexts, Martin finds an echo of the priestly role of preaching, which 
for him had been about “helping Christians through God’s Word to make sense of 
life.” Another way of reimagining his calling occurred to him during the first 
Easter to follow his withdrawal from the priesthood.  The Holy Thursday of 
Easter was a difficult day for him, as it is traditionally the day when priests renew 
their commitment to celibacy. The sermon that day focused on the connection 
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between Jesus’ humble act of washing his disciples’ feet and his celebration of the 
Last Supper with them. The focus on humility and kindness, as opposed to 
priestly authority and privilege, spoke to a thread of ministerial identity which he 
could continue to embrace. 
It helped me to see that while I perhaps would never be able to celebrate Eucharist 
again as a priest, I would always be able to find ways of washing feet.  So that call 
to discipleship was not lost. And if in my own mind I was able to somehow link 
that to the Eucharist that I was part of, something would continue. 
Martin described a further strategy he had developed for maintaining connection 
with the Eucharist which had been so central to his identity as a priest. It offered 
him a way to continue quietly resisting the false choice into which he had been 
forced, and to bring the sacraments of Eucharist and mutual human love into 
connection. 
At mass now each Sunday, as I say silently to myself the words of institution, 
because I’m not able to pronounce them—“This is my body, given up for you”—I 
instinctively reach for my wedding ring. And it’s as though in that sacred moment 
of doing what Jesus told us to do, I’m able to acknowledge both those sacraments. 
Both the power of the Eucharist to bring into this community the Lord’s giving of 
himself through his own death and rising again, but also the life-giving experience 
of my love for Anna and hers for me. And somehow those two things sit together 
quite well. 
 
This allusion to death and resurrection resonates with the shape of the personal 
journey I was privileged to hear Martin unfold in our interview. Having been 
drawn into a dark hole of despair by the discourses of his tradition, which 
constructed priesthood and sexual love as mutually exclusive, he was finding new 
and creative ways to transform this zone of exclusion into a place of possibility 
and hope. The place between the ages was still painful and wrong, but he was 
making it a place where, as much as possible, being could be let be, either-or 
could become both-and, and his two loves could “sit together quite well.” 
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7.4 Discussion points 
 
First research question 
Within Christian communities, how is it that some regimes of power and 
knowledge can subvert the call to freedom and justice which is pervasive in 
longstanding streams of Christian tradition? 
The stories of Andy, Sarah and Martin yield traces of a range of discursive 
regimes. The common discursive thread in their narratives is a sense of call to 
exercise pastoral ministry on behalf of others. In each case, the narrator tells of 
being positioned in a dilemma by discourses of leadership which conflicted with 
their sense of call, and describes the disruptive effects of this discursive conflict 
on their life and ministry. A point of interest in relation to my first research 
question is that in each narrative the regime of power and knowledge which 
conflicts with the narrator’s preferred approach to leadership originates in a 
discursive context which extends beyond the community in which they lead. 
Practices of entitlement feature strongly in the accounts given by Andy and Sarah, 
while Martin was affected deeply by discursive practices which diminished his 
entitlement to exercise priestly service.  
 
Second research question 
What has enabled some people to resist the practices of religious authority 
constructed by such regimes? 
Andy and Sarah have stories of resistance to the actions of particular people 
whose understanding of pastoral ministry was shaped by these wider discourses of 
leadership. This helps to support Rose’s (1996) contention that resistance, 
understood as “opposition to a particular regime for the conduct of one’s conduct” 
(p. 35), is a matter of perspective. Both sides of a conflict may claim higher moral 
ground for their position and name it resistance. I choose to call Andy’s and 
Sarah’s actions resistance because the ethical stance reflected in their accounts of 
their ministries resonates with the understanding of freedom and justice embedded 
in my first research question, and in their own ethical hopes and intentions. Their 
stories are less about discursive change (on their part) than a discursive struggle to 
maintain a viable space within which this ethical stance could be practiced. 
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Martin’s narrative is not one of dealing with particular individuals but with 
the longstanding discursive position of the worldwide Roman Catholic Church on 
priesthood and celibacy. Despite the monolithic nature of the Roman Catholic 
Church, Martin found ways to resist the pressure to quietly disappear from the city 
where he was a priest, and to reimagine his vocation as a priest. The process he 
endured produced some deeply challenging discursive shifts in his faith.  
In the discussion provided in Chapter 8, I draw on these stories as important 
examples of how resistance is supported by tenaciously held ethical intentions, 
especially those which are reinforced through regular liturgical practices such as 
Bible reading, prayer and corporate worship. 
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Chapter 8: Shining a discursive light on subjugating practices of 
authority and resistance in Christian communities 
 
The previous three chapters have presented the results of my discursive narrative 
analysis of transcribed interviews with the participants in this study. The purpose 
of this chapter is to bring the theoretical ideas developed in Chapter 3 to bear on 
the main findings of those chapters, and to focus this discussion on what has been 
learned in relation to my research questions: 
i Within Christian communities, how is it that some regimes of power and 
knowledge can subvert the call to freedom and justice which is pervasive in 
longstanding streams of Christian tradition? 
ii What has enabled some people to resist the practices of religious authority 
constructed by such regimes?  
I begin with a review of certain assumptions which I brought to this project, 
concerning the discursive worlds of the participants, and how these assumptions 
were challenged as I began to analyse the data. I then turn to the first research 
question and name several discursive technologies of subjugation and hegemony 
which characterised the regimes of power and knowledge in the participants’ 
communities. In the third main section of this chapter, I focus on the second 
research question and insights which emerge from my analysis of the participants’ 
accounts of their resistance. I offer theoretical reflection on the prominence in 
their accounts of talk about the embodied effects of subjugation, the contribution 
of alternative knowledges, and the tenacity of their ethical hopes and intentions. 
 
8.1 A reflexive pause: regarding ethical intentions and hopes 
As I look back on my initial thinking about this project, I realise that I began with 
a rather schematic understanding of Foucault’s analysis of the relationships 
between dominant discourses, positioning, and subjectivity within social systems. 
The basic social constructionist notion that “people can only think with the ideas 
that are available to them” had provoked me to wonder how divergent thinking 
and resistance can occur. Initially my question was something like this: “If the 
subjectivity of a person in a religious community is constructed by the dominant 
discourses of that community, how is it possible that they come to think 
differently, let alone engage in acts of resistance?” 
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I was aware of the view that a subject’s positioning within multiple, 
contradictory discourses may open a space in which a form of agentic choice is 
possible (Davies et al., 1990). Yet somehow this awareness did not alter my 
formulation of a paradigm in which the participants were like blank slates, 
inscribed by the discourses—whether unified or contradictory—of their contexts. 
I was overlooking the complexity of their discursive positioning prior to, and 
concurrent with, the influence of their religious communities. As I note in Chapter 
4, this oversight influenced the first iteration of my analysis of the interviews. I 
looked first for dominant discourses which were supporting the practices of 
religious authority they experienced, and secondly for the sources of their 
resistance, including any encounters with contradictory discourses (see Table 2, 
page 98). I therefore inadvertently privileged the dominant discourses of the 
religious communities, casting them as the primary actors in the stories of 
resistance I was hoping to present. Consequently, and ironically, I found myself in 
danger of passing over the ethical intentions and hopes which the participants held 
for their lives, because of my own initial discursive positioning as a researcher.  
As I embarked on the first iteration of analysis of the interviews, I became 
aware that the ways in which the participants had ordered their narratives 
suggested that they made meaning of their struggles and acts of resistance with 
reference to their ethical intentions and hopes. In most cases, they had not entered 
their various religious communities as tabulae rasae awaiting inscription by 
dominant discourses. In analysing Cathy’s story, for example, I was struck by the 
way she had started the interview by telling me of a “significant episode,” in 
which her hopes of collaborative discussion and decision making had been 
sabotaged by a very gendered process which placed little value on her 
participation. As I continued the analysis, a similar pattern became evident in 
many of the stories. Early on in telling their stories, the participants had given 
examples of their own ethical intentions and hopes being subjugated by the 
discourses and practices of religious authority in their communities. The re-
presentation of their stories in the preceding three chapters shows that these 
intentions and hopes most commonly centred on the conduct of relationships 
within their communities (e.g. valuing of persons, acceptance of difference, 
respect, inclusivity, compassion, honesty) and strategies for increasing the 
wellbeing of the communities and their members (e.g. collaboration, open 
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communication, reconciliation, advocacy, the pursuit of justice). Moreover, 
despite their subjugation, it was precisely these intentions and hopes which 
supported the participants in their eventual acts of resistance to religious authority. 
As appropriate to my avowed methodology of reflexivity and “narrative 
responsibility and respect” (Czarniawska, 2002; Denzin et al., 2005), the data 
itself was exerting an influence on the development of my research story, and I 
consequently adjusted the focus of my research interests to incorporate the 
presence of the participants’ ethical hopes and concerns more explicitly. My 
question shifted from, “If the subjectivity of a person within a religious 
community is constructed by the dominant discourses of that community, how is 
it possible that they come to think differently, let alone engage in acts of 
resistance?” to something more like the two research questions outlined above, in 
which my own ethical concern as a researcher is named (in the first question), and 
a tabula rasa view of the participants’ discursive history, including their ethical 
intentions, is avoided. 
As I pursued my analytical work with the participants’ stories, I became 
even more aware of the importance of paying close attention to their accounts of 
the ethical intentions and hopes which informed their involvement in their 
religious communities. In anticipation of the discussion to follow (sections 8.2, 
8.3), I want to highlight three aspects of this importance. 
Reflexivity. My initial thin regard for the ethical intentions of the 
participants was ironic for two reasons. First, as outlined in earlier chapters, my 
own commitment to supporting justice and freedom in religious contexts was and 
is a primary motivation for engaging in this research. In hindsight, my regard for 
my own ethical intentions initially obscured those of the people I interviewed. The 
second and more significant irony in my initially inadequate regard for the 
participants’ ethical intentions lay in its parallels with the experiences which they 
described as being at the heart of their subjugation by, and eventual resistance to, 
the practices of religious authority in their communities. I argue below that the 
people who performed these practices of governmentality were recruited to a lack 
of regard for participants’ ethical hopes and intentions by taken-for-granted ideas 
about authority in their communities. In my case, it was my initially simplistic 
version of Foucault’s power/knowledge paradigm which produced ways of 
thinking about my topic which privileged dominant discourses and minimised the 
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possibility of the participants entering, rather than simply emerging from, their 
communities with agentically held ethical intentions for the production of their 
lives. 
This was not only a salutary experience for me as a researcher, it also 
invited a more nuanced attitude on my part toward the people whose actions were 
described by the participants as having oppressive and diminishing effects. In 
some cases, those I interviewed acknowledged that the practices which had these 
effects were probably born of their leaders’ own ethical intentions. Andy, for 
example, spoke frequently of the “damage” he experienced in his relationship 
with his senior minister, yet speculated that the latter probably “genuinely 
believed he was doing this for God, and he was doing the best thing.” 
Subjectification. This point and the next constitute a paradox. My analysis 
of the interview narratives suggests that the ethical positioning of the participants 
supported both their subjectification by, and their eventual resistance to, the 
hegemonic discourses and practices of religious authority within their 
communities. This paradox is explored more fully in later sections of this chapter. 
Here I simply recall Weedon’s statement that subjectification works “most 
efficiently” for the established hierarchy of power relations when the subject 
position offered to a person is “fully identified by the individual with her 
interests” (1997, p. 109). Setting aside the word “fully” in that statement, it can be 
seen in the narratives which I have re-presented in the previous three chapters that 
aspects of some of the participants’ ethical intentions—acceptance of difference, 
respect, compassion and reconciliation, for example—contributed to their initially 
compliant acceptance of the subject positions offered to them within the dominant 
discourses of religious authority. 
Resistance. On the other side of this paradox, I argue in the third main 
section of this chapter (8.3) that the persistence of those same ethical intentions 
and hopes, which were at odds with their repeated experiences of subjugation, 
helped to produce and support their resistance. 
 
8.2 Discursive technologies of subjugation and hegemony 
In this section, I identify nine aspects of the analyses of the previous three 
chapters which help to address the first research question. Drawing on these 
threads from my analysis, and selected examples from the participants’ narratives, 
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I offer theoretical reflections on the discursive technologies by which the 
subversion of freedom and justice has been achieved. I distinguish between 
technologies which produce subjugated subjects and those which maintain the 
hegemony of dominant discourses (while acknowledging that these are closely 
related aspects of Foucault’s power/knowledge theorisation). In referring to 
technologies of subjugation, I have in mind discursive practices which hold 
people in non-agentic subject positions (i–iv below). Such practices are held in 
place by the hegemony of certain discourses. My analysis of the participants’ 
narratives has also brought to light a number of ways in which this hegemony 
itself is maintained in Christian communities, and these I refer to as technologies 
of hegemony (v–ix). In offering examples of the nine technologies from those 
narratives there is, unavoidably, some repetition of material from Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7. 
 
i The construction of monologic subject positions 
As outlined in Chapter 3 (section 3.4), I use the term “monologic” in Sampson’s 
(1993) sense of power relations in which one person or group constructs the other 
in ways that serve the interests of the dominant party. Social interaction is not 
dialogic (and therefore not just) if the other “must speak in a register that is alien 
to its own specificity, and in so doing lose its desires and interests” (Sampson, 
1993, p. 11). Genuinely dialogic forms of participation recognise that the ethical 
production of one’s life is a relational achievement, and require “that there be two 
separable presences, each coming from its own standpoint, expressing and 
enacting its own particular specificity” (p. 15).  
In describing the effects on them of subjugating practices of 
governmentality in their communities, the participants’ concerns very often 
centred on the ways they were called into monologic forms of participation in 
their communities. The monologic subject positions constructed by the dominant 
discourses of their communities can be summarised using four questions which 
recurred in various forms throughout the participants’ accounts. The discursive 
construction of these subject positions is addressed here, while their effects and 
the participants’ resistance to them are considered in section 8.3 of this chapter. 
 
212 
Who may belong to this community? Perhaps the most fundamental form of 
participation in community is a sense of acceptance and belonging. Some 
participants recalled being warmly welcomed and cared for by their communities, 
only to discover later that this belonging came with conditions attached. These 
conditions were summed up by Cathy and Jenny as “toeing the line,” that is, 
conforming to the leaders’ teaching and directions. When people tried “doing 
things their way,” or “doing something a little bit different,” Cathy recalled, they 
soon discovered that “if you don’t toe the line, you have to leave.” This contrasted 
with Cathy’s earlier experience of a church where all kinds of people were 
accepted, just as they were. In both of their stories, this expectation was supported 
by discourses of “covering” and leaders’ divinely sanctioned authority. In addition 
to the discursive practices which made conformity the condition of belonging for 
those within their communities, several participants spoke of practices of 
exclusion directed at those who were “other.” The theologies of separation and 
exclusion prominent in John’s and Lynne’s stories provided stark examples of 
these. 
 
Whose knowledges are valued and incorporated in this community? All of the 
stories re-presented in Chapters 5 and 6 featured discourses in which leaders 
possessed not only God-given authority, but also divinely revealed wisdom and 
knowledge. This notion is epitomised by the Man of God discourse, described in 
John’s and Lynne’s accounts. Other knowledge and experience was, by default, 
inferior to this supposedly God-given knowledge. In these discursive 
environments the knowledges and competencies of other members of the 
community were not valued. In the case of Andy, Sarah, and Martin (Chapter 7), 
rather different discourses were at work (discourses of successful leadership, the 
status quo, and church tradition), but each of them also described the 
marginalisation of their own knowledges and their view of ministry in particular. 
The women I interviewed described an additional layer of monologic 
positioning and subjugation of their knowledges due to gendered discourses which 
were pervasive in their communities. Both women and men related experiences of 
being “quarantined” within their communities—that is, being forbidden to use 
their knowledge and experience to help others—as a form of discipline and to 
protect others from being spiritually “contaminated” by their disobedience. 
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Exclusion and silencing related to sexual orientation do not feature prominently in 
the stories re-presented in this thesis. This theme is touched on by Lynne and 
Martin, and has certainly been present in stories I have heard in the course of my 
work, including the stories of heterosexual people who have been marginalised for 
accepting gay or lesbian others without judgment. 
 
Who may participate in the conversations and decisions of this community? 
Closely related to the kind of positioning which marginalises the potential 
contribution of a person’s knowledge and experience to their community is the 
question of who may participate in the conversations of the community, and on 
what terms. This is at the heart of Sampson’s contrast between monologic and 
dialogic power relations. It is also a key issue in Drewery’s (2005, p. 315) account 
of agency—“persons who are participants in the conversations that produce the 
meanings of their lives are in an agentive position”—and in Davies’ (1991) 
understanding of the discursive constitution of “presence” as access to a subject 
position in which a person has the right to speak and be heard. 
The participants recalled many instances of being thwarted in their attempts 
to enter into conversation with authority figures in their communities. For 
example, Jenny’s attempts to engage her pastor in dialogue were variously met 
with refusals, monologues and accusations of rebellion: “You could never actually 
have a conversation, because your point of view wasn’t actually valid. All that 
they were interested in as leaders was, were you submitting?” Although Sarah and 
Martin were in leadership roles which carried speaking rights, their voices too 
were muted by the interests of the dominant forces in their communities. As Sarah 
put it, “In the way that this power operated there was no discussion, and where I 
and others would be assertive, it would be shot down and criticised.” 
Other examples highlight the monologic character of decision making 
practices within the participants’ communities. Selina grieved the loss of the 
collaborative decision making processes of her community when a new leader 
came, claiming to be God’s man through whom God would give wisdom to the 
church. 
 
How is wellbeing conceptualised and performed within this community? Thinking 
again of Drewery’s notion of agentic positions as those in which people are able 
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to engage in “the conversations that produce the meanings of their lives,” it seems 
to me that one significant aspect of such conversations centres on wellbeing. To 
have one’s own wellbeing defined, and its conditions prescribed, without 
dialogue, is to experience a monologic form of positioning. 
A number of participants described gendered forms of such positioning. 
Lynne turned herself “inside out and upside down and back to front” in trying to 
be “the perfect wife,” having been told that the welfare of her marriage and the 
solution to her husband’s anger depended on it. This and similar examples 
illustrate a gendered version of the wider discourse of covering, which called 
people into positions of trusting submission to their leaders on the premise that 
this alone was where spiritual and physical wellbeing could be assured. An 
extreme expression of this positioning is evident in Jenny’s memory of fearing 
that, because she had strayed beyond the covering of her leaders, “God might 
actually kill me.” 
 
Having worked closely with the stories of the participants in this research, my 
clear sense is that the issue of monologic positioning is not merely one of a 
number of concerns. The experience of exclusion from participation in processes 
that affect the production of one’s own life is a recurring theme throughout all of 
the interview narratives. I regard this as a significant finding, because the issue of 
monologic versus dialogic positioning was not something that I focused on 
explicitly in my opening questions in the interviews. My questions were framed 
more broadly around the issue of resistance to religious authority, but the 
participants’ accounts of what it was that provoked them to resistance quickly and 
consistently turned to the issue of monologic positioning.  
 
ii The discursive construction of “serviceable others”  
As explained in Chapter 3 (section 3.4), Sampson (1993) introduces the notion of 
the serviceable other in relation to monologic forms of interaction: “Although you 
and I may converse together, in most respects the you with whom I am interacting 
has been constructed with me in mind” (p. 4). As Andy put it, his senior minister’s 
view of him and others seemed to be that they were “extensions of himself” and 
“just basically resources.” 
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Two aspects of the discourses traced in the interview narratives in relation 
to religious authority combine to give particular force to this serviceable other 
strategy of subjugation. First, as noted often in presenting my analyses of the 
participants’ narratives, to make an all-powerful God the ultimate point of 
reference in a hierarchy of authority ensures that the call to service will be very 
difficult to resist for a person who believes in such a God. This discursive strategy 
was well summarised by Bill when he observed that, for people in his church, 
leadership was perceived as “something to do with God’s authority on earth, and 
so challenging his authority on earth is like challenging God.”  
In a discussion with Foucault (1980, pp. 159–160), Perrot ponders the 
question of who occupies the central tower in Bentham’s proposed Panopticon: 
“Is it the eye of God?” Foucault argues that Bentham could not entrust the “eye of 
power” to any one person, since part of the intention was that “no one can or may 
occupy the role that the King had in the old system.” Within hierarchical 
discourses of religious authority, however, according to which a leader embodies 
God’s authority, Bentham’s purpose is both served and subverted. On the one 
hand, the all-seeing divine eye constitutes the ultimate motivation for constant 
self-surveillance. On the other hand, something like the divine right of the king is 
restored in the person of the Man of God. The subjugating force of this discursive 
technology is graphically illustrated in Lynne’s story. Despite holding particular 
ethical values around fidelity in marriage, she was too terrified to refuse her 
married leader’s demand that she be his sexual serviceable other, because, she told 
herself, “I have to obey the Man of God.” 
Second, and in tandem with notions of an all-seeing, all-powerful God, 
many expressions of the Christian tradition emphasise the importance of self-
sacrifice and serving others. This is strongly reinforced, as I observed in re-
presenting Bill’s story, by recourse to the example of Christ’s own self-sacrificial 
death. For women in some churches, there are additional gendered layers of social 
and religious discourse which construct their identities and relationships on the 
basis of submission and service. Despite her exposure to feminist discourse in 
earlier training, Jenny discovered in her new church that “being a Christian” 
implied taking on “dreadful things” that were taught about women “obeying” their 
husbands as “head of the house,” regardless of how they were treated by these 
men. 
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Referring to the paradigmatic examples of woman as other, and African-
American as other, Sampson (1993) argues that: 
The other is a figure constructed to be serviceable to the historically dominant 
white male group. In order to provide this service, the other cannot be permitted to 
have a voice, a position, a being of its own, but must remain mute or speak only in 
the ways permitted by the dominant discourse. . . . No real dialogue can be 
permitted to intervene, lest in permitting others to actually speak in their own 
terms, expressing their own point of view, the entire scheme of Western 
civilization would collapse. (p. 13) 
The participants in this project have all come from churches where “the 
historically dominant white male group” still holds the power. The dominance of 
this group is secured in the name of upholding a supposedly divinely ordained 
order of authority and submission, which is in turn necessary for spiritual and 
physical wellbeing. When people resist their positioning as serviceable others and 
try, however respectfully, to “speak on their own terms,” this order is threatened 
and often they are silenced (see below on disciplinary practices). In terms of the 
ethical stance I have outlined for this project, this construction and continued 
subjugation of serviceable others amounts to a refusal to admit the particular 
otherness of the other, and perpetuates “I–It” rather than “I–Thou” encounter 
(Buber et al., 1970). In Levinas’ (1999, p. 176) terms, this discursive strategy 
defaces the other, that is, prevents “the face of the other . . . from being 
recognised,” by assigning an “anonymous individuality,” which for Levinas is a 
precondition for totalitarianism. I am not suggesting that all (or even most) of the 
religious leaders featured in participants’ stories adopted this strategy with a 
conscious intention of gaining total control. Yet, whatever they believed their 
intentions to be, it can be seen how the twin aspects of dominant religious 
discourse outlined above—leaders’ divinely sanctioned authority and the call to 
self-sacrifice—construct authority structures in which a form of control with 
totalising tendencies is exercised. The next two technologies of subjugation show 
leadership moving in the direction of domination, through practices of entitlement 
and disciplinary power. 
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iii Discursive practices of entitlement 
Harré and van Lagenhove (1999) speak of positioning in terms of “ever-shifting 
patterns of mutual and contestable rights and obligations of speaking and acting” 
(p. 1). Some discourses strongly support the rights of dominant parties, while 
offering little contestability when it comes to the obligations placed on their 
serviceable others. Jenkins (2009), writing about male violence and abuse, 
suggests that discourses of competence, adequacy, and success in dominant 
masculine culture 
reflect values that promote conquest, acquisition, competition, ownership and 
entitlement to power and resources, without a requirement of responsibility for 
one’s actions and their consequences upon the welfare of others. Similarly, 
hegemonic ideas about male sexuality prescribe sexual entitlement and conquest 
without responsibility for the well-being of others. (p. 6) 
I include this description not simply to illustrate a general point about the 
discursive construction of entitlement (see also Nylund & Nylund, 2003; 
Winslade & Monk, 2008), but because it resonates with aspects of many of the 
participants’ stories. As noted in Chapter 2, the issue of sexual abuse by Christian 
leaders is widely reported, and dominates the literature on abuses of religious 
authority, but it is my contention that this is merely the codified and visible end of 
a spectrum of entitlement practices within religious contexts. I recall the following 
examples from the participants’ narratives in support of this claim. 
In her cross-cultural work, Cathy confronted a call to allow her husband to 
be “the best at language.” She recalled that, in the church, “if the women were 
stronger than the man, or more creative, or more up front—they were knocked 
back.” Cathy was not implying physical violence, but, as I noted in re-presenting 
her narrative, the metaphors she employed in describing the treatment of those 
who did not “toe the line” of submission were often violent in nature: “dealt to,” 
“bruised and battered,” and “bruised and confused.” Within the church, Cathy 
observed women who lived with violence in their homes being treated in ways 
that avoided the issue of their partners’ violence and located the problem within 
them (spiritually and emotionally). Selina had memories of feeling “awful” at 
having violated the “given order” of men’s entitlement to “hold the power” after 
bearing the brunt of her leader’s anger at her questions.  
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The rationalities which support a sense of entitlement in men, and in male 
leaders in particular, may produce violent attitudes toward other men, as well as 
toward women. Andy heard the language of entitlement in his senior minister’s 
words, and was aware of the potent mix of management discourse and theological 
ideas which supported it: “I’m sure he felt that somehow or other, that there—
along with the job—there was an entitlement to treat people the way he did . . . A 
God-given entitlement to treat people that way . . . A failure to respect him was a 
failure to respect God.” At times, Andy reflected, his meetings with this man were 
frightening: “You almost felt you were right on the edge of physical violence.” 
 Having highlighted patterns of entitlement at the less publicly visible end of 
the spectrum of violent practices of power within Christian communities, it 
remains to note again the more blatant theme of sexual entitlement which was 
evident in John’s and Lynne’s stories. I suggest that it is not coincidental that both 
of the leaders concerned were referred to as “the Man of God” within their 
communities, a title which embodies discourses of masculine and divinely 
sanctioned leadership. John recalled that when the international leader of the 
Exclusive Brethren was discovered in bed with the wife of a fellow leader, he 
“insisted that this was all above board, and that he had needs, and she would wash 
his feet, and things like that.” As I observed in re-presenting Lynne’s narrative, 
the highest levels of the hierarchy in The Fellowship operated according to a 
secret ethical code which apparently justified sexual exploitation and deception. 
There seems to be an echo of this in the Exclusive Brethren example also. The 
Man of God’s reference to the washing of his feet is an allusion to a biblical story 
about a woman washing Jesus’ feet, implying that his entitlement was supported 
by his elevated position in the Christ–Man of God–man–woman–child hierarchy. 
There is mention in both John’s and Lynne’s stories of the meeting of men’s 
“needs,” suggesting the presence of what Hollway (1989), in her study of gender 
and subjectivity, calls “the discourse of male sexual drive” (p. 54). The central 
proposition of this discourse is “that men are driven by the biological necessity to 
seek out (heterosexual) sex.” Hollway points out the wide range of effects which 
this discourse has “through the interpretation it puts on men’s conduct,” including 
the provision of a defence for exploitative sexual behaviour, as in the examples 
presented here. In Chapter 2, I noted Deans’ (2001) suggestion that in religious 
contexts women are often held responsible for men’s desires, while “men’s so-
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called ‘red-bloodedness’ is given cultural and religious acceptance” (p. 167). 
Morss (1996) and Burman (2008) critique the role of dominant psychological 
discourses of development in perpetuating such taken for granted ideas about 
male sexuality. 
In the words of Jenkins (2009), cited earlier, practices of entitlement are 
performed “without a requirement of responsibility for one’s actions and their 
consequences upon the welfare of others.” Practices of entitlement disregard the 
particularity of otherness, and perpetuate “I–it” encounter, thereby subverting 
freedom and justice as understood in the ethical discussion of Chapter 3. 
  
iv Disciplinary practices of power 
Several of the participants described disciplinary practices which met their efforts 
to resist being subjected to religious authority. In referring to discipline here, I 
have in mind both punitive practices, which tend toward domination, and the more 
subtle forms of subjectification and correction so thoroughly explored by Foucault 
(1973, 1977a, 1978). These two forms of disciplinary power correspond to the 
“old system” of centralised, monarchical power, and decentralised forms of 
“correct training,” which Foucault (1977a) characterises as a “modest, suspicious 
power” (p. 170). In his discussion with Perrot, referred to above, Foucault (1980) 
contrasts Bentham’s decentralised, panoptical approach to disciplinary power with 
the role of the king. 
It was implicit in the theory of monarchy that trust in the King was a necessity. His 
very existence, founded in God’s will, he was the source of justice, law and power. 
Power, in his person, could only be good; a bad King was either an accident of 
history or a punishment by God, the absolutely good sovereign. (p. 158) 
This is not simply a fine point of theory. My analysis of the participants’ accounts 
indicates that churches in which religious authority was buttressed with language 
such as “the Lord’s anointed” were drawing on texts from the Hebrew Scriptures 
concerning kingship. Similar ideas lie behind titles such as the Man of God and 
God’s man. As some of the interview narratives show, what Foucault says of 
kingship can be seen in operation in such discursive contexts, where power is 
vested in a pastor who leads by the will of God and is to be trusted and obeyed. 
This connects directly with the preceding discussion of practices of entitlement. It 
also offers an alternative to purely psychological accounts of the angry, 
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threatening responses some of the participants encountered when they questioned 
or challenged their leaders. 
At the same time, aspects of Foucault’s descriptions of decentralised 
techniques of disciplinary power remain applicable to some of the participants’ 
stories. As noted above with regard to the panoptical principle—the hegemonic 
gaze—it is not difficult to see how belief in an all-seeing God constructs a sense 
of living within a “permanent and continuous field” of surveillance (Foucault, 
1977a, p. 177). The effectiveness of this strategy is reflected in the internalised 
forms of self-surveillance reported by some participants, such as not permitting 
oneself even to think “no” (Jenny).  
As noted in Chapter 3, Foucault’s (1977a) discussion of technologies of the 
soul, including pastoral care and the confessional, is also particularly relevant to 
this project. Hook (2003) explains that disciplinary power for Foucault both 
objectifies individuals, by making them the objects of categorial knowledge, and 
subjectifies them in the sense of producing subjectivity according to such 
knowledge.  
It is in this sense that one can understand Foucault’s (1982) deliberate ambiguity in 
speaking of how disciplinary power produces ‘subjects’: subjects, that is, both in 
the sense of being subject to control, and in being tied to their own identity through 
self-knowledge or conscience. . . . To exist in this way, between the objectifying 
norms of disciplinary knowledge, and the subjectified production of self-
knowledge, is to exist in relationship of continual self-problematization, or 
disciplinary normalization. (p. 611) 
Objectifying practices are evident in the participants’ accounts of being named 
(categorised) by their leaders when they were perceived to have stepped “out of 
line” with terms such as “rebellious,” “under deception,” or “Jezebel.” For Martin, 
the process of laicisation was a powerful act of re-categorisation performed on 
him by the structures of his Church. Although such practices were clearly 
unwelcome and at times painful for the participants, it seems to have been the 
subjectifying processes of disciplinary power which were most effective in 
binding them to their communities (despite the tensions that often existed between 
these processes and the ways in which the participants hoped to produce their 
lives as ethical subjects). I am thinking here of the ongoing processes of self-
knowledge and self-problematisation, connected with self-surveillance under the 
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eye of God, to which Hook refers. These are evident in the participants’ stories in 
a variety of forms: a sense of guilt at having critical thoughts, feelings of fear in 
stepping out from the covering of submission to leaders, a sense of loyalty and 
duty toward a “fatherly figure,” fear of “upsetting God,” anxiety concerning 
eternal salvation, the need to confess “impurity,” a desire to please and be useful 
to God, internalised responsibility for the wellbeing and behaviour of others 
(husbands in particular), a belief that if leaders (or husbands) acted badly what 
mattered was a godly response (forgiveness and unquestioning submission), 
feeling wrong for having upset a male leader, a desire to be gracious/conciliatory 
rather than challenging when questioning leaders, and a sense of being called to 
serve God in Christian ministry. 
It could be argued that the most significant aspects of the processes of 
subjectification are those which produce a person’s sense of being, not merely as 
an individual, but as a social being who has a place of belonging. Earlier in this 
chapter, I suggested that the question of “who may belong” is fundamental to 
genuinely dialogic participation in community, and that this question was of vital 
ethical concern to several of the participants. Davies et al (2006) highlight the 
vulnerability which this aspect of subjectification produces for the human subject: 
I see the way in which this kind of subjecthood is granted, and I therefore also see 
how, on other occasions, it might not be granted—to me, to anyone. I see my 
attachment to it, I see my dependence on it and thus my vulnerability to it. . . . The 
subject is always vulnerable to the possibility that the terms of its conferred 
existence might be disrupted by the withholding of recognition, or some kind of 
sudden break in the certainty of belonging (p. 96). 
 This underscores the particular force of the final form of disciplinary power I 
want to note, most often experienced as exclusion or being “withdrawn from.” 
These experiences, or the threat of them, feature in a number of participants’ 
stories, but John’s account of life in the Exclusive Brethren described a highly 
developed disciplinary strategy of separation and exclusion. As explained in re-
presenting John’s narrative, members were generally born into the movement, and 
so identity was defined by belonging. The founding premise of the movement 
(reflected in the term “Exclusive”) was separation from evil, and to be outside of 
the community was to be in doubt of salvation. To be excluded, or even 
withdrawn from, was therefore a fearful prospect. In order to minimise the risk of 
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this happening, members were required to confess all possible misconduct to their 
leaders, who would decide what degree of public confession and temporary 
separation might be warranted. As noted in re-presenting John’s story, he looked 
back on this primarily as “a big opportunity [for leaders] to get power over 
people.” It was an effective technique. Rather than risk exclusion from the 
movement as a result of being contaminated by his “sin,” John’s wife pre-
emptively separated from him, taking their children with her. 
 
I turn now to technologies of hegemony. How is the persistent hegemony of the 
discourses which produce subjugated subjects in Christian communities to be 
accounted for? This question reflects my longstanding perplexity at the way 
biblical calls to freedom and justice are persistently subverted in many Christian 
communities.  
 
v Mutually-reinforcing discourses of authority and submission 
According to Foucault, power is maintained and transmitted by all who participate 
in social organisations, according to their common discursive positioning, whether 
or not they occupy recognised positions of authority. The discourses of covering 
and submission, which I have traced in various forms in several of the 
participants’ stories, provide a striking example of how this works. According to 
these discourses, spiritual wellbeing is contingent on remaining in submission to 
leaders’ God-given authority. This doctrine is preached by those who hold such 
authority, and remaining under their covering includes an acceptance that what 
they teach is God-inspired. This constitutes a self-reinforcing discursive loop 
which holds people in subject positions of credulity and compliance, thus 
entrenching the continued authority of their leaders, and the espoused theology of 
covering, within the community. 
As most of the participants’ narratives demonstrate, people can function as 
vehicles of hegemonic discourse in this way, and at the same time be positioned 
with values which are in tension with that discourse. Yet despite this discursive 
tension, repeated inscription by the dominant discourses of the community calls 
them back into subject positions of compliance, which in turn makes them 
available for further inscription as subjects. Bill’s account, cited in Chapter 5, 
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illustrated the persistent influence on him of the dominant discourses of his 
community, even after time away for theological education: 
I did maintain some level of independent thinking and ability to sort of . . . to make 
my own decisions and opinion. But on the other hand, I was quite absorbed into 
that community’s belief system, I suppose, at a young age. 
Lynne spoke of her indoctrination into The Fellowship as “a form of 
brainwashing.” Despite economic and vocational successes in her earlier life, the 
discourses which supported belief in her leaders’ divinely given insights 
constructed a different narrative which marginalised knowledge of her own 
competence: “they start to make you think that your life was, you know, terrible.” 
She described her own sense of powerlessness and moral conflict as she 
performed the dominant discourse of authority within the community, which 
required her submission to the Man of God. 
Within Foucault’s power/knowledge paradigm, the members of the 
relational networks within a social organisation, as well as those in authority, help 
to police one another when it comes to maintaining the truth regimes of the 
community. This was strongly evident in the stories of John and Lynne. Both of 
them gave accounts of being scrutinised and admonished by fellow members of 
their communities. Both experienced the loss of their marriage relationships as the 
cost of their resistance to religious authority. Other participants spoke of the 
prospect of losing of relationships, or abandoning vulnerable others, as a 
significant factor in their reluctance to leave their communities. As Andy put it, 
“nobody flees from the prison camp, because we can’t live with ourselves for 
deserting our comrades.” 
 
vi Personal identities are subsumed under community narratives 
Poststructuralist accounts of subjectification, the processes by which the dominant 
discourses of a community inscribe particular ways of being on subjects, help to 
shed further light on the hegemony of certain discourses of religious authority. In 
noting earlier the disciplinary power of separation and exclusion, I highlighted the 
vulnerability of subjects whose personhood and belonging are conferred and 
recognised within the terms of the dominant discourses of their communities. 
According to Butler’s (1997) discursive account of subjectification in terms of 
mastery and submission, outlined in Chapter 3 (section 3.2), subjects are 
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vulnerable to subjugation because they are bound to seek recognition of their 
existence outside of themselves, in the “categories, terms, and names” of the 
dominant discourses of their contexts (p. 20). The dominant discourses of a 
community therefore become embedded in the fabric of communal relationships 
and narratives, and individual identities are in turn bound up with these. The 
vulnerability which this produces for subjects is captured by Butler in this concise 
statement, cited already in Chapter 3: 
If the terms by which “existence” is formulated, sustained, and withdrawn are the 
active and productive vocabulary of power, then to persist in one’s own being 
means to be given over from the start to social terms that are never fully one’s own 
(p. 28). 
In any social context, for an individual to think of challenging the dominant 
discourses of the community, or of leaving the community, exposes this 
vulnerability. In some religious contexts this vulnerability is intensified. Where 
the ultimate Other who confers existence is considered to be God, and where this 
divine recognition is mediated by those who represent God, then to step away 
from the community and its leaders may be a frightening prospect. This fear may 
be magnified further when discourses of separatism construct the world beyond 
the community as a place of danger and deception. 
As an immigrant to New Zealand, Jenny stumbled on a community of 
people who “had a whole language and a whole way of being that was totally 
different.” These differences included “dreadful” patriarchal language and 
practices. “I struggled with it, Jenny recalled, “but I was a stranger in a foreign 
land. . . . So I sort of immersed myself.” Later, she found that the practices of 
religious authority in this church were calling aspects of her personhood into 
question: “Who I was before God wasn’t acceptable.” Yet, when Jenny 
contemplated leaving the church, she feared that to do so would mean walking 
away from the God on whom her life and identity depended. As she put it, “I 
couldn’t see that there was actually a difference.” For Martin, the theology of the 
Roman Catholic Church had constructed an identity for him, as an ordained priest, 
in terms of ontological identification with Christ. Unsurprisingly, Martin’s 
lifelong inscription by this theology meant that the prospect of leaving the 
priesthood dramatically affected his sense of spiritual and vocational identity, 
sending him for a time “into a kind of spiritual black hole.” 
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vii The positioning of leaders to view difference as trouble 
It is ironic that while the dominant discourses of religious authority in many of the 
participants’ communities called them into positions of loyalty and respect, the 
same discourses positioned those in authority to hear people’s questions, 
discomforts and alternative viewpoints as challenge, criticism or rebellion. This 
invited monologic and sometimes disciplinary responses on their part, rather than 
enquiry and dialogue, which in turn assisted the subjugation of alternative 
knowledges. In part, this pattern connects with notions of entitlement, and divine 
right, as outlined above. Discourses of religious authority, such as those that 
predicate spiritual wellbeing on submission, may also construct a sense of pastoral 
vigilance on leaders’ part, which again may produce disciplinary responses. 
Hook’s (2003) summary of Foucault’s idea of pastoral power (see Chapter 3, 
section 3.2) is strikingly pertinent to this point: 
The notion of the pastor, the leader as a shepherd in charge of a flock, has several 
basic constituents. Firstly, the shepherd’s role is to watch over his/her flock with 
scrupulous attention such that he/she will ensure their salvation through ‘constant, 
individualized . . . kindness’ (Foucault, 1988a, p. 69). Pastorship is a salvation-
based form of power predicated on the provision of love. Secondly, given that the 
shepherd is an intermediary of a greater religious structure, unquestionable 
authority comes to characterize his/her leadership, just as total obedience and 
absolute dependence characterizes the flock’s relationship to him/her. Thirdly, the 
pastor bears the responsibility for the destiny of the flock, and is bound by a 
particularly complex moral tie to each member. (p. 617) 
A particularly patriarchal expression of this “scrupulous attention” is seen in the 
way several female participants spoke of having been warned that their efforts to 
ask questions or challenge authority showed that they were under the influence of 
spiritual evil. No doubt the discursive construction of such warnings was 
complex. Those who gave them may have been positioned by discourses of 
pastoral responsibility, as described by Hook. But historical and religious 
discourses concerning women’s vulnerability to deception, and the proper place of 
women in relation to male leadership, can also be traced in the participants’ 
accounts of these experiences. Young-Eisendrath and Wehr (1989) write of the 
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marginalisation of women’s experience and ways of knowing in worldviews 
which are dominated by male approaches to knowledge: 
Female experiences and realities have been objectified by male observers, cast into 
an “otherness’ that is alien, exotic, remote, subversive, submissive, or silent. Their 
validity cannot inherently make sense because the independent male thinker reveals 
the female person as unknown. (p. 120) 
For many of the participants, it was more than ironic that they should be treated as 
troublemakers when they were trying to raise issues in a respectful way. It was 
sad and hurtful. It was also a lost opportunity. In all cases, their accounts describe 
concerns and initiatives that were produced by a sense of care for others, 
including their leaders, and by the ethical hopes and intentions they carried for 
their lives and their communities. The dominant discourses of authority often 
positioned those leaders not only to see the participants’ efforts as trouble, but 
also to disregard the ethical hopes and intentions to which they bore witness. As a 
result, the hegemony of these discourses remained intact.  
Another expression of pastoral vigilance—equally effective in protecting 
hegemonic regimes—is seen in the quarantining practices described by some of 
the participants. In the separatist church movements described by John and Lynne, 
for example, salvation was assured only within the discursive and social 
boundaries of their communities. Any questioning of these boundaries inevitably 
therefore met a strong negative response, designed to protect community members 
from contaminating influences. The Exclusive Brethren practice of miscreants and 
their families being “shut up” was, to recall John’s explanation (Chapter 6),  in 
fact based on a law in the Hebrew Scriptures concerning infectious diseases 
within a household. Whatever pastoral motivation there may have been behind 
such quarantining practices, they were effective in producing a fear of being 
viewed as a nonconformist. John was afraid to name his concerns, even to his 
wife: “I tried once or twice, but I knew that if I was too vocal, she would dob me 
in.” 
In other communities too, participants who failed to “toe the line” recalled 
that other community members and friends were advised by their leaders not to 
have contact with them, as if their alternative ideas might be contagious. Cathy 
was warned to take her “hands off the women of the church.” Her partner Bill, 
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too, Cathy noted, was told not “to pray and touch anybody or do any sort of 
ministry stuff.” Why? Because they had “begun asking questions.” 
 
viii Taken-for-granted ways of knowing  
In many religious contexts, including those of the participants in this study, 
knowing and believing “the truth” are matters of central concern. This is 
especially so when it comes to religious adherents knowing the truth about God, 
and knowing the will of God. In many cases, the foundation of their religious 
beliefs and moral norms is assumed to be what their God has revealed (e.g. 
through the Bible, nature, church councils, divinely inspired insights, visions, or 
ecstatic utterances). Within this general picture, a variety of ways of knowing are 
operative. In some communities (such as those led by a Man of God), it is 
believed that God imparts knowledge through the leader(s) at the top of the 
hierarchy. In other cases, there may be a more collaborative model of knowing, 
according to which knowledge is confirmed as divine truth through consensus.  
As I have observed throughout this discussion, the claim to have access to 
divinely given truth skews the balance of power hugely in favour of the 
claimant(s). Attempts to make meaning of the hegemony of certain discourses and 
practices within Christian communities therefore need to pay close attention to 
taken-for-granted ideas about who has access to divine truth and how that access 
is maintained. In keeping with the monologic positioning described in many of the 
participants’ accounts (see i above), many of the ways of knowing described in 
those accounts were hierarchical and non-participatory in character. Most 
members of their communities, therefore, were not participants in the processes of 
knowing which produced the normative theological and ethical shaping of their 
lives.  
In Chapter 5, for example, I re-presented Cathy’s description of a 
“discussion”—concerning the plans she and Bill had to go to a certain theological 
college—which was foreclosed by the pastor’s definitive “words . . . that the Holy 
Spirit wasn't there.” She observed that in their community, “The beliefs were that 
they heard from God for you.” Selina recalled that her new pastor spoke and acted 
in ways that suggested, “I’m God’s man for here. God speaks to me before he 
speaks to anybody else. I know what’s necessary for this church and you guys 
don’t.” 
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While Andy and Sarah were not confronted by the same kind of “direct line 
to God” epistemology in their church communities, they too were called into 
positions of subjection within power relations which discounted their capacities to 
know what was best for their communities. Both spoke of how alien this was to 
their own preferred collaborative approaches to discerning direction with their 
communities. In Martin’s case it was Roman Catholic tradition and the higher 
echelons of its leadership which had decided the (non-)future of his calling as a 
priest. There was a stark contrast between this and the non-hierarchical, 
participatory approach to decision making which he subsequently observed in a 
community of Catholic sisters. That group was, Martin reflected, a “community of 
equals” with a “system of shared leadership.” 
Over time, then, the performance of religious authority in such contexts—
whether through leaders’ claims to divine revelations, the giving and hearing of 
sermons, the pronouncing and receiving of truth claims and moral directives, or 
guidance given in the name of God—both draws its power from, and through 
iteration (Derrida, 1988) establishes, taken-for-granted ideas about how truth is 
known, and by whom. 
 
ix Discursive support from the wider social context  
With reference to Foucault, Hook (2001) speaks of the “highly specific and 
idiosyncratic matrix of historical and socio-political circumstances, which give 
rise to, and are part of, the order of discourse” (p. 525). On this basis, Hook 
critiques approaches to discourse analysis which focus primarily on texts and 
language, and pay insufficient attention to their socio-historical milieu, including 
“the multiple institutional supports and various social structures and practices 
underlying the production of truth” (p. 526). Foucault (1980) himself argued for 
 analyses in terms of the genealogy of relations of force, strategic developments 
and tactics. . . . The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war 
rather than that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning (p. 114). 
By applying discursive narrative analysis to the participants’ accounts, I have 
sought to bring such “relations of power” to light, as well as the technologies 
which have enabled dominant discourses to maintain their hegemony under the 
appearance of “givenness” or “rightness.” I have also noted traces of dominant 
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discourses from participants’ wider social contexts which have aided the 
subversion of freedom and justice in their communities.  
In relation to gendered forms of positioning, for example, earlier training in 
counselling and social work had made Cathy and Jenny aware of the history of 
patriarchy in Western society, and both recognised this in their experiences of 
religiously framed calls to submission in their marriages. I noted earlier in this 
chapter discourses of male sexual needs and entitlement which were reflected in 
Lynne’s account of sexual abuse by the Man of God. Cathy acknowledged that 
lifelong exposure to discourses of male leadership within her family and society 
created difficulties for her as a woman when it came to questioning authority. As 
noted earlier, Selina readily connected her experience of male power in the church 
with her inscription by wider social discourse: “as a woman, you’re very aware 
that basically men hold the power in society.” To make a man feel threatened “is 
awful. . . . Because you feel that you are actually somehow going against the 
whole kind of given order.” 
In The Fellowship, Lynne encountered a form of exclusivism directed at gay 
and lesbian people. Again this was couched in religious terms, but provided a 
vehicle for homophobic practices of exclusion. In the authoritative practices 
which Andy experienced in relation to his senior minister he recognised the 
presence of discourses of management and success familiar from the rhetoric of 
his denomination, as well as business models, management theory and “high 
profile Pentecostal” styles of leadership. The discourses which decided Martin’s 
future were ultimately anchored in the historical traditions of the Roman Catholic 
Church, which in turn had their roots in ancient Greek philosophy, the Holy 
Roman Empire, and centuries of monastic life. 
 
Concluding comments 
Within Christian communities, how is it that some regimes of power and 
knowledge can subvert the call to freedom and justice which is pervasive in 
longstanding streams of Christian tradition? 
The discussion in this section has offered a range of insights which address 
this first research question. I have highlighted the construction of monologic 
subject positions and serviceable others, practices of entitlement, and disciplinary 
practices, as powerful discursive technologies of subjugation in the participants’ 
230 
communities. I have shown how such technologies gain considerable leverage not 
only from dominant social discourses of masculinity and leadership, but also from 
the religious language, metaphors, and notions of God (as all-seeing, all-knowing, 
exacting, and punitive) which are embedded in the dominant discourses of those 
communities. Finally, I have delineated five technologies which help to ensure 
that these discourses maintain their hegemony within Christian communities. 
Taken together, these nine technologies constitute an organic system of control 
which efficiently replicates its own discursive DNA, and inhibits resistance, 
deviance, and change. This helps to explain how readily the ethical imperatives of 
freedom and justice can be subverted in Christian contexts. 
 
8.3 Accounting for resistance 
The preceding discussion of discursive technologies of subjugation and hegemony 
gives further impetus to my second research question: “What has enabled some 
people to resist the practices of religious authority constructed by such regimes?” 
I address this question by identifying four relevant threads within my analysis of 
the participants’ accounts, and connecting these with the theoretical discussions of 
agency and resistance reviewed in Chapter 3. Again I draw on selected examples 
from the participants’ narratives. 
 
i The felt effects of subjugation and discursive contradiction 
Participants’ narratives of resistance invariably included striking descriptions of 
the effects on them of the ways in which they were being positioned by others, or 
of seeing others positioned in similar ways. Descriptions of these effects included 
the following (interrelated) aspects:  
Cognitive responses: confusion, disbelief, doubt, suicidal thoughts. 
Affective responses: shock, anger, sadness, powerlessness, fear, anxiety, 
intimidation, shame, withdrawal, flatness, depression, despair. 
Embodied responses: tears, sickness, pain, tiredness, outrage, desire to escape. 
Recourse to vivid images and metaphors: being asked to lie down in a shallow 
coffin, being crippled, being squeezed by a python, being damaged, being plunged 
into a black hole. 
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The points in the interview narratives where these descriptions were included 
often seemed to mark important stages in the participants’ storying of their 
movement toward resistance. So, part of the meaning which the narrators made of 
their resistance was that experiencing (and witnessing) the subjugating effects of 
the discourses and practices of religious authority in their communities had 
amplified a sense that something was wrong and needed to change. Cathy’s 
account of her embodied response to the way a woman in her church was treated 
by the pastor provides a clear example of this, with its references to being 
“shocked” and “wild” and “banging away” on the piano, leading then to, “I came 
to a point where I thought, ‘I’ve got to see him, I’ve got to confront him.’” After 
difficult conversations with her leaders, Cathy recalled, she became unwell. Again 
she regarded her bodily experience as “significant,” that is, as signifying things to 
her that required her to make a choice: “I had to make a choice, to carry on and 
grow in it, I suppose. It was a significant sickness.” 
In recalling a time when very restrictive conditions were imposed on 
people’s contribution to the life of her church, including her own involvement, 
Selina’s metaphorical description of the effects involved her body—it was like 
being asked to lie down in a shallow coffin—and included a strong sense that she 
would have to leave the church: “I don’t think I can fit my body in there.” 
After just one year in The Fellowship, Lynne recalled, there were times 
when her “whole body just wanted to run away.” The emotional effects produced 
by her leaders’ sexual demands were very powerful, and accompanied by a strong 
sense of wrongness, but fear and confusion left her paralysed and unable to resist: 
“I was just so absolutely frozen in fear and shock and horror that I could not for 
several months, as I said, comprehend.” Lynne noted that her eventual exit from 
the movement was sparked by what she observed in terms of the effects on her 
mind and body—she was becoming increasingly withdrawn, depressed, and 
suicidal. 
While this emphasis on embodied effects and knowledge was especially 
prominent in the female participants’ accounts, it was not absent from those of the 
male participants. Andy, for example, spoke of the effects of being under 
authoritarian leadership using the language of anger, outrage, being sick, tired, 
stressed, damaged, and abused. There was a period when these effects left him 
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feeling unable to resist, but eventually, he recalled, his mounting anger “got [him] 
going.”  
Without seeking to abstract a general theory from these recalled 
experiences, I suggest that they share some significant features which help to flesh 
out the theoretical reflections on agency and resistance offered in Chapter 3. First, 
it seems to me that the participants’ frequent mention of embodied effects 
(including strong affective responses) as an impetus to their resistance can be 
connected with an aspect of subjective experience which Weedon (1997) refers to 
as “distance.” Subjectification works “most efficiently,” Weedon argues, when the 
subject position offered is “fully identified by the individual with her interests” (p. 
109). Correspondingly, resistance is produced when there is distance between the 
position offered and the interests of the subject. These interests are discursively 
constituted, but because the subject has a memory, and an already discursively 
constructed sense of identity, she may “resist particular interpellations or produce 
new versions of meaning from the conflicts and contradictions between existing 
discourses” (p. 102). My analysis shows that when participants were called by 
others into subject positions which distanced them from important ethical 
intentions they held in producing their lives (interests), this distancing was often 
experienced in the body. According to Davies (2006), the constitutive effect of 
discourse resides “not just in language but in the affect of the material body” (p. 
90). This is consistent with the notion of embodied discursive inscription 
described in Chapter 3 (section 3.3). When people are called into subject positions 
within multiple and contradictory discourses, these contradictions—experiences 
of distance in Weedon’s terms—are registered in the body. 
Lynne was attracted to, and for several years subjugated by, The Fellowship 
because its rhetoric resonated with her interest in gaining knowledge that she 
could use to help others. She soon became aware of “distance” between other 
spiritual concerns she held (such as respect for difference) and some of the 
practices of authority within the movement, and this awareness was felt in her 
“whole body.” As that sense of distance increased she engaged in small acts of 
resistance, until a tipping point was reached that resulted in more significant 
resistance, culminating in her withdrawal from the movement. 
Davies (1991) suggests that people may struggle to change their positioning 
because of “the inscription in one’s body of the ways of being that are appropriate 
233 
to the subject positions usually taken up” (pp. 49-50). She offers a personal 
example of listening to a seminar on women’s exclusion from ordained ministry, 
and momentarily experiencing in her own body a re-inscription by an old 
patriarchal discourse: “It was . . . an extraordinary feeling to be reinscribed, even 
momentarily, as wrong, deformed, and as in error in seeking to position myself as 
a legitimate member of the public world” (p. 50). Positively, my analysis of the 
participants’ accounts shows that such experiences may also have effects on 
behalf of resistance. Deeply inscribed ways of being that reflect long held ethical 
interests, for example, may assert themselves in embodied experiences of distance 
(or discursive contradiction) which energise people for resistance and change. 
This was certainly evident in the way participants described their responses to 
prolonged experiences of monologic practices of religious authority. There may 
also be a resonance here with White’s (2007) therapeutic use of “distancing 
tasks,” which are intended to help clients achieve space from the immediacy of 
oppressive experiences. Questions which produce a sense of distance in this way 
can create space for clients to “play a more significant part in influencing the 
course of their own development and, in so doing, to more fully inhabit their own 
lives” (p. 275). 
A second aspect of the felt effects described by the participants which 
invites theoretical reflection concerns the moments at which their resistance 
became more overt or definitive. A number of the narratives showed that the felt 
effects of subjugation were present for some time before decisive acts of 
resistance occurred. My earlier discussion of technologies of subjugation and 
hegemony help to explain why such overt expressions of resistance may have 
been delayed. What was it that contributed to their emergence, despite such 
technologies? In some cases, as noted already, it was witnessing the way other 
people were being treated that participants pointed to as providing the final 
impetus for change. In Jenny’s account of what “tipped it” for her, an other-
centred sense of outrage at what was being done to “other people,” along with 
traces of a gendered discourse of self-denial which may previously have been 
holding her back, is evident: 
So it was more offence that impacts other people, probably, or stuff that he was 
saying about God, rather more than what he did to me. . . . It was only when I saw 
234 
his treatment of people—that tipped it for me. . . . I suppose that was hard evidence 
in front of my eyes. 
This pattern of a protracted period of subjugation eventually reaching a turning 
point is evident in several of the interview narratives. I suggest that Butler’s 
(1997) emphasis on the role of reiteration in producing both subjectification and a 
sense of agency is relevant here. 
If conditions of power are to persist, they must be reiterated; the subject is 
precisely the site of such reiteration, a repetition that is never merely mechanical.  
. . . The reiteration of power not only temporalizes the conditions of subordination 
but shows these conditions to be, not static structures, but temporalized—active 
and productive. . . . The perspective of power alters from what is always working 
on us from the outside and from the outset to what constitutes the sense of agency 
at work in our present acts and the future expanse of their effects (p. 16). 
Earlier in this chapter, in discussing technologies of hegemony, I drew on Butler’s 
(1997) argument that subjection exploits a longing for social existence, “where 
existence is always conferred from elsewhere” (p. 21). Butler suggests that this 
desire for existence leads people to embrace noxious and even injurious discursive 
positions: “I am led to embrace the terms that injure me because they constitute 
me socially” (p. 104). However, Butler argues, the process of subjection is never 
fixed: “a subject only remains a subject through a reiteration . . . and this 
dependency of the subject on repetition for coherence may constitute that 
subject’s incoherence, its incomplete character” (p. 99). This accumulated fraying 
of coherence through reiteration, Butler suggests, contributes to the possibility of 
agency and resistance, and eventually the subversion of the subjectifying power. 
In Lynne’s case, the more she subjected herself to repeated workshops and 
teaching sessions within The Fellowship, having been drawn into them by the 
“carrot” of promised benefits, the more she became aware that these amounted to 
only “a plastic carrot ... it just left a bad taste in my mouth and didn’t satisfy me.” 
The further she was taken into the inner sanctum of the hierarchy of leadership, 
the more troubled she felt by what she saw and experienced (including the period 
of sexual abuse she endured). Through reiteration, then, the experience of 
“distance” was magnified for Lynne, and the hegemony of The Fellowship’s ideas 
and practices of authority was undermined. 
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Jenny recalled that one of the effects of her repeated exposure to the 
teaching within her church was that certain key phrases began to stand out. “So 
those to me began to be keywords that I always felt suspicious, you know, when I 
heard them.” This growing awareness in turn produced questions as to the origins 
of these ideas, and these led to research which was ultimately “liberating.” 
The contribution of felt effects to the participants’ resistance is a thread 
which emerged strongly, and rather unexpectedly, in my analysis of their 
narratives. In the light of the theoretical reflections I have offered here, I suggest 
that this finding is significant, both in relation to my research question, and in 
highlighting such effects as observable indicators of distance between the actual 
practices of a community and the ethical hopes and intentions of its constituents. 
 
ii The resources found in alternative knowledges 
Many of the participants spoke of having recourse to alternative knowledges in 
resisting the subject positions offered to them. By alternative knowledges I mean 
knowledges which are not produced by, or at least do not serve the interests of, 
the dominant discourses which support authoritative practices within the 
participants’ communities. Foucault (1980) writes of an “insurrection of 
subjugated knowledges,” referring to historical knowledge which has been 
obscured, and also to “naive knowledges . . . local popular knowledges” (pp. 81-
82; emphasis in the original). His interest is in the role of subjugated knowledges 
in sabotaging the hegemony of “global, totalitarian theories” (p. 80; emphasis in 
the original). My interest is in the way participants’ alternative knowledges helped 
to produce and support their resistance to hegemonic discourses and monologic or 
dominating practices of religious authority. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the question of whose knowledges were 
recognised and incorporated within their communities was an aspect of the 
monologic positioning which formed a common and significant thread in 
participants’ narratives. If the felt effects of this positioning signalled to the 
participants that something was wrong (the experience of distance), and also 
energised their resistance, it was the “insurrection” of various forms of alternative 
knowledge which several spoke of as giving meaning to what was happening and 
what needed to happen. In practice, this was not described as an ordered or unified 
sequence of experiences. Often participants recalled times when they were 
confused and pulled in contradictory directions by competing position calls. But, 
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as shown in my re-presentations of their narratives, this fracturing of subjectivity 
itself helped to prepare the ground for resistance. 
Knowledges which functioned in this way for the participants included 
exposure to alternative discourses gained through personal research, study or 
training; narrative resources from other times and places in their lives; questions 
and perspectives which emerged through interaction with others; and embodied 
knowledge (connected with the embodied effects referred to above), together with 
intuitive or spiritual awareness. 
Knowledge gained through personal research, study or training. The 
theological training which Bill had undertaken before returning to the church 
community of his youth helped to make him aware of abusive “power-over stuff” 
that he had previously taken for granted as normal. This supported him in raising 
questions with the leaders about the way power was being used. John’s exposure 
to a wider discursive world through his studies at school and university raised 
many questions about the Exclusive Brethren’s claim that they held the truth 
while other churches and “the world” were wrong. Lynne’s persistent questioning 
of some aspects of the teaching of The Fellowship was a product of her 
upbringing in Christian contexts where the Bible was studied. Cathy and Jenny 
had training in counselling during the period of their involvements in their church 
communities. This again prompted questions as to the way religious authority was 
being used, especially in relation to vulnerable people in their communities. 
Cathy, Jenny and John spoke of doing their own research, to pursue their 
questions further, and to help shed light on ideas and practices that were troubling 
them. 
With the exception of Bill, who had spent eight years away from his church, 
it is interesting to note that in most of these participants’ accounts the alternative 
knowledges which they were gaining through study and research travelled 
alongside their formation as subjects within the dominant discourses of their 
contexts. These knowledges produced questions and troubled the hegemony of the 
dominant discourses, but this did not amount to outright insurrection. As I have 
argued, it was usually their experience of the felt effects of their own and others’ 
subjugation, along with the process of reiteration, which triggered participants’ 
decisive acts of resistance. Alternative knowledges helped to prepare the way by 
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magnifying the experience of distance, and provided a valuable resource when the 
time came to take a stand against the subjugating practices of authority. 
Narrative resources from other times and places in their lives. Here I have 
in mind the memories and stories which participants held in relation to their 
experiences beyond the church contexts where resistance occurred. When Cathy 
was called into the submissive position of “second place” as a woman, for 
example, she was able to draw on counter-stories of her own competence as a 
single woman working in a challenging context overseas: “I guess my experiences 
[there] showed me that I could do things.” The call to submission also brought 
forward memories of the felt effects of similar position calls in that earlier 
context—“I think I nearly had a nervous breakdown”—intensifying the influence 
of the effects she experienced in the church. The presence of these stories, and 
others, produced an eventually subversive multiplicity in Cathy’s subjectivity, in 
which she experienced a position call “to try and be the perfect wife, the perfect 
mother,” and at the same time a feeling of confusion as how this fitted with the 
memories of her life overseas. When a new leader introduced monologic practices 
of authority to Selina’s church, and claimed a divine mandate for doing so, Selina 
recalled her earlier experiences of inclusive, dialogic styles of leadership. She 
remembered these experiences as having been life-giving, in contrast to the effects 
she was experiencing under the new regime. 
Questions and perspectives which emerged through encounter with other 
subjectivities. Drawing on what Wittgenstein has to say about “participative 
thinking,” Shotter (2001) argues that any account of social change must include 
the importance of our “immediate, spontaneous, living responses to the others and 
otherness in our surrounding circumstances” (p. 343). This is a helpful reminder 
that, given the discursive production of subjectivity, it is important to notice not 
just the discourses in which a person may be positioned, but the webs of 
relationships and social transactions within which meanings emerge. This 
connects with my account of intertextuality and subjectification (Chapter 3, 
section 3.2). One person’s re-authoring of their identity or life narrative may 
disturb the ways in which others are positioned in their own discursive contexts.  
In giving an account of their resistance, several participants recalled 
significant encounters and conversations with others. Sometimes these others 
were outside of the participant’s religious community, and their encounters with 
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otherness invited the participants to see things from a different discursive 
perspective. John’s time at university not only exposed him to alternative 
academic ideas, but also to encounters with people who breathed otherness. He 
met an atheist who “seemed more like what I imagined Jesus would have been 
like than anybody else around,” and suggested authors whose ideas helped John 
see the Bible in a new light. Against the wishes of her leaders, Lynne visited her 
mother regularly. Without telling her what to do, her mother kept raising a 
question which eventually contributed to her decision to leave The Fellowship: “Is 
it going to get any better?” Martin’s relationship with Anna led to an enormous 
discursive upheaval in his life and vocation. His interactions with writers, priests 
from other denominations and a community of Catholic sisters all contributed to 
the emergence of new perspectives on the Church, his calling and his God. 
For other participants, it was conversations with others within their 
communities—people who shared their experiences of subjection—which helped 
to support their concerns and acts of resistance. I think here of the people who 
came to talk to Cathy and Bill about being “dealt to,” and of Andy’s leadership 
team who supported him, not to mention his talk of being “comrades” together in 
the “prison camp.” Andy’s use of these terms hints at a grim humour, shared 
under adverse circumstances. This touches on an aspect of corporate resistance 
which is described by Scott (1990) as the “hidden transcript” of resistance: “Every 
subordinate group creates, out of its ordeal, a ‘hidden transcript’ that represents a 
critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant” (p. xii). Such 
resistance is expressed in forms such as gossip, jokes, storytelling or excessive 
politeness, by which people help one another to see the cracks and contradictions 
in the supposedly unified, unassailable regimes of authority in their contexts. As 
Manki (2003) notes, acts of resistance can “take place on the very terrain of 
power/knowledge, they do not, as many critics have suggested, have to exist 
outside the regime of power” (p. 59). 
Embodied and intuitive/spiritual awareness. I have already drawn attention 
to the important place given to the embodied effects of subjugation in relation to 
the participants’ experiences of distance and associated turning points in their 
narratives of resistance. I highlighted the sign-ificance of these effects for several 
of the participants, who concluded that what they were experiencing in their 
bodies was a form of knowledge which deserved to be heeded and acted on. So, 
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for example, Cathy on several occasions used phrases such as “my gut, my whole 
body, is telling me there’s something wrong.” Lock and Strong (2010) note 
Merleau-Ponty’s view “that we are our bodies, and that our lived experience in 
this body denies a fundamental duality between subject and object, mind and 
body, etc” (p. 49). The world and consciousness “meet in our bodies,” so that the 
body seems to have an intelligence which is not directly available to 
consciousness or rational thought (p. 50). 
In a related way—or perhaps it is the same way expressed in different 
language—several participants emphasised the contribution to their eventual 
resistance of ways of knowing which might be described as intuitive or spiritual. 
After her house moving experience, for example, Jenny recalled thinking that 
“people were being kind to us, even though we’d done wrong.” At the same time, 
she was aware that “there was still a spark in me that knew we hadn’t.” On the 
one hand, the dominant discourse of covering produced knowledge of deviance 
and possible punishment by God. On the other hand, another kind of knowledge, 
attributed by Jenny to a God-given spark of awareness, contradicted the guilt and 
fear. There were times when she wanted to share such God-given insights with her 
leaders, when these were relevant to the life of the church, but usually they were 
not welcome. I concluded my presentation of Lynne’s story with her strong 
statement of intent to honour these forms of knowing in any future experience of 
authority: 
To . . . submit blindly without questioning is—I would like to think I would never 
be so stupid to . . . go against my, my, my inner gut, and go against my, my 
intuition, or my heart and my soul. 
The significant contribution of embodied and intuitive/spiritual forms of 
knowledge to participants’ acts of resistance is consonant with Davies’ (1991) 
emphasis on the value of non-unified, non-rational and unconscious ways of 
knowing. She argues that assertions of the rational over the irrational, and the 
conscious over the unconscious, are expressions of humanist and masculinist 
discourse. It was certainly the experience of several of the women I interviewed 
that their ways of knowing were at best discounted, and at worst labelled as 
dangerous. Their accounts confirm Davies’ suggestion that a different form of 
agency is found 
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by allowing oneself to be aware of the contradictions, the discursive constitution of 
the self as contradictory (by claiming rather than disowning the unconscious and 
the irrational elements of subjectivity), one may have access to powerful ways of 
being that are not the result of normative judgement from within the dominant 
discourses made by those positioned powerfully within them. (p. 45) 
It was not only the content of participants’ alternative knowledges which had the 
capacity to disrupt the hegemony of dominant discourses, but also the ways in 
which their knowing bypassed the hierarchical channel of knowledge held in 
place by the dominant discourses of authority. In presenting Jenny’s story, I 
referred to one of the insights she felt God had given her—a picture of how power 
and knowledge might function dialogically in the church. In this picture, no one 
person had the right unilaterally to tell others what God thinks or wants. Rather, 
knowledge was distributed within the community, and “if the person happens to 
say, ‘What about—?’  I could say, ‘Well, I think—’.” 
This discussion reinforces the reflexive insight with which I began this 
chapter: that people do not come to their involvements with their communities as 
blank slates, but with discursive histories which include experiences, knowledges 
and ethical intentions. The tenacity of the latter, despite prolonged experiences of 
subjugation, is the focus of the next point. 
 
iii The tenacity of ethical hopes and intentions 
In the previous section, I outlined four aspects of monologic positioning which 
were consistently at the heart of participants’ accounts of their struggles with the 
practices of religious authority in their communities. I showed how these 
contrasted with the ethical hopes and intentions which they held for their lives and 
their communities. I have already suggested that repeatedly experiencing the felt 
effects of their own positioning, and of witnessing the effects of the subjugation of 
others, not only amplified participants’ general awareness that something was 
“wrong,” but invited them to reflect consciously on what it was that was wrong. 
These repeated experiences therefore became opportunities for the participants not 
only to notice and reflect on the distance between their hopes and intentions and 
the ways in which they were being positioned, but also to renew their commitment 
to those hopes and intentions. In this light, resistance is more than just opposition, 
or a reaction, to something; it is, explicitly or implicitly, an affirmation of 
something else. This can be observed in several of the examples I referred to in 
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the earlier discussion of felt effects, including Cathy’s visceral response to 
witnessing violent forms of so-called ministry to women in the church. She 
recalled being shocked by the strength of that response. As she expressed the 
energy produced in her body, a clarity of cognitive awareness came to her as to 
what was wrong, ethically. This awareness was framed within the discourse of 
abuse, which was familiar to her from her work in the women’s centre. She also 
became aware of the action she needed to take on behalf of the women concerned, 
and on behalf of justice. 
A second way I account for the tenacity of the participants’ ethical 
intentions and hopes concerns their relationship to the texts, theologies, and 
spiritual practices in which they located the sources of these convictions. This 
again entailed a process of reiteration, not now through recurring acts of 
subjugation, which reiterated the dominant discourses of religious authority, but 
through repeated acts of hearing, reading, reciting, singing, ritualising, and 
praying texts in which themes of justice and freedom were embedded. There is no 
suggestion here of stepping outside of discourse, but of being produced within 
competing discourses, each of which contributes to the production of subjects 
through processes of “sedimented iterability” (Butler, 1995, p. 134). Added to 
this, I recall White’s (1990) notion of the indeterminacy which is at work in the 
reading of every text, especially in the presence of metaphor.  
The process of subjectification within a given network of power/knowledge 
is, Butler argues, 
open to resignification, redeployment, subversive citation from within, and 
interruption and inadvertent convergences with other such networks. “Agency” is 
to be found precisely at such junctures where discourse is renewed (p. 135). 
Both “subversive citation from within” and “interruption” were evident in the 
participants’ stories. An aspect of the dominant discourses in most religious 
contexts is the expectation that members of the community will engage in 
practices such as those I have named above. In Christian contexts this is often 
referred to as “liturgy.” In some churches, liturgy is formalised in prayer books 
and rituals, while in other churches practices vary from one occasion to another. 
In most of the churches to which the participants belonged, it is likely that people 
were also encouraged to engage in private spiritual practices, such as reading the 
Bible and praying, as well as joining in corporate practices in church services. The 
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intention of regular immersion in liturgical practices is undoubtedly to do with the 
formation, that is, the subjectification, of worshippers within the particular 
dominant religious discourses of the community. But the effects can be subversive 
of this subjectification when the texts involved embody not only discourses which 
inscribe submissive ways of being, but also material which resonates with the 
ethical intentions they have for their lives. This shows again how the possibilities 
of producing one’s life with agency, that is, authority, are magnified through 
encounter with discursive complexity. This subversive potential of liturgical texts 
evokes Derrida’s (1997) idea of deconstruction as the creation of space for the 
emergence of new or suppressed meanings which are to be found in the midst of a 
powerful dominant discourse. 
I speculate that this liturgical process of reiteration was a factor in all of the 
participants’ resistance, whether or not it was associated with technologies of 
subjugation. This is evident in several of their narratives. John looked back with 
fondness to his early memories of Exclusive Brethren meetings where the Bible 
would be read and interpreted by the community, rather than by one person as 
happened later. Under the latter regime, he continued to read and reflect on the 
Bible for himself, with the result that he saw the increasing separatism in the 
movement as “getting right away from what Christianity is all about.” Similarly, 
Lynne’s knowledge and reading of the Bible led her to ask questions about the 
teaching and practices of The Fellowship, on behalf of her own values of healing 
and compassion, 
hoping desperately that they’d come around, and they’d actually see that, you 
know, we are to look after the weak people, and we are to help the sick people. . . . 
And so I was desperately trying and trying and trying and trying and trying to get 
them to actually behave according to the standard of the compassion of Jesus. 
Sarah spoke of being supported through her difficulties with the “power sector” in 
her church texts from the Bible and in particular an “awareness of justice.” As 
Andy engaged in silent prayer in an empty church, he called to mind the biblical 
story of the exodus, a narrative of liberation. This supported his hope that his and 
others’ experiences of injustice and domination by his senior minister would one 
day come to an end. Participation in an Easter service, with its themes of death 
and resurrection, marked the day of decision to leave his church and not return. As 
noted at the end of Chapter 7, the experience of an Easter service was significant 
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for Martin also, in enabling him to reimagine his vocation as a priest, rather than 
allowing the dominant discourses of his tradition to invalidate that vocation 
altogether. His own words, framed in the language of his tradition, offer a 
theological restatement of the point I have been making in relation to the potential 
for liturgical practices to support resistance:  
The sacraments are powerful sources of grace; of God’s presence coming into 
people’s lives, setting them free, and helping them to grow. 
 
iv “Lines of flight” toward life 
The final perspective I offer in accounting for the participants’ resistance is more 
speculative in nature than those considered so far. It concerns the language of life 
and death which featured in some of the participants’ stories and is noted in my 
discussion of the felt effects of subjugation. Death was named, in almost 
premonitory terms, as a feared spiritual or metaphorical consequence of accepting 
complete subjugation. In contrast, life was named by several participants as being 
God’s purpose for human beings, and located in freedom from subjugation. In that 
light, acts of resistance to subjugation are an implicit affirmation and expression 
of a desire for life. In re-presenting Jenny’s story in Chapter 5—Jenny who feared 
that God might kill her for her rebelliousness—I cited her concluding reflection 
on what she considered to be of greatest importance. It bears repeating here: 
I mean if the power of God is life, you know? And joy. And love. And all that 
stuff. . . . Well then, it isn’t evident in that system of thinking. . . . Like the other 
day . . .  I was walking—I go walking in the morning—and there was a solid 
concrete or tarmac pavement, and there was a crack. And this plant was growing 
up? That’s it, isn’t it? Life will overcome. 
Weedon’s idea of distance, experienced in the body, and Butler’s and Davies’ 
emphasis on subjects’ vulnerability to the withholding of recognition of their 
existence, help to make meaning of the negative effects of subjugation and the 
fear of a kind of death. However, I wonder if they offer an adequate account of the 
visceral terror reflected, for example, in these words of Selina’s, again cited in 
Chapter 5: 
I get very nervous if I feel that anybody’s telling me what to do. I mean, I have an 
irrational, you know, response to that—reaction to that. . . . For me it’s just sheer 
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survival. It is just trying to be able to—I’ve been haunted for decades by this 
enormous sense of annihilation, you know, that I will actually cease to exist, which 
was very frightening and very powerful. 
Equally, I wonder if purely discursive accounts of subjectivity and subjectification 
satisfactorily explain the euphoric sense of freedom and joy which characterised 
some participants’ accounts of leaving the contexts which they had found to be so 
oppressive. For example: 
We both got in the car and drove far enough away from the church, and just went, 
“Yes!” You know? We both came away just, just very, very happy with the 
decision we made. It was an incredible sense of release (Cathy). 
I thought, “Oh, we haven’t got a covering!” You know? . . . It was amazing! It was 
beautiful! It was like, “Wow!” (Cathy) 
I remember really clearly walking down the central aisle of the church, and as I 
stepped outside, it was like this explosion in my head. I physically felt the freedom 
of it. It was like I went—whoah! It was physical. It was—it shocked me. I 
physically felt this great weight, this huge weight, lift right off my head, and it was 
just like a total like clear sky straight up to God. And all this garbage just gone. It 
was amazing! (Selina). 
We never went back. We never went back. It was just such a relief to be 
somewhere where they hadn't lost the plot! (Andy) 
In raising questions about the adequacy of purely discursive accounts for these 
recalled experiences, I am not at all arguing for a return to humanistic notions of 
an essential “true self” which must find autonomy for full self-actualisation. 
Sampson (1993) and others have shown that such autonomy is illusory and often 
predicated on injustice. Nor am I suggesting that the meanings attributed to these 
experiences, or the words used to describe them, are anything but discursively 
constructed. Harré and Gillett (1994) acknowledge the importance of felt 
physiological states in relation to emotion, but note that these are “diffuse and 
indeterminate” (p. 150). Meaning is attributed to such states, and communicated 
to others, through socially produced displays, vocabulary, and social actions. 
Without wanting to make universal or essentialist claims about human nature, I 
want to observe the strong connection in several of the participants’ accounts 
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between the physical character of their reported experiences and what was 
experienced as a deeply felt need to retain the capability of acting and making 
decisions for the production of one’s own life. 
Intent on avoiding any notion of interiority, Foucault’s subject, according to 
Bell (2006), is “co-extensive with his or her outside” (p. 214). In other words, 
“what is readable on the body is only ever the embodiment, momentary if 
seamlessly reiterated, of forces that emanate from without” (p. 215). Butler 
(1997), however, notes an ambiguity in what Foucault says about the body. 
Although Foucault wants on occasion to refute the possibility of a body which is 
not produced through power relations, sometimes his explanations require a body 
to maintain a materiality ontologically distinct from the power relations that take it 
as a site of investment. Indeed, the term “site” seemingly appears in this phrase 
without warrant, for what is the relation between the body as site and the 
investments which that site is said to receive or bear? (pp. 89-90; emphasis in the 
original)  
Butler develops these observations by theorising the psychic life of persons, but I 
want simply to stay with the notion of a materiality which is “ontologically 
distinct” from the embodiment of power relations. Nothing can be said about this 
materiality, and no meaning can be attributed to it, which is not discursively 
constructed. Nor can it be known in any direct sense, unmediated by discourse. 
Yet it seems to me that the discursive idea which people call “life,” and which 
they attribute to various forms of materiality, human and otherwise, names an 
autopoietic entity which tenaciously resists extinction, reproduces itself, and seeks 
out the conditions of its own flourishing wherever possible. If these strategies 
exert themselves through human bodies which are also, in Foucault’s terms, 
“sites” of discursive production, then an aspect of resistance is introduced which 
is a response at a physiological level to a perceived threat to one’s existence as a 
living, choosing subject. The perception and the naming of such a threat is 
discursively produced and communicated (as in Selina’s “shallow coffin” or 
“enormous sense of annihilation”), but I suggest that the response of the body to 
such threats, or to the cessation of danger, might usefully be considered within 
this larger “life” perspective, in connection with an analytics of discourse, power 
and subjectivity. 
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At this point, the work of Deleuze helpfully complements that of Foucault. 
While there are many points of agreement between Deleuze and Foucault, there 
are also differences which bear on this study of power and resistance. Whereas 
Foucault offers an analysis of the way in which power and discourse operate at the 
micro-level of subjects, Deleuze’s (1988) interest is in the operations of desire, 
and of “Life,” on a macro-scale (p. 100). According to Colebrook (2006), “This 
radical sense of life—the life that is not that of the bounded organism with its own 
life—is what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the ‘body without organs’” (p. 2). 
The impetus for life and becoming does not originate with individual beings, but 
rather acts through things, including persons. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) speak 
metaphorically of the “rhizomatic” movement of becoming: open, productive, 
bifurcating, non-directed, networked processes. These processes are sometimes 
blocked or territorialized, and this is where power becomes visible as stratification 
and sedimentation (Seigworth, 2005, p. 187). On the other hand, Deleuze, with 
Parnet (1987), writes of “lines of flight” which disrupt this stratification, allowing 
for new possibilities and rhizomatic connections (p. 125). Bell (2006) construes 
such lines of flight as “a movement of creativity” toward life, and sees this as a 
balance to a purely co-extensive view of the subject: 
What has been, if not denied, then bracketed, namely the creativity of things, their 
self-activity, indeed the very insistence of life, is put back into the frame. (p. 217) 
In developing an ethic of freedom and justice in Chapter 3, I cited Winslade’s 
(2009) reflections on the insistence of life, and even the presence of joy, in 
Deleuze’s reading of Foucault. For Deleuze, Foucault writes with “the joy of 
wanting to destroy whatever mutilates life” (p. 337). Returning to the focus of this 
project, and my ethical intentions in pursuing it, there are rhizomatic connections 
here with my own desire to contribute to the subversion of “whatever mutilates 
life” within Christian communities. There is a connection also with the final story 
presented in Chapter 7, and Martin’s reflection on what it was that he resisted in 
the circumscriptions of his Church: “I think I’ve come to see that Christian life is 
more than anything about the letting be of being.” 
Winslade (2009) also draws parallels between Foucault’s focus in his later 
work and that of Michael White in his narrative practice. Transposed from the 
therapeutic realm to the religious contexts in which I work, his words speak 
eloquently for my own ethical intentions and hopes in this work: 
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Like Foucault himself, [White] travels through the impasse where power produces 
a sense of dark outrage at the presence of injustice to an experience of the effect of 
power producing a consciousness of the spiritual struggle for freedom from its 
influence, a struggle that might be pursued along a line of flight to some new 
territory of living and of therapeutic practice. (p. 338) 
 
Concluding comments 
My second research question was: What has enabled some people to resist the 
practices of religious authority constructed by such regimes? 
The speculative perspective outlined in the immediately preceding 
discussion suggests that resistance may be viewed not simply as a subject’s 
mechanical response to the action of power, but as an outcome of “the insistence 
of life,” in Deleuzean terms. From that perspective, acts of resistance which occur 
at junctures where processes of becoming have been blocked and territorialised 
are “lines of flight” toward life. For me, this adds richness to the Foucauldian 
account of resistance, and offers a way to describe the visceral experiences of 
relief and joy which may occur when impasses to life are broken through. 
To move from Deleuze’s “body without organs” to particular embodied acts 
of resistance by the participants in this study has, however, required a more 
nuanced account than this macroscopic picture provides. My discussion in this 
section has highlighted the important role played by the felt effects of subjugation 
in stories of resistance. Participants identified their awareness of these effects—in 
themselves and in others—as a significant catalyst in their movement toward 
resistance. I have suggested that these effects may be viewed as embodied 
indicators of the distance between subjects’ ethical interests and the ways in 
which they were being positioned within the dominant discourses of their context. 
The reiteration of subjugating position calls has the potential to amplify awareness 
of this distance, and to bring it to conscious cognitive realisation. This realisation, 
together with the energising quality of some embodied effects, seemed to lead to a 
turning point, where a person’s ethical interests became more significant in the 
production of their subjectivity than the interests exploited by the strategies of 
subjugation. 
In line with Foucauldian theory, the insurrection of alternative knowledges 
has also been shown to contribute significantly to participants’ resistance to 
248 
subjugating practices of authority in their communities. Knowledges gained 
through training, research, experiences in other times and places, participatory 
meaning making, embodied awareness, and intuitive/spiritual insights have the 
potential to shed new light on what is happening, disrupt unified subjectivities 
through contradiction, and subvert hegemonic truth claims. 
Finally, participants’ courageous acts of resistance bear testimony to the 
tenacity of the ethical interests and hopes which they held for the production of 
their lives individually and in community. I have argued that this tenacity was 
supported by a twofold process of reiteration: repeated experiences of monologic 
positioning provoked a renewed awareness of the ethical hopes which they 
initially held, while liturgical practices with cognitive, affective, and physical 
aspects entailed recurring exposure to themes of freedom and justice.
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Chapter 9: Concluding reflections 
 
Disturbed by people’s stories about their experiences of religious authority in 
Christian communities, I embarked on this study in the hope of shedding light on 
two questions: 
i Within Christian communities, how is it that some regimes of power and 
knowledge can subvert the call to freedom and justice which is pervasive in 
longstanding streams of Christian tradition? 
ii What has enabled some people to resist the practices of religious authority 
constructed by such regimes?  
Pre-modern approaches to problematic practices of religious authority viewed 
them as lapses of moral and spiritual character, best dealt with behind the closed 
doors of the church. Modern analyses considered the issues in terms of 
deficiencies and/or pathologies, which were evaluated according to professional, 
psychological and theological paradigms. Both pre-modern and modern 
approaches showed little regard for the role of taken-for-granted ideas and vested 
interests in the wider church and social culture in constructing the problem. 
Feminist analyses of the historical, cultural, and theological roots of the 
oppression of women in Christian communities have spoken into that gap.  
My intention in undertaking this study was to complement the work done by 
feminist critics by considering oppressive practices of religious authority that 
affected men as well as women, and to account for stories of resistance to such 
practices—an issue which has received less attention in feminist discussions of 
religious contexts. I argued that a poststructuralist conceptual framework was well 
suited to the task of analysing the complex relationships between ideas, language, 
interests, power relations, and individual subjectivities. By developing a research 
methodology based on this framework, and applying it to local stories of 
resistance to religious authority, I hoped to show how problematic practices of 
authority were socially constructed, and to shed light on how resistance to these 
practices was produced. A further intention in addressing both research questions 
was to contribute to efforts to develop Christian communities in ways that 
support, rather than subvert, freedom and justice. To that end, I decided to include 
the re-presentation of key aspects of the participants’ narratives as a central 
feature of my methodology. In addition to making available the results of my 
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analysis, my hope was that foregrounding the participants’ own accounts of what 
had happened in their communities might itself be a contribution to change. 
In light of these hopes and intentions, I now briefly assess the strengths and 
limitations of my research design and name the significant contributions of this 
study. 
  
9.1 Reflections on the research design 
The decision to approach this study by means of interviews, rather than a purely 
literature-based thesis, produced the outcomes for which I had hoped. The range 
of participants which emerged from the selection process resulted in a rich 
diversity of stories to analyse. In developing my methodology, I reflected on the 
argument that a focus on personal narratives and subjectivities would distract 
attention from the historical and cultural production of power relations—repeating 
the weakness of the modern approaches I had critiqued in Chapter 2. In the early 
stages of my analysis, I did find myself being captivated by the stories. But as I 
persisted with further iterations of analysis, the discursive aspects became clearer 
and more incisive. The ongoing challenge was to maintain a focus on the 
discourses which had produced the narratives, and the events recalled in the 
narratives, as the subjects of my analysis, rather than the narrators and their 
affecting stories. 
One limitation of the methodology that I designed for this project was 
acknowledged and discussed in Chapter 4 (section 4.2), under the heading, “A 
note on excluded voices.” The decision not to include interviews with church 
leaders about their experiences of exercising authority, or of having people resist 
their authority, was intentional. I outlined the practical reasons for this in the 
earlier discussion. To conduct such a study in the future would bring fresh insights 
in relation to my research questions, and would helpfully complement the present 
study. However, I do not consider that this limitation undermines the validity of 
the findings of this thesis, nor does it detract from their significance. 
In hindsight, it would have been valuable to include a brief follow up 
interview with each participant, in relation to gender. Without the opportunity for 
this kind of meta-reflection, I have found it difficult to assess what effects gender 
may have had in the co-production of the interview narratives. The fact that I 
didn’t see this as important at the time invites me to reflect on how I was 
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positioned to regard a research interview as an ungendered process. It was, I 
suspect, an instance of the disembodied form of knowing sometimes referred to as 
“the universalizing male gaze” (Sampson, 1993, p. 8). Sampson contrasts this 
with Code’s (1991) call to see knowledge as “both embodied—recognizing, 
therefore, that a person’s sex is important—and built upon an interpersonal rather 
than an isolated and abstract point of view” (p. 9). I was certainly aware of the 
importance of gendered discourses and positioning insofar as they formed part of 
the participants’ stories, but ironically put this to the back of my mind in relation 
to what was happening in the interview conversations. 
 
9.2 The contribution of this thesis 
The re-presentation of nine local stories of resistance to religious authority is itself 
a significant contribution of this thesis. Visible acts of resistance draw attention to 
otherwise hidden or taken-for-granted strategies of power, and testify to hopes for 
alternative ways of being in community. Each person’s story recalls and enacts 
agentic re-authoring processes, further subverting the hegemony of the discursive 
regime which formerly constrained the production of his or her life. These 
subversive effects may be replicated when others experience a resonance between 
such a narrative and their own stories. Such effects are an aspect of what I hoped 
for in re-presenting the participants’ stories. 
In response to the first research question, this study makes an important 
contribution to an understanding of the subversion of freedom and justice in 
Christian communities. There are three conclusions which I regard as having 
particular significance. These conclusions draw on my earlier discussion of 
technologies of subjugation and hegemony. 
Monologic positioning is a primary indicator of problematic discourses and 
practices of religious authority. While the nature of this research does not offer a 
basis for drawing conclusions about all Christian communities, the striking 
presence of this issue in all of the participants’ narratives suggests that monologic 
power relations are at the heart of the discomfort experienced by many people in 
authoritative religious contexts. If freedom and justice are thought of in dialogic 
terms, as I argued they could be in Chapter 3 (section 3.4), then in one sense this 
finding is simply a logical statement about the nature of injustice. It makes a 
contribution, however, by offering a way for people to make meaning of the 
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discomfort they experience without resorting to ideas which pathologise either 
their leaders or themselves. For those people, and for those who are committed to 
developing genuinely inclusive and dialogic forms of community, questions like 
those outlined in my earlier discussion may be a useful starting point in evaluating 
the ideas and practices of authority in their context: Who may belong to this 
community? Whose knowledges, and what ways of knowing, are valued and 
incorporated in this community? Who may participate in the conversations and 
decisions of this community? How is wellbeing conceptualised and performed 
within this community? Further to these questions, the following may offer a 
useful subsequent line of deconstructive enquiry: What ideas in our context are 
determining the answers to these questions, and what is holding those ideas in 
place? 
The Man of God discourse inevitably subverts freedom and dialogical forms 
of justice. Several of the discursive technologies identified earlier, such as the 
construction of serviceable others, practices of entitlement, and disciplinary 
practices, are found in many forms of social organisation. What I have shown and 
theorised in this study is the considerable force they acquire when buttressed by 
notions of an all-powerful, all-seeing God, who is represented by a Man of God. 
While only three participants spoke explicitly of the Man of God, or God’s man, 
as the leader of their community, less overt expressions of the same idea of 
representational authority were present in several other interview narratives. 
Positioning a leader in this way was invariably accompanied by expectations on 
the members of the community to submit to God’s representative, a position call 
reinforced by implicit or explicit warnings of the consequences of failing to 
submit. 
The negative effects of such a discourse are evident in my analyses of the 
participants’ stories. Patriarchal discourses of entitlement, alloyed with the Man of 
God notion, construct power relations with potentially abusive effects for women 
(and some men). The vulnerability implied in the relational construction of 
identity is hugely increased when one other speaks for the ultimate Other, God, 
and for the community. When the community has a leader who alone speaks with 
God’s authority, then monologic power relations are inevitable. That leader is 
positioned to regard the questions and concerns of others as trouble, and 
alternative knowledges and ways of knowing are marginalised. My analysis has 
253 
shown the lengths to which people have had to go in order to untangle themselves 
from such regimes. 
An alternative discourse, more supportive of freedom and justice, and 
espoused by several of the participants, construes the presence of God as 
something which is distributed among the members of the community. Rather 
than setting up monologic lines of force, this distributive picture invites dialogic 
modes of relationship, and collaborative practices of knowing and making 
decisions. It is also supportive of agency, understood as having the opportunity to 
participate in the conversations that produce the meanings of one’s life. 
Sexual abuse by religious leaders belongs to a spectrum of discursively 
produced entitlement practices. As suggested above, the Man of God discourse, 
together with a discourse of submission and patriarchal discourses of entitlement 
and male sexual drive, constructs power relations which readily become 
exploitative and damaging. While the law and professional codes of ethics 
establish important behavioural boundaries, and although the psychological 
assessment and treatment of offenders may at times be appropriate, neither of 
these approaches addresses the powerful discursive forces which construct and 
maintain the problem. Unless such wider contextual, discursive issues are 
addressed, their damaging effects will continue. This complements the feminist 
analyses of ministerial and sexual power referred to in Chapter 2 (section 2.3), 
and locates that issue in the context of a wider spectrum of harmful entitlement 
practices. 
 
Finally, this study has also shed light on the second research question, concerning 
the production of resistance to subjugating practices of religious authority. The 
findings of my analyses of participants’ accounts were largely consistent with 
poststructuralist theorisations of agency which are not dependent on humanist 
notions of an autonomous self, including those which view agency as an outcome 
of discursive complexity and contradiction (Davies), the socially constructed 
nature of language (Drewery), indeterminacy in the way meaning and identity is 
storied (White), and reiteration (Butler). My analyses also suggested that 
something more than these theorisations may be needed to satisfactorily account 
for the intensity of the language of life, death, and joy which was present in 
several of the narratives. I offered Deleuze’s notions of the “body without organs” 
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and “lines of flight” as one way in which Foucauldian approaches to resistance 
might be supplemented. 
The following two conclusions I believe add fresh perspectives on the 
production of resistance in religious contexts. They are of theoretical interest, and 
also provide useful points for reflection and discussion for communities 
committed to practices of freedom and justice. 
The embodied effects of subjugation bear witness to subjects’ hopes and 
intentions and can be instrumental in producing resistance. In my reading of 
poststructuralist accounts of agency and resistance, the issue of embodied 
inscription was mentioned, but not prominent. Nor did the cerebral ways of 
knowing in which I have been schooled lead me to expect that embodied 
knowledge would feature significantly in my interviews with participants. The 
fact that it did therefore suggests that this is a point worth underlining. The 
embodied effects of being called into monologic power relations and subjugated 
subject positions testified to fact that those practices were distancing the 
participants from something which they held as important, but which they had 
perhaps not fully articulated, even to themselves: their own ethical hopes and 
intentions. Embodied experience therefore speaks not only of inscription by 
dominant discourses, but of the tenacity of ethical hopes and intentions. It has the 
potential to produce critical awareness of having been distanced from one’s 
preferred life narrative, and contributes energy for resistance. 
Reiteration therefore produces two kinds of effects. First, reiteration may 
amplify awareness of distance, increasing the likelihood of resistance. Second, the 
more often people experience subjugating practices, the more the storying of their 
lives will be characterised by indeterminacy within determinacy (recalling 
Geertz’s point that it is the copying that originates, section 3.3). This opens up 
new possibilities for agentic authority. This account of resistance sheds 
significant light on my research question, and invites individuals and communities 
to value embodied experience as an important indicator of distance (or proximity) 
between the actual practices of a community and the espoused ethical hopes and 
intentions of its constituents. 
  Repeated exposure to a range of religious texts and rituals both supports 
and subverts subjectification within the dominant discourses of a community. As 
indicated in Chapter 2 (section 2.3), feminist analyses of church practices have 
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critiqued readings of biblical texts which support gendered forms of inequality 
and oppression. Repeated exposure to such texts supports the hegemony of 
patriarchal discourse and constructs subjugated subject positions for women. On 
the other hand, the complex collage of texts which make up the Bible, along with 
Christian prayers, songs, and other texts, are characterised by discursive 
complexity. My analysis of the participants’ accounts of their resistance confirms 
that regular spiritual practices may both serve a subjectifying purpose, on behalf 
of the dominant discourses of their communities, and produce a deconstructive 
effect, in Derrida’s sense of creating space for the emergence of new or 
suppressed meanings.  
In light of this finding, a community committed to freedom and dialogic 
expressions of justice might consider two invitations in relation to its liturgical 
practices. The first is to develop a critical awareness among its members with 
regard to the social and historical construction of the texts they encounter. In 
terms of supporting the agency of its constituents, I consider that such a strategy is 
preferable to determining which texts will be available to the community and 
which will not. The second invitation, which follows from this last observation, is 
for the community to embrace a diversity of liturgical texts and practices, creating 
space for each adherent to assemble their own bricolage of meanings. 
 
These five responses to my research questions show how poststructuralist 
approaches can offer fresh understandings of, and responses to, the longstanding 
problem of oppressive practices of religious authority. 
 
9.3 Final word 
The intention of Foucault’s work was not to denounce power, but to unmask its 
operations. Even on that point, he was realistic, rather than utopian. 
Relations of power are not something bad in themselves, from which one must free 
one’s self. I don’t believe there can be a society without relations of power. . . . The 
problem is not of trying to dissolve them in the utopia of a perfectly transparent 
communication, but to give one’s self the rules of law, the techniques of 
management, and also the ethics, the ethos, the practice of self, which would allow 
these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination. (Foucault, 
Fornet-Betancourt, Becker, & Gomez-Müller, 1988, p. 18) 
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Similarly, my purpose in this project has not been to suggest that religious 
authority is, in itself, antithetical to freedom and justice, but to bring to light its 
operations and effects through a discursive analysis of local stories of resistance. 
There are situations, whether in a church or a state, in which authority must be 
exercised to protect freedom and prevent injustice. This study suggests several 
ways in which Christian communities might conduct themselves “with a 
minimum of domination,” and, to return to the beginning, calls on those 
communities to revisit beliefs and practices which fail to “foster life or advocate 
for justice” (Brock et al., 2001, p. 9).  
How might a community take up this challenge to review critically its own 
taken-for-granted beliefs and practices and their effects? This study demonstrates 
how a process of deconstructive enquiry can bring such beliefs and practices to 
light. Few Christian communities will have sufficient acquaintance with 
poststructuralist ideas to engage in discourse analysis, but this study’s findings 
and discussion provide a basis for developing a reflexive review process for use 
by communities. By this I do not mean a diagnostic checklist, based on some 
paradigmatic ideal, but a process which invites people to story the effects on them 
of community practices, enquires into how such effects have been produced, 
enquires into the hopes people hold for their life in community, and explores what 
supports and/or subverts their efforts to practice those hopes. A community 
willing to engage in such a process will create hospitable spaces for unheard 
voices and disregarded knowledges when it makes it possible, and safe, to notice 
discomfort and engage with it; it will not be afraid to invite participation in 
conversations about ways of being together that foster freedom, justice, and life. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Letter of information and invitation to join research 
My name is David Crawley and I am embarking on a PhD research project on the 
use and abuse of authority within Christian faith communities (churches or other 
forms of community). In particular, I am deeply interested in the stories of people 
who have chosen to change their relationship to the people and/or structures of 
authority in such communities. 
 
This project is being undertaken through the University of Waikato and has been 
approved by the School of Education Ethics Committee. 
 
My chief supervisor is Dr Wendy Drewery, contactable at the University of 
Waikato on (07) 856 2889 or at educ1004@waikato.ac.nz. 
 
I plan to interview a range of people who have at some point chosen to resist 
religious authority. My aim is to gain a better understanding of what precipitates 
such actions (sometimes at personal cost to themselves), what changes take place 
in their ideas and practices, and what the ongoing effects are in their lives.  Part of 
my interest is also in seeing how well certain postmodern ideas about choice and 
change fit with the stories that come to light through this research. I am expecting 
that the interviews will take one to two hours, and there will be some follow up 
time involved as I want to give each participant the opportunity to read and offer 
comments on what I have written about the interview.  The total involvement 
could therefore be about 5 or 6 hours. 
 
Criteria for potential participants: 
1. You were a participating member of a Christian faith community of some kind 
(church, house church, or other structured grouping) for a period of at least 12 
months. 
2. At some point you began to re-evaluate the ideas and practices of this faith 
community (or of certain individuals within it) with regard to religious 
authority. 
3. You consequently took some action to change your relationship to these ideas 
and practices, whether that meant you challenged them, tried to change them 
or simply left the community. 
4. At least 12 months have passed since you took that action. 
5. You are at least 18 years of age. 
 
If you fit these criteria and would be open to participating in this study, then I 
would be keen to hear from you to discuss that possibility further.  Given that I 
can only interview a limited number of people, it may be that I will need to select 
some stories to include and not others.  Please do not be offended if I find that I 
am unable to include your story. 
 
You can contact me either by email:  XXXXX@XXXXX 
or by telephone (calls are free):  0800 XXX XXX   
 
Please feel free to ask me any further questions about the research before 
indicating your willingness to consider the possibility of involvement.  If you do 
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express an openness to involvement I will contact you with a few further 
clarifying questions.  I will aim to do this within one week of first hearing from 
you. 
 
The names of participants and other people and groups involved in their stories 
will remain strictly confidential to me and no identifying details will be included 
in the published research. 
 
Thank you 
 
David Crawley 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for potential participants 
 
Dear  
 
Thank you again for expressing your openness to involvement as a participant in 
my PhD research with the University of Waikato.  
 
Before finalising the participants I would like to ask some preliminary questions.  
These need not be answered in great detail as the full interview will go over these 
areas again in more depth, but I do need some information to help me select a 
suitable range of participants.  Please write something for each question, and then 
return the form to me in the enclosed stamped addressed envelope.   
 
Please feel free to contact me with any further questions you have about the 
project (0800 XXX XXX or email XXXXX@XXXXX).  Please read the enclosed 
Consent Form. You don’t need to sign this now, but it explains in more detail the 
research process and the ways in which your identity and privacy will be 
safeguarded. It may be that revisiting your story will not be an easy experience, 
and please note provision is made for counselling and/or spiritual support should 
that become necessary. 
 
If you have decided you would rather not participate in this study after all, simply 
indicate that on the form and return it to me in the enclosed stamped addressed 
envelope and I will destroy any information I have in relation to you. 
 
I would appreciate receiving the form by                            and hope respond to 
you by                               .   
 
Thank you 
David Crawley 
 
Questions: 
1. How long were you a member of the faith community concerned before you 
acted to change your relationship to religious authority? 
2. What sort of faith community was it? 
Church House-church    Other:  ____________________________  
Religious denomination?   _____________________ 
3. How would you describe the way religious authority/leadership worked in 
this community, in terms of: 
(a) the beliefs people held about religious authority/leadership? 
(b) the ways in which authority/leadership worked in practice? 
4. Briefly describe any particular event that was instrumental in changing your 
beliefs and/or attitudes to religious authority in your community. 
272 
5. Was there anything or anyone (no need to give names) that helped you decide 
what you needed to do in relation to religious authority/leadership in your 
community?  If so, explain briefly. 
6. Describe briefly what you actually did to enact the change you felt needed to 
happen in your relationship to religious authority/leadership. 
7. How long ago did this happen? 
8. What is your present relationship, if any, to a Christian faith community? 
9. How have these experiences influenced your present beliefs and actions with 
regard to religious authority/leadership? 
10. What is your present age range?     
18–25      26–35       36–45       45–55     55–65      65–  
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Appendix 3: Criteria for selection of participants 
In the light of the aims of this research, there were several factors which guided 
the selection of participants, and numbered criteria are listed in association with 
these. These criteria were not intended to pre-judge or pre-determine the shape of 
the participants’ stories, but to ensure that their stories do have as a central 
concern the issues that I am wanted to research.  (This sheet was not supplied to 
participants, in order not to influence their answers to the questions listed in 
Appendix 2.) 
 
 Centrality of issues of religious authority to the experiences described: 
 
1. Indication of centrality of issues of religious authority in answers to 
questions 3, 4, 6 and 9 in Appendix 2. 
 
 Evidence of significant change of position for participant (discursively and 
relationally): 
 
2. Length of involvement in the faith community concerned before action 
taken. 
 
3. Indications of significant repositioning in answers to questions 3, 6, 8 and 
9 (Appendix 2). 
 
 Evidence of having moved on from any traumatic effects of the experience: 
 
4. At least 12 months have elapsed since actions taken. 
 
5. Indications of having worked through emotional and psychological effects 
of the experience in answers to questions 5–9. 
 
 Evidence of ability to think and discuss at discursive level: 
 
6. Indications of ability to identify and articulate underlying ideas in 
answers to questions 3 and 9. 
 
 Demographic variation in the range of participants: 
 
7. Where other criteria suggest equal suitability, to consider factors such as 
gender, age and type of religious community. 
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Appendix 4: Consent form 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
1. I understand that I am being asked to participate in a PhD research study 
conducted by David Crawley under the auspices of the University of Waikato. 
 
2. I understand that the purpose of this study is to increase understanding of the 
use and abuse of authority within Christian faith communities and the ways in 
which people act to change their relationship to the people and/or structures of 
authority in such communities. 
 
3. I understand that my participation in this research is entirely voluntary and that 
no financial remuneration in involved.  I understand that I am free to choose 
without explanation to discontinue my participation in this study until one 
week after the follow up interview (see 7 and 8 below). 
 
4. I understand that the interviews will be recorded on audiotape, and will 
develop from some or all of the questions listen on the attached sheet. 
 
5. I understand that excerpts from the transcripts of interviews that I have with 
the researcher will be analysed and may be quoted and referred to in the PhD 
dissertation, in future papers, journal articles and books that may be written, 
and in seminars that may be presented, by the researcher. 
 
6. I am granting authorisation for the use of such information on the 
understanding that my anonymity and privacy will be preserved at all times.  I 
understand that my real name or any other identifying information concerning 
my identity or that of the faith communities of which I have been a part will 
never be disclosed or included in any written or verbal context.  I understand 
that for the duration of the research, audiotapes, computer disks, printed 
transcripts, written notes and any other material containing this information 
will be contained in a locked cabinet in the researcher’s home, and that when 
the research has been completed the audiotapes will be erased, and the other 
material (including full transcripts) will continue to be held in locked storage. 
 
7. I understand that prior to the follow up interview the researcher will present me 
with a transcript and a preliminary analysis of the first interview, that I will 
have an opportunity to request changes/additions/deletions to the transcript, 
that I will be invited to comment on the preliminary analysis, and that these 
comments may be incorporated in the published form of the research. 
 
8. I understand that one week after the follow up interview marks the final point 
at which I may withdraw my involvement in this project. 
 
9. I understand that the researcher will provide an opportunity for me to read draft 
sections of the dissertation that pertain to my story, and that there will again be 
opportunity to make comment and/or request that certain details of my story 
not be published. In light of point 7, however, I understand that I may not at 
this stage request that my story not be used at all in this study. 
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10. I understand that the purpose of the interviews is to elicit and record the story 
of my experiences, not to engage in counselling, spiritual direction or any other 
therapeutic process.  Should I find that the interview process causes distress or 
raises questions that I want to pursue, then I understand that it is my 
responsibility to take those issues to the appropriate qualified person(s), as 
named below. 
 
(The researcher is available to recommend a suitable person if necessary.  The 
first session will be paid for by the researcher if requested.) 
 
Name(s) of suitable counsellor/spiritual  Professional association(s) of 
director to whom you would be willing which this person is a member 
to take issues raised by the interviews (e.g. NZAC, ACSD): 
should that need arise: 
 
____________________________ ______________________ 
____________________________ ______________________ 
 
 
I have read this consent form and I understand what is being requested of me as a 
participant in this study.  I freely consent to participate. 
 
 _________________________________  (Full name of participant, printed) 
 _________________________________  (Signature of participant) 
             _____________  (Date) 
 
 _________________________________  (Signature of researcher,  
  David Crawley) 
             _____________  (Date) 
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Appendix 5: Sample interview questions 
 
Prior to the interviews, participants were supplied with the following list of 
sample questions, with an explanation that they were potential supplementary 
questions, aimed at exploring in more detail the story that emerged in response to 
the first main question. 
 
1. I understand that at some point you decided to make a change in your 
relationship to religious authority.  Please tell me about your experience. 
 
2. Tell me more about the faith community where these experiences occurred. 
3. How did you come to be a part of this community? 
4. How did religious authority/leadership work in this community? 
5. In practical terms, how did the practice of religious authority/leadership in this 
community affect your life—both in terms of your involvement in the 
community and your wider life? 
6. How were people in the community encouraged to relate to structures of 
authority/leadership? 
7. What do you remember about your own view of these beliefs and practices, in 
the earlier stages of your involvement? 
8. At this earlier stage, did you have some ideas of your own about the way 
spiritual authority/leadership should function in a Christian context? 
9. Do you remember how you come to these ideas?  What helped to keep them in 
place? 
10. At this stage, what place did you see for your own choices as to how you 
might pursue your life as a Christian? 
11. How had you come to those ideas about the place of individual choice? 
12. How was it that changes began to occur in your view of the beliefs and 
practices around religious authority in your community?  For example, 
• Were there any particular experiences or defining moments that 
contributed to these changes? 
• Were you influenced by other peoples’ experiences or actions? 
• Did you somehow become aware of alternative ideas about 
religious authority? 
13. Tell me more about the process of change from holding your earlier beliefs to 
coming to new ideas. 
14. When you began to experience a desire for change, what was that like? 
15. When did you begin to think that you may need to take action, to change your 
relationship to the ideas and practices of religious authority in your 
community?  What was it like for you to think about this? 
16. What and/or who (no need to give names) supported your movement toward 
making changes? 
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17. What was the first thing you did, in practice, that represented a challenge to 
the beliefs and practices of religious authority in the community? 
18. Tell me about other things that happened after that, that were also 
contradictory to the way in which religious authority functioned in the 
community? 
19. What do you think was your most significant act of resistance? 
20. What was supporting you in these acts of resistance? 
21. Tell me about any changes that were taking in place in your ideas about the 
place of personal choice in the Christian faith journey. 
22. What did you think about the way you were changing? 
23. How did people in your community respond? 
24. How did the person(s) in positions of authority respond? 
25. What do you think of your actions as you look back on them now?  What did 
you achieve?   
26. Tell me about the time after your actions. What happened? Did your ideas 
about religious authority continue to change? 
27. What is your present relationship, if any, to a Christian faith community? 
28. How is this community similar or different to the one where these events took 
place? 
29. Thinking back to the ideas you originally had about religious authority, what 
do you think of those ideas now? 
30. And thinking back to the changing ideas that eventually led to your acts of 
resistance, what do you think of those ideas now? 
31. Tell me about any further changes in your ideas about religious authority 
and/or about the place of individual choice in the Christian faith journey. 
32. What has helped to shape your current ideas about these things? 
33. Have your experiences led you to any further actions in terms of challenging 
the kind of beliefs and practices around religious authority/leadership that you 
experienced? 
34. Have you had involvement with other people who have had similar 
experiences?  If so, what kind of involvement? 
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Appendix 6: Follow up letter and response form for participants 
 
Dear   
Thank you for agreeing to help me with this last step in relation to my PhD 
project. I do very much appreciate the time and thought you are giving to this. 
The questions are attached. You can write as much or as little as you like. I don’t 
want this to be onerous. 
There are three ways you can choose to give me the feedback I’m asking for: 
1. Save this document on your computer and type your responses directly into 
the boxes—save the document again and then email it back to me as an 
attachment.   
or 
2. Type up your answers in a separate document and email it to me as an 
attachment. 
or 
3. Type or write your answers and then post them to me at this address: 
David Crawley, XXXXX. 
In my thesis, I have changed your name to                    . 
It is important for me to explain that in writing about your experiences, I have not 
attempted to tell the whole story. I have had to be selective, with nine stories to 
analyse in total. The parts I have selected relate to the two specific theoretical 
questions that I am addressing in my thesis. These questions concern: 
 (i)  ways of thinking (referred to as “discourses” in my thesis) that subvert the 
Judaeo-Christian traditions of freedom and justice in some Christian 
communities; and 
(ii)  what enables people to resist oppressive forms of religious authority in their 
communities. 
In addition to what I am sending you, there is further discussion of common 
themes later in the thesis, with reference back to the participants’ stories. When 
that chapter is finalised, you are welcome to read it for your own interest. Of 
course, there are many interesting aspects of the issue of religious authority, some 
of which may have been important to you, which fell outside of my topic and 
couldn’t be included.  
Finally, I’m also aware that I use a lot of postmodern philosophical language 
(jargon!) used in my thesis. One day I hope to write something more reader-
friendly for a wider audience. 
 
Thanks again 
David Crawley 
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Response form for David Crawley in relation to University of Waikato PhD 
 
1. I have attached a copy of the transcript of our interview conversation with this 
email. This transcript will not appear in full in my thesis, but you may like to 
read it through anyway, to remind yourself of the story you shared with me. If 
you see any errors of transcription or fact that you would like to bring to my 
attention, please list them here. Just give the number of the section concerned, 
and an instruction as to the correction. 
 
 
2. When you read the draft of what I have written about your story in my thesis 
(also attached), are you happy that I have sufficiently disguised your identity 
and the identities (and locations, etc) of others involved? 
(Type YES or NO):  
 
If NO, please indicate which details you would like to me to omit or disguise 
more carefully. Again, give the page number and specific details. 
 
3. Is there anything I have written that misunderstands something you said, or 
which is factually wrong?  (This is a little tricky—you may not agree with my 
interpretation or point of view on something, or fully understand it, but I’m 
not asking about that here. It’s more whether I have completely got the wrong 
end of the stick and misconstrued something you said). 
 
4. What was it like for you to read what I have written about your story? How 
did you find yourself responding? 
 
5. Is there any brief postscript to your story that you would like to tell me about? 
(It may or may not be included in what I write, but I’m interested anyway!) 
 
6. If I write something for a more public readership in the future, would you like 
me to check with you again before including aspects of your story? 
 
YES = Please check in with me again first 
NO = I’m happy for you to go ahead without needing to check again 
(Type YES or NO):    
 
7. Anything else you want to say? 
 
